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PREDICTING FORCED FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE MALAYSIAN CAPITAL MARKET 
 
ABSTRACT 
Historical precedent shows that forced financial restatements can have serious implications 
for the firm affected, investor confidence in financial markets and a country’s economic 
development more generally. The purpose of this study is to explore factors which affect 
the likelihood of forced financial restatements. This issue is particularly pertinent in the 
Malaysian context, as, despite repeated efforts by the government to improve the 
corporate governance of listed companies, weak regulatory enforcement and the influence 
of family groups and politicians give rise to continued concerns about financial reporting 
quality. 
This study uses the multivariate logit model to analyse firm characteristics which relate to 
forced financial restatement. The analysis was performed on the Malaysian listed 
companies from 2002 to 2012. Findings indicate that the likelihood of forced restatements 
was related to aggressive accounting practices. In addition, the presence of politically-
connected shareholders or top executives, the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, firms’ decreasing level internal fund and share price volatility were also related to an 
increased likelihood of forced restatement. More detail tests on the attributes of the 
different types of restatement show that the likelihood of income-increasing and zero-
effect forced restatement event were affected by opportunistic earnings management 
practices. This contradicts with the results shown for forced income decreasing 
restatement as they do not imply aggressive accounting, but are more likely to result from 
mistakes or technical accounting matters, such as change in accounting policy. 
This study contributes to our understanding by examining a much wider range of financial 
and non-financial factors as possible determinants of forced restatements. Moreover, 
compared to prior research, this study explores forced income-decreasing, income-
increasing, as well as zero-effect restatements to distinguish between earnings 
restatements that arise from related to opportunistic behaviour and those linked to 
accounting errors. Methodologically, this study further contributes by applying the 
penalised likelihood logit and structural equation modelling approach which are scarcely 
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examined in accounting research, to determine factors affecting the likelihood of forced 
restatements.   
It was not possible to develop a valid predictive model for forced financial restatements 
which is recognised as a limitation to the study. However, the findings in this study do 
provide some insights into factors which relate to the likelihood of forced restatements, 
which should be useful for investors, analysts, auditors, and regulators. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research background 
Forced restatement is an event where a company is forced by the auditors, Securities 
Commission or other enforcement agency to restate its earnings due to General Accepted 
Accounting Practices (GAAP) violations, where the reported original financial statements at 
the time of issuance were incorrect (Hennes, Leone and Miller, 2008). A GAAP violation, or 
earnings misstatement, may be due to unintentional errors or intentional irregularities and 
can be misleading to the users of financial statements. Forced financial restatement reflects 
a company’s acknowledgment that the original financial statement reported and filed by 
the company was not in compliance with GAAP (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), thereby raising 
a more general concern on the transparency and quality of a company’s financial reporting 
(Akhigbe, Kudla and Madura, 2005). Therefore, not only is forced restatement indicative of 
unintentional misstatements, it is also indicative of deliberate financial manipulation, or 
even a fraudulent act (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004), an outcome of management 
opportunism built on the purpose of extracting private benefits of control at the expense of 
uninformed shareholders (Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Forced earnings restatement is a rare event in a company’s life and can have catastrophic 
consequences (Agrawal and Cooper, 2015). It is often accompanied by large share price 
declines, bankruptcy filings, legal litigations, and even delisting from the stock exchange 
(see e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz, 2004; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Files, 2012; 
Agrawal and Cooper, 2013; Files, Sharp and Thompson, 2014). The rare forced restatement 
event does not only lead to substantial losses for the shareholders of the firms directly 
affected, but also for the stock market as a whole. It therefore rightly draws attention from 
regulators, academics and the media (Wang and Mu, 2011). E.g., based on the US General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report that examined a comprehensive list of restatement firms in 
the GAO restatement database, the whole US stock market was estimated to have lost 
around US$100 billion in market capitalisation from January 1997 to June 2002 (GAO, 
2002), and US$36 billion between July 2002 and September 2005 (GAO, 2006) due to 
earnings restatements in general.  
2 
 
Forced restatement creates great concern, not only in developed countries, but also in 
developing countries, as it erodes investors’ confidence in the reliability of financial 
reporting, thus threatening local and foreign investments in these markets (Ye and Yu, 
2017). Developing countries generally have high concentrated ownership, poor protection 
for minority shareholders and weak legal enforcement (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and 
Jiang, 2008). In addition to firms that are controlled by families, other firms in the emerging 
economies are mainly owned and/or controlled by the government (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Where equity ownership is highly concentrated and there is divergence between control 
rights and cash flow rights, owning a small proportion of the firm’s equity can be enough 
for the controlling shareholder to gain control over the firm (Brown, Beekes and 
Verhoeven, 2011). The separation of ownership and control in firms with inside/family 
blockholders, for example, motivates the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits 
at the expense of the minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002). Notwithstanding, firms 
that are controlled by government-related institutional investors tend to hold a dominating 
interest, leaving such firms susceptible to the risk of managerial exploitation. The 
government-owned/controlled firms are typically controlled by bureaucrats who have full 
control rights, but they do not personally own formal ownership rights. The citizens of a 
country may theoretically “own” the government owned/controlled firms, but practically, 
ownership rights lay in the hands of powerful ministries who act as the de facto “controlling 
shareholders” (Young and Ahlstrom, 2003). Overall, the above problems result in the 
incentives among the controlling owners/shareholders to mask the wealth effect of the 
rent-seeking activities by engaging in earnings manipulation and misstatement (Young et 
al., 2008). Studies such as Li, Selover, and Stein (2011) and Li et al. (2014) further found that 
firms in the emerging markets engaged in managing earnings to a greater extent than those 
in the developed markets.  
This study is therefore motivated to examine financial and non-financial factors that can 
indicate the likelihood of forced restatements. It does this to identify early warning signals 
of firms that warrant investigation, specifically in the emerging country of Malaysia. 
Findings from this study would be beneficial to the auditors and regulators to intervene 
earlier in terms of formulating planning and strategies to minimise aggressive managerial 
behaviour, and investors, customers, and suppliers to identify and avoid firms at risk of 
requiring a forced restatement.  
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1.2 Research problem and motivation 
Incidences of forced restatement were noted to have increased dramatically in the last 
decade and have continued to gain prominence (Su, Chin and Chan, 2013; Hirschey, Smith 
and Wilson, 2015). Following the high-profile forced restatement cases such as Xerox and 
WorldCom that had their earnings reduced by billions of dollars (Graham, Li and Qiu, 2008), 
recent cases such as Green Mountain Coffee, JP Morgan, and Tesco have focused public 
attention on the importance of forced restatement. Forced financial restatement that 
resulted from earnings misstatement is important to look at as it is indicative of a clear-cut 
accounting rules violation (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). It is a symptom of firm’s poor 
quality financial reporting that might affect investors’ perceptions of the reliability of a 
firm’s corporate reporting, and its legitimacy and trustworthiness as an actor on capital and 
goods markets.  
The importance of looking at forced restatements can also be seen from the economic and 
financial aspects. Specifically, the damage that forced restatements can cause is not limited 
to the mere immediate announcement effect on the value of the affected firm’s share 
price, as the practices that lead to forced restatement are often indicative of major 
problems with the business model of, or corruption within, firms. This might have wider, 
longer-term implications that can lead to bankruptcy, with the potential of transmitting 
problems to, e.g., customers or suppliers (Flanigan, 2001). Not only is forced restatement a 
serious concern in developed countries, it is also a concern in emerging countries.  
Several cases that happened in developing countries demonstrated the destructive impact 
of forced restatement. For example, the China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corporation (CAO) 
revealed that due to financial misstatements related to option valuations, it was unable to 
meet some margin calls as it had fraudulently overvalued options for kerosene by $550 
million. CAO’s forced restatement in November 2004 has not only led to the bankruptcy of 
the firm but investors are also selling-off their shares in Chinese-owned companies in the 
Singapore stock market: this led to approximately $1 billion being wiped off from those 
firms’ market capitalisation (China Daily, 2004). In China, the most prominent case of 
financial restatement that impacted not only on the firm and its immediate partners but on 
the stock market as a whole, is the case of Yin Guang Xia, which has also been dubbed the 
“Enron of China”. Between 1998 and 2001, the company reported fabricated profits 
amounting to 770 million yuan. Subsequent to a forced restatement announcement in 
August 2001, the company’s share price dropped by 80% in a month, and each shareholder 
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was estimated to incur an average loss of 500,000 yuan (Wei, 2016). Another example is in 
Malaysia where the air cargo service provider Transmile was involved in fraudulent 
reporting and overstated its revenue by a total of RM530 million in 2005 and 2006. The 
company’s shares fell from RM13 in early May 2007 to only RM8.90 at the end of May 
2007, when a forced restatement announcement was made and caused more than RM1 
billion in market capitalisation to be wiped off (The Star, 2007). The company’s share price 
continued to fall to less than RM0.50 by March 2010 (Oh, 2010). Despite government 
intervention, Transmile had to be delisted from the Bursa Malaysia stock exchange in May 
2011. Silver Bird Group, a bread and confectionery maker, is another company in Malaysia 
involved in financial irregularities. The company’s share price once increased to RM1.10 in 
late 2007 but plunged to RM0.18 on 5 March 2012, when a forced restatement 
announcement was made (The Star, 2012); the share price continued to fall to only RM0.07 
in 2014. Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), being the largest shareholder, once held a 29.6% stake 
at its peak in July 2008. However, LTH suffered a massive loss of RM48.87 million from its 
investment (The Malaysian Reserve, 2017) due to Silver Bird’s forced restatement. 
Forced financial restatement is, however, a rare event among publicly listed firms (Dutta, 
Dutta and Raahemi, 2017). In the US alone, the number of restatement firms almost 
reached 300 in the year 2005, which approximates to only 2 percent of the publicly listed 
firms in the US (Wang and Wu, 2011). Prior studies in the developing countries also show a 
very small sample size of earnings restatements relative to the publicly listed firms, which 
manifests the inherent comparatively rare nature of forced restatement; i.e., 1 percent in 
Malaysia between 2002-2005 (Abdullah, Yusof and Nor, 2010), 4 percent in China between 
2000-2005 (Firth, Rui and Wu, 2011), and 1 percent in Taiwan between 1998-2006 (Zhang, 
Wei and Wu, 2013).  
Financial restatements can be required for several reasons. On the one hand, forced 
financial restatement arises due to accounting errors, misunderstanding and misapplication 
of accounting rules, deliberate manipulation, or even fraud (e.g. Ettredge, Scholz, Smith, 
and Sun, 2010; Chen, Elder and Hung, 2014). It is a significant challenge to constrain 
financial reporting irregularities, especially for the auditors, because managers tend to hide 
malfeasances or fraudulent acts due to severe penalties for GAAP violations or other career 
consequences (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Schrand and Zechman, 2012). Specific 
circumstances that can trigger forced restatements include those done by the firms 
themselves (e.g., through a company’s voluntary announcement of misconduct), the firm’s 
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auditors (e.g., through audit findings on peculiar patterns of reported revenue), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (through a routine SEC review or delayed filing 
of the financial statements to the SEC), or other enforcement agencies (Dechow et al., 
2010). A firm is forced to make an earnings restatement by the SEC when investigations 
show that the firm is involved in producing false or fraudulent financial information (Files, 
2012). On the other hand is an accounting restatement that normally takes place resulting 
from operational actions such as changes in accounting policies or principles, change of 
accounting period, mergers and acquisitions, dividend distributions and stock splits 
(Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). However, this accounting 
restatement may not indicate financial reporting irregularities. 
Based on the above discussion of forced restatement, it is the objective of this work to try 
to understand the factors that lead to forced restatements, and then to see whether a 
forced restatement prediction can be built. Prior literature suggests that while income-
decreasing forced restatements are likely due to aggressive income-inflating recognition, 
income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatements are most likely due to accounting 
error (Ettredge, Huang, and Zhang, 2012) or attempts to avoid taxes (Lim, 2011). This study 
will further compare the attributes of income-decreasing forced restatement firms to that 
of the income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatement to gain insight on whether the 
impact of different factors on the likelihood of forced income restatements varies by type 
of forced restatements. 
This research is on a single country context. Conducting research in a single country is in 
line with the fact that a:  
“more focused approach would free authors from needing variables available 
across a wide range of countries, allowing variables to be designed that more 
cleanly capture the construct being measured” (Miller, 2004, p. 266).  
Developing countries may share similar features, but it is not possible to analyse pooled 
data across the different developing countries as each country has their own unique socio-
politic-economic system. Thus, data pooling would produce meaningless results (Gul, 2006). 
Emerging countries differ in many aspects; these include, e.g., culture, interpretation and 
enforcement of regulations, and type and degrees of government intervention. These 
attributes are difficult to capture and measure as they can be very subtle and informal 
rather than formal (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Miller, 2004; Fan, Wei and Zhu, 2011). This 
leads to limitations of research that uses samples comprising firms in multiple countries. 
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Hence, developing a single model of forced restatement for all South East Asian developing 
countries is unlikely. 
This study looks into Malaysia as a single country. Malaysia is important to look at as it is a 
good representative of the emerging markets. Malaysia is characterised by a highly 
concentrated ownership, a developing and fast-growing economy, a significant number of 
politically-connected firms, weak legal enforcement, and poor investor protection (Hasnan 
et al., 2013). Another distinctive attribute that makes Malaysia relevant for this study is 
because of its economic policy, which is aimed at improving economic participation among 
the Bumiputera indigenous population, therefore minimising economic imbalance between 
the different ethnic groups in Malaysia (Gul, 2006). Malaysia is well known for its 
relationship-based economy due to the strong relationship between firms and the 
government; this eventually resulted in the significant presence of firms with political 
connections. The unusual setting in Malaysia, featured by the combination of businesses 
dominated by family ownership, usually dominated by owners of Chinese heritage, and 
politics dominated by the indigenous Malays, further offered a unique research setting that 
varies from other Asian developing countries. This shows the substantial implications that 
the Malaysian structural and institutional setting might have for corporate governance and 
forced restatement.  
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
The main aim of this study is to examine whether firms’ financial or non-financial corporate 
governance characteristics affect the likelihood of forced restatements in Malaysia. In order 
to examine the factors that influence the likelihood of forced restatements, I will employ 
hypotheses testing. There is limited research that jointly incorporates financial and non-
financial factors to examine forced restatements. In general, research has so far failed to 
consider how the combination of various financial and non-financial factors can be used to 
determine the likelihood a forced restatement. Studies such as Öğüt, Aktaş, Alp, et al. 
(2009), Dechow, Ge, Larson, et al. (2011) and Kim, Baik and Cho (2016), that researched the 
development of a model to predict financial information misstatements, mainly consider 
the financial variables and ratios as the explanatory variables, while neglecting the potential 
impact of key corporate governance factors. This study differs from prior research by 
examining the influence of a more comprehensive set of covariates on the likelihood of 
forced restatement.  
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The hypotheses developed for examining the determinants of the likelihood of forced 
restatements in this study are based on the agency theory. The agency theory is employed 
for this study as it emphasises potential conflicts of interest between managers (agents), 
that run the company, and shareholders (principals). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) 
defined an agency relationship as:  
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”.  
Agency theory is based on two behavioural assumptions; these are (i) bounded rationality, 
and (ii) the potential for opportunistic behaviour. The former assumption means that 
individuals make rational economic decisions (e.g., to maximise their own utility) but are 
bounded to the extent that the decisions are made within a milieu of limited capacity to 
access and evaluate accurately all relevant information. They are based on different 
interpretations of the same information based on prior experiences, training, etc. The latter 
assumption implies that principals and agents might engage in opportunistic behaviour by 
seeking self-interest through guile (Williamson 1996) if they believe this is unlikely to be 
detected and sanctioned. 
Berle and Means (1932) contend that the separation between firm ownership and control 
reduces managers’ incentives to maximise corporate efficiency and shareholders’ return. It 
would be at least difficult, if not impossible, for shareholders to observe whether managers 
are working towards fulfilling the shareholders’ interest, or for them to monitor the 
riskiness of investment choices being made. Therefore, the resolution of the principal-
agency conflict becomes a central issue. Based on agency theory, large owners are useful as 
they have greater means and incentive to monitor managers and control agency problems 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This would mean that increased ownership concentration via 
large individual blockholders, for example, can help monitor managers effectively due to 
their high equity stakes (Dharwadkar et al., 2008). Accordingly, a high ownership 
concentration of owner-managers can help the alignment of controlling and minority 
shareholders’ interests, because the wealth of the controlling shareholders is tied up to the 
firm; therefore, they have more to lose if their decisions do not maximise firm value (Fan 
and Wong, 2002).  
While the concentrated ownership structure can be effective in mitigating the principal-
agent conflict, it may, however, lead to the principal-principal conflict. The principal-
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principal conflict refers to the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, where the controlling shareholders abuse their ownership control and 
expropriate the assets of minority shareholders. The high concentrated ownership may lead 
to a situation where the minority shareholders are excluded from top managerial decision-
making and their interests neglected (Young and Ahlstrom, 2003). The economic 
relationships might also suffer where principals with different preferences, access to 
information, and power, might use their influence to exploit each other. This problem is 
seen to be particularly prevalent with regard to the relationship between blockholders and 
minority shareholders.  
The principal-principal conflict of the agency theory seems to be more prominent in 
developing countries (Young et al., 2008), especially in Malaysia. There are two main modes 
of ownership concentration in Malaysia, i.e., domination by the CEO’s family, and 
domination by Government-related institutional investors (Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens 
et al. 2002; Sinnadurai, 2012). World Bank (2005) further documents that owner-managers 
are present in 85% of listed firms in Malaysia, more than 60% of equity is held by large 
shareholders, and the Chairman of the board belongs to the controlling family or a 
nominee. The alignment effect suggests that this concentrated ownership may align 
management and ownership and lead to goal congruence between the managers and 
shareholders. Instead of focusing on achieving short-term goals of maximising management 
self-interest, the managers would rather run the business with the aim of maximising 
shareholders wealth in the long-term (Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012). The alignment effect 
helps reduce the expropriation risk borne by the minority shareholders, and therefore 
assists in the reduction of principal-agent problems. However, the competing view of the 
entrenchment effect suggests that the lack of separation between dominant large 
shareholders/family owners and managers increases the expropriation risk from the 
minority shareholders (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The entrenchment effect holds that the 
existence of information asymmetry and control-ownership divergence among controlling 
shareholders provides them with the incentive to extract private benefits at the expense of 
the minority shareholders. 
Having stronger power and discretion, entrenched managers are more inclined to pursue 
actions to their own advantage. This includes a tendency for wealth distribution to be made 
towards the controlling owners in preference over other aspects of firm performance, e.g., 
maximising dividend payments to outside investors (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002). The 
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rent-seeking activities also involve controlling managers distorting firms’ financial 
information to cover up their expropriation behaviour (Sue, Chin and Chan, 2013). While 
users of financial statements place heavy reliance on accounting numbers, the managers 
could convince outside parties that the firm is performing better than non-manipulative 
reporting would suggest. With the absence of an effective corporate governance system 
and poor investor protection (both of which problems are common in developing 
countries), the principal-principal conflict can become severe (Morck, Wolfenzon and 
Yeung, 2005). Eventually, a firm’s inability to really perform as expected, or when the 
opportunities to misstate earnings are exhausted, would prompt a regulator’s investigation, 
which then increases the likelihood of firms issuing forced restatement (Ettredge et al., 
2010). 
In addition to examining the determinants of forced restatements, this study aims to 
analyse the different attributes of income-decreasing, income-increasing, and zero-effect 
forced restatement firms. Ettredge et al. (2010) suggest that income-decreasing forced 
restatements are corrections of intentional misstatements, while income-increasing forced 
restatements are most likely corrections of unintentional errors, although attempts at tax 
evasion might also be an incentive (Lim, 2011). Studies examining issues relating to 
managerial misconduct are susceptible to making inaccurate hypotheses inferences if 
intentional misstatements and unintentional errors are not appropriately distinguished 
(Hennes et al., 2008). This is becoming more crucial given the fact that the relative 
frequency of error-related misstatements has increased as post-Enron accounting 
regulations have become stricter (Kim et al., 2016). Apart from studies such as Kim et al. 
(2016), previous research failed to differentiate forced restatements that arise due to 
earnings misstatement from those that arise due to accounting errors or tax evasion (e.g., 
Lobo and Zhao, 2013; Sue et al., 2013). Kim et al. (2016) examined the causes of intentional 
and unintentional misstatements by analysing both upward and downward forced 
restatement. However, the factors examined were again restrained to only financial 
variables and a limited number of CEO attributes.  
This study fills the gap in the literature by examining the different attributes of income-
decreasing, income-increasing, and zero-effect forced restatement firms, using a 
comprehensive set of covariates. In addition to identifying firms’ attributes that drive 
earnings misstatements, this study helps to identify firms’ attributes that relate to more 
common but less aggressive misstatements more effectively; it does this by fully utilising 
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information, not only by testing samples related to fraudulent misstatements but also the 
more frequent unintentional errors. 
In achieving the above research aims, this study will examine the financial and non-financial 
characteristics of restatement firms during the pre-forced restatement period (t-1 to t-n) 
between 2002 and 2012. While the specific time gap prior to the announcement of a forced 
restatement in Malaysia is unknown, the study however applies a three-year lagged 
misstatement period prior to forced restatement for analysis purposes. This is done 
consistent with the analysis by Wiedman and Hendricks (2013) on a random sample of 
restatement firms in the 2002 GAO report, where it was found that firms’ misstatement 
period appears to concentrate in years 0 to -2. In addition to the Malaysian enforcement 
law that is rather weak and comparatively lagged behind compared to the developed 
countries such as the US, forced restatement may therefore not be prompt (Hasnan et al. 
2013). Hence, this study considers a three-year lagged misstatement period as being 
reasonable. The generic timeline of the study is outlined in Figure 1-1 as shown below. 
 
        Pre - restatement period    
 
             
  Restatement announcement 
 
 
                   t-n                              t-2               t-1                t  
 
Figure 1-1:  Generic Timeline of the Study 
The focus of this study will be on firms with income-decreasing forced restatements. The 
research draws on financial data downloaded from the Datastream database, corporate 
governance data that are hand collected from the companies’ annual reports, and 
accounting measures for earnings management calculated based on the Modified Jones 
Model (1995).  
In line with the main aim of the study, the multivariate logit regression is estimated to test 
the hypotheses regarding the determinants of forced restatements. Specifically, the logit 
model will examine the pooled sample to test the effect of the accruals quality, real 
earnings management, market-related incentives, financial performance, and corporate 
governance on the likelihood of forced restatement. Following this, the multivariate logit 
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regression was again applied to examine the determinants of income-decreasing forced 
restatement, income-increasing forced restatement, and zero-effect forced restatement.  
Finally, the secondary aim of this study is to develop an exploratory model to predict 
income decreasing forced restatements. A series of rolling out-of-sample estimations will 
be conducted, of which the estimated set of coefficients are then used to estimate the 
probability of forced restatements. Predicting the rare event of forced restatement with 
high accuracy is almost impossible due to the great uncertainty of events related to 
business activities (Makridakis, Hogarth and Gaba, 2009). Goodwin and Wright (2010) 
further demonstrated that the extant forecasting methods, which include statistical 
forecasting, the Delphi technique, prediction markets and expert judgement, contain 
fundamental weaknesses and are therefore problematic in producing an accurate 
forecasting. In view of the low degree of rare event predictability, the prediction testing in 
this study would be on an exploratory basis. Although prediction is not always feasible, it 
could be reasonable to test the predictability of forced restatement in line with prior rare 
event studies. Findings from this study prediction might offer valuable input for planning 
and strategy formulation, especially for auditors, investors, and regulators in facing the risk 
of firms’ financial irregularities. 
In relation to the main aim of this research, the following two objectives are shown: 
(1) to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial determinants and corporate 
governance determinants of forced financial restatements among public listed 
firms in Malaysia;  
(2) to identify in particular whether the relationship between key accounting, financial 
and corporate governance variables, and the likelihood of forced financial 
restatements differs, depending on whether they are income-decreasing, income-
increasing or zero-effect forced financial restatements; 
Based on the above hypotheses testing, two further secondary research objectives are 
developed in relation to the secondary research aim: 
(3) to develop an exploratory prediction model based on the key accounting financial 
determinants and corporate governance determinants that drive income-
decreasing forced financial restatement among the public listed firms in Malaysia; 
(4) to test whether the exploratory prediction model can signal potential for income-
decreasing forced financial restatement among public listed firms in Malaysia. 
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1.4 Research expected contributions 
The research that examines forced restatement differs from earnings management studies 
by its ability to identify firms that engage in intentional misstatements and unintentional 
errors (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010). While earnings management is “the practice of 
distorting the true financial performance of the company” (Klein, 2002, p. 376), forced 
restatement firms are distinguished as those that have admitted or been identified as 
making a mistake or deliberate attempt to mislead in financial reporting (Dechow et al., 
2011). In contrast to earnings management studies, the advantage of examining forced 
restatement is the ability to identify firms that violate GAAP due to unintentional error, 
deliberate manipulation or fraud, without the need to specify a model for detecting 
misstating firms. 
Research that examines the characteristics and determinants of forced restatement 
typically analysed solely on financial factors (e.g. Dechow et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2011) or corporate governance factors alone (Abdullah, Yusof and Nor 2010; 
Mohamad, Rashid and Shawtari 2012; Bao and Lewellyn 2017). While Kim et al. (2016) 
examined both financial and non-financial factors to detect misstatements, nevertheless, 
the scope of corporate governance being examined was restricted to only a limited number 
of CEO attributes. This study contributes by incorporating both types of factors jointly, thus 
providing a clear understanding of the financial indicators and firm-specific attributes of 
forced restatement. Findings from the study would allow the financial statement users to 
be better equipped in terms of identifying the symptoms and incentives of opportunistic 
accounting practices, therefore placing them in a better position to restrain future financial 
irregularities.  
To the best of my knowledge, no research has examined the effectiveness of a forced 
restatement model based on financial statement information and corporate governance in 
the milieu of an emerging economy. Although this study is mainly a replication of prior 
literature using Malaysian data, however it offers the first work to examine the effect of a 
comprehensive set of financial and non-financial factors on the likelihood of forced 
restatement specifically in Malaysia. Unlike other models, the forced restatement model 
can be used to compare the attributes of an income-decreasing forced restatement firm 
against those with income-increasing forced restatements and zero-effect restatements. 
Examining the different types of forced restatements provides some insights into 
understanding the ex-ante factors that cause firms to eventually report non-GAAP financial 
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results and those that lead to accounting errors, in addition to the mere classification of 
accounting items due to changes in accounting policy. Findings of the study provide 
distinctive perspectives, which, in many respects, are different from developed countries 
and may enhance the concept of forced financial restatement.  
Given the high power distance culture, especially in developing countries, it would be highly 
unlikely for enforcement agencies to rely on employees whistle-blowing for reports of 
financial irregularities (Hasnan et al., 2013). A mechanism that can be used to predict the 
likelihood of forced restatement can be very beneficial to capital market efficiency. It helps 
detection of financial manipulation at an early stage before the financial reports are 
published. As this study examines how certain firm-specific attributes can be useful in 
recognising firms that have the potential to manipulate their financial report in the future, 
it can also fulfil the strong needs among auditing practitioners to adjust their audit work 
accordingly and reduce possible legal risks. Furthermore, the empirical evidence on the 
drivers of forced restatements can be used by the regulators and policymakers (e.g. Bursa 
Malaysia and Securities Commission) to focus on investigation efforts and develop 
initiatives that can curb cases of misstatements, hence forced restatements (Plumlee and 
Yohn, 2010). Financial institutions and investors can also benefit by adjusting their exposure 
level to firms suspected of financial irregularities.  
1.5 Key literature and theoretical base 
Forced restatement is generally viewed as the corrections made to published financial 
statements as prompted by the auditors or regulators due to non-compliance with GAAP 
(Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). Forced restatements, especially those that are due to 
aggressive financial irregularities, lead to the impairment of investors’ confidence on the 
quality of financial reporting, increase investors’ concerns on managerial opportunistic 
decision-making, and cause substantial losses to shareholders. This has prompted efforts 
among academicians and practitioners to examine the underlying causes of forced 
restatement in the attempt to detect accounting irregularities (Price, Sharp and Wood, 
2011).  
There are numerous explanations as to why managers misstate earnings; these include 
inflating a firm’s share prices, avoiding violation of debt covenants, reducing tax liabilities, 
and hiding tunnelling activities. Identifying the underlying motive of the behaviour that 
leads to the need to restate earnings is difficult, as managers are unlikely to admit them; 
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they are more likely to blame errors in following GAAP regulations than any more 
pernicious motivations. While the reasons for forced restatements may vary, prior 
research, such as Palmrose et al. (2004) and Hennes et al. (2008) tried to distinguish 
financial restatements that are due to unintentional error and those that are intentional 
misstatements. Palmrose et al. (2004) classify the restatements due to errors and 
irregularities by keyword search in the restatement database and based on firm’s disclosure 
or SEC issuance of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER). Hennes et al. 
(2008) classify restatements as irregularities when followed by fraud-related class action 
lawsuits and as an error when the restatement is followed by only one lawsuit. The more 
aggressive financial irregularities are attributed to purposeful accounting misstatements, 
intended to influence shareholders into believing that the firm is performing better than 
the actual reporting would suggest (Ettredge et al., 2010). Unintentional errors, such as 
accounting and clerical mistakes and misunderstanding of complex accounting rules, lead to 
a non-aggressive type of misreporting (Plumlee and Yohn, 2009). Differentiating financial 
restatements into its distinct types would help to increase the power of testing as the 
research model may effectively detect the more aggressive misstatements and discriminate 
them from the more frequent accounting errors (Kim et al., 2016). 
Managers tend to utilise the flexibility available within the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) for them to manage accruals and report high earnings to influence 
shareholders’ perceptions of the firm’s underlying performance (Ettredge et al., 2010). 
They may resort to violating GAAP when the underlying firm’s performance does not 
improve and the opportunities for earnings manipulation within GAAP are exhausted 
(Dechow et al., 2011). Financial indicators (e.g., financial ratios) are highly correlated with 
the incidence of earning misstatements (Fu and Zhu, 2014). Prior research focuses mainly 
on examining firms’ financial variables, such as accruals quality and other financial 
characteristics, that act as incentives for, or are symptoms of, financial misstatements. For 
example, Dechow et al. (2011) analysed the impact of financial performance, accruals 
quality, market-based measures and off-balance sheet activities for identifying 
misstatements. They provide insights into the particular financial statement variables and 
financial indicators that may be useful in detecting misstatements. 
While financial factors are useful in the detection of earnings misstatements, corporate 
governance plays a significant role in deterring financial irregularities. It is seen as a tool 
that ensures an effective check and balance system, such that management acts in line with 
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fulfilling shareholders’ interests (Abdullah et al., 2010). Corporate governance acts as a 
mechanism to monitor, discipline and scrutinise management. However, within an 
environment with weak investor protection and poor legal enforcement, which is more 
pronounced in developing countries, corporate governance is likely to be ineffective 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Firms with dispersed ownership are susceptible to a situation where the shareholders and 
managers have conflicting goals, i.e. the principal-agent conflict. The conflict arises from 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour, whereby the self-interested managers 
(agents) make decisions for their own benefit at the expense of the shareholders 
(principals) (Arnold & de Lange, 2004). However, since high ownership concentration 
mainly characterised firms in the emerging market, it also gives rise to conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, known as the principal-principal 
agency conflict. It is difficult to mitigate such conflict by using the conventional function of 
the board of directors (Fan and Wong, 2003). The tightness of firm ownership allows 
managers’ self-interested behaviour to go unchallenged, either internally by the firm’s 
directors or externally by the takeover market. This is because the controlling 
owners/managers have full control of the company, thus giving them the opportunity to 
engage in the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth (Hashim and Devi, 2008). 
Therefore, incidences of forced restatements may reveal that the corporate governance 
system is relatively weak, which worsens investors’ concern about the possible rent 
extraction by the controlling shareholders (Ma et al., 2016). 
1.6 Overview of findings 
Research has examined the various financial factors that drive the financial misstatements 
that lead to forced restatements. For example, Ettredge et al. (2010) analysed 354 
restatements from 1995 to 2003 and found a systematic increase of balance sheet “bloat”, 
or abnormally high working capital accounts level, particularly for firms that later issue a 
fraudulent financial report. They further document that non-fraud restatement firms have 
higher balance sheet “bloat” when compared to the control firms of non-restatement firms 
for the two years preceding the initial financial misstatement. However, the balance sheet 
“bloat” is clearly higher for fraud restatement firms in comparison to the non-fraud 
restatement firms. Another study by Dechow et al. (2011) examined the characteristics of 
the US misstating firms from 1982 to 2005. They found that misstatement firms actively 
raise funds before and during the misstating years. They further found that a firm’s soft 
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assets (e.g., accounts receivables and inventories) are significantly higher in the misstating 
years, suggesting a build-up of assets whose values are more subject to manipulation 
during the misstatement period. Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) examined US 
restatement firms from 1997 to 2002 and found that firms are more likely to misstate when 
they raise new equity or debt and are constricted by a debt covenant. 
Other studies examined the impact of corporate governance factors on financial 
restatements. Agrawal and Chadha (2005), for example, examined a sample of 318 US firms 
based on the years 2000 and 2001. They discovered that firms having an independent 
director with financial expertise sitting on the board or audit committee tend to have a 
lower restatement probability. However, firms are more likely to restate when the CEO 
belongs to the founding family. A study by Chen, Firth and Gao (2006) examined 169 
samples of regulatory enforcement firms from 1999 to 2003. It was found that the 
proportion of outside directors on the board is negatively related to the occurrence of 
fraud. Fraud firms, however, were found to conduct more board meetings, suggesting that 
managerial decisions or acts are realised to be borderline legal, resulting in more directors’ 
debate over these issues, hence the frequent meetings. A study in Malaysia by Abdullah et 
al. (2010) examined 62 firm-years based on a matching process between restatement firms 
and non-restatement firms from 2002 to 2005. Results show that restatement firms tend to 
have a less independent nomination committee with high managerial ownership. 
Surprisingly, they also found that audit committee independence is significantly and 
positively associated with financial restatement. Managerial ownership, board 
independence and CEO duality nonetheless show no association with financial 
restatements. Baber, Liang and Zhu (2012) examined 715 US firms between 1997 and 2005 
and found a significant relationship between governance measures and financial 
restatement probability, but only when the interaction between the internal and external 
governance measures is considered. The study defined internal governance as the 
characteristics presumed to govern the efficiency of board oversight over management, 
whereas the external governance as shareholders’ ability to intervene in the decisions 
made by the board of directors and the management.  
However, studies that examined the impact of both financial and non-financial variables on 
the likelihood of forced restatement are limited. Kim et al. (2016) detected financial 
misstatements based on the different fraud intentions using a dataset of 788 irregularities 
and error instances from 1992 to 2005. Various financial and non-financial variables 
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(including some limited corporate governance factors) were tested using different classifier 
models, i.e., the support vector machine, multinomial logistic regression and Bayesian 
networks. The study found variables including accruals quality (e.g., changes in inventory), 
firm-efficiency measures (i.e., estimation of firm’s revenue-generating ability based on a 
given level of resources; e.g., research and development expenses using data envelopment 
analysis), industry level measures (e.g., top five industry leaders), and market variable (e.g., 
short term interest ratio) are useful in the detection of earnings misstatements and fraud. 
This study expands prior research in the detection of forced restatement by not only 
examining the financial variables but also including corporate governance variables (e.g., 
firm ownership, board characteristics and CEO characteristics) and uses the findings to 
develop a forced restatement prediction model. The examination of a more comprehensive 
dataset and its impact on the different categories of forced restatement (i.e., income-
decreasing, income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatement) may provide useful 
insights and a better understanding of a firm’s specific financial and non-financial 
attributes, and its impact on the occurrence of opportunistic financial reporting. 
1.7 Thesis structure 
The second chapter that follows gives an overview of the overall Malaysian capital market. 
The chapter explores the various aspects of the Malaysian institutional setting to provide an 
understanding of how the complex interplay between elements of the systems may 
influence managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management. 
The third chapter provides the theoretical framework of this study. This includes the 
discussion of the agency theory that forms a basis for a better understanding of the roles of 
corporate governance and ownership structure. The following section in the third chapter 
focuses on the different types of earnings misrepresentation that can lead to forced 
restatement. The various motivations of opportunistic earnings management that lead to 
financial misreporting and hence forced restatement are also discussed. 
The fourth chapter mainly discusses the hypotheses that are developed specifically on 
finding factors that impact the likelihood of forced restatement. The conceptual framework 
for the study is also presented to show the relationship of the relevant explanatory factors 
and the likelihood of a forced restatement event. 
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The fifth chapter explains the research methodology. Sample selection, data collection 
procedure, and variable measurement will be discussed. The specification of various 
research models that are used to test the study’s hypotheses is further explained. 
The sixth chapter delineates the testing of hypotheses, data analysis, and further presents a 
discussion of the findings from the first study.  
The seventh chapter presents an overview of a rare event and the degree of its 
predictability. The chapter further reports predictive ability analyses of the exploratory 
prediction model to predict income decreasing financial restatements among Malaysian 
public listed firms. 
Lastly, the eighth chapter will finish the thesis with a summary of the project, a discussion 
of the contribution and implications of the study, research limitations, as well as 
recommendations for future research. 
19 
 
CHAPTER 2  
THE CASE OF MALAYSIA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the background of the Malaysian capital market. The chapter gives an 
overview and understanding of how the complex interplay between various aspects of the 
Malaysian institutional environment may affect managerial behaviour and incentives. The 
Malaysian institutional structure includes the legal/judicial system, accounting standards, 
regulatory, market and political pressures. Insights into the complex interaction between the 
elements of the systems would give a better understanding of the causes that may influence 
managers to engage in opportunistic accounting behaviour, or symptoms that may indicate the 
likelihood of forced restatement. The overview may also be meaningful as it gives some hints 
to the set of covariates that is best captured in a prediction model so as to improve the 
model’s power and accuracy of predicting forced restatement.  
Forced restatement creates concern in Malaysia as the number of fraud cases related to 
earnings misstatement has notably increased since the year 2000 (for example, Malaysian 
Airline System Berhad, Transmile Group Berhad, Megan Media Holdings, NasionCom Holdings, 
Oilcorp Berhad and Silver Bird Group Berhad). The concern intensifies as investors find it 
almost impossible to detect accounting manipulations that act as a threat to their investments 
(Frédéric et al., 2013). The costs that forced restatement may cause to the market are massive, 
among which include a decline in stock prices (GAO, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004; Files et al., 
2014), an increase of a company’s cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), labour market 
penalties (e.g., loss of position on the restatement firm’s board and loss of positions on other 
firms’ boards), high executive turnover (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Hennés et al., 
2008); and regulatory enforcement proceedings (Files, 2012). The negative effect of corporate 
misreporting may even be contagious: Peasnell et al. (2011) found that firms recognised as 
having high-quality investors relations actually suffered worse from a large fall in stock price 
when triggered by other firms’ corporate misdeeds.  
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The capability of determining the likelihood of financial restatement will help assist market 
participants to identify red flags of possible misconduct, misstatement or even fraudulent 
financial reporting at an earlier stage; in this way, firms that warrant investigation can be more 
easily identified. Although there is a possibility that the forced restatement model may not 
produce high prediction accuracy, findings from the model may still offer valuable input to 
related parties, such as the investors, auditors, and regulators, for future planning and strategy 
on how to cope with an instance of a catastrophic and rare event. The study’s aim to develop a 
model that can indicate the likelihood of forced restatement is also in line with efforts by the 
Malaysian government who has invested a lot of resources trying to improve the corporate 
governance of listed companies (Muniandy and Ali, 2012). This is possible as awareness of a 
tool that can indicate the likelihood of forced restatements helps put pressure on managers to 
reduce their earnings management activities. 
Malaysia is located in the heart of Southeast Asia. It is an emerging market that has specific 
characteristics. For instance, it has a multi-ethnic society with two major ethnic groups, the 
Malays, being the country’s indigenous people (also known as Bumiputera1), and the Chinese. 
What is interesting is that the culture of these ethnic groups is, in effect, related to problems of 
supervision. The Malays are highly influenced by large government intervention in trading and 
commerce, which created a relationship-based economy system. As for the Chinese people, 
their business activities revolve more around informal personal relationships instead of formal 
legal contracts. They are found to be high in collectivism, which is manifested in ‘guanxi’ or 
social networking, and guilds linked within the business community (Lim, 1998)2.  
The interdependence between the Malaysian economy and culture contributes heavily 
towards market development, as can be seen from the pervasiveness of government-
controlled firms and family firms in Malaysia. However, the close interrelationship between the 
Malaysian economy and culture leads to the creation of intransparency in the market. The 
importance of networks that might be motivated differently gives rise to the same end effect, 
i.e., problems of supervision and the creation of information asymmetry that makes the market 
                                                          
1
 Bumiputera refers to a term that describes the Malay race and the indigenous people of Malaysia. The term 
originates from the Sanskrit word ‘Bhumiputra’, literally translated as being the “son of the soil” or “son of the land” 
(bhumi = land or earth, putra = son) (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). 
2
 Guanxi refers to trust, assurance, mutual obligation and understanding among group members (Hwang, Golemon, 
Chen, Wang, and Hung, 2009). 
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very intransparent. That is why the Malaysian government struggles to give much effort to 
strengthen the regulatory framework, corporate governance system and financial reporting 
system to reduce problems of intransparency and forced restatement.  
Malaysia makes an interesting case study for predicting the likelihood of forced restatement 
due to its unique business environment. Arising from the multi-ethnic culture, the business 
environment in Malaysia is characterised by family-owned and government-owned firms 
(Ghazali, 2010). These types of highly concentrated ownership are also commonly found in 
other Asian developing countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, Korea 
and Singapore (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). Highly concentrated ownership leads to 
agency problems that arise from conflicts between controlling owners and minority 
shareholders. It is in contrast to the agency conflict between managers and outside 
shareholders in firms with diffused ownership, which is generally found in developed countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Given that the 
controlling owners are managers themselves, concentrated ownership allows the managerial 
behaviour of self-interest to go unchallenged, either internally by the firm’s board or externally 
by the takeover market. Controlling owners have the power to determine how the firm is 
operated, hence the likelihood that the wealth of minority shareholders might be expropriated 
(Hashim and Devi, 2008) 
The interplay between culture and political factors give rise to other unique institutional 
features of the Malaysian capital market, which may have affected managerial behaviour and 
the integrity of financial reporting. These include the prevalent pyramidal or cross-holding 
share ownership structure, politically-connected firms, cross-directorships on the Malaysian 
listed firms’ boards, poor regulatory enforcement, weak investor protection, and weak external 
discipline in the market (Hasnan et al, 2013). These institutional features are possible factors 
that may contribute towards aggressive earnings management and fraud taking place in 
Malaysia (Hasnan et al., 2013). This is because the lack of monitoring and disciplinary action 
provides controlling owners with the incentives and opportunities to exercise private control 
for personal gain at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
The above features call into question the integrity and quality of financial reporting in 
Malaysia. The Malaysian institutional structure, weak enforcement, and high political 
22 
 
intervention give concerns regarding the quality of the corporate governance system. The 
prevalent ethnic culture also encourages a certain level of earnings misstatement. The political 
system, inadequate prosecutorial resources, and heavy state intervention further lead to a 
weak judicial system in Malaysia. The self-censorship practiced by the media led to low public 
awareness and few public debates with regard to the wrongdoing of the Malaysian publicly 
listed firms and the politicians (Gunasegaram, 2007). Such a unique institutional and structural 
environment in Malaysia may have a negative impact on managerial behaviour, making them 
prone to produce low quality financial reporting, leading to a lack of transparency in the 
market. 
In light of this matter, Malaysia provides a unique setting for the development of a model that 
can indicate the likelihood of forced financial restatement. With the development of the forced 
restatement likelihood model, this study may demonstrate new evidence from a country that 
has different firm ownership, unique business environment and regulations (in comparison to 
western countries such as the US and the UK). The research findings might also represent other 
Asian countries with similar backgrounds (such as Thailand and Indonesia) in terms of large 
government intervention, which is supposed to benefit economic development and the 
economic empowerment of the Malay population. Findings of the study may also provide a 
distinctive perspective, which in many respects is different from developed countries. 
The following sections are arranged accordingly. Key external factors of the Malaysian 
institutional environment will be discussed first. These include Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that 
provide discussion on the political environment and financial reporting in Malaysia. 
Subsequently, discussion on internal institutional factors, such as the Malaysian regulatory 
structure and firm ownership structure, are presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. It 
should be noted that several key issues, such as culture, the level of regulatory enforcement 
and corporate governance, are interdependent between a number of areas, and therefore the 
discussion of these key issues would emerge in several sections.  
2.2 The political environment in Malaysia 
More than half the Malayan population is constituted of the Malays, who are the country’s 
indigenous people. Other ethnic groups include the Chinese and Indians, who have migrated to 
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Malaya since the 19th century (Verma, 2004). The Chinese became the most economically 
dominant among all ethnic groups as they have been involved in productive business activities. 
The issue of wealth inequality between races became a major issue of concern because the 
Malays felt insecure and were mindful of the Chinese economic dominance.  
The era following the 1969 ethnic riot (due to socio-economic imbalances between ethnic 
groups), saw fundamental changes take place in the Malaysian political, corporate and socio-
economic landscape with the implementation of the 20-year New Economic Policy (NEP) 
(1970-1990). It was the NEP’s aim to resolve socio-economic imbalances among the different 
ethnic groups (Tam and Tan, 2007). Two main NEP objectives include eradicating poverty and 
restructuring the Malaysian multi-racial society, such that status within the economic function 
is no longer dictated by race (Randhawa, 2011). 
The period in the 1970s saw the rising of Malay-oriented policy and leadership. The Malay 
political hegemony brought about by the ruling party, the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO)3 and its coalition parties, was justified on the basis that it represents the Malay 
interest, being the largest Malaysian ethnic group (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). This led to the rise 
of “Bumiputerism”, an ideology manifested by the NEP (Fraser, Zhang, and Derashid, 2006). 
The NEP introduced, inter alia, capital accumulation for the Bumiputera, an ethnic affirmative 
policy that favours the Bumiputera, and creation of a Bumiputera capitalist class (Fraser et al., 
2006; Gomez and Jomo, 1999). The Bumiputera firms, for example, were given priority for 
various concessions, including access to capital and subsidies, credit schemes, and licenses, as 
well as business contracts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The implementation of the NEP has 
nonetheless led to active government intervention in the Malaysian economy.  
Limited access to finance may impede the economic development of emerging economies 
(Claessens and Perotti, 2007; Fan, Wei, and Xu, 2011). In view of this, the Malaysian 
government often took the initiative to invest in companies so as to provide them with access 
to funds for business development (Lau and Tong, 2008). The implementation of the Malaysian 
NEP has resulted in huge political involvement in financing Malaysian firms (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003). Certain Bumiputera private firms were favoured by the government for granting 
                                                          
3
 UMNO was established in 1946 and is the largest political party that fights for the Malayan rights. It has ruled 
Malaya, together with other coalition parties, without interruption since Malayan independence in 1957 (Funston, 
1980). 
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access to finance (Perkins & Woo, 2000). For instance, the Heavy Industries Corporation of 
Malaysia (HICOM) received huge financial assistance from the government during the term 
when Dr Mahathir became the Minister for Trade and Industry in 1980. Subsequently, HICOM 
managed to invest in steel, cement and the auto industry. While certain firms received 
financial priority from the government, businessmen were seen to increasingly use their 
personal connections to persuade the allocations of such financial favours (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997). 
Following the NEP implementation, several pension and investment funds were set up by the 
Malaysian government to help the Bumiputera invest their pension contributions and savings 
in privatised firms (Bin Muhamed, Strätling, and Salama, 2014). This has led to the creation of 
government investment organisations that hold ownership and gain control rights in privatised 
firms. Government investment organisations facilitate in the supervision and improvement of 
the financial performance and corporate governance of their portfolio companies. At the same 
time, the government investment organisations assist in mobilising domestic savings and 
attracting foreign investment to improve their portfolio companies’ access to external funds 
(Bin Muhamed et al., 2014).  
The existence of informal ties between a leading politician or political party and the Malaysian 
corporations that arose following the NEP implementation became one type of political 
favouritism in Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). This has caused Malaysia to be well-known 
with its relationship-based economy due to firms’ close relationship with the government (in 
contrast to the arm’s length system) (Bliss and Gul, 2012). From one perspective, the 
relationship-based system can be seen as a mechanism to stimulate business interest among 
the Malaysian Bumiputras, and lessen the inequality of wealth distribution among the various 
ethnic groups. For example, government initiatives of establishing government investment 
organisations (so-called the government-linked investment companies – GLICs) has helped 
society to indirectly participate in the economic development by investing their pension 
contributions and savings in private companies. The indirect influence government officials and 
politicians exerted over the GLICs, as well as senior civil servants and politicians who serve on 
the firm’s board, has greatly shaped firm’s business decisions towards managing society funds 
in developing the Malaysian economy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Affirmative government 
actions, such as enforcing ethnic employment quotas and retaining government ownership in 
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strategic industries, further enforced ethnic equality in promoting economic growth 
(Randhawa, 2011). 
From another perspective, the relationship-based system can be seen as creating cronyism, 
capitalism, and political patronage (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). The NEP has created 
opportunities for cronies to gain benefits relatively easily, including benefit on monopoly 
rights, lucrative contracts, import protection and easier loan financing (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The NEP implementation has forced the Chinese businessmen to 
realise that cultivating close ties with influential political figures in UMNO may give them 
continuous access to the means of wealth accumulation. Chinese capitalists started to hire 
politically influential Malays to serve as company directors, while some Chinese businessmen 
started to fund the UMNO and its leaders (Gomez, 1999). The practice of funding ambitious 
politicians by Chinese entrepreneurs acted as a means of getting access to government 
patronage. 
Malaysian state policies favouring certain connected Bumiputera firms remains to be seen as a 
form of institutionalised ethnicity discrimination (Johl, Subramaniam, and Mat Zain, 2012), and 
has led to a negative impact on the efficiency and transparency of firms’ business operations 
(Hasnan et al., 2013; Braam et al., 2015). Based on the study by Faccio et al. (2006), during 
1997-2002 Malaysia was found to have among the largest number of firms with a political 
connection in relation to its capital market size, which is nearly 20%. Studies have shown that 
heavy state intervention and the existence of political connections has continued to prevail 
among Malaysian firms (e.g. Hasnan et al., 2013; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014; Fung, Gul, and 
Radhakrishnan, 2015). The existence of political connections can be explained by the view held 
by political scholars, such as North (1990) and Olson (1993). They contend that the existence of 
political connections acts as a means for the government to control firms in such a way that 
firms are operated to attain goals consistent with the government’s agenda, such as providing 
employment, government subsidies and other related benefits in return for supporters’ votes, 
political support, and bribes. These politically-connected firms will then obtain benefits from 
the government, such as privileged access to profitable government contracts, subsidies and an 
exclusive business relationship with government-owned corporations, in return for their 
political contribution and votes (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Overall, it was argued that politicians 
or political parties share policies with connected firms to stay in power and build personal 
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wealth (North, 1990; Olson, 1993). Crony capitalism in business affairs creates criticism due to 
resources misallocation in the Malaysian economy, thereby causing massive wastage, 
inefficiency, and intransparency in the corporate sector. This is based on the fact that 
politically-connected firms become rent-seekers who use their close connection with 
politicians and the state to acquire as much unearned benefit and reward as possible. 
In the case of Malaysia, politically-connected firms are not only those firms owned by the 
government but also include those firms favoured by the government (Gul, 2006). Business 
benefits arising from a political connection may cause politically-connected firms to be 
inefficient, and may even inculcate a culture of inefficiency due to the ‘protective shield’ that 
the firms get against any scrutiny on deviant behaviour (Bliss and Gul, 2012). Bushman et al. 
(2004) identify several ways in which a political connection may affect financial transparency. 
Firstly, politicians may exploit the control they have over regulatory policies in support of their 
cronies who, in return, give bribes, political support, and nepotism. Secondly, politically 
connected firms may obscure expropriation activities carried out by the politicians and their 
cronies by suppressing certain firm-specific information. Studies have shown that politically-
connected firms are prone to use aggressive earnings management strategies to mask the 
benefits that they gain from the political connection, particularly those of suspicious legality 
(Faccio, 2006; Chaney et al., 2011; Hasnan et al., 2013). 
Notwithstanding, the Malaysian regulatory authorities lack independence, such that the 
enforcement of rules and regulations is largely limited due to huge political influence (Liew, 
2008). Changes in the regulations are often due to political reasons (Liew, 2008). The control 
that political elites (who are ultimately involved in the setting of the capital market regulatory 
framework) have over regulatory policies is often exploited to favour their cronies in return for 
political support, bribes and nepotism (Gul, 2006; Liew, 2008). As highlighted by Ken (2010, p. 
108):  
“…the ruling elite and their corporate patrons/clients/proxies (most being major 
shareholders/owners of public-listed firms) as well as captive market regulators are 
involved in numerous blatant scandalous, manipulative and even fraudulent activities in 
the capital markets, often to the detriment of minority shareholders”.  
As previously discussed, companies do have links with the government, and the regulators 
have links with the government. Within this view, there is a risk that the government might put 
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pressure on the regulator, not to force through a restatement but to allow companies to 
basically find an excuse.  
Overall, it is concluded that huge political influence in the Malaysian economy system creates 
an information asymmetry environment, thus generating problems of intransparency in the 
Malaysian capital market. In this scenario, the Malaysian regulators may have to rely on red 
flags to detect misstatement firms. Hence, the aim of this study, to develop a model that can 
signal towards the likelihood of forced restatement, remains essentially crucial. In relation to 
this, the study will examine a firm’s political connection as one of the likely indicators of forced 
restatement.  
2.3 Financial reporting in Malaysia  
The UK’s accounting standards have substantial influence on Malaysia since, historically, the 
country was under British rule for over 80 years. The presence of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) in the 1970s continues to influence and shape Malaysian accounting standards 
(Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). The UK and IAS accounting standards were universally perceived 
as being of high quality, and are consistent with the concepts of common law of presenting 
accounting information that gives a true and fair view (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; Ball et 
al., 2003)). Based on the adoption of the international accounting standards alone, it is 
therefore expected that reported earnings of Malaysian listed firms would be of high quality.  
Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the initial financial reporting quality of Malaysian firms 
generally shows that they are of low quality. Ball et al. (2003) did a study on financial 
information quality based on annual earnings announcements of four East Asian countries 
(Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong) between 1984 and 1996. Overall, they found 
that there is no timely recognition of the firm’s economic income4, especially economic losses, 
hence reducing financial reporting quality. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) did a study on 
1990-1999 accounting data of 31 countries and found Malaysia to be among the countries with 
the worst earnings management ratings.  
                                                          
4
 Economic income is defined as “change in the market value of equity, adjusted for dividends and capital 
transactions with shareholders” (Ball et al., 2003,.p. 236). 
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At the early stages of the Malaysian capital market development, the regulatory regime 
governing the financial reporting and corporate governance practices in Malaysia was a merit-
based system. Under the merit-based regulatory regime, it is the regulators who decide on the 
propriety of firms’ transactions via a regulatory assessment of the quality of securities issuance 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013). In particular, a regulatory assessment is made 
on a company’s viability, management’s capability and quality, and overall suitability for listing 
prior to approving securities issuance (Wong, Fatt, and Yap, 2010). Not only did the merit-
based regime have a low regulatory expectation with regard to disclosure practices, it had also 
effectively reduced market incentives for voluntary disclosure (Ho, Tower, and Barako, 2008). 
During the era of the merit-based system, the existence of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) in the 1970s took over to shape Malaysia’s formal accounting standards. Since 
1978, Malaysia was among the first countries to adopt the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) that were issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (Morris et 
al., 2011). The IASC (and its successor, the International Accounting Standards Board - IASB), is 
a private-sector and independent accounting setting body with the goal of developing a set of 
high quality principles-based international accounting standards (Barth et al., 2008). The IASC 
and IASB have taken steps to produce accounting measurements that better reflect a firm’s 
financial position and performance, and remove any allowable accounting alternatives. The 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Association of Certified Public 
Accountants (MACPA) were two professional Malaysian accounting bodies that endorsed the 
adoption of IAS in Malaysia. The IAS were reviewed by the MIA and MACPA, who then adapted 
the Malaysian accounting standards to the IAS. However, compliance with the IAS, or the 
Malaysian equivalent, was not compulsory and not enforceable until the enactment of the 
Financial Reporting Act (FRA) 1997 (Saleh, Iskandar, and Rahmat, 2005). As highlighted earlier 
in this section, prior research has nonetheless shown that improvement of the accounting 
standards alone (via IAS adoption) does not determine higher accounting quality among 
Malaysian listed firms (Fan and Wong, 2002; Ball et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). Although the 
IAS are of high quality, the effects of other features within the financial reporting system, such 
as poor enforcement quality, could deter accounting quality improvement arising from the 
adoption of the IAS (Barth et al., 2008; Holthausen, 2009). 
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In 1996, the Malaysian Securities Commission enforced a new disclosure-based regulatory 
system (from the old merit-based regime) to promote more rigorous development of 
transparency and corporate disclosure in Malaysia. Under the disclosure-based regime, an 
emphasis is put on the timeliness and quality of financial information disclosed by the listed 
firms (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013). The Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
however, had destructive implications towards Malaysian economic growth that was rooted in 
poor corporate governance practices, weak disclosure, transparency, and accountability.  
Following the Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and 
Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) were established by a Malaysian Parliamentary Act under 
the Financial Reporting Act (FRA) 1997, with an attempt to reform the Malaysian financial 
reporting regime and develop an improved formal accounting framework (Morris et al., 2011; 
Wan Ismail et al., 2013; Kasipillai and Mahenthiran, 2013). The FRF acts as a trustee body that 
oversees MASB performance, funding arrangements, and becomes the initial source of views 
for proposed standards and pronouncements issued by the MASB (MASB, 2010). The MASB 
was mandated to set accounting standards and is responsible for reporting directly to the 
Securities Commission (Kasipillai and Mahenthiran, 2013). The MASB plays the role of 
reviewing, revising and adopting existing accounting standards, as well as issuing new 
accounting standards; it named the approved accounting standards as MASB standards (Wan 
Ismail et al., 2013). With the FRA (1997) force of law, all Malaysian companies were required to 
comply with the MASB’s approved accounting standards (Liew, 2007). Overall, the two-tier 
financial reporting framework, comprising the FRF and MASB, provides an independent 
standard-setting structure that includes representatives from relevant parties, such as 
regulators, preparers, the accounting profession and users (Wan Ismail et al., 2013).  
Enforcement of approved accounting standards among Malaysian publicly listed firms resides 
with the Securities Commission (SC). In cases of non-compliance, the SC has the authority to 
instruct firms to rectify matters, make announcements of the non-compliances, or even 
penalise the firms for such offences (Wan Ismail et al., 2013). The development of the 
improved MASB accounting standards is in line with the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) from 2001 that aims to develop an optimal framework of corporate 
governance principles and best practices that eventually allows reliable and quality information 
to be reported to investors and the public in a timely manner (Lim et al., 2014). The study by 
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Lim et al. (2014) that was done on a panel data of 1,276 Malaysian listed firms for the period 
1996 to 2009, found a shorter reporting lag in the post-MCCG implementation period. The 
result suggests improvement in the quality of firm’s financial reporting and disclosure. The 
findings by Lim et al. (2014) indicate that the effectiveness of the MASB accounting standards 
(introduced in 1999) was partially supported by the implementation of the MCCG, which is an 
integral part of the Bursa Listing Requirement in 2001, hence allowing improvement in financial 
information disclosure. 
A new step forward for the Malaysian financial reporting system was documented during the 
period 2004-2005 when the MASB made great efforts towards adopting the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the IASB (Muniandy and Ali, 2012). The 
announcement for IFRS adoption was made at the end of 2004. The Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRS) were used to rename the MASB standards in 2005. Although the accounting 
standards were renamed as FRS, the standards remain in line with the IFRS, except for some 
minor modifications to adapt to the Malaysian settings (Yeow and Mahzan, 2013). The 
adoption of the Malaysian FRS standards was officially made effective on 1st January 2006. The 
FRS was initiated based on the MASB plan to ensure that the Malaysian accounting standards 
move closer towards global convergence with international accounting standards, hence 
promoting enhanced confidence among foreign and domestic investors (Wan Ismail et al., 
2013).  
A further step forward was again made when the full convergence of the Malaysian accounting 
standards to the IFRS took place on 1st January 2012. Following this, the Malaysian accounting 
standards were again renamed and are now called the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards 
(MFRS). It is the main aim of the IFRS full convergence to improve the consistency and quality 
of financial reporting in Malaysia and promote harmonisation with global accounting 
standards. The full convergence also works in line with the Malaysian Capital Market 
Masterplan 2 (2010) to enhance the market’s potential value in the future.  
There were mixed findings on the quality of financial reporting as a result of the move towards 
a financial reporting regime since 1997 that required greater mandatory disclosure. The study 
by Wan Ismail et al. (2013) compared earnings quality of the Malaysian listed firms during the 
period before and after the IFRS adoption (made effective from 1st January 2006) using data 
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between 2002 and 2009. In comparison to the pre-IFRS adoption period, they document that 
earnings reported during the period post-IFRS adoption were associated with higher value 
relevance and lower earnings management. Abdullah et al. (2015) analysed 221 Malaysian 
listed firms in the year 2008 and found that firms’ disclosure level was not value relevant, 
suggesting that a firm’s compliance with the IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements does not 
affect firm value. The fact that the increased level of mandatory disclosure does not appear to 
be value relevant might suggest that the information is not required by the investor as they 
have already been informed, or they simply do not trust the information issued in a firm’s 
financial statements.  
Overall, substantial efforts have been undertaken by the regulators to improve and maintain 
high quality accounting standards in Malaysia. This includes the far-reaching IFRS convergence 
that is intended to create a set of accounting standards that can promote financial statements 
comparability, enhance corporate transparency, and improve the quality of financial reporting 
that can benefit users, especially investors and regulators (Ballas, Skoutela, and Tzovas, 2010; 
Karampinis and Hevas, 2011; Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012). However, the argument on 
“reporting incentives” raises doubt about whether the quality of financial reporting is 
enhanced by merely changing standards. It is unlikely that firms opposing the adoption of the 
IAS, which is subject to poor enforcement, will make material amendments in their reporting 
policies (Ball, 2006; Daske et al., 2013), and whether they really disclose genuinely informative 
figures, even when superior accounting practices are mandated (involving more disclosure, or 
estimates disclosure) (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). Even with common standards, reporting 
behaviour across various firms may differ due to dissimilar reporting incentives (Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). From their study of four East Asian countries (including Malaysia), Ball 
et al. (2003) conclude that managers’ and auditors’ incentives have more effect on firms’ low 
quality financial reporting (measured as the timeliness of income recognition), despite the high 
quality accounting standards that were implemented. 
Managerial reporting incentives appear to dominate financial reporting standards as a 
determinant of the quality of corporate disclosure in Malaysia (Ball et al., 2003). Factors such 
as culture, high ownership concentration, and large political influence encourage incentives 
among controlling owners/managers to expropriate the interest of the minority investors for 
the sake of personal or political gain. Obscure financial information is issued so as to mask their 
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operational inefficiency and deviant actions of rent expropriations, thus creating information 
asymmetry and lack of transparency in financial reporting.  
Additionally, weak investor protection and poor law enforcement feature the Malaysian legal 
system, a condition that may foster aggressive earnings management practices to take place 
(Hasnan et al., 2013). The Malaysian judicial system is weak with inadequate prosecutorial 
resources, weak investor protection and heavy state intervention in business activities 
(Gunasegaram, 2007). Shareholders’ lawsuits and class-action lawsuits are uncommon in 
Malaysia (Hasnan et al., 2013). Moreover, the degree of punishment is inadequate and is 
disproportionate to the extent of corporate crime being committed (Hasnan et al., 2013). 
Overall, regardless of having a high quality financial reporting framework in place, the quality 
of corporate disclosure and earnings informativeness might be compromised by the presence 
of a weak enforcement mechanism.  
Finally, weak corporate governance practices may also affect the effectiveness of the adoption 
of IFRS. Studies have questioned real board independence among the Malaysian listed firms 
regarding whether they are effective monitors (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hashim and 
Devi, 2008) (please refer to Section 2.4 for discussion). The use of aggressive accounting 
standards (e.g., manipulation of the fair value accounting standards that require estimates 
based on personal judgement) supplemented by weak board monitoring, may cause earnings 
management activities to be more damaging to a firm’s value. Supplemented with weak 
regulatory enforcement, aggressive earnings management may be almost impossible to be 
detected and curbed.  
The move taken towards establishing a reporting regime based on international accounting 
standards with more rigorous mandatory disclosure requirements are among the attempts by 
the Malaysian government to allow the disclosure of high quality corporate reporting among 
listed firms. High quality international accounting standards were used as a benchmark as they 
produce accounting measurements that better reflect a firm’s financial position and 
performance, and remove any allowable accounting alternatives, hence improving 
transparency in corporate disclosure (Muniandy and Ali, 2012). Overall, there were no major 
breaks in the development of the financial reporting standards, rather a continuous struggle 
for improvement. Nonetheless, institutional features within the financial reporting system, 
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such as highly concentrated ownership, government-related ownership, and excessive state 
intervention, play a role in influencing managerial reporting incentives to be more self-
interested, therefore deterring the issuance of high quality financial information (Ball et al., 
2003). Weak governance, such as boards not being independent and poor board monitoring, 
aggravated by weak enforcement of laws and regulation, may provide a ripe condition for 
aggressive management to take place in Malaysia. Given the institutional environment, firms 
are initiated to issue obscure financial information to mask perverse managerial actions and 
inefficiency, thereby creating information asymmetry and intransparency; this ultimately 
reduces the efficiency and efficacy of the Malaysian capital market. Hence, this study’s aim in 
developing a model to indicate the likelihood of forced restatement remains essentially crucial 
as it will help to indicate red flags for the Malaysian authorities and other related parties to 
detect misstatement firms.  
Malaysia provides a unique setting for this study to investigate the interplay of the various 
institutional features towards financial reporting quality within the widely-known ‘high quality’ 
principle-based accounting standard setting. This study examines the factors that could 
indicate the likelihood of forced restatement within a study period from the year 2002 to 2012. 
The 11-year study period encompassed various development phases of the Malaysian financial 
reporting framework. These phases include the implementation of the MASB accounting 
standards (2002-2005), FRS accounting standards (2006-2011), and MFRS accounting standards 
(2012 to date). Gradual improvements towards enacting more rigorous mandatory disclosure 
level with the adoption of the international accounting standards were made throughout the 
study period. In view of this, it is expected that a huge proportion of the study sample would 
include firms with unforced accounting restatement. This is because the period of study 
coincided with the transition period for the full convergence of the Malaysian reporting 
standards with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It would also be 
interesting to examine whether firms might have hidden necessary (potentially eventually 
forced) accounting adjustments in a more routine announcement about earnings restatement 
in relation to accounting standards.  
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2.4 Regulatory structure in Malaysia 
The history of Malaysian stock trading dates back to the 1930s (Ibrahim, 2006). Table 2.1 
shows the key developments in the Malaysian capital market during the period prior to the 
1997 Asian financial crisis.  
Table 2-1: Key Developments in the Malaysian Capital Market Pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
Year Key development in the Malaysian capital market pre-1997 Asian financial crisis 
1964 
The Malaysian stock exchange was officially formed under the name Stock 
Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS). 
1973 
SEMS undergoes a formal separation to become the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) for Malaysia and Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) for 
Singapore. 
1993 
The Securities Commission (SC) was formed under the Securities Commission Act 
1993. 
1993 
The mandatory requirement on audit committees for Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) listing. 
1996 
The disclosure-based regime was introduced to replace the old merit-based 
regime. 
In 1973, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was established and was the prime stock 
exchange in Malaysia. In 2005, KLSE was demutualised and renamed Bursa Malaysia. Bursa 
Malaysia prescribes and is empowered to enforce listing requirements, practice notes, and 
guidelines to market participants. This is consistent with the mission of Bursa Malaysia to 
ensure that the stock market operates fairly, orderly and with high transparency5. 
Under the authority of the Ministry of Finance, the Malaysian statutory body, Securities 
Commission (SC) was formed under the Securities Commission Act 1993. The SC plays the 
prime role of promoting Malaysian capital market development and helps to streamline the 
law and regulatory framework of the Malaysian securities market. This is to ensure 
professionalism, efficiency and orderly development of the futures and securities industries, 
therefore protecting investors’ interests. The SC gives licensing to market players and monitors 
activities to ensure proper conduct among business institutions and several trade exchanges 
within Bursa Malaysia. Overall, the SC’s Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer and KLSE Listing 
                                                          
5
 See Vision and Mission of Bursa Malaysia, available at: http://bursa.listedcompany.com 
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Requirement play a significant role in regulating investors, directors, issuers and brokers (Liew, 
2007).  
Regardless of the rapid growth experienced by the Malaysian capital market in the 1990s, 
Malaysia also has its share of corporate misconduct (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). The Malaysian 
corporate sector is not free from features such as weak corporate governance, low level of 
corporate disclosure and transparency (Ball et al., 2003; Mitton, 2002). The prevalence of high 
ownership concentration among Malaysian firms was also seen to be among the reasons that 
made Malaysia vulnerable to the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis (Jiang and Peng, 2011). 
According to Claessens et al. (1999), while most firms in Malaysia had concentrated ownership 
and the controlling owners also manage the firm, there is the tendency that self-interested 
managers would run the business in such a way that fulfil insiders’ interest, although 
detrimental to the firm’s overall profitability. The findings by Khatri, Leruth and Piesse (2002) 
show that poor corporate governance practices, highly concentrated ownership, and weak 
debt management negatively impacted firm performance, and has made Malaysian companies 
vulnerable and more susceptible to financial crises. Bhattacharyay (2004) highlights other key 
problems that undermine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in Malaysia; 
these include (i) heavy government intervention; (ii) weak regulatory framework and legal 
systems; (iii) weak investor protection; (iv) lack of quality information; and (v) poor discipline in 
the external market. 
In the early stage, the requirements for Malaysian corporate governance were limited (Morris, 
Pham, and Gray, 2011). Efforts to enhance the corporate governance mechanisms started in 
1993 with the mandatory requirement on audit committees for Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) listing (Muniandy and Ali, 2012). With this requirement, the audit committee (a 
subcommittee of the firm’s board) being independent of firm’s management, was made 
responsible for monitoring and ensuring firms’ proper corporate governance to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Liew, 
2007). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the audit committee in instilling higher integrity and 
transparency among firm managers is questioned. Findings by Abdullah et al. (2010), for 
example, show that audit committee independence is associated with the likelihood of 
earnings misstatement. The study was conducted during the period prior to the amendment of 
the MCCG in 2007, and the CEO or finance director was not prohibited from serving on the 
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audit committee. The result raises a cause for concern of the ineffectiveness of the audit 
committee, and that having an audit committee is simply a matter of complying with the listing 
requirements of the Malaysian stock exchange rather than truly being a “watchdog” over a 
firm’s financial reporting process. 
The process of enhancing corporate governance practices was expedited when the Asian 
financial crisis hit Malaysia in 1997; this saw several corporate failures (partially due to 
ineffective corporate governance mechanism) (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The High Level 
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) was established by the Malaysian 
government in March 1998 as an urgent response to the prevalent weaknesses in corporate 
governance of state-owned and private companies being exposed by the outbreak of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The finance committee is chaired by the 
Secretary General of Treasury, Ministry of Finance, and has representatives from the 
government and industry6. The FCCG was responsible for assessing corporate governance 
practices and proposing legal reforms for further improvement.  
There were several lapses in the Malaysian corporate governance practices identified by the 
FCCG; these relate to board of directors’ efficacy, shareholders’ passivity, directors’ insufficient 
responsibilities awareness, ownership concentration and enforcement mechanisms (Othman, 
1999). Scepticism arises as to the ability of the board to monitor management, as the non-
executive directors are often perceived merely as a ‘rubber stamp’ for management plans; they 
are often hired for reasons other than monitoring (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In addition, the 
development of good governance practices is quite constrained when both domestic and 
foreign shareholders play a passive role in demanding better corporate governance 
mechanisms (Othman, 1999). Furthermore, the early 1990s recorded an economic boom that 
turned owners of small firms into directors overnight. This happened following firms’ public 
floatation, where the new directors may not be fully aware and understand the complex 
regulations and statutory responsibilities to which they are subject. In addition, the prevalent 
concentrated ownership structure in Malaysia gives rise to problems where minority 
shareholders were being expropriated by the dominant large shareholders when exercising 
their control rights (Bany-Ariffin et al., 2010). Finally, the enforcement mechanism for good 
                                                          
6
 There are 12 members in the committee that represent almost all sectors, including the MASB, the Financial 
Reporting Foundation, the Securities Commission, the KLSE, the Registrar of Companies, the Federation of Public 
Listed Companies, the Central Bank and the Association of Banks (Shim, 2006).  
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governance practices is relatively weak, supplemented with relatively small penalties that are 
inadequate to be a deterrent (Othman, 1999). 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), which was released by the FCCG in 
2000, sets out recommendations that introduce principles and best practices of good 
corporate governance that relate to directors’ remuneration, shareholders, the board of 
directors, and audit and accountability (Lokman, Cotter, and Mula, 2012). The MCCG was 
largely based on the recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report 
(1998) in the UK (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p. 1035). The MCCG was fully executed with the 
revamp of listing requirements of the KLSE in January 20017. Listed firms are required to make 
full compliance and disclose the extent to which they have complied with the MCCG in the 
annual reports, or explain the reason for their non-compliance (Saad, 2010). The Revamped 
Listing Requirements signify an important milestone in the Malaysian corporate governance 
reform, which creates an environment that mandates a higher quality of disclosure and higher 
standards of conduct among publicly listed firms (Hashim and Devi, 2008).  
The MCCG (2000) sets out a number of principles and best practices of corporate governance. 
The regulations, among others, include the minimum number of independent directors 
required on the board (two directors or one-third of the board, whichever is higher). 
Appointments of directors to the board are to be made by the nomination committee. 
Furthermore, the whole board should determine the optimum number of members on the 
board to make sure there are adequate members to perform the various functions and 
responsibilities. In addition, the chairman role should be separated from that of the CEO so as 
to ensure a balance of authority and power. The audit committee is also required to have at 
least three directors, that the majority are to be independent, and that an independent non-
executive director should be the chairman. The principles and best practices of the MCCG are 
aimed at improving managerial integrity and standards of conduct, thereby enhancing the 
accountability and credibility of financial disclosure made by listed firms.  
In 2007, the MCCG was revised where improvement was made to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities of audit committees and boards of directors (Johl, Kaur, and Cooper, 2015). 
                                                          
7
 Malaysian publicly listed companies were mandated to disclose, among others, the statement of internal control, 
statement of corporate governance, audit committee composition, board composition, and audit committee 
quorum in their annual report (Hashim and Devi, 2008).  
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Revision of the codes mainly focused on the qualifications, integrity, and professionalism of the 
appointed directors and members of the audit committee. The revised code also requires listed 
firms to have an internal audit committee where all audit members should be non-executive 
directors. Generally, it is the aim of the MCCG (2007) to strengthen firms’ boards of directors 
and audit committees, as well as the internal audit function, and ensures that their roles and 
responsibilities are being discharged effectively (Bhatt, 2016). It should be noted that the 
MCCG level of compliance among Malaysian listed firms is limited and changes in terms of 
adoption was gradual. Thus, this study anticipates no pre/post reform dummy or structural 
break in data.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has affected the Malaysian economy very badly 
(Rahman, Ibrahim, and Ahmad, 2015). The weaknesses and calamity that the global crisis 
caused the Malaysian capital market have prompted the authorities to seek ways of improving 
corporate governance best practice (OECD, 2011). Furthermore, the need to revise the MCCG 
(2007) intensified in light of the growing trend of poor firm performance and corporate 
scandals post-financial crisis involving companies such as Maxbiz Corp Berhad, Megan Media 
Holdings Berhad, Tat Sang Berhad and Transmile Berhad8 (Johl et al., 2013; Abdul Wahab et al., 
2014). Accordingly, a newly revised MCCG was introduced in March 2012. The MCCG (2012) 
consists of eight main principles that cover important issues on strengthening board 
composition, establishing clearer roles and responsibilities of the board, upholding financial 
reporting integrity, reinforcing effectiveness and commitments of independent directors, 
recognition and management of risks, ensuring high-quality and timely disclosure, and 
recognising the company and shareholder relationship. The introduction of the MCCG (2012) 
may be seen as a step in the right direction towards achieving an optimal governance 
framework in Malaysia.  
Prior research has, however, shown that the adoption of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model (mainly existing in the US and the UK) is relatively ineffective in promoting 
higher integrity and transparency among the Malaysian listed firms due to the unique political, 
                                                          
8
 Maxbiz Corp defaulted on stock loans redemption that were previously issued for the restructuring of Geahin 
Engineering Berhad, a firm that formed Maxbiz. Megan Media was involved in massive collusive fraud and debt 
amounting to RM1billion was raked. Tat Sang inflated assets value in 2007 and was found guilty of providing 
deceitful information to the stock exchange to obtain an IPO in 2003. Transmile reported false receivables account, 
and by mid-2007, its market capitalisation was reduced to RM155 million from the previous reported amount of 
RM4billion (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014).  
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economic and corporate settings in Malaysia. For example, a study by Wan Mohammad, 
Wasiuzzaman and Nik Salleh (2016) on a sample of Malaysian listed firms within the 
manufacturing sector for the period 2004-2009, found that board independence and financial 
expertise are associated with higher earnings management. This may suggest the possibility 
that firm’s boards might technically comply with the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement and 
the definition of ‘independence’, but then hire members who are supporters or from a circle of 
friends, causing them to be reluctant in raising questions and scrutinising the board 
performance effectively (Hwang and Kim, 2009). The findings by KPMG Malaysia (2013) on 100 
top ranked market capitalised Malaysian firms in 2012-2013 reveal that about half of the 
independent directors (45%) are former politicians or retired civil servants. The result implies 
that having a political connection becomes an attraction for a person to be appointed as 
independent director. They are seen as having the capability of getting easy access to projects, 
funding and support for business operations, advice on nuances when dealing with 
government red-tape and help to navigate the myriad of agencies commonly encountered 
when running a business (Wan-Hussin, 2009; KPMG Malaysia, 2013). The above findings raise 
the argument that compliance towards corporate governance practices is merely a tick-box 
exercise rather than by spirit.  
Overall, an immense effort was undertaken by the local government and related authorities to 
develop and improve the quality of the regulatory framework and corporate governance 
system in Malaysia. There had been criticism on the adequacy, effectiveness and transparency 
of enforcement by the Malaysian principal enforcement agencies, such as the SC and the 
Malaysian stock exchange (Liew, 2007). It was revealed at the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA) Conference 2005 held in Hong Kong, that based on a scale of ten, Malaysia 
ranked 2nd for instituting almost all rules, but was ranked 4th for enforcements (Allen, 2005). 
Furthermore, the survey by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2006) shows that based 
on a scale of ten, Malaysia scored nine for instituting almost all corporate governance rules and 
regulations (the CLSA consists of various sub-measures of corporate governance score), but 
only scored 3.5 for enforcement. The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) 
further highlighted several main concerns with regard to the enforcement actions that include: 
(i) inadequate autonomy for law enforcement on the regulators’ part; (ii) fragmented 
enforcement power and regulatory framework; (iii) lack of skills and experience in enforcement 
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efforts; (iv) lack of transparency and accountability by the regulators (Shim, 2006). According to 
Gunasegaram (2007a), the weak regulatory enforcement in Malaysia is considerably related to 
excessive political interference, to the extent that political executives have the power to be 
selective in the imposition of rules and regulations. The view by Gunasegaran (2007b, p.132) 
says that, 
“These politicians can determine if regulatory institutions should act against 
businessmen, even when there is evidence of corruption. By ostensibly enforcing 
corporate governance provisions, politicians in control of the executive have transferred 
corporate assets into the hands of their allies…”.  
Weak enforcement therefore appears to be the main hurdle in establishing good corporate 
governance practices and high transparency in corporate disclosure. Weak enforcement of 
rules and regulations may exacerbate with the prevalence of high ownership concentration in 
Malaysia that increases managerial incentives to control earnings, thereby reducing the quality 
of reported earnings (Fan and Wong, 2002). In short, while the financial reporting standards, 
the regulatory and corporate governance framework is of high quality, weak regulatory 
enforcement within the Malaysian milieu of excessive political intervention and high ownership 
concentration may suggest that opportunistic earnings management might be a huge problem 
in Malaysia. This leads to the creation of information asymmetry and lack of transparency in 
the market, which causes forced restatement to take place among the listed firms in Malaysia. 
2.5 Ownership structure of listed companies in Malaysia  
Malaysian public listed firms are commonly featured with highly concentrated ownership 
(Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012). The high concentrated 
ownership structure of Malaysian firms can be dated back to many years ago when, 
historically, the Chinese ethnic group dominated businesses in Malaysia, although the majority 
of the total population (60%) is accounted for by the Malay Bumiputra ethnic group (Johnson 
and Mitton, 2003).  
Family ownership forms the main mode of ownership structure in Malaysia (Ismail and 
Sinnadurai, 2012). Family firms in Malaysia, i.e., families owning and controlling a huge number 
of firms (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006), are a unique group of shareholders that have great 
concern regarding reputation, hold poorly diversified long-term investment portfolios (multiple 
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generations), and full control of senior management positions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2003), family firms face reputation concerns that arise from 
the sustenance of family presence in the firm. The reputation concerns are also in regard to the 
effect on third parties. The long-lasting nature of family firms suggests that third parties, such 
as capital providers or suppliers, are prone to have business dealings with the same practices 
and entities for longer periods in family-owned firms compared to non-family firms. Family 
firms’ reputation will thus develop long-term economic consequences in comparison to the 
non-family firms that tend to have a relatively continuous turnover of directors and managers.  
Managers, cum the firm’s controlling owners, have full control of the company and complete 
power in determining how the firm is managed and run, thus giving them the opportunity to 
engage in the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth (Hashim and Devi, 2008). Family 
firms with founders sitting on the board are also prone to engage in deviant managerial 
behaviour, as these founders are contended to have a strong emotional commitment towards 
the firms. This would mean that they would engage in almost anything to ensure firm survival 
and safeguard their reputation concerning their long-term presence within the family business 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). 
Government-related institutional ownership is another major form of concentrated ownership 
in Malaysia (Subramaniam, Samuel, and Mahenthiran, 2016). Large ownership among 
Government institutional investors is the result of the Malaysian National Economic Planning 
(NEP) implemented in 1971. The NEP was initiated mainly to lessen the imbalances of equity 
ownership among the different Malaysian ethnic groups, where previously Chinese people 
predominantly controlled the Malaysian economy (Gul, 2006). Following the NEP policy, 
government-related institutional investors played a main role in dominating a firm’s equity 
ownership to promote Bumiputera’s share of the nations’ wealth (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
Government investment organisations (so-called government-linked investment companies – 
GLICs) were also established with the main aim of helping society to indirectly participate in 
the economic development by investing their pension contributions and savings in private 
companies (Bin Muhamed et al., 2014). 
Three different types of government investment organisations exist in Malaysia (Bin Muhamed 
et al., 2014, p. 455): (i) investment organisations owned by the federal government (FGLICs) 
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with the role of promoting federal government’s social and economic policies; (ii) pension and 
investment funds sponsored by the federal government (PIF GLICs) with the role of providing 
pension benefits or maximising the long-term savings of the Bumiputera depositors; and (iii) 
State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs) with the role of promoting state 
governments’ social and economic policies. Although the different types of government 
ownership may appear to have their own unique set of objectives, nonetheless, Bin Muhamed 
et al. (2014) found that portfolio companies of government investment organisations that are 
more remote from the central authority (such as the SEDC) demonstrate poor financial 
performance compared to those owned by more strictly supervised government investment 
organisations. The findings suggest that the heightened scrutiny by regulatory authorities on 
federal government owned investment organisations help compensate for the weaknesses in 
personal incentives of a firm’s board members when compared to those board members of 
government-sponsored investment organisation with relatively looser scrutiny. Overall, while 
government investment organisations generally help improve the proportion of Bumiputera 
ownership in the capital market and facilitate firms’ access to private funding, government 
investment organisations as blockholders in listed firms can potentially mitigate problems of 
transparency and expropriation of the minorities by improving their control and supervision of 
portfolio firms (Lau and Tong, 2008).  
From another perspective, there are arguments where government investors, as large 
shareholders, lack the incentive to perform effective monitoring as their actions are essentially 
motivated by political expediency (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Choy, Gul and Yao (2011) 
contend that agency problems arise particularly when government utilises their control and 
influence via large ownership to favour connected parties, such as politicians and cronies, 
leading to the expropriation of the minority shareholders. There is also the incentive for firms 
to act in the interest of government-owners and expropriate rents from the minority 
shareholders in return for special treatment9. Dominant government ownership can lead to a 
relationship-based system that helps build a protective shield by the government against any 
scrutiny on actions being made by the firm (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). This would mean that 
government-owned firms tend to have a close political connection and benefit from 
                                                          
9
 Special treatment includes examples such as secured business contracts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003); access to 
acquire privatised assets (Johnson and Mitton, 2003); access to funding priorities and subsidies (Gul, 2006); privilege 
of bailout (Faccio et al., 2006); relaxed regulatory oversight (Bushman et al., 2004); and increased hurdles for 
competitors or new entrants (Choy et al., 2011). 
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government protection, such that they are less exposed to market discipline especially when 
the managers are involved with self-interested deviant behaviour (Lim et al., 2014). It is thus 
expected that government-owned firms tend to be more opaque in their financial disclosure so 
as to mask their business inefficiency and deviant behaviour of favouring certain connected 
parties and rent expropriation from the minority shareholders. This was supported by the 
findings in Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010) that show the stock price of Chinese-listed firms with 
government as the largest shareholders incorporate less firm-specific information.  
Based on the survey by Claessens et al. (2000) on 238 Malaysian listed firms in 1996, 67% were 
in family hands while 13% were state-controlled firms. Further examples can be seen from 
prior research that shows that the majority of firms’ top largest shareholders alone are 
dominated by family shareholders. For instance, based on a study in 1999, the World Bank 
Report (2001) found that the five largest shareholders in more than half of the listed firms 
owned more than 60% of the firms’ equity and more than 50% of voting power. The five largest 
shareholders include nominee companies (46%), non-financial institutions (25%), and 
government-related institutional investors (17%). In another study by Capulong et al. (2000), it 
was found that most of these nominee companies and non-financial institutions belong to 
family shareholders. Appointing nominee companies was initially done to hide the true identity 
of owners, partially resulting from the government’s attempt to reallocate corporate shares to 
the indigenous Bumiputras (Capulong et al., 2000). The study by the World Bank Report (2005) 
in 2004 shows that Malaysian listed firms are mainly managed by owner-managers. In 
approximately 85% of Malaysian listed firms, the position of board chairman, vice-chairman, 
and CEO was held by a member of the controlling family or nominee of the controlling family. 
A follow-up study was done by Carney and Child (2013) to examine the ownership and control 
of the Southeast Asian countries in 2008. It was found that Malaysia remains to have family 
ownership as its dominant form of ownership structure. More than half of the family firms 
were at least 25 year old. Carney and Child (2013) further found that Malaysia exhibited the 
largest increase of government ownership by 2008 in comparison to other South East Asian 
countries. They noted several changes in ownership among the listed firms from family-
dominated to becoming state-dominated, possibly due to the Asian financial crisis being the 
precipitating factor. Some of the family firms might have been involved in financial distress or 
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bankruptcy during the crisis, which forced the government to intervene for financial assistance 
leading to the acquisition of the firm’s equity (Carney and Child, 2013).  
The deviation of control and cash flow rights of large blockholders is another key feature of 
firms with a highly concentrated ownership. This is achieved mainly via pyramidal ownership 
and cross-shareholding between firms (Claessens et al., 2000). High control via crossholdings 
and pyramidal ownership is another salient feature of listed firms in Malaysia (Faccio, Lang, 
and Young, 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013). A pyramidal structured firm, 
with separation of control and cash flow rights, is defined as “owning a majority of the stock of 
one corporation that, in turn, holds a majority of the stock of another corporation” (Claessens 
et al., 2000, p.93). The example given by Lemmon and Lins (2003) can be illustrated as follows. 
A Malaysian entrepreneur named Halim owns 28% of Renong Berhad. With the 28% stake, 
Halim is made the effective majority shareholder and ultimate owner of Renong Berhad. 
Renong Berhad, in turn, owns 33% of United Engineers Malaysia’s (UEM) equity. The 33% stake 
makes Renong the effective controlling shareholder of UEM. Since Halim effectively controls 
Renong and Renong is UEM’s major shareholder, Halim then appears to have effective control 
of UEM. In short, Halim’s control right in UEM is 28% and cash flow right of (28% x 33%) 9.2%. 
According to Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000, p. 299), in comparison to pyramidal 
ownership, firms within a cross-holding ownership structure are “linked by horizontal cross-
holding of shares that reinforce and entrench the power of central controllers”. This would 
mean that for a cross-holding ownership structure, the voting rights that are used to control a 
group are distributed over the whole group; this contradicts the pyramid ownership where 
voting rights are concentrated in the hands of a single shareholder or company. A study was 
conducted by Claessens et al. (1999) in December 1996 to examine the patterns of ultimate 
control in 2,980 listed companies in nine East Asian countries. They found that 39% of the 
Malaysian sample firms have a pyramidal ownership structure, while 15% of the Malaysian 
firms have a cross-holding ownership structure. Carney and Child (2013) did a follow up study 
in 2008, and document a decrease of 12% in the proportion of pyramidal ownership structured 
firms (from the previous 39% of pyramidal ownership documented in Claessens et al. (2000)). 
While the means by which ultimate owners enhance their control (via pyramidal ownership) of 
the Malaysian listed firms were found to be declining, the separation of ownership and control 
remain bounded tightly together and generally exhibited relatively little change. 
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Pyramidal-structured ownership may, however, lead to the separation of cash flow rights and 
control rights, most affecting firms positioned in the lower tier of the pyramid (Claessens et al., 
2000). Pyramid-structured ownership allows the ultimate owner to exercise greater control 
rights that are disproportionate to the amount of ownership that becomes smaller at the lower 
part of the pyramid (Bany-Ariffin et al., 2010). Claessens et al. (2002) and Lemmon and Lins 
(2003) empirically document the devaluation of other shareholders’ interests within a pyramid 
group as the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights allows ultimate owners to exploit 
and expropriate a company’s resources. The problem is substantiated when the protection of 
minority shareholders is usually lacking, particularly in the emerging market (Young et al., 
2008).  
Research by Faccio et al. (2010) and Bany-Ariffin et al. (2010) indicates that the ultimate 
owners’ incentives to avoid dilution of their shareholdings in firms at the bottom of the 
pyramid means that they prefer raising debt rather than equity to fund investments in these 
firms. Raising equity may give rise to the presence of multiple intermediates of other 
shareholdings along the line of ownership, which may dilute the ultimate owners’ 
shareholdings (Carney and Child, 2013). The motive for protecting the ultimate owner’s 
dominance and entrenchment may lead to excessive leverage, which may, in turn, finally put 
firms in financial difficulty and bankruptcy. The excessive leverage may only cause minimal 
impact on the ultimate owner in the event of financial distress or bankruptcy; this is because of 
the separation of cash flow rights and control rights, while other shareholders in the firm carry 
most of the financial losses.  
Overall, prior research shows that managers of the highly concentrated form of ownership 
tend to report low informative accounting earnings so as to hide potential expropriations (Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Lim et al., 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). This may lead to information 
asymmetry and lack of transparency in the market, thus encouraging managerial practices of 
opportunistic earnings management to influence firm’s share price, which can be misleading to 
the investors. The prevalence of firms with concentrated ownership in Malaysia may also mean 
there is less developed public disclosure as insiders are fully informed of the company’s 
activities and financial position (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006), leading to many cases of 
insider trading in Malaysia. This is evidenced by Ameer and Othman (2008) in their analysis of 
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264 Malaysian listed firms where there was a total of 1,629 sales and purchase of share 
transactions undertaken by directors in the open market from January 2007 to July 2008 alone. 
To conclude, some studies may have shown that high ownership concentration reduces agency 
problems due to a greater alignment between owner’s control and equity ownership, leading 
to high monitoring incentives and a more focused strategic direction of increasing firm’s 
profitability and shareholders’ return (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mitton, 2002; Lins, 2003). 
Firms with a large family ownership, for example, have the intention of preserving family 
reputation and ensure long-term firm survival so as to pass the family business to future 
generations. There is, therefore, a tendency for family firms to disclose earnings in good faith 
(Wang, 2006). As large shareholders, government institutional investors also act as a 
controlling and monitoring mechanism to compensate for the weaknesses in board members’ 
personal incentives.  
Nonetheless, contradicting evidence was also shown by the majority of the studies, where 
highly concentrated ownership gives rise to agency problems (Fan and Wong, 2002; Young et 
al., 2008; Jiang and Peng, 2011). The tightness of equity ownership in family firms allows 
managers’ self-interested behaviour to go unchallenged, either internally by the firm’s 
directors or externally by the takeover market. Consistently, government-owned firms prefer 
to issue obscure financial information so as to mask their inefficiency (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997) and deviant actions of favouring specified parties, as well as their rent expropriations 
from the minority shareholders (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The lack of monitoring and 
disciplinary action provides controlling owners with the incentive and opportunities to exercise 
private control for personal gain at the expense of the minority shareholders. This finally 
impacts the transparency and reliability of financial reporting, such that information on 
aggressive earnings management is concealed to deceive other shareholders (Hasnan et al., 
2013). Overall, in an attempt to develop a model that can indicate the likelihood of forced 
restatement, this study would examine how ownership factors, e.g., family firms and 
government-controlled firms, may link to the possibility of earnings misstatement, hence 
forced restatement. 
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2.6 Summary 
The Malaysian market and institutional environment play a major role in influencing 
managerial behaviour and the resulting quality of a firm’s financial reporting. The overall 
Malaysian corporate governance framework and regulatory system is of high quality and 
provides very good support to Malaysian business activities (Arshad et al., 2016). Nonetheless, 
there remain certain weaknesses that create a condition that is conducive for aggressive 
earnings management to take place. Highly concentrated ownership that is prevalent in 
Malaysia gives great influence towards opportunistic managerial behaviour, resulting in 
frequent conflicts between both controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Hashim 
and Devi, 2008). The conflict becomes worse with the absence of effective investor protection, 
weak legal enforcement, weak board independence, strong political connection, and 
government interference within the Malaysian economy. Even disciplinary actions, such as 
penalties imposed for corporate control, are sometimes small enough to become an effective 
deterrent. This has led to the pervasive cases of earnings misstatements among the Malaysian 
listed firms.  
Overall, the weaknesses in the Malaysian institutional structure have led to problems of 
information asymmetry. With poor information transparency, accounting manipulation can be 
used to influence a firm’s share price (Efendi et al., 2007). This, in fact, can be misleading to the 
investors, thus preventing them from effective investment decision-making.  
The overview given in this chapter gives insights into the complex interaction between the 
elements of the Malaysian institutional structure that in turn could give a better understanding 
of the causes that may influence managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management, 
or symptoms that may indicate the likelihood of financial misstatement. The overview of the 
Malaysian capital market environment might also give some early ideas on the type of firm-
specific factors (such as financial performance) or corporate governance factors (such as firm’s 
ownership structure and political connection) that could help predict the likelihood of forced 
restatement. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EARNINGS MISREPRESENTATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the theoretical framework for the study. Based on the main objective of 
the study, which is to examine whether firms’ financial or non-financial corporate governance 
characteristics affect the likelihood of forced restatements in Malaysia, this chapter starts with 
a discussion of agency theory to support a better understanding of managerial opportunism, 
the incentive for earnings misstatement, and the consequential forced restatement. Section 
3.2 firstly explains the definition and behavioural assumptions of agency. Section 3.3 then 
presents the concept of the agency problem, and its relationship with financial reporting. 
Section 3.4 discusses how ownership structure, financial reporting discretion, and corporate 
governance may relate to each other.  
Following the discussion on how agency conflict may influence managers’ incentives in the 
financial reporting process, the next section of this chapter further highlights the importance of 
forced restatement. Specifically, Section 3.5 begins by discussing the definition of the different 
types of financial restatement and the destructive effect of forced restatement. Section 3.6 
discusses earnings misrepresentation; this covers all of those areas, some of which are allowed 
(earnings manipulation), some of which are not allowed (earnings misstatement), and some of 
which are fraudulent. The discussion on the various types of earnings misrepresentation may 
help provide a better understanding of the differentiation between each particular earnings 
attribute, and identify which of the earnings attributes are more likely to lead to forced 
restatement. Subsequently, the different motivations of earnings management are presented 
in Section 3.7. Earnings management represents an important subject matter in this whole 
study; this is because incidences of earnings misstatement normally arise from opportunistic 
earnings management, which then tends to shift towards more aggressive accounting practices 
that cross the non-GAAP boundary. This marks the point when firms are likely to issue forced 
restatement. The final Section 3.8 provides the summary for this chapter.  
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3.2 Agency theory 
Modern corporations have evolved to become an entity that is established based on the 
operational skills of a qualified management team combined with an amount of capital funded 
by a dispersed pool of shareholders (Koh 2003). This has led to the existence of an agency 
relationship. An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) as  
“a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”.  
In particular, managers (agents) are involved in initiating and executing exchanges between the 
nexus of shareholders (principals), customers, suppliers, employees, creditors and other 
relevant stakeholders (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The agency theory emphasises 
that shareholders become the residual claimants to the remaining payoffs once the contractual 
rewards have been delivered to relevant parties such as executives, debtholders, and possibly 
other stakeholders (Walker, 2013).  
Agency theory, which was developed based on the contractual framework, focuses on 
incentive problems that arise from the divergence of risk preferences and objectives among 
the contract parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is developed based on two behavioural 
assumptions: (i) bounded rationality, and (ii) opportunism. Firstly, it is assumed that both 
principals and agents are intendedly rational but boundedly so. This means that economic 
decisions are made rationally by individuals (e.g., to maximise their own utility), but it is 
bounded to the extent that the decisions are not made within a milieu of perfect knowledge; 
this is because an individual’s capacity to retrieve and assess all relevant information 
accurately is limited (due to cognitive limitation, for example).  
Secondly, both principals and agents can get involved in the problem of opportunism, where 
there is a propensity for an individual to seek self-interest through guile (Williamson 1996). 
Individuals would rather “strive rationally to advance their own personal goals” than 
prioritising those of the firm due to the “human selfishness and struggles for power” that form 
part of their self-interest behaviour (Simon, 1997, p.88). Given the opportunities, rational 
individuals typically opt for choices that make them better off. When engaged in opportunism, 
hidden actions, such as shirking, perquisites consumption, and reporting manipulated 
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information, may result in one party (agents) enjoying self-benefits but at the expense of other 
parties (principals) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Schipper, 1989). 
Overall, agency theory highlights a major problem in establishing and preserving mutually 
satisfactory behaviour among the potentially self-interested agents, when information about 
their actions is incomplete, uncertain, costly and asymmetrically disseminated among the 
principals (Oviatt, 1988).  
3.3 Agency problem 
The delegation of power to agents by principals to take control and use a firm’s assets give rise 
to an agency problem. An agency problem occurs when, (a) there are conflicting goals or 
desires between principals and agents, and (b) it is hard or costly for principals to observe and 
verify agents’ actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Asymmetric information and transaction cost are thus 
seen to be the key factors of the agency problem. In the event where these two constraints are 
absent, both principal and agent may possess the same information, in such a way that the 
principal is able to observe and verify actions undertaken by the agent without any cost.  
Agency theory highlights that the condition of uncertainty in which a firm operates gives rise to 
possible information asymmetries between managers who control the firms and the 
shareholders. Information asymmetry potentially leads to the divergence of interest between 
shareholders and managers. There are two main forms of information asymmetry (Walker 
2013). First is the moral hazard problem (hidden actions) that arises when external 
shareholders are not able to scrutinise the actions and decision-making made by the managers. 
It would be at least difficult, if not impossible, for shareholders to observe whether managers 
are working towards fulfilling the shareholders’ interests, or for them to monitor the riskiness 
of investment choices being made. Second is the adverse selection problem that represents 
agents’ misrepresentation of ability. Adverse selection arises when a principal has limited 
ability to completely verify the skills and abilities that the agents claimed to have, either when 
the agent is working or during the hiring period. For instance, adverse selection takes place 
when an employer cannot assess whether a research scientist really has experience in a 
scientific specialty that he claimed to have (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Principals may minimise agency problems by incurring some agency costs. According to Jensen 
(2005, p. 6), agency cost represents “the sum of the contracting, monitoring and bonding costs 
undertaken to reduce the costs due to conflicts of interest plus the ''residual loss" that occurs”, 
based on the fact that it is almost impossible to perfectly align the interests of the agents to 
that of the principals. Solving the agency problem may require contracts that “are not 
costlessly written and enforced” (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 307). A comprehensive contract 
may be written covering all aspects of possible future events to ensure objectives align 
between principals and agents. However, transaction costs that arise from uncertainty, 
negotiating, harmonising and enforcing the contract between the two parties tends to restrict 
the principal’s scope of writing a complete contract (Oviatt, 1988; Hart, 1995). Due to the 
costliness of writing a complete contract, an incomplete contract may be written by a principal 
that contains gaps and missing provisions (Hart 1995). As a result, an information gap may 
remain between the principal and agent. 
Other than a written contract, bonding and monitoring activities may also help minimise 
agency problems. Monitoring costs are typically incurred by the principals when monitoring 
activities are undertaken to control agents’ behaviour; this includes instances such as 
appointing a board of directors, auditing, incentive plans and budget restrictions. As for 
bonding costs, these are incurred by the agents to guarantee that agents do not engage in 
activities that can harm principals’ interests. For example, the cost of the internal audit 
incurred by the managers acts as a signal to the owners that managers are performing in a 
manner that is consistent with the employment contract and are acting responsibly.  
Nonetheless, implementing bonding and monitoring activities are all costly, meaning that the 
total elimination of agents opportunistic behaviour is almost impossible (Dechow and Sloan, 
1991). The cost that remains from the divergence between agents’ decisions and the decisions 
that would maximise principal’s wealth is called residual loss (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Residual loss refers to the ultimate loss in firm value that cannot be further reduced by either 
incurring additional bonding or additional monitoring expenditures.  
3.3.1 Agency problem: Dispersed ownership vs concentrated ownership  
Since the 1930s, many large firms in the US are mainly owned by many small shareholders. 
According to Berle and Means (1932), shareholders make small investments in each firm to 
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diversify their investment risks. The dispersion of ownership across a huge number of public 
shareholders results in the effective separation of ownership of residual claims (vested in the 
shareholders) and control of corporate decisions (vested in the management team) (Berle and 
Means, 1932). The widely-scattered ownership implies that no dominant working control can 
be maintained. Generally, the widely dispersed shareholders have no power to effectively 
exercise control over the wealth that they themselves contributed to the company (Berle and 
Means 1932). In this condition, the power to operate the business’s day-to-day activities is 
delegated by the shareholders to the managers who possess relevant, valuable and specific 
skills and knowledge. Management acts on behalf of shareholders’ interests as the firm’s 
coordinator in making decisions related to resources allocation (Fama, 1980).  
The separation of ownership and control creates a condition where the interest of 
shareholders and managers often do diverge. The divergent interest gives rise to incentives 
among managers, who have the power of control, to maximise their own utility and extract 
private gain at the expense of the shareholders; this gives rise to the term principal-agent 
conflict (Young et al., 2008). Writing contracts that perfectly align the objectives of both 
managers and shareholders is very costly (Healy and Palepu, 1993), and relying on contracts 
alone is insufficient to resolve agency conflicts (Hart, 1995). 
In developed markets, concentrated ownership is widely viewed as a mechanism that could 
possibly address traditional principal-agent conflicts (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Grossman and 
Hart, 1986). Ownership concentration is where a large portion of shares with voting rights are 
owned by certain individuals or a few groups of shareholders (Young and Ahlstrom, 2003). 
Agency theory postulates that dominant shareholders are more inclined to monitor managers’ 
actions due to the significant loss of wealth they might incur if a firm performs poorly, and that 
they have enough power to monitor activites at a low cost. Monitoring further supports the 
alignment of interest, where minority shareholders can further benefit from the dominant 
shareholders’ oversight (Holderness, 2003). 
Nonetheless, if the dominant shareholders are more concerned about their own interests, it is 
likely that they will pressure managers to act for their own personal benefit (Holderness, 2003; 
Young et al., 2008). There are various forms of personal benefit; these may include transfer 
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pricing through related party transactions, or even those relating to gaining reputation and 
personal satisfaction (Hart, 1995). 
Many listed firms, especially in the emerging economies, are mainly dominated by highly 
concentrated ownership. The uniqueness of the institutional background in emerging 
economies with high concentrated ownership and poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders, calls for two key types of agency problems. The first is the common traditional 
principal-agent problem that involves conflict between shareholders and managers. The 
second, which is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed countries, is the 
principal-principal conflict that take place between two different types of principals, i.e., 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008).  
Generally, shareholders’ behaviour towards a firm might be affected by the extent of control 
(voting) rights and cash flow (ownership) rights associated with their common shareholdings. 
Specifically, cash flow rights may affect the wealth of shareholders (via capital gain or 
distribution of dividends), while the control rights give shareholders the power to observe and 
monitor managerial action, as well as protection from being exploited by a firm’s managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this view, shareholders’ power and incentive to oversee 
managers and maximise profit should intensify when a substantial proportion of ownership 
rights is retained in addition to control. Such incentives may also help in restraining controlling 
shareholders from the diversion of a firm’s resources, as well as increasing share value of the 
minority investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Overall, it is 
postulated that concentrated ownership creates effective monitoring by the dominant 
shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In the East Asian emerging economies, firms with concentrated ownership exhibit huge 
divergence between control rights and ownership rights; this is due to the fact that dominant 
shareholders often exercise great control over a firm, regardless of their small stake in 
ownership rights (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002). A shareholder is considered as a controlling or 
dominant shareholder when the person has indirect or direct ownership of substantial voting 
shares and obtains effective control over a firm’s policies and operations (La Porta et al., 1999). 
This would mean the substantial number of shares owned by the controlling shareholders 
should increase their ability and incentive to control the firm’s policies and major decisions. In 
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most cases, these controlling shareholders participate in undertaking a certain managerial role, 
such as becoming the firm’s chairman or chief executive officer (La Porta et al., 1999). The high 
overlap between management and controlling shareholders may not only weaken discipline 
towards management, but it also creates an opportunity for rent-seeking activities to take 
place (Filatotchev et al., 2005). Furthermore, the excess control rights over ownership rights 
often give rise to the expropriation of minority shareholders wealth (Faccio et al., 2001). This 
principal-principal agency problem mainly arises due to the goal incongruence between the 
majority and minority shareholders, resulting in the majority investors abusing their control 
rights by extracting private benefit of control at the expense of the minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
It was documented that the vast majority of public listed firms in Asia are controlled by families 
as the largest investor (Claessens et al., 2000; Heugens et al., 2009; Steier, 2009). Claessens et 
al. (2000) further found that over two-thirds of East Asian companies, including Malaysia, have 
a single shareholder as the largest controlling shareholder. Claessens et al. (2000) also 
discovered that in most parts of the world, ultimate owners of most listed firms have control 
rights that significantly exceed their cash flow rights; this is usually via pyramidal ownership or 
cross-stockholdings. Thus, the ability of the dominant shareholders to exercise control over a 
firm’s operations, despite their small stake in cash flow rights, is inevitable in developing 
countries. It is the separation of control rights and cash flow that has motivated controlling 
shareholders to go for asset expropriation (e.g. poor strategies or shirking) for personal benefit 
(e.g., hiring unqualified family members).  
With regard to the discussion above, the agency theory, in particular, the principal-principal 
agency theory is used in this study as a theoretical background to justify incidences of 
managerial opportunism and misstatement, and therefore the forced restatement that occurs 
in Malaysia. This is further explained in the next Sub-section 3.3.2 and Section 3.4. 
Consequently, the implementation of a high quality corporate governance mechanism 
becomes important to help monitor managerial activities, limit deviant managerial behaviour, 
and finally mitigate these agency conflicts. As noted by Hermanson (2003, p.44), “Good 
governance goes in-hand with reduced risk of financial reporting problems and other bad 
accounting outcomes”. 
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3.3.2 Financial reporting and agency problem 
The demand for financial information arises due to information asymmetry and incentives 
misalignment between principals and agents (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Corporate reporting 
serves as a monitoring tool that helps reduce the information gap that arises due to the 
separation of ownership and control, where principals do not have full rights in decision 
making and where the agents’ behaviour is unobservable (due to adverse selection or moral 
hazard). Ideally, corporate reporting and auditing help provide shareholders with reliable and 
relevant information that is used to assist in the effective monitoring of agents’ behaviour and 
thus reduce principal-agent problems (Armstrong et al., 2010). 
Companies started to report financial information even before it was legally required. The 19th 
century provides evidence of an unregulated economy where corporations in the US and the 
UK present their financial statements to the shareholders, although not legally required to do 
so (Watts, 1977). In alleviating agency conflicts, the implicit and explicit principal-agent 
contracts typically use accounting information that includes aspects such as business decisions 
taken, usage of resources, and returns generated from investments (Beyer et al., 2010). This 
enables shareholders to monitor agents’ compliance with the contractual agreements and to 
determine whether a firm’s resources are managed in line with the shareholders’ interests. 
However, misalignment of incentives between principals and agents (principal-agent conflict) 
can impede managers from conveying reliable information. In a business environment with 
concentrated firm ownership that is prevalent in emerging countries such as Malaysia, the 
principal-principal conflict is more likely to prevail. The controlling shareholders (who are also 
the firm’s managers) have superior firm-specific information than the minority shareholders, 
i.e., by virtue of being closer to a firm’s production process and other aspects of the firm’s 
business activities; this gives rise to information asymmetry. Due to the informational 
advantage that controlling shareholders have over the minority shareholders, they are prone 
to selectively and strategically disclose information, and may not voluntarily disclose all private 
information. Controlling shareholders often do not report information that is harmful to their 
personal interests, e.g. information that indicates extraction of private benefits or firm’s poor 
performance (Verrecchia, 2001). The minority shareholders are typically at an informational 
disadvantage, which thus creates or exacerbates principal-principal conflicts (Armstrong et al., 
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2010). The information gap that exists may hinder even highly skilled board members from 
monitoring and evaluating controlling shareholder’s actions effectively (Jensen, 1993). 
The regulation of disclosure and auditing is among the mechanisms that help regulate 
controlling shareholders/managers in the disclosure of certain accounting information levels 
and improves information credibility. Accounting standards and disclosure regulations are used 
to regulate financial reporting choices that are available to the managers in preparing the 
financial statements. For instance, local and international accounting standards are designed to 
increase the level of transparency and quality of financial information. The accounting 
standards probably fail because there are forced restatements, but they only fail in extreme 
circumstances and are therefore actually fulfilling their functions. The reasons why there are 
rare cases of earnings misstatements, or why their systems generally work, are that the 
standards are well thought through and are of high quality; hence there are these outliers of 
misstatements and forced restatements.  
Disclosures can be effectively enforced by the regulators (where shareholders are unable to 
enforce on their own) as regulators can execute certain sanctions that are not available in 
private contracting (Beyer et al., 2010). For example, stock market supervision in Malaysia is 
performed by the Securities Commission (SC) by setting certain disclosure rules for listed firms. 
In cases of non-compliance, the SC have the authority to instruct firms to take rectifying 
actions, make announcements of the non-compliances, or even penalise the firms for such 
offences (Wan Ismail et al., 2013). Furthermore, by having minimum disclosure requirements 
as imposed by the ruling accounting standards, the information gap between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders can be reduced (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Alternatively, monitoring expenditure incurred by the shareholders in hiring reputable 
information intermediaries, such as auditors, may help align principal-principal interests by 
scrutinising the credibility of financial statements. External auditors may provide independent 
assurance on the quality of financial information being disclosed publicly, thereby limiting 
managers’ ability to engage in earnings manipulation, and thus the incentive to extract 
minority shareholders’ wealth (Fan and Wong, 2005). Establishing an internal audit within 
companies acts as an adjunct to the external audit function, the difference being that internal 
audit costs are incurred by the managers (Adams, 1994). Incurring internal audit costs (i.e., 
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bonding expenditure) may signal to the shareholders that managers are behaving responsibly 
and fulfil shareholders’ demand for accountability. Ideally, disclosure regulations and auditing 
are among the corporate governance mechanisms that can reduce information asymmetry. 
Nonetheless, the ineffectiveness of financial reporting regulations and auditing may hinder the 
efforts of curbing agency problems and information asymmetry in capital markets. Problems 
specific to Malaysia, such as weak regulatory enforcement, may limit the efficacy of regulations 
to impede managerial opportunism in financial reporting. Poor audit quality may also render 
auditing to be ineffective. When there are imperfections in accounting regulations and 
auditing, among others, it is likely that managers may trade-off between implementing and 
disclosing accounting decisions to disseminate their superior information on the firm’s 
performance to the shareholders, and to manage financial information that suits managers’ 
self-interests.  
In the case of Malaysia, notable cases of forced restatement that have emerged indicate the 
continued failure to ensure that there is reliable and credible financial reporting. In effect, 
unscrupulous shareholders or blockholders use corporate reporting as a medium to increase 
information asymmetry by not reporting accurately. Overall, incidences of forced restatement 
that occur in Malaysia can also be taken as symptoms of poor corporate governance (further 
discussed in Chapter 2). The Malaysian government, as well as international agencies, 
advocated that improving Malaysian corporate governance practices is a crucial reform; it is 
also a significant way of making the Malaysian corporations resilient to any opportunistic 
behaviour and deviant actions, thus enhancing the quality and credibility of a firm’s financial 
reporting. As advocated by the World Bank (2000, p. 69), “Deficiencies in corporate 
governance did not constrain the impressive pre-crisis performance of East Asia’s emerging 
market economies – but they amplified the subsequent downturns”.  
3.4 Ownership structure, financial reporting discretion, and corporate governance 
Malaysia is well known with its highly concentrated ownership among most of the listed 
corporations (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002). The proportion of listed firms with family 
ownership in Malaysia is among the highest in the world (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002). Other 
investing parties, such as regulators and institutional investors (private sector and government-
related), also hold dominating interests in Malaysian listed companies (Ismail and Sinnadurai, 
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2012). Other forms of ownership, such as crossholdings and pyramidal structure, present as 
another salient feature of listed firms in Malaysia (Faccio et al., 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Hasnan et al., 2013).  
The deviation of control and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders is a key feature of 
firms with highly concentrated ownership. As discussed in Section 3.3.1 earlier, the divergence 
between control rights and cashflow rights among controlling shareholders exacerbates agency 
costs. This is due to the incentives and opportunities that arise among controlling shareholders 
to engage in extracting private benefits of control at the expense of the minority investors 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Various ways were employed for extracting private 
control benefits, which include the appropriation of a firm’s assets, perquisite consumptions, 
or even outright theft.  
These private control benefits are considered to be part of an opaque information 
environment that lead to controlling shareholders (who are also the managers/insiders) 
abusing private information (Peng and Jiang 2010). The opaque information environment 
within highly concentrated firm ownership creates the incentives among dominating 
shareholders to employ aggressive accounting practices to conceal the firm’s true underlying 
performance; it also masks their deviant behaviour of extracting the wealth of minority 
investors (Leuz et al., 2003; Haw et al., 2004). Prior research has shown that expropriation 
activities lead to practices of opportunistic earnings management that result in poor quality of 
public disclosure, especially among firms where owners have more control rights than the cash 
flow rights (Fan and Wong, 2002; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Ismail and Sinnadurai, 2012; Hou et 
al., 2015). Managers’/owners’ adoption of aggressive accounting practices results in earnings 
manipulation and misstatements; this then leads to the likelihood of firms being issued with 
forced restatement (Ma et al., 2014; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). 
A variety of external and internal mechanisms have been introduced to curb and limit agency 
costs, through what is called corporate governance. Good corporate governance practices 
affect the way a firm is managed and the efficacy of its governance structure (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). Various governance mechanisms were suggested; these include debt financing, 
board structure, market for corporate control, and shareholdings by outsiders and insiders 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Gregory and Simms (1999) assert that the implementation of 
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effective corporate governance mechanisms is crucial as it promotes an efficient allocation of 
resources and facilitates in attracting productive investment capital for firms and economy 
growth, via increased confidence among creditors and investors, locally and internationally. 
Good corporate governance also helps improve a firm’s responsiveness towards fulfilling 
societal needs and expectations, which could lead to a better long-term performance for the 
firm (Gregory and Simms, 1999).  
Lack of transparency of firm’s business operations to the shareholders increases the demand of 
corporate governance mechanisms that can alleviate mainly the moral hazard agency problem 
(Fan and Wong, 2002; Bushman et al., 2004). Cohen et al. (2004) highlight the 
interrelationships between the various mechanisms within the corporate governance mosaic 
for financial reporting quality. There are two mechanisms: (i) internally, which comprise of 
internal auditors, external auditors, audit committee, the board of directors, and management; 
and (ii) externally, comprising regulators, the legal system, stock exchanges, legislators, 
financial analysts, and stockholders. 
One aspect of internal corporate governance mechanisms is auditing, as has been discussed 
earlier in Section 3.3.2. Auditing is nonetheless essential as it helps scrutinise managerial 
actions. The external audit may provide independent assurance on the credibility of financial 
information. In support of the external audit, an internal audit helps maintain cost-efficient 
contracting between managers and shareholders. The audit committee is another monitoring 
mechanism that mainly comprises of independent directors that oversee the firm’s financial 
reporting process. The contribution of these various auditing mechanisms may improve 
managerial monitoring activities and enhance the effectiveness of aligning the interests 
between owners and managers.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) illustrate the role of the board of directors as another monitoring 
device for managerial opportunistic behaviour. The board retains the ultimate control rights 
(delegated from the shareholders) over the agents, including monitoring, hiring and firing, as 
well as setting compensation plans for the top management. The board of directors acts as an 
information system that can be used by shareholders of large corporations to monitor and 
supervise managerial behaviour. The firm board tends to have rich firm-specific information, 
which initiates a firm’s top management to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Fama 
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and Jensen, 1983). The board’s richness of information can be measured operationally in terms 
of its specific characteristics, such as board meeting frequency, board independence and the 
proportion of financial expertise on the board (Eisenhardt, 1989). The inclusion of an outside 
non-executive director further enhances the board’s ability to monitor managerial behaviour 
efficiently. The outside directors reduce any potential collusion with the top management, 
consistent with their incentive to uphold the reputation as being experts in decision control. 
Overall, board monitoring that is done in combination with efforts from non-executive and 
outside directors (who are independent from managerial influences) may enhance the integrity 
and reliability of accounting information.  
In addition, substantial efforts were made by regulators and relevant authorities to improve 
corporate governance practices; these included introducing improved accounting rules that use 
international standards of good practice as a benchmark, and high quality corporate 
governance codes of conduct (Filatotchev et al., 2011). Nonetheless, the increasing cases of 
high-profile accounting scandals and corporate failures that took place, especially in emerging 
countries such as Citic Pacific in China, SK Networks in South Korea, Satyam in India, and 
Transmile in Malaysia (Filatotchev et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014), have highlighted the 
possibility that firm-level corporate governance practices might have failed to curb abuses of 
private information and improve corporate transparency in developing stock markets 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011). 
The mere imitation of governance structures and mechanisms in developed countries without 
properly considering the socio-politic-economic environment in that developing country might 
not help mitigate corporate scandals, especially in Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The 
presence of an asymmetric information environment and the separation of control rights and 
cash flow rights among concentrated ownership firms in emerging economies, are among the 
factors that might have contributed towards the failure of the firm-level corporate governance 
system. Such phenomena introduce the likelihood of principal-principal conflicts as the 
controlling shareholders’ (who also tend to be the manager) self-interest may result in the 
misappropriation of corporate assets, e.g., by pursuing imprudent or overly risky investment 
projects at the expense of the minority capital providers (Young et al., 2008).  
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Furthermore, the possibility of detecting accounting misstatements in developing countries is 
relatively low due to their less effective governance mechanism when compared to developed 
countries. Regulatory enforcement and legal protection are relatively weak in developing 
countries, especially in Malaysia (Gunasegaram, 2007a), resulting in difficulties for detecting 
and curbing the acts of earnings misstatement. This is in contrast to developed countries 
where firms with alleged financial misstatements will restate their earnings promptly as they 
are highly scrutinised and are impacted largely by the reputational and financial penalties 
imposed by the capital market (Johnson et al., 2000; Cheng et al., 2010). In view of this matter, 
this study finds it essentially important to investigate factors that could indicate the likelihood 
of forced restatement that is rarely documented, especially in developing countries (Bany-
Ariffin et al., 2010).  
Within the Malaysian economic background of highly concentrated ownership, the tightness of 
firm ownership may leave the behaviour of self-interested managers to go unchallenged, either 
internally by the firm’s board or externally by firm takeover in the market. This is because 
controlling shareholders, who also act as the firm’s managers, acquire effective control over 
the firm and gain high power in determining how the company is operated, thus the likelihood 
of them expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders. Hence, it is the study’s main 
objective to examine the financial and corporate governance determinants of forced 
restatement firms. Findings from the research will later be used as a basis to develop an 
exploratory forced restatement prediction model, which forms the secondary objective of this 
study. With this, the impact of weaknesses in corporate governance factors, such as ownership 
structure, the board of directors and audit, among others, on managerial opportunistic 
reporting can then be determined.  
3.5 Definition of forced restatement 
A financial restatement is typically issued when a firm’s initial financial information is non-
compliant with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), or provides material 
misleading information. For the purpose of this study, financial restatement is identified in two 
different forms, i.e., (i) accounting restatement, and (ii) forced restatement. The first type, 
accounting restatement, may take place resulting from operational actions and may not 
indicate financial irregularities (Efendi et al., 2007). A firm’s operational actions that give rise to 
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accounting restatement include changes in accounting policies or principles, dividend 
distributions, stock splits, mergers and acquisitions, and change of accounting period (Palmrose 
and Scholz, 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). The second type, forced restatement, refers to 
an event where a company is forced by the auditors, Securities Commission or other 
enforcement agencies to restate its earnings due to GAAP violations, where the reported 
original financial statements at the time of issuance were incorrect (Hennes et al., 2008). The 
GAAP violation or earnings misstatement may be due to unintentional errors or intentional 
irregularities, and can be misleading to the users of financial statements. The seriousness of 
forced restatement may extend to be due to earnings misstatement and even outright fraud 
(Chen et al., 2014). 
Forced financial restatement is an outcome of management opportunism built on the purpose 
of extracting private benefits of control at the expense of uninformed shareholders (Schipper, 
1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999), thereby raising a more general concern about the quality of a 
company’s financial reporting (Akhigbe et al., , 2005). In contrast to bankruptcy and firm 
failures, forced restatement signals a lacking in credibility of a firm’s prior financial reporting as 
it fails to uphold integrity in public disclosure, which prevents investors from making 
informative investment decisions (Chen et al., 2014). It is unlikely that sceptical investors can 
detect any accounting manipulations that act as a threat to their investments absolutely 
(Frédéric et al., 2013). Therefore, not all misstating firms end up with forced restatement as 
some of them are likely left unidentified, while some are unknown misstatements (Dechow et 
al., 2011).  
Although forced earnings restatement rarely occurs, it is considered a significant accounting 
event (Ettredge et al., 2012). This can be explained by the destructive consequences that 
happen when a firm is forced to restate. The impact is damaging, not only to the firm but also 
to other main market players including the investors, auditors, regulators and financial 
analysts. Prior empirical research has also shown that forced restatement gives rise to a high 
cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004), significant penalties and reputational cost (Karpoff et 
al., 2004), high executive turnover, and labour market penalties (e.g., poor employment 
prospects) (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Hennés et al., 2008), an increase in shareholder 
lawsuits and firm litigation (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), huge stock price declines (Agrawal and 
63 
 
Cooper, 2015), massive investor loss (Palmrose et al., 2004; Hennés et al., 2008), and 
bankruptcy filings (Palmrose and Scholz 2004).  
In view of the destructive nature of forced restatement, the development of a research model 
that can identify factors that affect the likelihood of forced restatements seems crucial, so that 
firms that warrant investigation can be more easily identified. Findings of the study on the 
likelihood of forced restatement may then be used to assist investors in making more efficient 
investment decisions, financial analysts in producing reliable investment planning and strategy, 
auditors in identifying red flags of misstatement firms, and regulators in improving laws and 
regulations for better investor protection.  
3.6 Types of earnings misrepresentation 
Prior research has identified various attributes of low accounting quality that can lead to forced 
financial restatement. These include accounting errors (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991), earnings 
manipulation (Beneish, 1999), earnings misstatement (Dechow et al., 2011), and fraud 
(Ettredge et al., 2010; Hasnan et al., 2013). Stolowy and Breton (2004) explain the distinction 
between fair presentation, earnings manipulation, and fraud. This study, however, extends the 
different categories of earnings misrepresentation by including not only earnings manipulation 
and fraud (Stolowy and Breton, 2004) but also earnings misstatement. Figure 3-1, as shown 
below, is adapted from Stolowy and Breton (2004). The figure explains the difference between 
fair presentation, earnings manipulation, earnings misstatement, and fraud. It is essential to 
define and discuss the various terms of low accounting quality so as to enable differentiation 
between each particular earnings attribute on which this study focuses.  
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Figure 3-1: Earnings misrepresentations and fair presentation 
Source: Adapted from Stolowy and Breton (2004). 
Financial statements should be prepared with a fair presentation in compliance with the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (GAO, 2002). The IASB (2010, p.86) describes 
fairly presented financial statements to be showing “a true and fair view of, or as presenting 
fairly, the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an entity”. The 
financial position of an entity represents the expectation of future economic benefits that will 
flow to or from the entity, whereas financial performance represents the net measure of 
increases or decreases in economic benefits during the accounting period. In accordance with 
the objective of financial reporting, financial statements with fair presentation should provide 
useful and valuable information for users to make more efficient and informed decisions.  
The concept of faithful presentation is violated when a firm’s reported earnings are 
misrepresented. Earnings misrepresentation comes in three different forms: (i) earnings 
manipulation, (ii) earnings misstatement, and (iii) fraud. The first type of earnings 
misrepresentation is earnings manipulation. A firm’s reported financial information is distorted 
when there is earnings manipulation (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Schipper, 1989). Earnings 
manipulation arises when managers are involved in altering financial information to mislead 
users of a firm’s underlying economic performance, or to opportunistically influence a 
contractual outcome that depends on a firm’s reported earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). 
The distortion of financial information is considered as earnings manipulation when the 
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earnings figure is still prepared and presented within the boundary of GAAP (Stolowy and 
Breton 2004). When financial information is manipulated, a firm’s business operation’s results 
and financial position are no longer within the “fair presentation” zone, indicating that the 
reported profit no longer represents a firm’s long-term capacity to generate earnings (Stolowy 
and Breton 2004); this makes it difficult for investors to predict a firm’s future performance 
(Habib et al., 2013).  
The (within-GAAP) earnings manipulation can be performed either by accounting manipulation 
(through managerial discretionary choices and application of accounting methods) or by real 
activities manipulation (performing actions that deviate from normal business practices) 
(Jiambalvo, 1996). Managing the accruals component of earnings is one common way of 
accounting manipulation. In certain circumstances, managers adjust accruals to convey private 
information and improve the informativeness and accuracy of financial statements (Defond 
and Jiambalvo, 1994, Fields et al., 2001). Alternatively, managers may discretionarily exercise 
accounting choices to mask a firm’s true economic performance; this includes opportunistically 
managing the abnormal or discretionary accruals of earnings (Fields et al., 2001). The idea of 
opportunistically exercising accounting choices is consistent with the concept of earnings 
management, which will be further discussed in Section 3.7. 
As shown in Figure 3.1, accounting manipulation occurs in one of two ways, i.e., by 
understating or overstating reported earnings (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Stolowy and 
Breton, 2004). There are several explanations why managers manipulate earnings downward 
and understate earnings. It might be because managers opt to shift high abnormal earnings to 
a future period so that it is easier for them to meet or beat future earnings’ targets. 
Alternatively, managers avoid reporting large gains due to the possibility that it increases their 
future earnings-based performance targets (Peasnell et al., 2005). 
 Other examples, as shown by Gong et al. (2008), reveal that managers of stock repurchasing 
firms manipulate earnings downward to reduce the repurchase price prior to an open-market 
repurchase announcement. Jackson and Liu (2010) discover that managers have the incentives 
to manipulate earnings downward to slightly beat the earnings benchmark. This is to allow the 
creation of hidden reserves (e.g., cookie jar reserves) that enable future upward earnings 
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management10. Others, such as Liao and Lin (2016), found that repurchasing firms that operate 
in low competitive industries engage in more intensive downward earnings management 
compared to those firms within highly competitive industries. Liao and Lin (2016) contend that 
repurchasing firms within low competitive industries are subject to less market disciplinary 
power, hence the firm’s association with lower earnings quality.  
There are other instances where managers manipulate earnings upward and overstate 
earnings (Ayers et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Research, such as Teoh et al. (1998a, b), 
Shivakumar (2000) and Teoh and Wong (2002), show that managers inflate earnings prior to 
seasoned equity offerings and initial public offerings with the aim of increasing the offer price 
and improve investors’ expectations of a firm’s future performance. Franz et al. (2014) found 
that firms with restrictive debt covenants tend to manipulate earnings upward to avoid the 
costs associated with loan default and hide their distressed condition. Hou et al. (2015) also 
found that managers manipulate earnings upward to meet performance targets when a firm’s 
true performance is lacking.  
Earnings manipulation can also be accomplished through real activities. Real activities 
manipulation refers to managerial actions that deviate from normal business operating 
activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). With the aim of boosting reported 
profit, managers may engage in real activities manipulation, such as cutting down activities on 
advertising and research and development (Roychowdhury, 2006; Osma and Young, 2009), 
selling assets that a firm would otherwise keep (Bartov, 1993; Poitras et al., 2002), offering 
more lenient credit terms and high price discount, and increasing production (that can lower 
the fixed overhead cost per unit leading to lesser cost of goods sold) (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Nevertheless, all these actions are costly in that they negatively impact a firm’s future cash 
flows. Real activities manipulation reduces firm value in the long-run and appears to be more 
costly than accounting manipulations (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
The second type of financial misrepresentation is earnings misstatement. This is different from 
earnings manipulation as it involves GAAP violation or aggressive accounting practices; these 
may be done unintentionally, or intentionally to mislead investors. The GAO definition of 
                                                          
10
 A “cookie jar” reserve is created by managers as a hidden account used to expand earnings in later years when 
economic events unfold that lead to actual losses to be realised (Levitt, 1998).  
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“aggressive” accounting practices captures specifically “intentional and unintentional misuse of 
facts applied to financial statements, oversight or misinterpretation of accounting rules, and 
fraud” (GAO, 2002, p.76). Both unintentional or intentional financial misstatement can give rise 
to forced restatement as both incidences constitute a violation of the General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Ettredge et al., 2010).  
Unintentional earnings misstatement, which comprises material accounting errors, may arise 
due to ineffective financial reporting controls and standards that are in place (Abdullah et al., 
2010; Dechow et al., 2010). The Accounting Principles Board (Opinion No. 20, 1971) specifies 
material accounting errors as items arising from mistakes in the application of accounting 
principles, mathematical mistakes, the oversight or misjudgement of accounting rules, and 
unintentional misuse of facts that existed at the time the financial statements were prepared. 
Examining the likelihood of forced restatements due to material errors remains crucial as the 
findings might help identify firms with poor internal control systems and weak management 
information systems. These typically result from poor corporate governance practices and 
directors’ ineffectiveness in discharging their monitoring duties.  
Intentional misstatement involves non-GAAP financial reporting, which indicates a lack of 
management integrity (Palmrose et al., 2004). An intentional misstatement is typically engaged 
by managers to obscure a firm’s suboptimal operating policies and investments. Earnings 
misstatement creates uncertainty with regard to the credibility and reliability of management 
representations, thus increasing information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
(Palmrose et al., 2004). In most circumstances, managers commit misstatement to reverse 
prior income inflation or deflation that was done via earnings management (Ettredge et al., 
2010). For example, there is a tendency for managers to manipulate accounting figures to meet 
specific firm goals via earnings management by using the flexibility available within GAAP11. 
Income-increasing (or income-decreasing) accruals are generated and reverse over time. When 
the opportunities to exercise within-GAAP discretion to reverse prior income-increasing or 
income-decreasing earnings management are exhausted, at this point managers are prone to 
                                                          
11
 Managers may manipulate accounting figures by overstating reported earnings to achieve specific goals; for 
example, to conceal a firm’s financial distress (Pryshchepa et al., 2013), to avoid breaching debt covenants (Franz et 
al., 2014), or to seek low-cost external funding (Feltham et al., 2007). 
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cross the boundary of non-GAAP accounting (Ettredge et al., 2010). This is when managers 
perpetrate earnings misstatement. 
The idea of the separation between unintentional and intentional misstatement might be an 
odd construct arising from prior literature (Dechow et al., 2010; Badertscher and Burks, 2011). 
It might be hard to distinguish whether earnings misstatement is committed intentionally or 
unintentionally. While a firm’s earnings misstatements might actually be due to errors 
(unintentional), others might declare it as an error when actually it was deliberate, as it is 
easier to admit to mistakes than cheating. Due to this, in this research, intentional and 
unintentional earnings misstatements are not separated, as the whole idea of earnings 
misstatements itself may give rise to forced restatement. 
Overall, the above discussion indicates that earnings misstatement could potentially involve 
earnings management practices, to the extent that earnings are managed outside the 
boundary of GAAP before earnings are considered to be misstated. Aggressive earnings 
management that leads to earnings misstatement typically involves a firm’s use of a variety of 
aggressive gimmickry techniques (e.g., misapplication of GAAP and accounting rules) to distort 
a firm’s true performance for the sake of achieving desired earnings targets (Magrath and 
Weld 2002). The detection of financial errors by auditors may help trigger managers’ 
involvement in earnings misstatement. Otherwise, firms’ deviant behaviour of misstating 
earnings may be left undetected, the firm gets away with their behaviour and there is no 
forced restatement.  
The third type of earnings misrepresentation is fraud. Earnings misstatement can develop into 
fraud when there is detrimental reliance by the users of financial statements (Hennés et al., 
2008). In empirical research, fraud cases are usually reserved when a firm’s accounting 
irregularities are subject to legal action (Hasnan et al., 2013; Finnerty et al., 2016). Technically, 
the difference between earnings misstatement and fraud is that fraud is when earnings 
misstatement is subject to legal action, whether it is intentional or not. As defined by the 
Treadway Commission (1987), fraudulent financial reporting is:  
‘‘intentional or reckless misconduct, whether act or omission, that results in materially 
misleading financial statements. It may entail gross and deliberate distortion of 
corporate records as well as the misapplication of accounting principles”.  
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Fraudulent financial reporting is typically perpetrated to conceal corporate fraud activities, or 
to enhance the appearance of a firm’s financial performance (Hasnan et al., 2013). Fraudulent 
acts would include instances such as altering or falsifying documents, recording forged 
transactions, omitting transactions from records, and concealing significant information 
(Stolowy and Breton, 2004). The consequences of fraudulent financial reporting can be very 
severe, such that firms may be confronted with the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, delisted 
from the stock exchange, or suffer a significant drop in stock value (Rezaee, 2005). 
Overall, this study adapts the grouping of the different types of earnings misrepresentation by 
Stolowy and Breton (2004) to include earnings manipulation, earnings misstatement and fraud. 
For the purpose of this study, the sample of forced restatement firms is based on Malaysian 
listed firms that restate due to intentional and unintentional earnings misstatement (which 
include material error) and fraud (all of which are aggressive accounting practices that violate 
GAAP). This is in line with the definition of forced restatement itself, which reflects a 
company’s acknowledgment that the original financial statement reported and filed by the 
company was not in compliance with the General Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
(Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). In particular, the identification of forced restatement firms in this 
study follows Abdullah et al. (2010) by distinguishing financial statements that were deemed to 
have restated according to the definition outlined by GAO (refer to Appendix 1). The GAO 
definition of “aggressive” accounting practices captures specifically the, “intentional and 
unintentional misuse of facts applied to financial statement, oversight or misinterpretation of 
accounting rules, and fraud” (GAO, 2002, p.76). GAO’s restatement category mainly includes 
restatements that are due to improper accounting of:  
(i) Mergers and acquisitions 
(ii) costs or expenses; 
(iii) research and development; 
(iv) reclassification of accounting items; 
(v) related party transactions; 
(vi) restructuring, assets or inventory; 
(vii) revenue recognition; and  
(viii) securities related items.  
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The data collection in this study is based on a sample of 121 Malaysian forced restatement 
firms (please refer to Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5 on sample selection). In line with the main 
objective of this study, the sample will be used to analyse both financial and non-financial 
characteristics of a forced restatement firm. Subsequently, in line with the study’s secondary 
objective, the findings will be used to develop an exploratory model to predict the likelihood of 
forced restatement.  
3.7 Motives of earnings management 
Managers use their discretion opportunistically in financial reporting to increase managerial 
wealth at the expense of the shareholders (Call et al., 2014). Practices of opportunistic earnings 
management are typically favoured among self-interested managers, for instance via 
manipulation of operating accruals, as it has relatively no direct impact on cash flow and is 
generally hard to detect (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
The definition by Schipper (1989, p. 92) claims earnings management as “… a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some 
private gain…,”. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) explains that earnings management takes 
place when managers alter financial reports based on judgement in financial reporting with the 
purpose of misleading the stakeholders about a firm’s underlying performance, or influencing 
contractual outcomes that basically rely on reported accounting figures.  
Dechow et al. (1996) show evidence that firms engage in earnings misstatement or fraudulent 
reporting when the opportunities to engage in within-GAAP earnings management are limited. 
When all the within-GAAP flexibilities are exhausted, firms eventually employ aggressive 
accounting practices that violate GAAP to perpetuate an artificial performance of a firm’s 
growth. Although managers might not have the incentives to cross the GAAP boundary, many 
do, whether unintentionally or not (Ettredge et al., 2010). An example can be seen from the 
study by Ettredge et al. (2010) that reveals a systematic increase of balance sheet “bloat”, or 
abnormally high working capital accounts level, particularly for firms that later issue a 
fraudulent financial report. They further document that non-fraud restatement firms have 
higher balance sheet “bloat” when compared to the control firms of non-restatement firms for 
the two years preceding the initial financial misstatement. However, the balance “bloat” is 
clearly higher for fraud restatement firms in comparison to the non-fraud restatement firms. 
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Their findings provide some insight into the circumstances that lead to non-GAAP financial 
reporting.  
In reality, however, the situation may be more complicated. The transition from within-GAAP 
earnings management to more aggressive accounting practices may not be clear cut. Managers 
may, however, shift from managing earnings in the ordinary course of business to managing 
earnings fraudulently. Magrath and Weld (2002) contend that once improper revenue 
recognition practices has started, the pressure exists for firms to continue with exercising 
within-GAAP and/or non-GAAP earnings management activities to achieve increasing sales 
targets and analysts’ earnings expectations. Earnings manipulation, misstatement or fraudulent 
reporting generates a firm’s need to engage in more sophisticated and complex accounting 
techniques so that analysts’ earnings expectations are achieved. Consequently, managers are 
coerced into getting involved in manipulating earnings or otherwise engage in fraudulent 
activities, such as applying creative acquisition accounting practices, understating reserve 
liabilities, or creating artificial reserves, to perpetuate the myth of a firm’s artificial growth. 
It may be a common practice for managers to use earnings management opportunistically, but 
the reason they end up in the area of forced restatement is either because they manage 
earnings in huge amounts or due to the cumulative effect, where managers manage earnings 
in only one direction. This is where this study differs from prior research. Prior studies often 
look at the absolute value (or size) (e.g., Tong, 2007; Wan Ismail et al., 2013; Lennox et al., 
2016), rather than the signs of earnings management as it gives them the idea of how much 
managerial opportunistic behaviour is going on. The size or extent of earnings management is, 
however, subject to the transitory nature of discretionary accruals which, in fact, means 
reverting since discretionary accruals may eventually reverse. Conversely, this study 
particularly examines the signs of earnings management, in such a way that earnings are 
managed in one direction and get accumulated to the point where managers can no longer 
hide it and are forced to make a financial restatement.  
There are many potential motivations that influence managers to employ opportunistic 
earnings management (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Dechow et al., 1996; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999; Walker, 2013). Overall, the literature indicates the three main sets of motivations, which 
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are: (i) contracting motives, (ii) capital market motives and (iii) political costs (e.g. regulatory 
and tax-based motives). 
3.7.1 Contracting motives 
The divergence of objectives between managers and owners may lead the managers to make 
financial reporting decisions based on self-interest. Hence, contracting mechanisms, for 
instance management compensation that tie managerial rewards to share value, act as a 
device to mitigate the agency conflict (shareholder-manager conflict) problem (Healy and 
Palepu, 1993). Accounting data are used to help regulate and monitor the contracts between a 
firm and its stakeholders (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Executive compensation plans are introduced to provide managers with the incentive to 
perform in line with shareholders’ best interests. Early studies on managerial compensation 
and earnings management focused on the association between cash bonuses and firm 
performance. The classic article by Healy (1985) shows that managers manage earnings 
upward to earn large bonuses. There is also an incentive for managers to manage earnings 
downward, especially when the current reported earnings fall short of the minimum threshold 
for a bonus payment. Such technique of “taking a bath” may help managers to achieve the 
threshold for bonus payments in the succeeding period, although this may mean no bonus 
payment for the current period12 (Healy, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
Following this, research examining the link between executive compensation plans and 
accounting measures increases (Walker, 2013). Many empirical studies have shown that 
management compensation plans are positively associated with the maximisation of firm value 
(Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Benson and Davidson, 2010). At the same time, other studies have 
shown that asymmetric payoffs from stock options encouraged managers of high growth firms 
to take risks, thus reducing problems of agency costs (Baber et al., 1996; Hanlon et al., 2003). 
However, since compensation rewards are tied to reported accounting numbers, this creates 
an initiative for managers to exercise accounting discretion (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). 
There is the desire for managers to artificially boost earnings to ensure that stock prices are 
                                                          
12
 According to the big bath theory, firms having low earnings in the current period tend to undertake large write 
downs to further lower reported earnings. This practice makes it easier for managers to report higher profits in 
future years. This is based on the notion that the managers will not be penalised proportionately more due to 
boosting earnings on the already depressed earnings (Jordan and Clark, 2011).  
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high and keep rising; this, in effect, improves the chances for managers to benefit from highly 
paid stock-based compensation.  
For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) found that firms with relatively high equity incentives 
tend to produce earnings that meet or just beat analyst consensus forecasts. Furthermore, it is 
less likely for these firms with high equity incentives to report a huge positive earnings 
surprise. The findings indicate that firms manage earnings upward to prevent having a fall in 
share price due to the failure of meeting an earnings forecast, but otherwise engage in 
smoothing firm’s earnings in order to have continuous high value option payouts. Their 
findings are supported by Feng et al. (2011) who documented in the US that CEOs of 
manipulation firms tend to have relatively greater equity incentives compared to CEOs of non-
manipulation firms. 
Another contract-based motivation is when managers may be motivated to manage earnings 
to prevent them from violating debt covenants. The debt covenant hypothesis asserts that 
managers engage in income-increasing earnings management when firms are close to violation 
of a debt covenant, where shareholders’ wealth (for example, debt to equity ratio) or 
measures of earnings (for example, interest cover) are involved (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; 
Ghosh and Moon, 2010). However, the evidence to support the debt covenant hypothesis is 
mixed. For instance, a major review of the earnings management literature by Fields et al. 
(2001) revealed that the motivation by debt covenants for managers to make accounting 
choices is inconclusive. Nonetheless, more recent literature found contradicting evidence. 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) found that, based on a sample of 2,810 borrowers, US firms are 
found to avoid breaching debt covenants by making accounting choices. Daniel et al. (2008) 
documented that firms who have debt manage earnings upward when their pre-managed 
earnings are lower than the expected dividend level. The finding indicates that firms with debt 
manage earnings upward to prevent breaching debt covenants that limit the maximum level of 
dividend payout based on accounting earnings, e.g., interest cover ratio.  
3.7.2 Capital market motives 
Managers of publicly listed firms are exposed to capital market pressure; this increases the 
incentive for them to manage earnings so that earnings targets are achieved (Hope et al., 
2013). Essentially, a firm’s accounting information is used by market participants, such as 
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investors, securities analysts and market regulators, to evaluate firm performance. This creates 
the motivation for managers to exercise accounting discretion in order to fulfil the needs 
deriving from instances such as short-term capital gains, equity financing, and meeting 
investors’ expectations. 
Teoh et al. (1998b), for example, show that US initial public offering (IPO) firms use 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward, by which investors are deceived into 
overpaying for the IPO. Morsfield and Tan (2006) support the above findings by documenting 
lower earnings management among IPO firms backed by venture capitalists who serve as a 
monitoring incentive13. Kothari et al. (2016) further reveal that both accruals management and 
real earnings management jointly forecast negative future returns for US seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) firms. 
Firms are also motivated to make accounting choices when raising external finance. Dechow et 
al. (2011) found that misstatement firms actively raise funds before and during the misstating 
years. The problems of obtaining finance has encouraged managers of misstatement firms to 
manage earnings opportunistically in the earlier years; this turns to aggressive accounting 
practices during the misstating years.  
Additionally, meeting or beating analyst forecasts has become of great importance over time 
(Brown and Caylor, 2005). Managers are motivated to manage earnings to meet market 
expectation and thus manipulate investors’ perceptions towards a firm’s high growth 
performance. This, in turn, could lead to an increase in the short-term stock price (Dechow et 
al., 1996), for example, thus benefiting the firm from capital gains as a result of selling stocks at 
a higher price. Studies undertaken by Daske et al. (2006) in the EU, and Gore et al. (2007) in the 
UK, show empirical evidence that EU and UK firms manage accruals to meet or just beat 
earnings forecasts. Doyle et al. (2013) further provide evidence where managers use their 
discretion to define non-GAAP earnings opportunistically (e.g., actual recurring expenses 
reclassified as non-recurring exclusions) for the sake of meeting or beating analyst 
expectations.  
                                                          
13
 A venture capital organisation typically consists of various investment funds. The funds are raised by the venture 
capitalists from passive shareholders for a particular investment strategy. The fund is governed by a contract that is 
intended to protect the interests of the passive shareholders (Morsfield and Tan, 2006). 
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Badertscher (2011) investigated how management’s practices of earnings management are 
affected by firm overvaluation. It was found that managers manage discretionary accruals of 
earnings in the early period of overvaluation before shifting to real earnings management 
practices, consistent with attempts to sustain a firm’s overvaluation. Badertscher (2011) 
further found that the longer the firm is overvalued, the higher the likelihood for the managers 
to employ non-GAAP or fraudulent accounting practices.  
3.7.3 Political costs motives 
The motive of avoiding political cost may also influence managers to make earnings 
management choices (Walker, 2013). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), political 
costs are comprised of expected costs imposed on a firm (wealth transfer) from possible 
adverse political actions such as regulation, government subsidies, tariffs, and taxes.  
Larger firms may incur greater political costs than smaller firms due to greater investor scrutiny 
and analyst following (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). The political cost hypothesis (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986) implies that publicly visible, large firms may have the incentive to manage 
reported profits; this is interpreted by political pressure groups as monopoly rents. Firms 
confronted by price pressure from powerful trades unions, large customers, or large suppliers 
may also find it expedient to manage earnings downward, thus reporting a lower profit. A 
common incidence that took place, particularly in Asian countries, is where the ethnic 
minorities-controlled firms are faced with political costs when reporting a large profit, as they 
are pressured to have their wealth redistributed to the majority ethnic groups (Ball et al., 
2003). Alternatively, firms are pressured by the government to prevent or delay their reporting 
of financial losses by earnings management, as the government seeks to avoid bearing the 
public blame for business failure (Ball et al., 2003). 
The imposition of regulations by the law or capital regulators may also encourage firms to 
engage in accounting discretion so as to meet regulatory requirements; these include instances 
such as antitrust investigations, industry regulation or other regulatory requirements that are 
tied to reported accounting numbers. An example is shown by Jones (1991) who found firms 
managing earnings to influence public policy so it was in their favour. There is evidence that 
firms exercise accounting discretion to reduce earnings during the period of US import relief 
investigation, thus increasing the possibility of them being granted import relief or increasing 
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the amount of relief obtained. Other examples include regulations imposed in the US on the 
banking industry (that require banks to maintain a minimum level of capital), the insurance 
industry (that requires insurance companies to maintain good financial conditions), and the 
utilities industry (that require utility companies to earn just a normal return on invested 
assets). Such imposition of regulations create the motivations for firms to use their discretion 
for managing financial information that is of interest to the regulators (Healy and Wahlen 
1999). Prior studies have provided empirical evidence on banks’ practices of earnings 
management over loan loss provisions with the intention of avoiding capital requirement 
violations (Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Leventis et al., 2011). 
Managers may also have the initiative to exercise opportunistic earnings management for tax 
purposes. Managers may in fact discretionarily choose accounting methods or policies in order 
to minimise tax expenses, rather than report a firm’s actual performance. For instance, 
managers tend to manage earnings (by deferring revenue recognition or overstating accrual 
expenses) so as to postpone income recognition in the succeeding year with lower tax rate so 
that future tax payments will be much lower (Guenther, 1994; Holthausen et al., 1995; 
Mahenthiran and Kasipillai, 2012). While other studies show that managers manipulate 
earnings by managing the component of tax expenses, i.e., deferred tax expenses. Prior 
research shows empirical evidence that high deferred tax expenses or book-tax income 
differences are linked to low earnings quality (Phillips et al., 2003), low earnings persistence 
(Hanlon, 2005), and low ability to predict future earnings growth (Lev and Nissim, 2004). The 
study by Kasipillai and Mahenthiran (2013) on Malaysian firms shows that the accrual 
component of deferred tax liabilities is managed to prevent a decline in earnings. They claim 
that Malaysian listed firms manage earnings to mask declining performance by manipulating 
the pre-tax earnings that relate to the accruals component of revenue and expenses. 
Overall, the above discussion shows the various incentives that could induce managers to 
engage in earnings management. Essentially, the motivation for earnings management may 
arise from almost any contract that exists between a firm and its stakeholders (Walker, 2013). 
Failure to mitigate agency conflicts that arise among contracting parties may intensify 
managerial incentives for opportunistic earnings management, which aims to protect and 
satisfy managers’ self-interest. Based on the evidence shown earlier, this may lead to earnings 
management practices based on contracting motivations or capital market motivations. Other 
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motivations, such as political cost, may indicate that incentives for accounting discretions are 
driven by external factors such as regulations and taxes.  
3.8 Summary 
Agency theory forms the theoretical underpinning for this study that mainly examines the 
effect of a firm’s financial and corporate governance attributes on the likelihood of forced 
restatement. This chapter presented the discussion of agency theory to support a better 
understanding of managerial opportunism, the incentives for earnings misstatement, and 
consequential forced restatement. Agency theory thereby lays the foundation for the study 
hypotheses developed in the following chapter.  
The separation between ownership and control may give rise to managerial opportunism. This 
leads to agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, better known as the principal-
agent conflict, which often takes place in diffused ownership firms. In addition, conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, also known as the principal-
principal conflict, are more likely to occur in the concentrated ownership firms that are 
prevalent in emerging economies, especially in Malaysia. The divergence of control rights and 
cash flow rights that is common in the concentrated ownership system arises due to 
asymmetric information environment, thus creating incentives among controlling shareholders 
to expropriate the wealth of minority investors. Consequently, aggressive accounting practices 
and opportunistic earnings management result, based on the managers’ intention to conceal 
their deviant behaviour, and therefore the increased likelihood of forced restatement.  
Various corporate governance practices, such as accounting standards, stock market 
supervision, auditing and board of directors, were viewed as monitoring mechanisms that help 
alleviate the principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts. Nonetheless, deficiencies in such 
mechanisms may impede attempts to curb agency problems. Controlling shareholders or 
managers may take advantage of the imperfection in corporate governance to reduce 
transparency in financial reporting by disclosing inaccurate information.  
Earnings misstatement is unlikely to be easily detected in a developing country with relatively 
weak investor protection and poor law enforcement. Hence, the findings of this study would be 
of great interest, especially to the regulators, investors, financial analysts and other relevant 
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parties, as it highlights warning signals of forced restatement firms, especially in the unique 
setting of an emerging economy that is characterised by a highly concentrated ownership 
structure. This study might also provide unique findings different from those documented in 
developed countries.  
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CHAPTER 4  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Based on the discussion of the theoretical framework and the particularities of Malaysian 
corporate governance in Chapter 3, this chapter develops and justifies the key hypotheses 
explored in this thesis. The hypotheses development is presented in Section 4.2. Seven 
hypotheses are proposed based on both financial and non-financial factors that may affect 
the likelihood of a forced restatement. 
The subsequent Section 4.3 discusses the study’s conceptual framework based on the 
hypotheses. The study’s conceptual framework shows the interrelationship of the relevant 
explanatory factors and the likelihood of forced restatement events among Malaysian 
publicly listed firms. The chapter ends with a summary presented in Section 4.4. 
4.2 Hypotheses development 
Forced restatement is an event where a company is forced by the auditors, Securities 
Commission or other enforcement agencies to restate its earnings due to GAAP violations, 
where the reported original financial statements at the time of issuance were incorrect 
(Hennes et al., 2008). Forced restatement may arise due to intentional misstatement or 
unintentional error. Specifically, self-interested managers make intentional attempts to 
misstate earnings to mislead shareholders by showing that the firm’s performance is better 
than the actual reporting would suggest, e.g., to ensure an increase in a firm’s share price 
or to avoid violation of debt covenants (Ettredge et al., 2010). This would involve managers 
inflating earnings during the misstatement period that leads to income-decreasing forced 
restatement. Alternatively, managers make intentional attempts to misstate earnings to 
make the firm look worse than its actual performance, e.g., to reduce tax burdens (Lim 
2011). This would involve managers reducing earnings during the misstatement period that 
leads to income-increasing forced restatement. Notwithstanding, managers might get 
involved in earnings misstatement due to unintentional error such as accounting and 
clerical mistakes and misunderstanding of complex accounting rules (Plumlee and Yohn, 
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2009). In such case, managers might be issued with income-increasing, income-decreasing 
or zero-effect forced restatement.  
Managers may hide their deviant behaviour of fraudulent reporting due to fear of serious 
penalties imposed for GAAP violations (Schrand and Zechman 2012). It is, thus, a great 
challenge, especially for the auditors, to constrain and detect financial irregularities. 
Indications of financial misstatements commonly surface when a trigger event takes place. 
Trigger events may occur through a firm’s self-disclosure (e.g., a company’s voluntary 
announcement of misconduct or accounting error), which is commonly followed by a 
formal investigation undertaken by the enforcement agencies, the firm’s auditors (e.g., 
audit findings showing peculiar patterns of reported revenue), or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (e.g., delayed filing of the financial statements to the SEC). A 
firm is forced to make an earnings restatement by authorities when investigations show 
that the firm is involved in producing false or fraudulent financial information (Files, 2012).  
Several examples of misreporting cases have shown how forced restatement is triggered. 
For example, the renowned case of Enron showed that forced restatement was triggered 
when, in 2001, the firm itself announced that it was actually worth $1.2 billion less than 
previously reported. Enron further disclosed that it made a massive $618 million loss for 
the quarter, in relation to reported profits in prior years. The firm’s self-disclosure alerted 
the SEC; this led to the exposure of fraudulent financial reporting, hence forcing them to 
make a restatement. Another example can be seen from Transmile in Malaysia. In this case, 
forced restatement was triggered when the firm’s external auditors, Deloitte and Touche, 
found deficiencies in the firm’s supporting documents, such that the auditors refused to 
approve the company’s annual accounts. Following this, a special audit was conducted by 
Moores Rowland Risk Management; it was later found that the firm’s revenue, amongst 
others, were heavily overstated by RM530 million in 2005 and 2006. Due to the material 
misstatement, Transmile was forced to restate its earnings in 2007 by the special auditors. 
Agency theory considers the relationship between principals and the agents they hire to act 
on their behalf. In the context of listed companies in countries where shareholders are 
legally the owners of firms and hold the rights to the residual profits, shareholders are 
generally identified as the principals whereas managers are the agents. The issue of 
“agency problem” lies in ensuring that agents act in line with the principals’ interests rather 
than merely fulfilling the agents’ own interests. It is in the shareholders’ interest to have 
their investment return being maximised, however, this is not perfectly aligned with the 
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agents’ who are prone to maximise their own personal wealth. Furthermore, agents, who 
control the firm, have access to better information than the principals in terms of decision 
situation and consequences of actions (Ross, 1973). With such information asymmetry and 
the inability for the shareholders to fully observe managers, agents tend to abuse their 
private access to information to fulfil their own self-benefit at the expense of the 
shareholders.  
Governance factors, such as the distribution of ownership and control, might serve to 
reduce agency problems. In particular, dominant shareholders or blockholders can exercise 
their power to influence managers by means of the threat of using shareholders’ 
concentrated control rights. Dominant shareholders may induce or even coerce managers 
to work in fulfilling their interest. Although dominant shareholders may have high power 
and control to induce managers towards running the business in their interest, nonetheless, 
these interests might not align with those of the minority shareholders. Misappropriation of 
wealth at the expense of the minority shareholders may be even easier when the dominant 
shareholders are also the director or part of the firm’s top management. In this case, the 
intent to detriment minority shareholders goes concurrently with top executives’ authority 
to make business decisions on corporate transactions. 
Specifically, within the Malaysian background of highly concentrated ownership, the 
effectiveness of this internal control mechanism can be questioned. While controlling 
blockholders are beneficial such that they can assist in enhancing the effectiveness of the 
board’s monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), nevertheless, the control that insiders have 
can also provide them with the opportunity to misuse their power and extract private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. In this case, corporate governance 
factors, such as the presence of founders on the board and a family CEO, can become 
ineffective and may exacerbate managers-shareholders conflicting interests and 
information asymmetry. Not only do controlling owners make decisions that deprive 
minority shareholders of their rights, they may even have the incentive and ability to 
manipulate the firm’s corporate reporting to conceal their opportunistic behaviour and 
mislead the shareholders, thus increasing information asymmetry. With the concentrated 
ownership among listed firms in Malaysia, which are typically managed by families of high 
status and are politically well-connected (Rachagan and Kuppusamy 2013), it would be 
highly unlikely for the firm to whistle blow themselves against any aggressive behaviour 
due to fear of retaliation by the controlling shareholders. 
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Based on the above situation, Malaysian firms may rely on external authorities as their 
alternative resort to identifying earnings misstatement, hence forced restatements. There 
is the possibility that supervision by external shareholders or authorities might either deter 
or lead to a detection of earnings misstatement. Supervision by external blockholders (e.g., 
institutional investors) can be effective due to the large investment they have made in the 
firm, which induces them to monitor managers more closely. Firm supervision can also be 
done by financial analysts, auditors and regulators. External auditors, for example, can 
closely supervise firms as they have the capacity to probe a firm’s accounts in order to 
determine whether the firm is reporting the true picture of its performance. The fact that 
these external parties are watching the firm can itself be a deterrent to aggressive 
accounting behaviour (Degeorge et al., 2013). In supervising firms, the regulators might also 
rely on the fluctuation or volatility of a firm’s share price as it acts as an indicator that 
investors suspect a firm’s high risk and poor reporting, which prompt closer monitoring and 
supervision. 
Accordingly, the following section presents the hypotheses being developed based on the 
grouping of explanatory variables. These include:  
(1) board quality and  
(2) audit committee quality – to discuss the impact of the quality of the board of 
directors and audit committee on the likelihood of forced restatement;  
(3) family ownership and control – to discuss how family blockholders, and other ways 
founding families may affect management, hence the likelihood of forced 
restatement;  
(4) government-related institutional ownership and political connection – to discuss 
how government-related blockholders and political connection may affect 
management behaviour leading to forced restatement;  
(5) corporate reporting quality – to discuss financial reporting quality that might be a 
reasonable proxy for opportunistic behaviour by managers or blockholders, as not 
all managers or blockholders behave opportunistically;  
(6) firm performance and demand for external financing – to discuss whether a firm’s 
financial performance and the demand for external financing might either affect 
managers’ and blockholders’ ability to hide or detract from problems, hence the 
likelihood of forced restatement; and finally,  
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(7) share price volatility – to discuss whether investors’ perceptions of a firm’s 
behaviour might affect forced restatements. This is because share price variability is 
an indication of risk perception, and might alert regulators to potential problems in 
firms and therefore increase the possibility that they monitor the firm more 
closely14.  
With regard to the above discussion, the main aim of this study is to examine whether 
firms’ financial or non-financial corporate governance characteristics affect the likelihood of 
forced restatements in Malaysia. The hypotheses developed in this section are based on 
explanatory variables that represent the incentives and symptoms of earnings 
misstatement, hence forced restatement, while some of the corporate governance 
variables represent constraint factors of forced restatement.  
4.2.1 Board quality 
Based on agency theory, the divergence of interest that arises from the separation between 
ownership and control lead to the possibility that managers might be tempted to behave 
opportunistically to pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders15. The 
writing and enforcement of contracts between principals and agents may not always be 
enough to resolve the agency conflicts (Hart, 1995). As discussed in Section 3.3 of Chapter 
3, the monitoring mechanism plays an important role in controlling agents’ behaviour and 
thus helps minimise agency problems. It is presumed that the board of directors performs 
the monitoring function on behalf of the shareholders due to the investors’ inability to 
exercise full control over the corporation. 
Agency theory posits that firms’ boards of directors play an important role for internal 
governance in monitoring managers and ensuring principal-agent incentive alignment 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). The ability to perform effective oversight duties thus indicates a 
quality board. The activities of a quality board involve a framework of effective and prudent 
control, thereby enabling close monitoring of the corporation’s management and control 
system, the assessment and management of risks faced by the firm, and the approval of the 
corporation’s strategy (Rizzotti and Greco 2013). With this monitoring activity, a quality 
board may thus ensure that managers’ actions are in line with the shareholders’ interests 
thus reduces the likelihood of forced restatement.  
                                                          
14
 In relation to the conceptual framework presented in Section 4.3, corporate governance variables include (1) 
board quality, (2) audit committee quality, (3) family control, and (4) political connection, while blockholder 
ownership variables include (5) family ownership, and (6) government-related institutional ownership. 
15
 It should be noted that not every agent would behave opportunistically all the time, neither can every agent 
be trusted at all times. 
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In Malaysia, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance – MCCG (2000) and MCCG 
(2007) – highlight the attributes of a quality board; these include independence, expertise, 
and diligence to ensure a strong internal control environment. The MCCG recommends that 
at least one-third of the board consists of independent non-executive directors to ensure 
that directors are subject to less management interference, and that independent 
judgement is given within the decision-making process. The MCCG further highlights the 
importance for directors to be financial experts so they are able to exercise their skills and 
knowledge in discharging their monitoring function effectively. More specifically, board 
diligence signals board quality. Not only is a diligent board is willing to devote substantial 
time to monitoring, but it also shows that the directors are fully committed and vigilant in 
discharging their oversight duties. A diligent board thus reflects board quality and is 
essential to minimising agency problems. 
Given the characteristics of being independent, expert, and diligent, a board is viewed as 
high quality, such that they have a strong incentive to monitor, and thus reduce, the 
likelihood of forced restatement. Three factors may potentially drive such incentives. First, 
directors may want to protect their reputation as independent and expert monitors, 
because the market punishes directors associated with poor performance or corporate 
disaster (e.g., Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Gilson 1990). Secondly, directors are 
subject to heavy penalties when they fail to exercise reasonable care in performing their 
monitoring duties. Thirdly, directors seek to protect shareholder wealth due to the 
significant losses they might incur from financial irregularities (e.g., Gilson 1990).  
Prior studies have shown that board independence, expertise, and diligence, as direct 
measures of board quality, are related to a more effective monitoring function. Klein (2002) 
in the US, Peasnell et al. (2000) and Peasnell et al. (2005) in the UK, and Marra et al.    
(2011) in Italy found that board independence can better constrain discretionary 
accounting practices and reduce the extent of earnings management. Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) further found that the presence of financially expert independent directors on a 
firm’s board reduces the possibility of financial misstatement. Ferris et al. (2003) found no 
evidence of shirking when directors with multiple directorships (diligent) are on the board. 
Johl et al. (2013) further showed that the interaction between board quality and audit 
quality is positively and significantly associated with abnormal accruals. The result suggests 
that board quality and audit quality can be substituted between each other to maintain the 
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quality of financial reporting. Overall, results from prior studies indicate that board quality 
helps improve managerial monitoring, thus reducing the likelihood of forced restatement. 
For the purpose of this study, three different measures are used as proxies for board 
quality. First is the independence of the board of directors (Johl et al., 2013; Ang et al.    
2014; Chakravarthy et al., 2014). With board independence, the directors have no interest 
to perform in order to win management’s good graces, thus, they are free to speak out 
regarding management misdeeds and protect shareholders’ interests (Clarke, 2006). There 
are concerns among independent directors to secure their reputation of being experts in 
decision control, thus there is a low likelihood for them to collude with the management for 
the expropriation of shareholders’ wealth (Fama and Jensen 1983). Overall, board 
independence improves monitoring of managers, which reduces the likelihood of forced 
restatement. 
Second are financially expert directors (Badolato et al., 2014). A financially sophisticated 
board is an important factor that helps constrain managerial propensity to engage in 
opportunistic financial reporting (Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004). Board members with 
financial expertise are valuable since the firm’s board is responsible for monitoring duties 
that require a certain degree of accounting sophistication. A financially expert board 
improves corporate governance since the board is expected to be able to understand how 
the accounting policies applied may affect a firm’s financial position and performance, 
review whether the accounting policies are conservative or aggressive, assess the 
acceptability of certain judgement and estimates applied (for example on a company’s 
reserves and assets valuation), and evaluate the quality of a firm’s financial reports. The 
presence of financial expertise on the board may improve the overall evaluation of a firm’s 
financial reporting quality since more attention and time will be devoted to discussing 
imperative issues that relate to the credibility and reliability of financial information, which 
reduces the likelihood of forced restatement (McDaniel et al., 2002). 
Third are multiple directorships which are a proxy for board diligence (Saleh et al., 2005; 
Sharma and Iselin, 2012). Multiple directorships provide directors with the incentive for 
more diligent monitoring due to the diverse knowledge and experiences that they gained 
from different management practices and policies of different companies (Beasley, 1996). 
Multiple directorships are even indicative of high directorial diligence as the appointment 
to various firms’ boards are due to superior performance demonstrated by the director in 
previous firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Vafeas, 1999). With high diligent quality, it is 
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unlikely for directors with multiple directorships to shirk from their responsibilities as they 
might suffer from a reputation loss (Wan Hussin and Ibrahim, 2003; Sharma and Iselin, 
2012). Therefore, directors with multiple directorships tend to carry out better monitoring 
which may reduce the likelihood of forced restatement taking place.  
In addition to this, this study takes board size and board meetings as control variables. 
Board size is included to control for the effect that it might have on forced restatement. 
This is because the number of board members would determine that sufficient members 
are available to carry out various corporate functions and the discharge of responsibilities 
(MCCG 2000), thus the ability to constrain earnings misstatement and reduce the possibility 
of forced restatement. For example, large-sized boards are believed to improve synergetic 
monitoring due to various expertise on the board (Zahra & Pearce II 1989), thus reducing 
incidences of forced restatement (Cao, Myers & Omer 2012). However, there is also the 
possibility that a large board size gives rise to problems of free-riding and communication 
breakdown, resulting in monitoring inefficiency (Jensen 1993). Board size is, in particular, 
an important control variable for methodological reasons. Previous research suggests that 
omission of this variable leads to omitted variable bias and the distortion of the coefficient 
for board independence (see e.g., Knyazeva et al., 2013). Board meetings are also included 
to control for the effect that the number of board meetings might have on the occurrence 
of forced restatement. Xie et al. (2003) claim that the frequency of board meetings is 
expected to constrain aggressive accounting activities, hence forced restatement, due to 
the time allocated by the board to meet and discuss issues on firm’s financial reporting. 
Alternatively, the frequency of board might also indicate firms’ ongoing financial problems 
which in turn increase the possibility of forced restatement (Sharma et al., 2009). Hence, 
board meetings might impact on the likelihood of forced restatement.  
Based on the above discussion, this study posits that board quality improves the 
effectiveness of a board’s oversight duties that helps minimise reporting errors and deter 
the management from engaging in opportunistic behaviour. This means that there is less 
likelihood for income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced restatement to 
take place. Overall, a quality board is capable of constraining utility maximising managerial 
behaviour, which might lead to a reduction in the likelihood of forced restatement. The 
following hypothesis is thus developed: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board quality and the occurrence of 
forced financial restatement. 
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4.2.2 Audit quality committee 
The misalignment of incentives between principals and agents (principal-agent conflict) can 
impede managers from conveying reliable information. Managers may opt to disclose 
opaque financial information in order to conceal managers’ deviant behaviour and to 
mislead shareholders that the firm is performing well. This situation may give rise to 
increased principal-agent information asymmetry. In dealing with information asymmetry, 
another monitoring mechanism, i.e., an audit committee, assumes an important role. An 
audit committee, which is part of a firm’s internal control, helps to minimise information 
asymmetry by improving the credibility of financial disclosures. 
An audit committee is a sub-committee of a firm’s board of directors, and thus accountable 
to the board (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir 2004; Chen et al., 2015). A quality audit committee 
is essential as it effectively oversees a firm’s financial reporting process and monitors the 
relationship between the management and the firm’s external auditor (Abdullah and 
Mohd-Nasir, 2004). In particular, an audit committee facilitates the communication 
between external auditors and firm’s internal auditors in reviewing a firm’s internal 
accounting systems and control, audit processes and financial statements. It is typical for 
the management to discuss and negotiate a firm’s financial results with the external 
auditors (Nelson et al., 2003). In this situation, the audit committee acts as an arbitrator 
between the management and the external auditors. A quality audit committee may be 
willing to disagree with the management on issues (Hadani et al., 2011), including matters 
related to the application of GAAP. A quality audit committee may demand a wider audit 
scope from the external auditors, or additional audit procedures (and incur a high audit fee) 
for areas of uncertainty and high risk. This would improve the detection of accounting 
misstatement and reporting errors, which then triggers and increases the likelihood of 
income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced restatement. 
In Malaysia, publicly listed firms are required to have an audit committee to ensure 
effective monitoring of the firm’s financial and audit functions so that financial 
misstatements can be prevented. The Malaysian Code of Governance (MCCG) specifies that 
at least three directors should make up an audit committee, the majority of whom should 
be independent and the chairman should be an independent non-executive director. The 
MCCG further highlights the relevant skills and knowledge an audit committee member 
should have for them to be able to detect opportunistic management reporting practices. 
This is consistent with the contention by Abbott et al. (2004) that the effectiveness of an 
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audit committee in reducing financial restatement is due to two reasons. First, the 
effectiveness of an audit committee is enhanced when it does not involve any former or 
current managerial member. Second, the audit committee undertakes more thorough 
oversight duties and will insist on a greater scope for the external audit to ensure high 
quality financial reporting. In this case, a quality audit committee can be reflected through 
its independence, expertise and audit fee. 
Prior studies documented several findings with regard to the quality of an audit committee. 
Baber et al. (2012) and Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) reveal that a higher level of audit 
committee independence lowers the possibility of firms restating their financial statements. 
Similar studies conducted in the emerging market, such as Malaysia, produced mixed 
findings. Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir (2004), Saleh et al. (2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) 
found no association between audit committee characteristics and financial reporting 
quality. The study by Abdullah et al. (2010), which examined a sample of Malaysian 
restatement firms from 2002 to 2005, however, found that audit committee independence 
is positively correlated with the probability of financial restatement. The findings indicate 
that the audit committee independence is effective in discharging their duties such that 
they are able to identify misstatements that require the need for earnings restatement.  
In this case, the first proxy for audit committee quality is audit committee independence, 
which ensures that an audit committee is effective and of quality. If the audit committee is 
dominated by insiders, this may cause the audit committee to ignore internal problems and 
the potential of not issuing a clean opinion on firm’s financial reporting system (Zhang et 
al., 2004). Independence further ensures that the audit committee provides objective and 
independent oversight of a firm’s financial reporting process (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 
2004), enabling them to detect errors or aggressive accounting practices more effectively, 
hence triggering income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced restatement.  
The second proxy is audit committee expertise (Badolato et al., 2014). Having an 
accounting or finance background is important for audit committee members to be able to 
address a firm’s financial reporting or accounting risk. This is possible as a financially expert 
audit committee may strongly justify the negotiations made by the external auditors to the 
firm’s management about issues related to accounting estimates and judgements, and 
accounting principles application (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Ng and Tan, 2003). A 
financially expert audit committee demonstrates a more structured discussion on financial 
reporting quality, and gives greater focus to concerns that are critical for a company’s 
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reporting quality (McDaniels et al., 2002). In this case, a financially expert audit committee 
may lead to the discovery of opportunistic earnings or material accounting errors, thus 
triggering the need for income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced 
restatement. 
In relation to prior research that examined audit committee expertise, the US studies by 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Carcello et al. (2011) show that higher financial expertise 
sitting on the audit committee is associated with lower financial restatement, while Farber 
(2005) revealed fewer financial experts in the audit committee among fraud firms 
compared to the control firms. Hoitash and Bedard (2009) further show that a higher 
proportion of financial experts on the audit committee is related to a lower likelihood of 
material weakness disclosure related to financial reporting control problems. 
The third proxy is the audit fee. Carcello et al. (2002) reveal that a more rigorous and 
thorough audit, which reflects audit quality, is signalled through higher audit fees. In 
relation to this, an audit committee would demand more extensive external auditing to 
gain additional assurance on financial reporting quality. Therefore, a high audit fee thus 
gives greater assurance through greater audit effort, where the examination of a client’s 
accounts and transactions is conducted in great detail. With such a vigilant audit, it is more 
likely that the auditors will detect errors and misstatements, which trigger the need for 
income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced restatement. 
In addition to the above proxies, control variables, such as audit committee size and audit 
committee meetings, are included in the study. The size of the audit committee ensures 
that optimal or sufficient resources are available to control and oversee a firm’s financial 
reporting process: the larger the audit committee, the more likely it is to uncover potential 
problems in the financial reporting system that increase the likelihood of forced 
restatement (Bédard et al., 2004). There is also the possibility that the pooling of experts in 
large audit committees increases monitoring effectiveness thus reduces the likelihood of 
forced restatement (Sharma et al., 2009). As for audit committee meetings, this allows 
more time for the directors to perform their monitoring duties (Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005) which reduces the likelihood of forced restatement. In another perspective, the time 
spent to meet allows audit committee members to discuss and resolve any outstanding 
accounting issues that require a restatement (Sharma et al., 2009). In this case, the 
frequency of audit committee meeting allows the detection of fraudulent financial 
90 
 
reporting more effectively, hence increases the likelihood of income-decreasing, income-
increasing or zero-effect forced restatement. 
Given the above assertions, this study posits that audit committee quality improves the 
effectiveness of its oversight of a firm’s financial reporting process. As such, a quality audit 
committee is deemed to improve the detection of earnings misstatement and errors, which 
may trigger income decreasing, income increasing, or zero-effect forced restatement. It is 
therefore hypothesised that: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit committee quality and the 
occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
4.2.3 Family ownership and control 
According to Berle and Means (1932), the separation of ownership and management in 
widely dispersed ownership firms commonly give rise to principal-agent conflicts. The 
misalignment of interest between agents and principals may create information asymmetry 
(Farrer and Ramsay 1998) whereby agents may withhold information and divert a firm’s 
resources for their own benefit, rather than the principals’ interests. Corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as corporate reporting and external auditing, may help reduce 
information asymmetry. However, managers’ opportunism of manipulating financial 
information may further increase information asymmetry, thus hindering shareholders’ 
ability to supervise and incentivise them effectively. 
Agency theory suggests that monitoring by large owners or blockholders is an essential 
governance solution to the agency problem. It is more likely for blockholders to assume 
monitoring costs compared to the free-riding small shareholders, especially when the 
monitoring benefits exceed the monitoring costs and allow blockholders to recoup their 
investments (Gillan and Starks 2000, Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Notwithstanding, high 
ownership concentration of large shareholders helps align both majority and minority 
shareholders’ interests, because the wealth of the large shareholders is tied up with the 
firm. They therefore have more to lose if their decisions do not maximise firm value (Fan 
and Wong, 2002).  
While the concentrated ownership structure can be effective in mitigating principal-agent 
conflict, it may, however, lead to principal-principal conflict. Principal-principal conflict 
refers to the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, where 
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the controlling shareholders abuse their ownership control and expropriate the assets of 
minority shareholders. Misalignment of interest between large and minority shareholders 
often leads to wealth expropriation from the small investors’ wealth for private gain (Young 
and Ahlstrom, 2003). Information asymmetry and high costs of observing and verifying 
managers’ actions result in aggravating the principal-principal agency problem, which 
eventually results in weak corporate governance.  
Family ownership is considered one of the major forms of concentrated ownership (La 
Porta et al., 1999). There are two competing theories to explain how family ownership may 
affect forced restatement; these are the alignment effect and the entrenchment effect 
(Wang 2006). On one hand, the alignment effect holds that family blockholders have the 
incentive to engage in more effective monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and are more 
inclined to report in good faith and preserve good reputation (Wang, 2006). As individuals 
who have developed their business from the ground-up, it is argued that family owners 
exhibit high confidence in their ability to run the business, and own great control over the 
business; this suggests that family blockholders are less likely to commit illicit behaviour 
that could be harmful to the firm’s survival (Anderson et al.,  2012). Family shareholders are 
less likely to take up the short-term benefit of opportunistic reporting; this is based on their 
incentive to safeguard the family’s reputation and have their business passed on to future 
generations (Wang, 2006). Accordingly, family firms tend to report earnings faithfully to 
ensure long-term performance. Therefore, firms with family ownership are less likely to 
have forced restatement. 
The entrenchment effect, on the other hand, holds that interest divergence and the 
existence of information asymmetry between family blockholders and minority 
shareholders provides them with the incentives to extract private benefits at the expense 
of the small investors. Fan and Wong (2002) contend that ownership concentration limits 
the flow of accounting information to the minority shareholders. The information 
asymmetry gives the opportunity for family members to be involved in the misstatement of 
accounting figures for personal benefit. Therefore, it is posited that firms with family 
ownership are more likely to have forced restatement.  
Accordingly, findings from prior research have shown consistency with the expectation of 
the alignment effect. For example, Wang (2006) and Ali et al. (2007) found that family firms 
produce higher quality reported earnings relative to non-family firms. Martin et al. (2016) 
reveal that family shareholders are less likely to engage in earnings management due to the 
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potential damaging reputational consequences from such opportunistic practices. In the 
context of a less developed market in Taiwan, Sue et al. (2013) documented that the 
financial reporting quality of family firms and non-family firms shows no significant 
difference. However, when family firms are detected with financial irregularities, these 
inappropriate accounting practices would generally impact in more serious accounting 
failure. The findings based on a study in Hong Kong by Filatotchev et al. (2011), however, 
show consistency with the entrenchment effect, where family ownership and the high 
control over a firm’s board heighten the exploitation risk of private information. Family 
shareholders take the opportunity from firm opacity to exploit their dominant position to 
extract the wealth of the minority shareholders, which results in lower earnings quality. 
In Malaysia, the perspective of blockholding is specific as family firms are prevalent in the 
country. Relatively, family blockholders mainly hold a dominating interest in Malaysian 
listed companies. For example, Claessens et al. (1999) examined 2,980 listed firms in nine 
East Asian countries and found that 67.2 percent of the Malaysian firm sample was family 
owned. The highly concentrated family ownership among Malaysian firms can be dated 
back many years where, historically, the Chinese ethnic group dominated businesses in 
Malaysia, although the majority of 60 percent of the total population is accounted for by 
the Malay Bumiputra ethnic group (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Therefore, many of the 
family firms are of Chinese origin. By nature, the Chinese family is high in collectivism 
where their business activities revolve closely around informal personal relationships. 
Based on this culture, Chinese families tend to pass their successful business to future 
generations, thereby adopting a long-term investment approach in business (Ma et al.,    
2016).  
Accordingly, this study will examine the effect of family ownership on the likelihood of 
forced restatement. For the purpose of measuring family ownership, this study takes family 
ownership per se. This is because family ownership in Malaysia is a highly insider 
ownership. The World Bank (2001) reported that in half of Malaysian listed firms, the five 
largest shareholders owned an average of 60 percent of outstanding shares, and over 50 
percent of voting shares. Malaysian family firms are heavily attached to the family for 
funding and employment (Jasni, 2002). The pervasive pyramidal ownership and cross-
holding structure in Malaysia further leverage family blockholders’ control in the companies 
(Claeesens, 2002).  
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Consistent with Filatochev et al. (2011), Sue et al. (2013) and Hasnan et al. (2013), this 
study measures family ownership by using the proxy of a dummy variable equal to one if at 
least 20% of the firm’s equity is owned by the family members, and zero otherwise. Prior 
empirical research claims that ownership blocks as small as 20% are considered adequate 
for the owner to exercise full control over a company (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002). High concentrated ownership and control 
via crossholdings and pyramiding are ubiquitous in Malaysia (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio 
et al., 2001; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013), which leverage the controlling 
power of family shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) document that the probability of 
becoming a single controlling owner via the holding of only 20% of a company’s stock is 
really high (above 80%) in East Asian countries, as it was found that control can be attained 
with substantially lesser share ownership via pyramiding as well as cross-ownership 
structure. Some leading families are also politically well-connected, which gives them more 
power to exercise control over a firm (Rachagan and Kuppusamy 2013). Family 
blockholders, especially among the Chinese, are also found to be high in collectivism; this is 
manifested in their wide social networking and guilds linked within the business community 
(Lim, 1998), thus further intensifying family control in businesses. With the presence of a 
large family shareholding, the family blockholder has more incentive and capability to 
influence managers to divert firm resources for their own benefit at the expense of the 
minority investors, which leads to the likelihood for forced restatement to occur. Although 
a dummy variable is used to measure family ownership, a sensitivity test will be performed 
(as shown later in Chapter 6), where family ownership is measured in terms of the 
percentage of equity shareholdings held by family members from the top ten largest equity 
shareholders (Hasnan et al., 2013)16. 
Family firms in Malaysia are mainly family-controlled firms as the family members 
commonly hold important positions in the management team and on the board (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Wang, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013). Having large shareholders holding 
managerial positions enables them to exert influence and control over the firm. Two 
competing arguments arise on how family control may impact on forced restatement. First, 
family can readily align the interests of the firm with the family’s. It is argued that a 
controlling family tends to monitor managers’ actions more effectively (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). A controlling owner would ensure that managers act in line with maximising 
                                                          
16
 The sensitivity analysis of family ownership was done on the ten largest shareholders as many studies have 
found it to represent a large proportion of shares ownership (more than 50%) in Malaysian listed companies 
(see for example, Zulkafli et al., 2005; Tam and Tan, 2007;. Rachagan and Kuppusamy, 2013).  
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shareholders’ wealth, thus reducing the likelihood of forced restatement. Second, 
controlling family owners may encounter less severe principal-agent conflicts, but rather 
more severe principal-principal conflict, in relation to non-family firms (Sue et al.,    2013). 
Bennedsen and Nielson (2010) argue that a controlling owner has no incentive to monitor 
managers, i.e., themselves. Thus, huge family control on the board does not improve 
monitoring efficiency. There is also the likelihood that only family members are appointed 
to hold a firm’s management position at the expense of hiring more talented outside 
professional managers, which may result in suboptimal decision making (Anderson and 
Reeb 2003). Firms with a controlling family may thus mask information to outsiders, 
especially minority investors, to enable the expropriation of larger assets for private 
benefit, thus increasing the likelihood of forced restatement.  
Studies such as Chen (2005) have shown that controlling family owners were able to detect 
earnings manipulation very quickly, and that they do not rely too much on the firm’s 
accounting-based performance measures to compensate managers. Ma et al. (2016) 
further found that family control in Chinese family firms is less likely to misstate earnings. In 
this case, controlling owners help to minimise managerial opportunistic behaviour in 
financial reporting. The overall findings above support the view that the dominant power of 
controlling family owners over non-family management leads them to becoming effective 
monitors. Contrarily, Filatotchev et al. (2011) provide evidence of negative effects that a 
controlling family has on firm performance. They show that controlling families abuse 
private information at the expense of minority investors.  
In addition to family ownership, this study will also examine the effect that family control 
has on the likelihood of forced restatement. In measuring family control over the firm, this 
study uses four different proxies. First, is founder(s) on the board (e.g., Hasnan et al., 2013, 
Sue et al., 2013, Ho and Kang, 2013). The influence of founders on the board facilitates in 
perpetuating a firm’s existing culture that tolerates opportunistic managerial behaviour 
(Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). As founders have been part of the 
business from the start, it is typical for them to have a strong emotional commitment and 
attachment to the firm. Due to such strong commitment, founders would safeguard the 
firm by doing almost anything, including shutting their eyes to opportunistic managerial 
behaviour such as boosting earnings performance (Hasnan et al., 2013), thus increasing the 
likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement. Bennedson and Nielson (2010) found 
that in relation to non-family firms, family firms’ value is discounted almost five times 
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greater where the manager belongs to the family owners. Their finding suggests that family 
blockholders have no incentive to monitor, such that the increase in their power of control 
leads to the incentive for them to divert a firm’s resources for their own benefit. 
Second, is founder CEO (e.g., Carcello et al., 2011, Ho and Kang, 2013). Dechow et al.    
(1996) contend that founder CEOs tend to be less accountable to the firm’s board since 
they have high influence over business affairs and decision-making. A founder CEO has the 
power to control a firm regardless of the percentage of their shareholdings, leading to 
expropriation of assets for their own benefit (Morck et al., 1988). They might even collude 
with the management to inflate earnings in order to conceal their deviant behaviour and 
portray that their company is doing well. This would lead to the possibility of income-
decreasing forced restatement.  
Third, is CEO serving on the board’s nominating committee (e.g., Carcello et al., 2011). A 
controlling owner often exerts huge influence over corporate affairs by using their power to 
nominate family members to the board (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, Filatotchev et al., 
2005). When a CEO sits on the nominating committee, they are more inclined to appoint 
incompetent directors, more gray directors (e.g., having a family relationship) and fewer 
independent outside directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). The CEO uses their power 
to pick the board and appoint any directors he thinks suitable, especially among family 
members, to curb performance pressure. This provides opportunity for management to 
collude and engage in opportunistic behaviour, which includes producing false information, 
thus creating the likelihood for forced restatement. 
Fourth, is CEO duality (e.g., Efendi et al., 2007, Baber et al., 2012, Lobo and Zhao, 2013). 
Family owners may want to increase their managerial monitoring by holding a duality CEO-
Chairman position on the board (Tam and Tan 2007). Being the figurehead of the company, 
the controlling family owner could concentrate better on management control and improve 
firm performance by virtue of their high power (Haniffa and Cooke, 2000). The duality 
position also gives power to the family to take control in ensuring timely and forceful 
intervention in cases of mismanagement or deterioration of a firm’s performance 
(Rachagan and Satkunasingam, 2009). However, CEO duality may give rise to conflict of 
interest between the board chairman (monitor) and the CEO (implementer of board’s 
decision). The CEO who serves as the board chairman may monitor and gain high influence 
over various firm-related matters such as board agendas, managerial compensation, and 
nomination of board members, although they might not formally be involved in serving on 
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the committees charged with the respective responsibilities (O’Connor et al., 2006). Such 
high influence may compromise a CEO’s integrity and their tendency to expropriate firm’s 
assets and misreport growth in earnings for private benefit, which eventually lead to the 
possibility for income-decreasing forced restatement to occur. 
Whether the entrenchment or alignment effect dominates is an empirical issue; this study 
develops the hypothesis from the entrenchment view. The detrimental effect of the 
principal-principal agency problem on forced restatement may be larger in family firms 
relative to non-family firms, especially in Malaysia that has weak investor protection. The 
control that family blockholders have over firms can be leveraged through the use of cross-
shareholdings and stock pyramid structures. It is thus expected that family ownership may 
pose a threat of intervention via family power of exerting pressure on the managers to 
report artificial favourable firm performance, which is detrimental to the small 
shareholders, hence the likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement to occur. The 
following hypothesis is therefore posited: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the existence of a family blockholder 
and family control and the occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
4.2.4 Government-related institutional ownership and political connection 
It is postulated that a firm’s equity ownership structure may affect the principal-agent 
conflict. In particular, large shareholdings help align managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
more closely. This is because blockholders have higher incentives and ability to monitor due 
to their large stake, especially when the monitoring benefits exceed the monitoring costs, 
thus allowing the blockholders to recoup their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Concentrated ownership acts as a means for blockholders to influence managers by using 
their power of concentrated voting rights and direct access strategies, thus enabling 
blockholders to motivate or even force the management to work for their interests (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). 
Institutional ownership has emerged to become one of the main forms of a firm’s 
ownership structure (Mitra and Cready, 2005). Institutional shareholders are depicted as 
sophisticated investors who have the advantage of possessing value-relevant information, 
and therefore an ability to monitor managerial behaviour (Lev, 1988; Hand, 1990; Jiambalvo 
et al., 2002). The institutional shareholders, via their large shareholdings, enjoy high 
economic benefit from their monitoring activities based on the economies of scale in 
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collecting information; this results in increased returns outweighing the monitoring costs 
(Gillan and Starks 2000). The institutional investors further enjoy the huge voting power 
that assists the implementation of necessary corrective actions. Provided that these 
institutional shareholders are keen on a firm’s long-term success, the investors are in a 
position to restrain opportunistic managerial behaviour by encouraging managers’ 
involvement in long-run profitable business activities (Dharwadkar et al., 2008).  
Studies have shown that institutional investors are good monitors and help mitigate agency 
problems. For example, Mitra and Cready (2005) found that firms with large institutional 
ownership engage in less discretionary accounting than those having a low level of 
institutional ownership, suggesting that substantial institutional ownership acts as a 
deterrent tool from earnings management practices. Hadani et al. (2011) also show that 
monitoring by large institutional investors is negatively associated with earnings 
management.  
In the context of Malaysia, the institutional ownership structure is quite unique as it is 
closely linked to the government. The so called “government-related institutional 
ownership” forms another main mode of ownership among listed firms in Malaysia (Ismail 
and Sinnadurai, 2012). Initially, reforms were introduced by emerging economies to 
increase transparency and enhance the protection for minority investors; nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of relevant regulatory enforcement is rather limited (Bin Muhamed et al., 
2014). However, in addressing this dilemma, Malaysia offers a particularly distinctive 
institutional setting such that government-related institutional ownership is established, 
not only to facilitate savings of the public but also to provide effective supervision and 
control over their portfolio firms. The blockholders therefore have the ability to mitigate 
agency problems and help in the improvement of firms’ corporate governance. As such, the 
hypothesis proposed in this section looks on the impact of government-related institutional 
ownership on the likelihood of forced restatement as particularly unique as it has not or 
cannot be tested in any other institutional setting. 
The establishment of government-related institutional ownership can be dated back to 
1971 when the Malaysian government implemented the 20-year New Economic Policy 
(NEP). The NEP’s main objective was to balance the wealth among the different ethnic 
groups, especially between the indigenous Malays (Bumiputras) and the Chinese who were 
then dominating the economy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Following implementation of the 
NEP, several pension and investment funds were set up by the Malaysian government to 
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help the Bumiputera invest their pension contributions and savings in privatised firms, 
thereby allowing the Bumiputera to participate in the country’s economic growth (Bin 
Muhamed et al., 2014). This has led to the creation of government investment 
organisations that hold ownership and gain control rights in privatised firms.  
There are three different types of government investment organisations that exist in 
Malaysia (Bin Muhamed et al., 2014, p. 455):  
(i) investment organisations owned by the federal government (FGLICs) with the role 
of promoting federal government’s social and economic policies;  
(ii) pension and investment funds sponsored by the federal government (PIF GLICs) 
with the role of providing pension benefits or maximising the long-term savings of 
the Bumiputera depositors; and  
(iii) State Economic Development Corporations (SEDCs), with the role of promoting 
state governments’ social and economic policies.  
 
Generally, the government investment organisations assist in mobilising domestic savings 
and attracting foreign investment to improve their portfolio companies’ access to external 
funds (Bin Muhamed et al., 2014). While government investment organisations generally 
help improve the proportion of Bumiputera ownership in the capital market and facilitate 
firms’ access to private funding, government investment organisations as blockholders in 
listed firms can potentially mitigate problems of transparency and expropriation practices 
by improving their control and supervision of portfolio firms (Lau and Tong, 2008). 
The government-related institutional investors hold huge fiduciary responsibility, especially 
to the contributors as the pools of funds get larger. Government-related institutional 
blockholders can exercise huge controlling power to urge managers to pursue policies that 
promote the interests of the society and the small shareholders. The government-related 
blockholders become more active in determining the governance of their shareholdings 
(Abdul Wahab et al., 2009) in a way that that their close supervision and control efforts 
help reduce agency costs.  
A counter-argument to this is that government-related institutional investors normally lack 
the incentive to undertake effective monitoring as their actions are motivated for serving 
the government and fulfilling public policy objectives at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Substantial investment further provides 
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government-related institutional investors with access to private information that is later 
manipulated for self-benefit (Koh, 2003). In this view, government-controlled firms tend to 
produce defective financial reporting so as to hide potential expropriations (Lim et al., 
2014), possibly by misstating earnings downward to reduce political costs, thus leading to 
the possibility of income-increasing forced restatement.  
Consistent with other Malaysian studies, such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002), no evidence 
was found by Wan-Hussin (2009) to support the assertion that institutional shareholders 
promote corporate reporting transparency. Nonetheless, Hashim and Devi (2012) provide 
evidence that institutional investors show greater incentives to monitor firms’ activities 
closely.  
Based on the above discussion, this study will examine the impact of government-related 
institutional ownership on the likelihood of forced restatement. In measuring government-
related institutional ownership, this study uses the proxy of the percentage of equity 
shareholdings held by the institutional investors from the top ten largest equity 
shareholders. The percentage of shareholding is used to prevent multicollinearity problems 
that might arise when a dummy is applied for both family ownership and government-
related institutional ownership; this is due to insufficient firms that fit into neither of the 
two categories. The proxy of government institutional ownership is used as government 
blockholders might use their power of control to influence a firm’s management to pursue 
policies that help promote their political interests at the expense of the minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). In this case, there is a possibility for a downward 
earnings misstatement to take place, perhaps for the management to reduce political cost, 
thus leading to the likelihood of income-increasing forced restatement.  
Despite attempts by the government to assist in enhancing the Bumiputera’s wealth, the 
increased government intervention required for the implementation of the Malaysian NEP 
has, however, given way to heavy political involvement, especially in terms of firm 
financing. Certain Bumiputera’s private firms were favoured by the government for 
granting access to finance (Perkins and Woo, 2000). While certain firms receive financial 
priority from the government, businessmen were seen to increasingly use their personal 
connections to persuade the allocations of such financial favours (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). 
Various other benefits are also gained from a firm’s close political connection; these include 
tax discounts, government subsidies and market power, which assist in improving firm 
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performance (Faccio et al., 2006). The informal ties between the Malaysian political elite 
and businessmen can be mutually lucrative for wealth accumulation (Fraser et al., 2006).  
Theoretically, having a political connection may assist firms to mitigate agency costs. The 
involvement of politicians or key government servants on a firm’s board may further 
enhance patron-client relationships between the government and the business (Faccio, 
2006). Such political relationships may discourage value-reducing tendencies through closer 
supervision, thus helping in mitigating agency costs. 
Nonetheless, the close ties that firms have with the government may not always be 
beneficial as they may lead to agency cost. There are two main ways in which firms’ 
political connections may create agency costs in the Malaysian context (Al-Dhamari and Ku 
Ismail, 2015). First, agency costs are created when managers of politically connected firms 
are inclined to conceal information that relates to the benefits gained from the 
government, and used to maximise their own wealth at the expense of the shareholders 
(Chaney et al., 2011). Second, agency costs can be exacerbated when the government puts 
pressure on the politically connected firms to mask information that relates to 
expropriation activities carried out by the government and their cronies (Bushman et al.,    
2004). Politically connected firms are subject to high public scrutiny and public monitoring 
relative to non-connected firms (Chaney et al., 2011). Therefore, any gains benefited from 
political connection and expropriation activities need to be concealed, especially when it 
involves large benefits that are of dubious legality (Fisman 2001). In such situations, 
managers might become engaged in earnings misstatement to mislead shareholders, thus 
increasing the tendency for forced restatement to occur. 
Prior studies, such as Chaney et al. (2011), show that politically connected firms report 
much poorer earnings quality relative to non-connected firms. Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) 
further found that politically connected firms are more likely to issue earnings restatements 
compared to non-connected firms, possibly due to connected firms carrying high risk and 
being operationally inefficient. Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2015) document that the 
reported earnings of politically connected firms are perceived to be of low quality by the 
investors. Politically connected firms in Malaysia further experience low earnings 
conservatism (Mohammed et al., 2011) and are more likely to manipulate earnings, as 
reflected by the firms’ high audit fees (Gul, 2006). 
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In terms of measuring a firm’s political connection, this study follows prior studies (e.g., 
Faccio, 2006; Hasnan et al., 2013; Lim et al., 2014) by taking a proxy of a dummy variable 
equal to one if the company is identified as being connected with a politician, if at least one 
of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10% of voting shares) or one of its top 
officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman or secretary) is a member of a 
parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party; and zero otherwise. 
The existence of a political connection is taken as a proxy as politically connected firms may 
be exploited for the government to achieve objectives that are against firm value 
maximisation. The government may consume firms’ resources for the benefit of cronies and 
supporters, who give political contributions, votes and even bribes in return (Bushman et 
al., 2004; Gul, 2006). Managers may thus intentionally misstate earnings to mislead the 
shareholders in relation to the profits generated or losses incurred from the firm’s political 
connections, thus increasing the likelihood of income-decreasing or income increasing 
forced restatement.  
In summary, this study takes the view that government-related institutional investors are 
responsible for myopically achieving public policy objectives and serve the government, 
rather than maximising shareholder wealth (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Furthermore, huge 
political influence and government interference in firms’ business activities may drive the 
agents away from working towards maximising principals’ return. Rather, managers in 
politically-connected firms tend to expropriate firms’ assets at the expense of shareholders 
for the sake of fulfilling a certain political agenda (Bliss and Gul, 2012). This study posited 
that: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between government-related institutional 
ownership and a firm’s political connection and the occurrence of forced financial 
restatement. 
4.2.5 Corporate reporting quality 
The divergence of ownership and control gives rise to agency conflict where agents tend to 
perform actions that are not in line with principals’ interests. This misalignment of interests 
leads to information asymmetry, such that the agents as the insiders have better access to 
information in relation to the firm’s present and likely future performance that is superior 
to those acquired by the principals. In such situations, agents may take advantage of their 
102 
 
unobservable actions to engage in opportunistic behaviour for personal benefit (Ho Tower 
and Barako, 2008).  
It is viewed that the corporate governance mechanism of legal corporate reporting 
becomes a necessity as it is intended to reduce information asymmetry and monitor 
managerial behaviour. The demand for corporate reporting arises as shareholders are 
unable to completely observe and verify managers’ actions. Quality corporate reporting is 
thus essential as it acts as a tool to evaluate a firm’s performance level and serve as a guide 
for a firm’s value (Dechow, 1994).  
The quality of corporate reporting may be impaired when managers use corporate 
reporting to report artificial firm performance to obscure the firm’s true financial situation. 
Managers might manipulate corporate reporting to increase information asymmetry in 
order to inhibit shareholders’ ability to supervise and incentivise them appropriately. While 
managers and blockholders might engage in opportunistic behaviour, agency theory 
highlights that not all investors do this, it is merely a possibility. 
Prior literature has identified that earnings management can prevent the attainment of a 
high quality corporate report. It is also seen as evidence of a financial reporting process 
breakdown (Cohen et al., 2004). This is possible as earnings management is commonly used 
by managers to camouflage a firm’s actual financial performance for rent seeking purposes 
at the expense of the shareholders. In this view, managers or blockholders might engage in 
earnings management to intentionally boost reported profits (e.g., to portray good 
performance) or reduce earnings (e.g., to reduce tax payable), thus increasing the 
likelihood for income-decreasing or income-increasing forced restatement to take place. 
In view of this, earnings management is taken as a proxy in this study for opportunistic 
behaviour by managers and blockholders. One of the earnings management techniques 
used by managers is accruals-based earnings management. On the one hand, accrual-based 
earnings management can be used to deliver value-relevant information (Healy and Palepu, 
1993; Subramanyam, 1996). Ghosh and Moon (2010), for example, found that accruals 
were used by managers as a tool to communicate private information about a firm’s future 
prospects. On the other hand, accrual-based earnings management can be used to mask a 
firm’s true underlying performance (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Numerous earnings 
management literature document that accruals are being managed opportunistically by 
self-interested managers to conceal poor firm performance (Rangan, 1998; Jones et al.,    
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2008; Dechow et al., 2011). In contrast to the non-discretionary component of accruals, 
which are standard accounting adjustments to operating cash flows (such as salary and 
rental expenses), the discretionary component of accruals are exposed to managerial 
discretion. This is because the GAAP allows considerable flexibility for managerial 
judgement and discretion (e.g., by manipulating accounting estimates or changing 
accounting methods); this leaves substantial leeway for managers to engage in 
opportunistic management or manipulation of discretionary accruals (Marra et al., 2011). 
Accruals based earnings management is typically favoured among self-interested managers 
as it has relatively no direct impact on cash flow and is generally hard to detect (Peasnell et 
al., 2005).  
This study uses several proxies to measure accruals-based earnings management. One of 
the proxies used to examine discretionary accruals is the Modified Jones model (1995) 
(DAMJ). The DAMJ is chosen over the Jones (1991) model because the explanatory power 
of the Jones model is relatively low. Specifically, Jones (1991) provides evidence on the 
correlation between accruals and firm attributes, but found that the explanatory power 
only explains approximately 10 percent of the variation in accruals. The Jones model is also 
subject to high Type I and Type II errors (Dechow et al., 2010). Type I error refers to false 
positive, where accruals are classified as abnormal when in fact they represent a firm’s 
fundamental performance. Type II error refers to false negative, where accruals are 
classified as normal when in fact they represent managerial discretion. The DAMJ by 
Dechow et al. (1995) is derived by adjusting for credit sales growth to reduce Type II errors. 
Since manipulation often involves credit sales, such modification improves the explanatory 
power of the DAMJ at a level where the residual is uncorrelated with normal revenue 
accruals. In such cases, the Modified Jones model is seen to help improve the detection of 
revenue manipulation, which triggers the likelihood of forced restatement. 
Deferred tax accrual is taken as another proxy. Using deferred tax accrual to measure 
earnings management is likely to be more appealing than other accruals for several 
reasons. First, the potential for other accruals, such as depreciation or non-operating 
accruals, as an earnings management instrument is rather limited because of its rigidity and 
visibility (Young, 1999, p. 11; Beneish, 1998, p. 5). Second, Young (1999) found that the 
Modified Jones model produces systematic measurement error in the estimation of 
abnormal accruals when depreciation is included in the accruals measure. Third, other 
accruals are based on historical cost and can be manipulated through the various GAAP 
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chosen by the managers for financial reporting. Deferred tax accrual is incrementally useful 
beyond other accruals as it can better measure managerial accrual discretion, because the 
tax law generally allows less discretion of accounting choices compared to the discretion 
available under GAAP (Mills and Newberry, 2001; Phillips et al.,2003). It is expected that 
managers or blockholders might want to manage earnings to achieve certain objectives 
(e.g., avoiding a decline in earnings) by exploiting the flexibilities under GAAP available for 
financial reporting purposes, vis-a-vis tax reporting. The possibility for managers to manage 
earnings upward, for example, may increase book income but not taxable income. Thus, 
managing income upward generates temporary-book-tax differences, indicating that 
deferred tax expense is likely to be more informative and a useful measure for detecting 
opportunistic accrual-based earnings management compared to other accruals measures, 
which increases the likelihood of forced restatement. 
This study further examines working capital accruals as a proxy to measure accruals-based 
earnings management. It is defined as the change in non-cash current assets less change in 
current liabilities (excluding short-term debt and tax), deflated by average assets (Dechow 
et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2013; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). The measure is restricted and focuses 
solely on ‘working capital’ accruals; any non-current accruals (e.g., including depreciation 
expenses) are excluded from the definition. As Beneish (1998) and Young (1999) have 
discussed, the possibility for depreciation to become an earnings management tool is 
limited (particularly over multiple periods) due to its rigidity, predictability and visibility. 
More specifically, it is not possible to change depreciation policy frequently without 
prompting adverse attention from the auditors, thus the limitation for depreciation as an 
instrument for systematic earnings management (Beneish, 1998). 
Working capital accruals are more susceptible to opportunistic management and 
misstatement, relative to non-working capital accruals (Kreutzfeldt and Wallce, 1986; 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Botsari and Meeks, 2008). Manipulating working capital 
accruals is relatively hard to detect and appears attractive as it involves judgemental 
estimates (e.g., McNichols and Wilson, 1988) and does not have any direct cash flow 
consequences (Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004). Therefore, the overstatement or 
understatement of working accruals may indicate opportunistic behaviour and may lead to 
the likelihood for misstating firms to be issued with income-decreasing or income-
increasing forced restatement. 
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Generally firms tend to manipulate working capital accruals, such that it increases firms’ 
earnings figure (reported performance) thus making firm’s growth prospect (economic 
performance) to appear more favourable. Based on prior studies, Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), for example, provide evidence that changes in working capital are used to achieve 
increased earnings. This is supported by Defond and Jiambavlo (1994) when they examined 
94 firms that violated their debt covenants; they found that working capital accruals are 
significantly positive, hence producing favourable earnings, in the year prior to and the year 
of debt violation. Based on an analysis of misstating firms, Dechow et al. (2011; 2012) 
consistently show that working capital accruals are unusually high during the misstatement 
years, but are then reversed based on a significant decrease in the accruals after the 
misstatement years. Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998) found, however, that firms with 
high discretionary working capital accruals show poor future reported earnings.  
From the perspective of the impact of working capital accruals management on economic 
performance, prior studies show mixed findings. For example, Dechow et al. (2011) 
discover that, in addition to reporting high working capital accruals, misstatement firms 
also have a high price-earnings and market-to-book ratio, suggesting that the market is 
optimistic about the future potential growth of the companies. Ettredge et al. (2010) 
further reveals a systematic increase of balance sheet “bloat”, or abnormally high working 
capital accounts levels among fraud restatement firms compared to non-fraud restatement 
firms. However, it was found that the fraud firms report a high book-to-market ratio, 
indicating that firms have poor growth expectation. 
To a certain extent, the impact of opportunistic management or misstatement of working 
capital accruals on economic performance can be catastrophic; this can be seen from the 
example of some real cases. Transmile, an air cargo service provider in Malaysia has been 
managing its working capital, which included inflating its accounts receivables from RM111 
million to RM381 million in 2005. This has resulted in an 80 percent increase of its revenue 
and doubling of its net profit. By the time forced restatement was announced in May 2007, 
its share price had dropped from RM13 in early May 2007 to only RM8.90 at the end of 
May, with an estimated total paper loss of RM3.4 billion (Abdullah et al., 2010).  
Another example is Megan Media, considered to be the largest data storage product 
manufacturer in Malaysia. In 2007, the company was found managing and misstating both 
accounts receivables and accounts payable amounting to RM456 million. The company’s 
financial performance deteriorated and it reported a negative cash flow of RM897 and net 
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loss of RM1.27 billion for the financial year ending 2007. The company’s share price 
plunged 43 percent to only 6 cents in July 2007 when the announcement of a forced 
restatement was made; the company was finally delisted in April 2008.  
Guenther (1994) further argues on the tendency of opportunistic management of operating 
accruals due to its material value and states that it is routinely incurred in daily business 
operations. Therefore, in addition to working capital accruals, four other operating accruals 
metrics are tested. This includes the proxy of non-cash net operating asset accruals. 
Pryshchepa et al. (2013), who applied the non-cash net operating asset accruals measure, 
document significant higher accruals for the incorrectly identified healthy firms in 
comparison to those correctly identified. The finding indicates that aggressive accruals 
management is typically engaged by incorrectly identified healthy firms to signal the firm’s 
future prospects to be much better than that assessed by the investors. Based on this view, 
it is argued that firms with a high level of non-cash operating asset accruals are more likely 
to engage in upward earnings management, and therefore there is the likelihood of 
income-decreasing forced restatement. 
Further current accruals proxies include change in receivables, change in inventories, and 
soft assets17. The overstatement of receivables and inventory is another way of 
manipulation used to artificially boost a firm’s sales and assets value (Thomas and Zhang, 
2002; Dichev et al., 2013). Receivables misstatements may improve a firm’s sales growth, 
while inventory misstatements may improve a firm’s gross profit margin, both of which 
metrics (sales and gross profit) are closely tracked by investors (Dechow et al., 2011). 
Dechow et al. (2011) further found that a firm’s soft assets are significantly higher in the 
misstating years, suggesting a build-up of assets whose values are more subject to 
manipulation during the misstatement period. Overall, the above findings suggest that 
firms that report positive changes in receivables and inventories, and have more soft assets 
on the balance sheet, have more discretion in opportunistically managing accruals to report 
higher earnings, hence the likelihood for a firm to be issued with income-deceasing forced 
restatement. 
Another technique that can be used by managers to manage earnings is real earnings 
management. Unlike accrual-based earnings management that is performed by changing 
accounting estimates or methods used in the presentation of a transaction in a firm’s 
                                                          
17
 A soft asset is defined as the percentage of assets on the balance sheet that are neither cash nor property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE); it includes examples such as accounts receivables and inventories. 
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financial statements, real earnings management involves managers altering the execution 
of real business transactions. Firms manipulate real activities by adapting the structure or 
timing of real transactions in order to achieve a firm’s short-term goals (e.g., to meet or 
beat earnings expectations or avoid a breach of debt covenants). While accruals 
management is confined within the flexibility of accounting practices allowed by the GAAP, 
no such framework exists for real business operations. Managers are thus expected to use 
their judgement in deciding the best possible course of action given the economic 
circumstances. Opportunities thus arise for managers to engage in real earnings 
management in addition to, or in lieu of, opportunistic accruals management in an attempt 
to manipulate a firm’s reported earnings. The detection of real earnings management might 
seem to be more challenging relative to the opportunistic practices of accruals 
management (Kothari et al., 2016). Real earnings management has direct cash flow 
consequences, and causes a more damaging economic impact on the firm’s long-term 
underlying value (Gunny, 2010). Hence, there is a possibility that professional managers 
might be more prepared to use real earnings management rather than long-term family 
owners or managerial shareholders. 
Prior studies document that firms employ accruals-based and real activities management as 
substitutes for managing earnings (Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). Prior research also shows that firms will either stop 
managing earnings or substitute another type of earnings management when the ability to 
manage earnings is constrained (Ettredge et al., 2010). Accordingly, Badertscher (2011) 
argued that firms resort to engaging real earnings manipulation when all choices of accrual 
management are exhausted.  
In the perspective of real earnings management, Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) contend that firms that engage in managing earnings upwards will possibly 
have certain accounting effects including:  
(i) an abnormally low level of cash flow from operations resulting from lenient 
credit terms or increased price discounts in order to improve current period 
sales;  
(ii) an abnormally low level of discretionary expenses resulting from an aggressive 
cut in research and development, advertising, and administrative expenses in 
order to boost current period reported earnings; and  
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(iii) an abnormally high level of production costs to cut down the costs of goods 
sold, which in turn improves the current period operating margin. (According to 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), a firm over produces and allocates fewer overheads 
to cost of goods sold but more to inventory, thereby leading to a lower cost of 
goods sold and higher operating margin). 
 
In view of this, three metrics are examined as proxies for real earnings management, 
including abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal 
discretionary expenses. 
In general, this study posits that while not all managers/blockholders are opportunistic, the 
possibility exists that some managers/blockholders are prone to engage in accounting 
manipulation to mislead outsiders, either to show that the company is performing well 
(e.g., to increase share price) or poorly (e.g., to reduce tax liability). In this case, managers 
use their discretion to manipulate accrual earnings based on the flexibilities available under 
GAAP. Alternatively, managers may adjust real transaction activities to distort earnings. 
Managers may even use accruals-based and real earnings management jointly to meet 
market expectations, which increases the propensity for the firms involved to be issued 
with income-decreasing or income-increasing forced restatement. Overall, the distortion of 
corporate reporting may increase the likelihood of forced restatement. In this view, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the distortion of corporate reporting 
quality and the occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
4.2.6 Firm performance and demand for external 
Principals would expect that managers work towards maximising shareholder wealth. 
However, the principal-agent misalignment of interest results in managers pursuing self-
interests at the expense of the shareholders, thus impeding them from delivering a good 
performance (Rachagan and Satkunasingam, 2009). Pressure may arise for the managers to 
meet market expectations, explaining their attempts to disguise a firm’s underlying 
performance to make the firm appear more profitable or less risky than it really is (Zhao 
and Chen, 2008).  
Managers prefer reporting positive growth in earnings to exhibit good firm performance 
(Graham et al., 2005; Huang and Scholz, 2012). Managers do not seek earnings growth for 
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its own sake but rather to increase their own welfare (Badertscher, 2011). This is possible 
as a firm’s growth increases managers’ power due to the increase of resources under their 
control (Jensen, 1986). More specifically, managers are often rewarded when they report 
increasing earnings and keep the share price high and rising (Badertscher 2011). Firms 
would be penalised in the share market if they fail to meet market expectations, hence the 
pressure to report consistent and predictable growth (Jensen, 2004; Brown, 2011). The 
pressure intensifies particularly among firms in a distressed financial condition to report 
earnings growth for them to convince creditors and shareholders of their favourable 
performance (Saleh and Ahmed 2005). In such situations, there is a tendency for firms to 
show their ability to meet or beat earnings targets and maintain a high share price, which 
further helps improve a firm’s credibility within the market (Graham et al., 2005). Overall, 
firm managers might succumb to the pressure of reporting continuous strong financial 
results and maintaining a high firm valuation, which increases the likelihood of income-
decreasing forced restatement.  
The following presents findings of prior literature on firms’ reported performance (defined 
as firm’s earnings performance reported in their financial report), in comparison to firm’s 
fundamental economic performance (defined as firm’s growth performance). Findings 
generally show that firms tend to report positive earnings to ensure that they can maintain 
high stock return, thus demonstrating firm’s healthy growth prospect.  
Relatively, prior research documented the reported performance of firms that strive to 
achieve or maintain positive earnings growth (including the impact of accounting 
misstatements). Myers et al. (2007), for example, found 746 US firms reporting increasing 
earnings between 1962 and 2004 in order to achieve their defined earnings target. From 
the perspective of economic performance, Myers et al. (2007) discovered that these firms 
benefited from significant abnormal returns. Misstatement firms were also found by 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) to report increasing earnings. Based on a sample of 49 SEC 
sanctioned firms from 1996 to 2003, they document that misstatement firms reported 
growth in earnings to show good firm performance. In the perspective of distressed firms, 
Chen et al. (2010) discovered that these firms commonly reported increasing earnings. It 
was further revealed that firms are penalised by the market when they show a 
deteriorating earnings pattern with negative abnormal returns (DeAngelo, 1996). 
In extreme cases, firms’ incentives to maintain and extend positive growth can eventually 
lead to a destructive economic performance. WorldCom, for example, overstated its 
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earnings by falsely increasing outputs and sub-optimal price cutting to catch up with their 
superior financial performance, which resulted in potential bankruptcy impacting the entire 
industry. Reliance on WorldCom’s inflated earnings caused its rivals to overinvest, involving 
$90 billion of sub-optimal and misallocated investment (The Eastern Management Group, 
2001). Another case is Enron, where the company was involved in fraudulent financial 
reporting to maintain its credit rating at investment rates for it to continue its business. 
While Enron was not making sufficient profit, they engaged in aggressive misstatements 
when they treated the sale and purchase of investments held for trading by including it in 
firm’s operating cash flow (and free cash flow). Enron managed to boost its operating and 
free cash flow, which looked good to the investors. In October 2001, Enron announced that 
the firm was actually worth $1.2 billion less than previously reported. Enron further 
disclosed that it made a $618 million loss for the quarter, and had overstated earnings by 
$586 million since 1997. A $40 billion lawsuit was filed by Enron’s shareholders, after the 
company’s share price plummeted 99.5 percent from its highest of $91 in 2000, to less than 
$1 by November 2001. However, the deal failed and Enron filed for bankruptcy in 
December 2001 (Benston, 2003). 
For the purpose of this study, four proxies will be used as a measure for firm performance. 
The first proxy, change in earnings, is based on the contention by Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1991) and Graham et al. (2005) that firms are inclined towards reporting high growth in 
earnings; there is, therefore, an incentive for firms to produce positive earnings growth 
during the misstatement periods. The fact that managers report positive earnings growth to 
meet market expectations may increase the likelihood of income-decreasing forced 
restatement.  
The second and third proxies are book-to-market ratio and price-earnings ratio, which 
measure a firm’s growth prospects. Essentially, the spread between a firm’s book value and 
market value is taken as a measure of a firm’s perceived ability to pay returns to its 
shareholders, an amount in the future in excess of the expected return (Rappaport, 1981). 
Managers have strong incentives to show persistent growth in order to maintain high stock 
valuations. Dechow et al. (2011) found that misstating firms report high price-earnings and 
market-to-book ratios, suggesting that managers really strive to avoid disappointing 
shareholders and losing firms’ high valuation. This is consistent with the findings by Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) that firms are heavily penalised by the market when they fail to meet 
targeted earnings after a period of continuous growth. Even in period of downturn, firms 
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experiencing rapid growth may report to show that they appear to be experiencing a stable 
growth (Beasler 1996). Managers of growth firms may therefore have the incentive to 
sustain high growth to manifest good firm performance, which may lead to the possibility 
of income-decreasing forced restatement to occur.  
The fourth proxy is financial distress. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), financial 
distress creates a condition that incentivises managers to show a favourable firm 
performance by reporting growth in earnings. The incentive arises due to the pressure of 
meeting the expectations of shareholders and analysts for firms to report positive earnings 
(Habib et al., 2013). In this view, it is thus expected that managerial action of reporting 
earnings growth among financially distressed firms may eventually lead to the likelihood of 
the firm being issued with income-decreasing forced restatement.  
In addition to the four proxies of firm performance, a control variable, i.e., leverage, is 
included to control for the effect that the variable has on the likelihood of forced 
restatement. It is argued that firms with high leverage have the incentive to misstate 
earnings to enhance a firm’s financial performance for the purpose of raising new debt, 
based on favourable terms or preventing violations of covenants in the existing debt 
contracts (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Minton and Schrand, 1999). Ettredge et al. (2010), 
for example, found that firms with higher leverage are associated with core earnings 
misstatement. Following Sharma and Iselin (2012), this study controls for leverage as it 
captures misstatement and thus restatement risk associated with a high debt level. 
Certain control variables such as sales growth, profitability, and income volatility may also 
affect the likelihood of forced restatement (Subramanyam 1996; Sue, Chin, & Chan, 2013; 
Correia 2014). However, these control variables are excluded from the hypotheses testing 
model due to high collinearity between these variables and change in earnings. Statistically, 
the pairwise correlations between the control variables and change in earnings are 
relatively low (coefficient below 0.30). However, conceptionally, since sales growth, 
profitability, and income volatility are measured by sales and earnings performance which 
are represented in change in earnings, it is thus argued that there is a high correlation 
between these items. In this case, introducing the control variables, sales growth, 
profitability, and income volatility into the equation can gives rise to a multicollinearity 
problem which hinders from accurate estimations of variable coefficients and significance 
levels (Hamilton 1992).  
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Within a different perspective, the attempt to ensure growth in a firm’s performance may 
give rise to the demand for external finance to improve a firm’s capital base and to expand 
the scale of business operation (Dechow et al., 2011). The intention to raise new capital 
may exist in some firms, but they could not just proceed with raising funds due to the 
inability of securing favourable terms (Dechow et al., 2011). Thus, as the internal funds are 
near to getting exhausted, managers are more inclined towards reporting higher 
profitability with the anticipation of getting access into the capital market (Erickson et al., 
2006; Lennox and Pittman, 2010). By reporting good earnings performance, the firm’s share 
price may increase, thus reducing the cost of issuing new equity. This explains why 
managers tend to report positive earnings when raising external funds that, in turn, 
increases the likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement. 
Prior studies revealed that managers disclose a firm’s good prospects in order to allow the 
managers to raise the external funds necessary for investment. Research has shown that 
misstatement firms frequently issue shares or bonds in the capital market (see e.g., Efendi 
et al., 2007). Dechow et al. (2011) found that misstatement firms actively raise funds before 
and during the misstating years. They suggest that the concern to obtain finance has 
encouraged managers of misstatement firms to report favourable earnings during the 
misstating years. Overall, the above research findings show that firms relying on external 
financing are more likely to issue forced restatement. 
In measuring a firm’s demand for external finance, three metrics are used as proxies. The 
first is change in free cash flow. Free cash flow is “cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost 
of capital” (Jensen, 1986, p.323). A lesser free cash flow would mean that the ability of a 
firm to cover its capital expenditures by using internal funds held by the company is 
reduced. When free cash flow reduces, a firm has the incentive to attract external finance 
at low cost (Dechow et al., 1996). In such situations, there would be an incentive for 
managers to report and show good firm performance, allowing them access to the capital 
market at low cost. As such, firms having a lower free cash flow are more likely to be issued 
with income-decreasing forced restatement. In a similar vein, a firm’s incentive on raising 
new capital (FINR) is examined as the second proxy to measure the demand for external 
funds. Following Dechow et al. (1996), FINR, which represents an ex-ante measure of 
finance need, is measured by a firm’s free cash flow deflated by current assets. When FINR 
becomes more negative, i.e., less than -0.5, a firm is nearer to exhausting its own internal 
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funds and thereby prone to show favourable earnings, which increases the likelihood for 
income-decreasing forced restatement.  
The third proxy is the actual issuance that represents the ex-post measure of finance need. 
The actual issuance proxy helps to identify whether the firm has issued new equity or debt 
prior to the forced restatement event. While there is evidence that the issuance of debt 
and stock does not motivate earnings misstatements (Beneish, 1999), more recent research 
has shown that debt and equity issuance is associated with the probability of fraudulent 
accounting (Efendi et al., 2007; Lennox and Pittman 2010). It is suggested that 
management’s concerns regarding obtaining finance might trigger managers to report 
favourable earnings during the misstatement period. Efendi et al. (2007) and Dechow et al. 
(2011), for example, show corroborating evidence that firms are active in raising finance 
during their misstatement years with the incentive to keep their cost of capital to the 
minimum. In summary, it is contended that companies that are raising external funds have 
the propensity to be issued income-decreasing forced restatement. 
Overall, there is tendency for managers to report favourable earnings to meet market 
expectations. Furthermore, in an attempt to maintain a growth trend, the need for external 
funds might arise to support business operations. In this situation, there is a tendency for 
managers to report higher profits to portray good firm performance, hence reducing the 
cost of issuing new capital and enabling the firm to have easy access into the capital 
market. Overall, the attempt of portraying firm growth and the demand for raising external 
funds may increase the likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement. Hence, the 
following proposition is developed: 
H6: There is a positive relationship between firm performance and demand for 
external finance and the occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
4.2.7 Share price volatility 
Based on the agency theory, principals and agents are assumed to act rationally and will 
make use of the contracting process to maximise their wealth. With the existence of 
information asymmetry and the inability of the shareholders to fully observe managers, 
there is a tendency for agents to abuse their private access to information to fulfil their own 
self-benefit at the expense of the shareholders. Agents would use a firm’s assets for self-
interest, including diverting the assets for personal benefits that compromise the quality of 
a firm’s performance (Rachagan and Satkunasingam, 2009). This increases firm risk, hence 
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the fluctuation in firm value. This is possible as the low predictability and uncertainty of a 
firm’s future performance explains the fluctuation in a firm’s share price (Wei and Zhang, 
2006). Since investors are heavily affected by share price, the volatility might result in poor 
investment return. 
Share price is a function of future expected earnings, hence share price volatility signals 
high uncertainty about a firm’s future earnings (Chen et al., 2002). From the investor’s 
point of view, the volatility in share price might as well indicate a firm’s perceived risk 
(Froot et al., 1992) and is undesirable to the investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000). The 
volatility in share price may create market awareness of a firm’s ongoing problems. This 
does not only prompt more intense public scrutiny, but also closer monitoring by the 
regulators so as to minimise the probability of poor firm returns. In effect, the close 
monitoring by the external authorities on these high risk firms may trigger forced 
restatement.  
Prior studies have shown that high risk firms exhibit high volatility in share price. For 
example, Wei and Zhang (2006) document that stock volatility is driven by the firm’s 
uncertainty of future profits. Zhang (2010) further shows a positive association between a 
firm’s stock price volatility and sales growth volatility. He also found that firms with high 
leverage tend to be more volatile, indicating that highly levered firms are susceptible to 
higher bankruptcy risk. The fact that a firm is high risk prompts a more effective monitoring 
by the market and regulators as they are suspicious of a firm’s business problems; and 
investors are heavily affected by the volatility in a firm’s share price. Jones and Weingram 
(1996) revealed that firms experiencing large return volatility and large negative returns are 
subject to closer monitoring by the regulators because investors are disappointed with their 
low investment return. Markarian and Gill-de-Albornoz (2012), however, revealed that 
income smoothing to reduce stock return volatility tends to reduce as external monitoring 
by institutional investors increases. 
Share price volatility is taken as a proxy for investors’ concerns about the riskiness of an 
asset (Anderson et al., 2004). Share price volatility also implies a lack of confidence in the 
information produced by the firm, so investors rely on, and respond strongly to, private 
information, which explains the fluctuations of the share price. While high risk firms exhibit 
high stock price volatility, it is postulated that this might alert institutional investors, 
auditors and regulators to potential problems in firms, and therefore increases the intensity 
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of close firm monitoring. This close monitoring would eventually trigger the need for forced 
restatement. Hence, the following hypothesis is developed: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between share price volatility and the 
occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
4.3 Conceptual framework 
It is the study’s main aim to examine whether firms’ financial or non-financial corporate 
governance characteristics affect the likelihood of forced restatements in Malaysia. 
Relatively, the conceptual framework for the hypotheses testing in identifying factors that 
affect the likelihood of forced restatements is shown in Figure 4-1. 
In testing the first main objective of this study, the hypotheses testing is performed 
whereby variables will be examined to assess their ability in determining the likelihood of 
forced restatement among the Malaysian listed firms (please refer to Figure 4-1). These 
variables include including corporate governance variables, blockholder ownership 
variables, corporate reporting quality variables, firm performance and demand for external 
finance variables, and share price volatility variables. 
In relation to the second main objective of this study, the hypotheses testing will examine 
all these explanatory variables to determine the specific attributes of income-decreasing 
forced restatement firms in comparison to firms with income increasing forced restatement 
and zero effect forced restatement. By definition, income-decreasing forced restatement is 
where restated income is lower than the reported income, income-increasing forced 
restatement is where restated income is higher than reported income, and zero-effect 
forced restatement is where restated income equals reported income. With this, 
characteristic differences between firms that engage in misstatement and firms that 
unintentionally commit accounting errors may be identified.  
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Figure 4-1: A conceptual framework on the association of corporate governance, blockholder 
ownership, corporate reporting quality, firm performance and demand for external finance 
and share price volatility, being symptomatic of a forced financial restatement  
4.4 Summary 
In line with the main aim of this study, which is to examine whether firms’ financial or non-
financial corporate governance characteristics affect the likelihood of forced restatements 
in Malaysia, this chapter begins with the development of hypotheses that posited on the 
various incentives, symptoms and constraints factors that could possibly indicate towards 
incidences of forced restatement in Malaysia. The explanatory variables are grouped 
accordingly and include: (i) corporate governance variables; (ii) blockholder ownership 
variables; (iii) corporate reporting quality variables; (iv) firm performance and demand for 
external finance variables; and (v) share price volatility variables.  
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These explanatory variables are expected to have an impact and therefore the ability to 
signal the likelihood of a firm’s forced restatement. Following this, the research conceptual 
frameworks are laid out to consider the impact of various financial and non-financial factors 
that may potentially signal the likelihood of forced restatement.  
Based on the developed hypotheses and conceptual framework, Chapters 5 will delineate 
the research methodology whereas Chapter 6 will present an empirical analysis and 
findings on the determinants of forced restatement among publicly listed firms in Malaysia. 
Table 4-1, as shown below, summarises the hypotheses developed in the study, together 
with the related variables and the predicted effect on forced restatement.  
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Table 4-1: Summary of developed hypotheses 
No Formulated hypothesis Proxies 
Predicted effect on 
forced restatement 
H1 
There is a negative relationship between board quality and the 
occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
1) Board independence (BI) 
2) Financial expert directors (FL) 
3) Multiple directorships (MULTI) 
- 
H2 
There is a positive relationship between audit committee quality and 
the occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
1) Audit committee independence 
(ACIND) 
2) Audit committee expertise 
(ACEXP) 
3) Audit fees (AF) 
+ 
H3 
There is a positive relationship between the existence of a family 
blockholder and family control and the occurrence of forced financial 
restatement. 
1) Family ownership (FM) 
2) Founders on the board (FB) 
3) CEO belongs to the founding 
family (CEOF) 
4) CEO serves on the board’s 
nominating committee (CEON) 
5) CEO duality (CEOB) 
+ 
H4 
There is a positive relationship between government-related 
institutional ownership and a firm’s political connections and the 
occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
1) Government institutional 
ownership (INST) 
2) Political connection (PC) 
+ 
H5 
There is a positive relationship between the distortion of corporate 
reporting quality and the occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
1) Modified Jones model 
discretionary accruals (DAMJ) 
2) Deferred tax expense (DT) 
3) Working capital accruals (WCAC) 
4) Change in non-cash net 
operating assets (RSST) 
5) Change in receivables (CHAR) 
6) Change in inventories (CHINV) 
7) Soft assets (SFAST) 
+ 
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8) Abnormal cash flow from 
operations (ABCFO) 
9) Abnormal level of production 
costs (ABPROD) 
10) Abnormal level of discretionary 
expenditures (ABDISX) 
H6 
There is a positive relationship between firm performance and 
demand for external finance, and the occurrence of forced financial 
restatement. 
1) Change in earnings (CHROA) 
2) Book-to-market ratio (BM) 
3) Price-earnings ratio (PE) 
4) Financial distress (DISTRESS) 
5) Change in free cash flows 
(CHFCF) 
6) Incentive on raising new capital 
(FINR) 
7) Actual issuance (AI) 
+ 
H7 
There is a positive relationship between share price volatility and the 
occurrence of forced financial restatement. 
1) Share price volatility (SDW) + 
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CHAPTER 5  
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The development of hypotheses was delineated in the previous Chapter 4, in line with the 
study’s main objective, i.e. to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial 
determinants and corporate governance determinants of forced restatements. The current 
Chapter 5 proceeds by discussing the research methodology of the study used for testing 
the hypotheses. The chapter begins by presenting the study’s data collection procedure 
and sample selection, followed by the discussion on variable measurement. Finally, this 
chapter explores in depth the specification of key research models applied in the study. 
The need for identifying the determinants of forced restatement appears crucial specifically 
in Malaysia due to its unique institutional and structural environment which may have 
significant implications on the quality of financial reporting. Weak law enforcement, poor 
investor protection, poor monitoring and sanctions by the Malaysian regulators on firm 
behaviour feature the Malaysian economic background (Hasnan et al. 2013; Johl et al., 
2013). The existence of politically connected firms, firms with pyramidal ownership 
structures, companies with family ownership concentration, the presence of cross-
directorship on the companies’ board, concealment of influential shareholders identities 
through the use of nominees, are among the common institutional features of publicly 
listed firms in Malaysia (Hasnan et al., 2013). All these unique features may initiate ripe 
conditions for financial misstatements to take place.  
It is, therefore, the main objective of the study to test hypotheses regarding key 
accounting, financial determinants and corporate governance determinants of forced 
financial restatements among public listed firms in Malaysia. The model may provide input 
to the auditors, financial analysts, investors, and regulators to identify possible misconduct, 
misstatement, manipulation or even fraudulent financial reporting at an earlier stage.  This 
study further contributes to the literature by responding to the call of Dechow et al. (2011) 
and extend their study by incorporating both financial measures and corporate governance 
factors in developing a model to identify forced restatement. Although this study is a 
replication of prior research on Malaysian data, it is however believed that this is the first 
121 
 
work of developing and providing evidence on the effectiveness of a forced restatement 
model based on financial statement information and corporate governance in the milieu of 
an emerging economy, specifically in Malaysia. The model tested in this study uses 
Malaysian data but nonetheless may be applicable in other emerging capital market. The 
tested model differs from the US papers (e.g.  Dechow et al., 2011; Hribar et al., 2014) as it 
takes into account specific characteristics of the emerging economies in general and 
Malaysia in particular (such as highly concentrated ownership and  heavy state intervention 
in the economy - La Porta et al., 1999; Stijn Claessens et al., 2000; Lins, 2003; Ray Ball et al., 
2003). 
Given the above justification and significance for a forced restatement model in Malaysia, 
this chapter serves to discuss the research approach adopted in the study.  
5.2  Research approach 
5.2.1 Data collection 
This study uses two main types of data which are financial and non-financial data. The 
collection of data is made from two sources. The first source is the Datastream database 
which is mainly used to retrieve financial data. The collection of financial statement data is 
based on originally reported numbers (not restated). The purpose for using originally 
reported numbers is to identify the extent to which the financial measure representing 
aggressive accounting behaviour is associated with the likelihood of forced restatement 
(see e.g. Ettredge et al. 2010). Since the financial statement numbers are originally 
reported figures, they are in fact not in compliance with GAAP and are effectively misstated 
numbers, which require the issuance of forced restatement. In such situation, the approach 
of examining originally reported data may give rise to the possibility of a mechanical 
positive association with the likelihood of forced restatement. This is most likely to happen 
especially in tests that involve variables such as earnings quality and firm performance. The 
reason why the mechanical association problem might arise is because forced restatement 
is itself an evidence of aggressive accounting practices or earnings misstatements that are 
present in financial reports. For example, while this study interprets a positive association 
between the distortion of corporate reporting quality and the likelihood of forced 
restatement as the propensity for firms to issue forced restatement when managers 
engage in aggressive accounting behaviour, an alternative explanation is that by employing 
aggressive accounting practices, managers are essentially involved in GAAP violation in 
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producing financial report leaving the firm susceptible to forced restatement. The same 
applies to the association between firm performance and the likelihood of forced 
restatement, as the relationship may implies the pressure for firms to meet market 
expectation, hence, their attempt to disguise firm’s underlying performance to make the 
firm appears more profitable or less risky than it really is which increases the risk for firms 
to issue forced restatement. In this case, results of test analyses might be due to 
mechanical relation that exists between the variable of interest and the likelihood of forced 
restatement. This study is aware of the mechanical relationship problem and recognises 
this as part of the study limitation. However, later in examining the effect of financial 
factors on the likelihood of forced restatement in Chapter 6, I do examine accruals-based 
earnings management as a proxy for the accuracy of financial data in corporate report (the 
variable measurement is explained in Section 5.2.3). Literally, the proxy help indicates the 
extent to which accrual earnings are discretionarily managed. In this respect, this study 
would expect that a high level of accruals reported by the firms to be an indicator that they 
might have engaged in earnings manipulation and misstatement, that lead to a forced 
restatement. 
The second source is companies’ annual reports which are used to hand manually collect 
non-financial or corporate governance data. The annual reports were downloaded online 
from the Bursa Malaysia website and are accessible via the following link: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/market/listed-companies/company-announcements/. The 
hand collection involves data that relates to the quality of board of directors and audit 
committee, firm ownership, political connection and family control.  
It should be noted that variables including multiple directorships (MULTI) and director 
expertise (FL and ACEXP) rely on annual report disclosures that are voluntary. Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006) have highlighted that the high ownership concentration that is prevalent 
in Malaysia means that firm’s voluntary disclosure is poor because insiders are better 
informed about firm’s business activities and financial position. In relation to this matter, 
the reliance made on voluntary disclosure may induce potential endogeneity problems in 
test analyses due to spurious correlation as both accounting misstatements (leading to 
forced restatement) and poor disclosure quality may be driven by the same omitted 
variable. More specifically, managers with the incentive and ability to misreport earnings 
could be reluctant to voluntarily disclose to mask their deviant reporting behaviour. There 
is thus the possibility for the low voluntary disclosure firms to misstate earnings and issue 
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forced restatement. Overall, the reliance made on the low voluntary disclosure may give 
rise to endogeneity problem in test analysis due to spurious correlation and is thus 
recognised as part of the study limitation. 
5.2.2 Sample selection 
Data sample used in this study is based on the Malaysian public companies that are listed 
on Bursa Malaysia. The sample focuses on four major sectors that include (i) the trading 
and services sector; (ii) consumer products sector; (iii) properties sector; and (iv) industrial 
products sector. These four sectors made up approximately 72% of the total public 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia). The four sectors constitute the considerable number 
of forced restatement cases, and this is in accordance with the relative size of these 
industries. Firms from the financial sector are excluded from the sample of the study. These 
financial institutions are regulated separately under the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act (1989). Firms from the utility industry are also excluded since they are so much 
regulated by the government, thus they possess different opportunities and incentives of 
earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
The research sample comprises of two different groups which are (i) forced restatement 
firms (treatment group) and (ii) non-forced restatement firms (control group). In identifying 
the treatment group, firms with forced restatement were identified manually through the 
corporate annual report. In line with previous research ( e.g. Callen et al., 2006; Abdullah et 
al., 2010), the search attempt for evidence of forced restatement was done by searching 
for keywords of “restate”, “restated”, “restatement”, or “prior year adjustments” in each 
company’s annual report. Due to the absence of a restatement database in Malaysia, the 
study follows Abdullah et al. (2010) by including financial statements that were deemed to 
have restated according to the definition outlined by GAO (refer Appendix 1). The GAO 
definition of “aggressive” accounting practices captures specifically “intentional and 
unintentional misuse of facts applied to financial statement, oversight or misinterpretation 
of accounting rules, and fraud” (GAO, 2002, p.76). GAO’s restatement category mainly 
include restatements that are due to improper accounting of (i) mergers and acquisitions; 
(ii) cost or expenses; (iii) research and development; (iv) reclassification of accounting 
items; (v) related party transactions; (vi) restructuring, assets or inventory; (vii) revenue 
recognition; and (viii) securities related item. Restatements due to changes in a firm’s own 
accounting policies are also included in the forced restatement sample due to the 
possibility that a firm may previously misapply accounting policies for private gain.  
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As for the control group, it covers those Malaysian listed companies that have no financial 
restatement due to prior period accounting error or misstatement. The control group 
further includes firms that restate their reported earnings due to the implementation of 
the new Malaysian Accounting Standards (accounting restatement). Restatement 
announcements due to changes in accounting standards, stock splits and other 
restatements that were made not to correct accounting errors (GAO, 2006) are also 
included. Restatements due to these items are included in the control group because they 
do not indicate the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour engagement that may lead 
towards earnings misstatement. 
Using lagged data in this study may help avoid endogeneity issues and the risks of reverse 
causality. The lagged explanatory variables were collected from the financial year 2002. The 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 was declared over in 1999, thus it is argued that any 
confounding effect from the financial crisis will not be present in the sample of the study 
(Abdullah, Yusof, & Nor, 2010). Furthermore, the introduction of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (2000) has been implemented for two years, giving ample time to 
allow the study to examine the importance of corporate governance and its effect on 
practices of aggressive accounting. Since lagged data is required, the collection of forced 
restatement data will then commence in 2003 until 2013. Period of the study ends in the 
year 2013 which is the most recent period for the study as we carried out the data 
collection in 2014. 
The population of listed firms in Bursa Malaysia consists of 937 firms with 8,350 firm-year 
observations throughout the study period. From the total population, this study focuses 
only on four major sectors18 deriving a sample data consisting of 634 firms with 6,052 firm-
year observations (approximately 72% of the total public companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia). This sample data is further refined, in which the data is firstly screened for any 
missing values19. Data with negative earnings (including negative PE and market-to-book 
ratio) is also eliminated due to firms’ negative net worth which is not meaningful (Lam, 
2002). In total, 1,293 firm-year observations are eliminated due to missing data and 
negative earnings. The sample is finally reduced to 626 firms with 4,759 firm-year 
observations. The following explanation presents the detail breakdown of the sample 
selection process. 
                                                          
18
 As discussed earlier, the four major sectors being studied are trading and services sector, consumer products 
sector, properties sector, and industrial products sector. 
19
 I have tried examining various sources of data collection including the Thomson One database and individual 
company annual report. Nonetheless no data is available for the missing observations.     
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Table 5-1 below outlines the summary of the sample observations. With regard to forced 
restatement data, a total of 206 firm-year observations were initially collected. Out of this, 
36 multiple forced restatement cases that took place in consecutive years were 
eliminated20. 49 forced restatement cases with untraceable missing observations and 
negative earnings were dropped. This leaves a net total of 121 forced restatement firm-
years observations. 
In addition to this, there are 1,909 accounting restatement observations that are due to the 
implementation of the new Malaysian Accounting Standards. 404 were dropped due to 
untraceable missing observations and negative earnings. Overall, the accounting 
restatement data totaled to 1,505 firm-years observations. 
Finally, the firm-years observations with no restatement totaled to 3,973. 840 which are 
untraceable missing observations and negative earnings were eliminated. The net total for 
non-restatement observation reached to 3,133 firm-years.    
Altogether, the net sum of forced restatement, accounting restatement and no 
restatement observations equals to 4,759 firm-years observations. Data being eliminated 
due to missing observations and negative earnings approximates to 21% of the total 
sample. I have tested for sample representativeness of which the independent sample t-
test shows insignificant difference between the sample mean and population mean for key 
variables including: (i) natural logarithm of total asset  (sample mean: 12.75, population 
mean: 12.74); and (ii) natural logarithm of revenue (sample mean: 12.30, population mean: 
12.29); both of which has a significance level of p > 0.10. Moreover, I found that earnings 
variable shows equal distribution between the sample and the population, with p > 0.10. 
Overall, results from the test indicate that the sample size used in our study (number of 
firms = 626, number of observations = 4,759) is representative of the firms listed on Bursa 
Malaysia.  
                                                          
20
 Consistent with prior studies (for example; Srinivasan, 2005; Wiedman and Hendricks, 2013; Hennes et al., 
2014), this research retains only one restatement for every firm unless there is at least a five year gap between 
multiple restatements. This is to ensure that the statistical results are not driven by the multiple restatements 
of certain firms (firm-level effect). It is very unlikely that firm’s subsequent restatement will cause firm-level 
effect across observation if there is at least five year gap due to the extensive length between two events of 
restatement. 
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Table 5-1: Sample Selection of Forced Financial Restatement (2002 -2012) 
 Number 
of firm-
years 
Number 
of firm-
years 
Number 
of firm-
years 
1) Forced restatement observations    
Total forced restatement observations 206  206 
Less:    
Restatement in consecutive years / multiple restatement (36)  (36) 
 170  170 
Missing observations and negative earnings  (49) (49) 
Total forced restatement observations (A)   121 
    
    
2) Accounting restatement observations    
Restatement observations due to implementation of 
changes in the Malaysian Accounting Standards (MASB) 
1,909  1,909 
Missing observations and negative earnings  (404) (404) 
Total accounting restatement observations (B)   1,505 
    
       3)    Non-restatement observations    
Non-restatement observations 3,973  3,973 
Missing observations and negative earnings  (840) (840) 
Total non-restatement observations (C)   3,133 
    
Total missing data due to missing observations and 
negative earnings 
 (1,293) (1,293) 
Total number of observations (gross) 6,052   
Total number of observations (net) A+B+C   4,759 
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Table 5-2 below presents the breakdown for the classification of forced financial 
restatement data. Following Palmrose et al. (2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005), core 
accounts represent earnings associated with firm’s core business operations; for example, 
revenue, cost of sales and operating expenses. Earnings associated with non-core business 
activities of a company, such as pension funds, merger-related items, and non-recurring 
items, are classified as non-core accounts. Table 5-2 shows that the 121 forced financial 
restatements comprise of 51 restatement cases which involved core accounts, 64 
restatements cases which involve non-core accounts and six cases involving both accounts. 
From the total of 121 forced restatement cases, 52 are income-decreasing restatements, 
43 cases are income-increasing restatements, whilst 26 are forced restatements with zero 
impact on net income21. Finally, out of the total 121 cases of forced restatements, eight 
cases are due to accounting irregularity, 86 restatements are due to error while 27 
restatements are due to the changes in the firm’s own accounting policy.  
 
Table 5-2: Classification of Forced Financial Restatement 
 
Type of forced restated accounts: 
   
Core 51   
Non-core 64   
Mixed 6   
Total 121   
    
Effect of forced financial restatement:    
Decrease in income 52   
Increase in income 43   
Zero net effect on income 26   
Total 121   
    
Reasons for forced financial restatement:    
Accounting irregularity  8   
Error 86   
Change in firm’s accounting policy 27   
 121   
    
 
Table 5-3 displays the financial restatement distribution by year and by industry. Overall, 
the financial restatement frequency presented in Panel A of Table 5-3 shows a relatively 
small number of annual forced restatement cases. The largest in a year is 18 while the 
                                                          
21
 The study includes forced restatements with zero income impact as these restatements normally involve 
income acceleration or expenses delay across quarters (Kedia et al., 2015). 
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smallest is three forced restatement cases. As for the accounting restatement data, it can 
be noted that there is a substantial proportion of accounting restatements in relation to 
the whole data sample, most probably due to the period of the study (year 2002 – 2012) 
that coincides with the transition period for the full convergence of the Malaysian reporting 
standards with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The highest number 
of accounting restatement can be seen in the year 2003 at 67%, while the smallest is 12% in 
the year 2005 and 2009. 
 Panel B of Table 5-3 presents the industry distribution of financial restatement. The mining 
and construction industry, and the durables industry account for nearly half the forced 
restatements, but this is in line with the relative size of these industries. The mining and 
construction industry is overrepresented in forced restatement, forming 14% of the total 
sample and 22% of forced restatement. On the other hand, the durables industry is 
underrepresented accounting for 34% of firm-year observations but only 25% of forced 
restatement. The majority of accounting restatements due to changes in the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards (MASB) comes from the biggest industry which is the durable 
industry accounting for 35% of the total accounting restatement. 
Table 5-3: Classification of Financial Restatement  
Panel A: By Year 
 
Year 
 
 
Total 
 
Forced Financial 
Restatement 
Accounting  
Restatement  
Non-forced 
restatement 
 
Firm-
years 
% 
Firm-
years 
% 
Firm-
years 
% 
2003 237 7 3 159 67 71 30 
2004 302 10 3 93 31 199 66 
2005 320 8 3 39 12 273 85 
2006 362 13 4 160 44 189 52 
2007 437 18 4 262 60 157 36 
2008 482 16 3 143 30 323 67 
2009 478 11 2 57 12 410 86 
2010 514 8 2 189 37 317 62 
2011 525 11 2 231 44 283 54 
2012 544 3 1 89 16 452 83 
2013 558 16 3 83 15 459 82 
        
Total 4,759 121  1,505  3,133  
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5.2.3 Empirical model and variable measurement 
Subsequent to the hypotheses development in Chapter 4, the multivariate logit model 
shown in Equation (1) is employed to examine the study’s objective of testing the 
hypotheses in determining which financial variables and corporate governance variables 
can provide better insight on the likelihood of forced financial restatement among public 
listed firms in Malaysia. The dependent variable RESTATE equals one for firm-years with 
forced restatement, and zero otherwise. It is unknown whether a misstatement is a one-
time event or it accumulates over a certain period of time, hence the inability to predefine 
the misstatement period prior to firm’s forced restatement announcement. Nonetheless, 
this study applies a 3-year lagged misstatement period prior to forced restatement for 
analysis purposes. This is done consistent with the findings by Wiedman & Hendricks 
(2013), where they analyse a random sample of restatement firms in the 2002 GAO report 
and found that the misstatement period appears to concentrate in years 0 to -2. 
Richardson et al. (2002) found a mean of 454 days (median: 564 days) between the end of 
the year of the alleged earnings manipulation and the date of restatement. Furthermore, in 
comparison to the US with its relatively effective law enforcement, especially in dealing 
with securities violance (Reffett, 2010; Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011), the Malaysian 
enforcement law is rather weak and comparatively lagged behind, thus forced restatement 
may not be prompt (Hasnan et al. 2013). In such case, I would assume that the 3-year 
lagged period prior to forced restatement is reasonable. The use of lagged data in the 
Panel B: By Industry 
Industry and Two-Digit SIC Code 
Total 
Sample 
Forced Financial 
Restatement 
Accounting 
Restatement 
 n (%) n (%) n (%) 
       
Mining and construction (13,15) 668 14 27 22 181 12 
Food and tobacco (20) 356 7 10 8 159 11 
Lumber, furniture and printing (24-27) 765 15 15 12 241 16 
Chemicals (28) 289 6 6 5 98 6 
Durables (30-37) 1634 34 30 25 527 35 
Transportation (44) 94 2 3 2 30 2 
Sanitary (49) 39 1 0 0 7 1 
Retail (50-51) 381 8 13 11 125 8 
Security Brokers and Real Estate (65) 372 8 12 10 107 7 
Services (73, 87) 161 3 5 4 30 2 
       
Total 4,759 100 121 100 1,505 100 
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model estimation helps to avoid the problem of endogeneity and reverse causality. The 
empirical model is shown in Equation (1) below: 
 
RESTATEi (0,1) =  α + β1BIi + β2FLi  + β3MULTIi + β4ACINDi + β5ACEXPi + β6AFi + β7FMi + β8FBi  
+ β9CEOBi + β10CEOFi + β11CEONi + β12INSTi + β13PCi + β14DAMJi + β15DTi 
+ β16WCACi + β17RSSTi + β18CHARi + β19CHINVi + β20SFASTi + β21ABCFOi + 
β22ABPRODi + β23ABDISXi + β24CHROAi + β25BMi + β26PEi + β27DISTRESSi + 
β28CHFCFi  + β29FINRi + β30AIi  + β31SDWi + β32BDSIZEi + β33BDMEETi + 
β34ACSIZEi + β35ACMEETi + β36FEMi  + β37LEVi + β38LNTAi + β39AGEi + 
∑ 𝛽KINDi∈K56𝐾=1    + ∑ 𝛽
11
𝑡=1 tYEAR 𝑡 + ԑit-1                         (1) 
The variables included in Equations (1) are firm-specific attributes based on financial 
factors and corporate governance factors. The variables are identified in line with the 
study’s theoretical framework and hypotheses developed in previous chapters, and are 
expected to have an impact on the likelihood on forced restatement. The following 
discusses the variables examined and their related proxies.  
1. Board quality  
Firstly, the board quality variable is examined. A quality board ensures that an effective 
monitoring is undertaken such that managers act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
This, in effect, minimises the risk of forced restatement. A number of proxies are used to 
measure board quality. The first proxy for board quality is board independence (BI). It is 
argued that a board comprising a majority of outside directors would reduce moral hazard 
problem due to the board being an effective monitoring mechanism (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This is based on the contention that having outside directors on the board ensures 
no collusion with the top management on expropriation of shareholder’s wealth due to the 
attempt of securing their reputation as being experts in decision control. In line with 
previous studies (Baber et al., 2012; Chakravarthy et al., 2014), this study measures BI as 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the firm’s board.  
The second proxy for board quality is financial expert directors (FL). A financial expert 
director is seen to be more familiar with how earnings are managed. The financial expert 
director can take essential measures to curb opportunistic earnings management activities 
(Lin and Hwang, 2010) and, therefore, reduces the likelihood of forced restatement. In line 
with studies such as Badolato et al. (2014), FL is measured as the proportion of board 
members with financial expertise (e.g. a certified public accountant, a chartered financial 
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analyst or a member having experience in corporate financial management or other 
comparable experiences such as being a CFO, treasurer or other senior position that may 
result in the person’s financial sophistication).  
 
The third proxy for board quality is multiple directorships (MULTI). Beasley (1996) proposes 
that having multiple directorships give directors the opportunity to obtain insights on how 
different companies pursue new business approaches, compare management practices and 
policies and being exposed to the various management styles. With the wide range of 
experience, directors become skilful and tend to be more diligent in carrying out their 
monitoring duties, thus their ability to minimise the risk of forced restatement. MULTI is 
measured by the proportion of directors on the firm’s board who have at least one 
additional directorship in another company (Hasnan et al., 2013, Sharma and Kuang, 2014). 
2. Audit committee quality  
Equation (1) further examines audit committee quality variable. A quality audit committee 
ensures that an effective monitoring of a firm’s financial reporting process is performed 
(Abdullah and Mohd-Nasir, 2004). In discharging their duties, a quality audit committee 
would insist for a wider scope of external audit or more intense audit procedures in areas 
of high uncertainty or risk. This increases the likelihood of detecting earnings 
misrepresentation which triggers the need for forced restatement. Three proxies are used 
to measure audit committee quality.  
The first proxy is audit committee independence (ACIND). Being independent of the firm’s 
management is very crucial for the audit committee. This is to ensure that the audit 
committee performs an objective and independent oversight duty over a firm’s financial 
reporting process. It further allows a more effective detection of deficiencies in financial 
reports (Klein 2002; Le et al., 2006) which triggers the need for forced restatement. This 
study measures ACIND as the proportion of independent non-executive directors in the 
audit committee (Carcello et al., 2011; Baber et al., 2012; Lobo and Zhao, 2013).  
The second proxy for audit committee quality is audit committee expertise (ACEXP). A 
financially expert audit committee strengthens the negotiations handed in by external 
auditors to the management surrounding the issues of accounting principles application, 
accounting judgment and accounting estimates (DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Ng & Tan, 2003). 
An expert audit committee is thus regarded as an effective monitoring mechanism that can 
enhance financial reporting quality as they are expected to discover earnings 
132 
 
misrepresentation more effectively which increases the risk of forced restatement (Agrawal 
& Chadha, 2005; Carcello et al. 2011). ACEXP is measured as the proportion of financially 
expert directors on the audit committee (Carcello et al., 2011; Baber et al., 2012; Lobo and 
Zhao, 2013). 
The third proxy for audit committee quality is audit fees (AF). High audit fees are incurred 
when an audit committee demand for a more extensive external auditing to gain additional 
assurance on the firm’s financial reporting quality.  With a more vigilant external audit that 
is signalled through high audit fees, the likelihood of detecting deficiencies in financial 
reporting increases, which in turn, triggers the need for forced restatement.  In measuring 
AF, the following formula applies: 
AFit = AFit / TAit (2) 
where AFit is audit fees for firm i in year t (annual Datastream data item WC01801) and TAit 
is total assets for firm i in year t (annual Datastream data item WC02999). 
It is noted that the audit fees variable is influenced by the different size and complexity of 
sample firms (Barth & Kallapur, 1996). This would mean that small (large) firms have small 
(large) values for the audit fee variable. This is consistent with prior literature which 
indicates that firm size is closely correlated with audit fees, possibly due to the increased 
volume of work for the auditor or due to the increased potential for reputational damage 
for auditors if problems emerge in large and therefore highly visible forms (e.g. Hasnan et 
al. 2013). In addressing the problem of scaling effect that may give rise to coefficient bias 
and heterocedasticity, audit fees are deflated by firm size. This is done to prevent firm size 
from having unduly influence on findings of the study. 
3. Family blockholder and control  
The presence of a family blockholder (FM) is also included in Equation (1). The 
opportunities for earnings manipulation are considered more open in firms with family 
ownership. This is due to the information asymmetry that exists between family and non-
family shareholders (Filatotchev, Zhang & Piesse 2011). Family members are prone to 
manipulate earnings for their own benefit (Sue et al., 2013), hence leading to the risk of 
forced restatement.  
The measurement of family ownership data creates a potential concern where some 
families may just require a minimal fractional ownership to exert control, while others need 
larger ownership stakes to be able to exert the same control level due to differences in 
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business practices, product placement, firm size and industry (Anderson et al., 2003). Based 
on this contention, this study uses a binary variable to denote firms with family ownership. 
Specifically, FM is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least 20% 
of the firm’s equity is owned by the family members, and zero otherwise (Chu, 2009; 
Hasnan et al., 2013; Ho and Kang, 2013). As discussed earlier in Section 4.2.3 of Chapter 4, 
ownership blocks as little as 20% is considered adequate for the owner to exercise full 
control over a company  (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000;  Faccio et al., 2001; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
In addition to family ownership, the variable for family control was also examined in 
Equation (1). While controlling owners manage to exercise full control over a firm, there is 
likelihood that their large control may not improve monitoring efficiency. They rather use 
their capability from holding managerial positions to divert firm resources for their own 
benefit at the expense of the minority investors, which increases the risk of forced 
restatement (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007).  
Four proxies were examined in Equation (1) that measure family control. The first proxy is 
founders on the board (FB). Founders have a huge emotional commitment towards the 
firm irrespective of their ownership interest. Having such a great commitment, founders 
would safeguard the firm by doing almost anything including shutting one’s eye to 
managerial opportunistic behaviour (Hasnan et al., 2013) which increases the likelihood of 
forced restatement. This study measures FB as the percentage of firms’ founders on the 
board of directors (Hasnan et al., 2013; Sue et al., 2013; Ho and Kang, 2013). 
The second proxy is CEO duality (CEOB). Family owners may want to exercise huge control 
over the company by holding the CEO-Chairman duality position. However, the duality 
position gives rise to conflict of interest. The CEO who serves as the board chairman may 
monitor and gain high influence over various firm-related matters, although they might not 
formally involve in serving the committees charged with the respective responsibilities 
(O’Connor et al., 2006). Such high influence may impair CEO’s integrity and that board 
members may fail to discharge their duties effectively in monitoring the management 
which increases the risk of forced restatement. The proxy CEOB is measured as a dummy 
coded one if CEO chairs the board, and zero otherwise (Baber et al., 2012; Lobo and Zhao, 
2013; Ang et al., 2014). 
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The third proxy is founder CEO (CEOF). Dechow et al. (1996) contended that a founder CEO 
tend to be less accountable to the firm’s board since they have high influence over business 
affair and decision-making. There is a tendency for a self-interest founder CEO to 
expropriate assets for private gain, thus increasing the possibility for forced restatement to 
take place. Based on Equation (1), CEOF is measured as a dummy which equals to one if the 
CEO belongs to the founding family, and zero otherwise (Baber et al., 2012; Lobo and Zhao, 
2013; Ang et al., 2014). 
The fourth proxy is CEO serving on the board’s nominating committee (CEON).  Controlling 
owner often exert huge influence over corporate affairs by using their power to nominate 
family members, or even appoint incompetent and less independent outside directors on 
the board (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). As such, board members selected by nominating 
committee where the family CEO is part of it, might not be effective monitors. It provides 
opportunity for the management to collude in reporting aggressive earnings, which creates 
the risk for forced restatement. CEON is measured as a dummy variable equals one if the 
CEO serves on the board’s nominating committee or if the board has no such committee; 
and zero otherwise (Efendi et al., 2007; Ho and Kang, 2013; Ang et al., 2014). 
4. Government-related institutional investors and political connection 
The next variable examined in Equation (1) is government-related institutional ownership 
(INST). It is one of the main forms of ownership structure in Malaysia. Being controlling 
owners, the government-related institutional investors may be motivated to serve the 
government and fulfil public policy objectives more than to undertake an effective 
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In such situation, the government-related 
institutional investors may exercise their controlling power to hide potential expropriations 
at the expense of the small shareholders (Lim et al., 2014), hence the possibility of forced 
restatement. In estimating Equation (1), INST is measured by the percentage of equity 
shareholdings held by government-related institutional investors from the top ten largest 
equity shareholders. As highlighted earlier in Section 4.2.4. of Chapter 4, the percentage of 
shareholding is used to prevent multicollinearity problems which might arise when a 
dummy is applied for both family ownership and government-related institutional 
ownership due to insufficient firms that fit into neither of the two categories. 
Firms’ political connection (PC) is another variable that is examined in Equation (1). 
According to Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2015), there are two main ways by which firms’ 
political connection may affect earnings quality. Managers of politically-connected firms 
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may either mask information that relates to the benefits they gained from the government, 
or mask information that relates to the expropriation actions performed by the 
government and its cronies. In this case, firm’s political information may increase the 
likelihood of forced restatement. For measurement purposes, PC is defined as a dummy 
variable coded one if the company is identified as being connected with a  politician if at 
least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10% of voting shares) or one 
of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman or secretary) is a member of a 
parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party; and zero otherwise 
(Faccio, 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). 
5. Distortion of corporate accounting quality 
Equation (1) further examines the distortion of corporate accounting quality variable. 
Managers become opportunistic (but not all managers are opportunistic) and might distort 
earnings to obscure firm’s real underlying performance which increases the likelihood of 
forced restatement. Several proxies that measures managerial opportunistic behaviour that 
include accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management are 
examined.  
The first proxy is the discretionary accruals measurement by the Modified Jones model 
(1995) (DAMJ). There is a tendency for managers to opportunistically manage the 
discretionary accrual of earnings to overstate good performance or masquerade any 
deteriorating performance which increases the risk of forced restatement (Jensen, 2005; 
Badertscher, 2011). Following Dechow et al. (1995), DAMJ is measured as follows: 
Firstly, total accruals are calculated based on the difference between net income before 
extraordinary items and net operating cash flows as shown in Equation (3): 
TACCit = NIit - CFOit (3) 
Where TACCit is total accruals for firm i in year t, NIit is net income before extraordinary 
items (annual Datastream data item WC01551) for firm i in year t and CFOit is net cash flow 
from operating activities (annual Datastream data item WC04860) for firm i in year t. 
Following this, the model parameters are estimated for all firms in a two-digit SIC industry 
based on the following equation (4): 
TACCit / TAit-1 =α + β1(1 ⁄ TAit-1) + β2 (ΔREVit - ΔARit) ⁄ TAit-1 + β3PPEit⁄ TAit-1 + ԑ. (4) 
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Where TAit-1 is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t-1, 
ΔREVit is change in revenue (annual Datastream data item WC01001) from the preceding 
year for firm i, ΔARit is change in accounts receivable (annual Datastream data item 
WC02051) from the preceding year for firm i, PPEit is property, plant and equipment 
(annual Datastream data item WC02501) for firm i in year t. 
The discretionary accruals are then calculated by using the estimated parameters:  
Uit =(TACCit / TAit-1) – [α + β1(1 ⁄ TAit-1) + β2 ((ΔREVit - ΔARit) ⁄ TAit-1) + β3(PPEit⁄ TAit-1) (5) 
Where Uit represents the discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
The second proxy is deferred tax accrual (DT). The substantial flexibilities available in GAAP 
compared to the tax rules gives managers the opportunity to discretionarily manage book 
income upward, in ways that leave taxable income unaffected (Phillips et al., 2003; Hanlon, 
2005). The difference between book income and taxable income thus acts as a useful 
measure to indicate earnings management. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Ettredge et 
al., 2008; Badertscher et al., 2009; Dechow et al., 2011), DT is measured as: 
DTit = DTit ⁄ TAit-1 (6) 
Where, DTit is deferred tax expense (annual Datastream data item WC03263) for firm i in 
year t and TAit-1 is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t-1. 
The third proxy is working capital accruals. Working capital accruals involve judgemental 
estimates and do not have direct cash flow consequences. Hence, working capital accruals 
provide managers with an attractive platform for earnings management. Following studies 
such as Dechow et al. (2011) and Allen et al. (2013), working capital accruals are measured 
based on the following formula: 
WCACit = [[ΔCAit–ΔCSTIit] – [ΔCLit – ΔDCLit– ΔTPit]] ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] (7) 
Where ΔCAit is change in current assets (annual Datastream data item WC02201) from the 
preceding year for firm i, ΔCSTIit  is change in cash and short-term investments (annual 
Datastream data item WC02001) from the preceding year for firm i,  ΔCLit  represents 
change in current liabilities (annual Datastream data item WC03101) from the preceding 
year for firm i, ΔDCLit is change in debt in current liabilities (annual Datastream data item 
WC03051) from the preceding year for firm i, ΔTPit is change in taxes payable (annual 
Datastream data item WC03063) from the preceding year for firm i, and TAit is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
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In addition to the working capital accruals, operating accruals are also tested due to its 
material value and is routinely incurred in a business operation making it susceptible to 
manipulation. Relatively, the proxy of non-cash net operating asset accrual (RSST) is 
examined. The net operating assets represent various events and transactions such as post-
retirement benefit obligations, long-term receivables and long-term debt, which are 
themselves manifesting the accrual accounting process, previously ignored in the working 
capital accruals model. It is argued that firms with high level of RSST are more likely engage 
in opportunistic accruals management (Pryshchepa et al., 2013). Following Dechow et al. 
(2011), Francis et al. (2013) and Chakravarthy et al. (2014), RSST is measured as: 
RSSTit = (ΔWCit + ΔNCOit + ΔFINit)⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] (8) 
Where; 
WCit = [CAit– CSTIit] – [CLit– DCLit] (9) 
NCOit = [TAit– CAit - IAit] – [TLit– CLit – LTDit] (10) 
FINit= [STIit + LTIit] – [LTDit+ DCLit + PSit] (11) 
CAit is current assets (annual Datastream data item WC02201) for firm i in year t, CSTIit is 
cash and short-term investments (annual Datastream data item WC02001) for firm i in year 
t, CLit represents current liabilities (annual Datastream data item WC03101) for firm i in 
year t, and DCLit is debt in current liabilities  (annual Datastream data item WC03051) for 
firm i in year t. 
TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t, IAit is 
investments and advances (annual Datastream data item WC02250 & WC02256) for firm i 
in year t, TLit is total liabilities (annual Datastream data item WC03351) for firm i in year t, 
and LTDit is long-term debt (annual Datastream data item WC03251) for firm i in year t. 
STIit is short-term investments (annual Datastream data item WC02008) for firm i in year t, 
LTIit is long-term investments (annual Datastream data item WC02250 and WC02256) for 
firm i in year t, and PSit is preferred stock (annual Datastream data item WC03451) for firm i 
in year t. 
Other related proxies include change in receivables (CHAR), change in inventories (CHINV) 
and soft assets (SFAST), i.e. assets that are neither cash nor PPE (e.g. accounts receivables 
and inventories). Essentially, the build-up of receivables and inventories are among red 
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flags that can help signal misstated earnings. Managers tend to overstate receivables and 
inventories to artificially boost revenue and assets value (Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Dichev 
et al., 2013). In addition, when firms report a high proportion of soft assets in their balance 
sheet, this would mean that the management is left with more discretion to change 
assumptions to meet short-term earnings goals (Barton and Simko, 2002; Richardson et al., 
2005). Hence, account receivables, inventories and soft assets are highly susceptible to 
opportunistic earnings management that increases the likelihood of forced restatement. 
Following Feng et al., (2011) and Francis et al (2013), this study measures CHAR as: 
CHARit = ΔARit / [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] (12) 
Where ΔARit is the change in accounts receivables (annual Datastream data item WC02051) 
from the preceding year for firm i, and TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
Following Feng et al., (2011) and Francis et al (2013),CHINV is measured as: 
CHINVit = ΔINVit ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] (13) 
Where ΔINVit is the change in inventories (annual Datastream data item WC02101) from 
the preceding year for firm i, and TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
Whereas, SFAST is measured as: 
SFASTit  = (TAit – PPEit – CCEit) ⁄ TAit (14) 
TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t, PPEit is 
property, plant and equipment (annual Datastream data item WC02501) for firm i in year t, 
and CCE is cash and cash equivalent (annual Datastream data item WC02001) for firm i in 
year t. 
Proxies to measure opportunistic managerial behaviour based on real earnings 
management activities are also examined. Managers may engage in real activities 
manipulation to mislead shareholders that certain financial performance goals have been 
attained in the normal course of business operation (Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 337). Real 
activities such as discounting selling price (which reduces abnormal cash flow), increasing 
production (which increases abnormal production cost) and reducing research and 
development expenditure (which reduces abnormal discretionary expenses) may help 
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achieve firm’s goals in the short term (to meet or beat earnings expectation), but may not 
necessarily contribute towards enhancing firm value in the long run.  
In estimating the real earnings management, this study follows Roychowdhury (2006) by 
firstly estimating abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCFO). This is done by running a 
cross-sectional regression for each two-digit industry and year. ABCFO is the residual from 
the following equation:   
CFOit / TAit-1 = β1 [1/ TAit-1] + β2 [REVit / TAit-1] + β3 [∆REVit / TAit-1] + εit (15) 
CFOit is net cash flow from operating activities (annual Datastream data item WC04860) for 
firm i in year t, TA it-1 is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in 
year t-1, REVit is revenue (annual Datastream data item WC01001) for firm i in year t, ΔREVit 
is change in revenue (annual Datastream data item WC01001) from the preceding year for 
firm i, εit is a residual term that captures the level of abnormal cash flow of firm i in year t. 
Abnormal level of production cost is next estimated based on the residual from the 
following equation:   
PRODit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) + α2 (REVit / TAit-1) + α3 (Δ REVit / TAit-1) + α4 (Δ REVit-1 
/ TAit-1) + ԑit 
 
(16) 
PRODit represents the production cost and is defined as the sum of the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and change in inventory (ΔINV). COGS is estimated based on the following 
regression: 
COGSit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) + α2 (REVit / TAit-1) + ԑit (17) 
Whereas ΔINV is estimated as: 
ΔINVit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) + α1 (Δ REVit / TAit-1) + α2 (Δ REVit-1 / TAit-1) + ԑit; (18) 
TAit-1 is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t-1, REVit is 
revenue (annual Datastream data item WC01001) for firm i in year t; and ΔREVit is the 
change in revenue from the preceding year for firm i, ΔREVit-1 is the change in revenue from 
year t-2 to year t-1 for firm i, εit is a residual term that captures the level of abnormal cash 
flow of firm i in year t. 
Finally, abnormal level of discretionary expenditure is estimated based on the residual from 
the following equation:   
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DISXit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) + α2 (REVit-1 / TAit-1) + ԑit (19) 
DISXit is discretionary expenditures defined as the sum of research and development 
expenditures (annual Datastream data item WC01201) and selling, general and 
administrative expenses (annual Datastream data item WC01101) for firm i in year t, TAit-1 
is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) in year t-1 for firm i, REVit-1 is 
revenue (annual Datastream data item WC01001) in year t-1 for firm i, εit is a residual term 
that captures the level of abnormal discretionary expenses of firm i in year t. 
6. Firm performance and demand for external financing  
Another variable examined in Equation (1) is firm performance. Managers are motivated to 
report a good firm performance as they are often under pressure to meet market 
expectation (Zhao and Chen 2008). Managers’ attempt to make the firm appears more 
profitable or less risky than it really is may however impact in an increased likelihood of 
forced restatement. Three proxies that measure firm performance are examined. 
The first proxy for firm performance is change in earnings (CHROA). Change in earnings may 
indicate the likelihood of forced restatement based on the assertion that managers tend to 
boost earnings prior to forced restatement to conceal firms’ declining performance 
(Schrand and Zechman, 2012). In line with prior studies (e.g. Dechow et al., 2011; Feng et 
al., 2011; Lobo and Zhao, 2013), CHROA is measured as: 
CHROAit = [EARNit  ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2]]- [EARNit-1  ⁄ [(TAit-1 - TAit-2)/2]] (20) 
Where EARN it is net income before extraordinary items (annual Datastream data item 
WC01551) for firm i in year t, TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) 
for firm i in year t. 
The second and third proxy is book to market ratio (BM) and price earnings ratio (PE). Both 
of these proxies are measures of a firm’s growth prospect. Relatively, managers have the 
incentive to show that a firm has a good future prospect via reporting growth in 
performance. Firms tend to be heavily penalised by the market if managers fail to maintain 
a continuous firm growth (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). In measuring BM, the following 
estimation is applied: 
BM = BVE ⁄ (EQ x MP) (21) 
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Where BVE is book value of equity (annual Datastream data item WC03501), EQ is common 
shares outstanding (annual Datastream data item WC05301), and MP is year-end market 
price (Datastream data item WC05001). As for PE, the measurement is as follows: 
PE = (EQ x MP) / EARN (22) 
Where EARN is net income before extraordinary items (annual Datastream data item 
WC01551). 
The final proxy for firm performance is financial distress (DISTRESS). Managers of financially 
distressed firms may have the tendency to mask firm performance failure (Habib, Bhuiyan 
& Islam 2013). Hence, the incentive to report positive earnings may arise as managers are 
under pressure to meet market’s expectation (Habib et al., 2013). 
The Altman Z-score equation is one of the many models that can be used to measure firms’ 
financial distress. This study applies the Altman (1993) Z”-score model consistent with the 
claim by Altman (2002) that the model demonstrates 80 percent accuracy. The model 
incorporates specific credit characteristics of the emerging market companies and was 
tested by Altman (1998) on Mexican companies that issued Eurobonds in US dollars in the 
year 1994. The method was verified as being a robust tool and effective in performance 
assessment and financial distress prediction of companies within the emerging market. The 
fifth ratio (sales to total assets) which was previously included in the original model of 
Altman (1968) was omitted from the current version of the Z”-score model as it put too 
high value for non-manufacturing companies. Notwithstanding, the adjusted formula 
provides equally valid prediction results. Altman (2002) argued that the newly revised 
version of the Z-score model is more appropriate for emerging market with minimised 
potential industrial effect. Alareeni and Branson (2013) concur with the remarkability of 
Altman Z”-Score which was specifically designed to predict firms’ failure within an 
emerging market. The model was found to be highly accurate in predicting failure of the 
Jordanian non-manufacturing companies based on a sample of 71 listed companies that 
failed between 1989 and 2008. Zaabi (2011)  reveal that the Z”-score model provides useful 
instrumental indicators and is exactly a valuable analytical tool to be used by the Islamic 
banks in the UAE complementing other financial distress prediction model that is available. 
Furthermore, Pok (2012) applied the Z”-score model based on a sample of 477 Syariah-
compliant Malaysian firms and concurs that the model acts as an effective tool to screen 
financially problematic companies. 
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Hence, the application of the Altman (1993) Z”-score model, by which the equation is 
shown below: 
Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4) (23) 
Where X1 = WCit / TAit; X2 = REit / TAit; X3 = EBITit / TAit; X4 = BVEit / TLit 
WCit is working capital (annual Datastream data item WC03151) for firm i in year t, TAit is 
total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t, REit is retained 
earnings (annual Datastream data item WC03495) for firm i in year t, EBITit is earnings 
before interest and tax (annual Datastream data item WC18191) for firm i in year t, BVEit is 
book value of equity (annual Datastream data item WC03501) for firm i in year t. 
In addition to the firm performance variable, Equation (1) further examines the demand for 
external financing variable. The need to raise external funds may arise to increase a firm’s 
capital base in order to support the firm’s growth performance (Dechow et al 2011). In this 
case, managers may be inclined to report high profitability in the hope of getting easy 
access into the capital market at a low cost. The incentive may be intensified when the 
level of internal funds is depleting, as firm’s capital base becomes exhausted. This explains 
why managers tend to report positive earnings when the demand for external fund arises, 
which increases the risk of forced restatement. Three proxies that measures the demand 
for external finance are examined. 
The first proxy is change in free cash flows (CHFCF). When a firm’s free cash flow reduces, 
managers would be incentivised to raise external fund in order to expand their capital base 
to support firms’ growth. In this situation, managers have the tendency to report good 
profit in order to attract external funding at low cost which in turn, increases the likelihood 
of forced restatement. In measuring CHFCF, this study follows Ettredge et al. (2008), 
Dechow et al. (2011) and Linck et al. (2013), where: 
CHFCF = Δ[EARNit - RSST Accrualsit] ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] (24) 
EARNit is net income before extraordinary items (annual Datastream data item WC01551) 
for firm i in year t, RSST Accrualsit (RSST’s definition and operationalisation is explained 
earlier under the variable distortion of corporate reporting quality) for firm i in year t, TAit is 
total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
143 
 
The second proxy is firm’s incentive on raising new capital (FINR). FINR represents an ex-
ante measure of finance need. A low FINR (e.g. less than -0.5) would indicate that the firm 
is close to exhausting its internal fund, hence a more intensified need for the firm to report 
favourable earnings to get access to the capital market. This however may result in an 
increased likelihood of forced restatement. To measure FINR, this study follows Ettredge et 
al. (2008), Lennox and Pittman (2010), and Chakravarthy et al. (2014) where: 
FINRit = (CFOit – CAPEXit-1 ) ⁄ CAit-1 (25) 
CFOit is net cash flow from operating activities (annual Datastream data item WC04860) for 
firm i in year t, CAPEXit-1 is capital expenditures (annual Datastream data item WC04601) in 
year t-1 for firm i, CAit-1is current assets (annual Datastream data item WC02201) in year t-1 
for firm i. 
The last proxy is actual issuance (AI). AI represents an ex-post measure of finance need. The 
issuance of debt and stock might indicate the possibility of a defective financial reporting. 
Relatively, the concern to obtain external funding might have initiate managers to report 
favourable earnings, to ascertain that the firm’s cost of capital is kept to the minimum. As 
such, the issuance of debt or equity may increase the likelihood of forced restatement. In 
line with Baber et al., (2012) and Francis et al. (2013), this study measures AI as a dummy 
variable coded 1 if annual Datastream data item WC04251 > 0 (net proceeds from 
sale/issue of common and preferred equity) or annual Datastream data item WC04401 > 0 
(long term borrowing), and zero otherwise. 
7. Share price volatility 
The final variable examined in Equation (1) is share price volatility (SDW). Share price 
volatility acts as a signal of firms’ perceived risk, thus implying uncertainty in firms’ future 
earnings (Chen et al., 2002). Share price volatility may alert the market of firms’ ongoing 
problem and may prompt closer monitoring by the regulators which in turn may trigger 
forced restatement. Following Anderson et al. (2004), SDW is measured as the annual 
standard deviation of monthly SRTN, where SRTN is stock return (monthly Datastream data 
item WC05001). 
In total, there are seven group of predictor variables that covers a wide range of financial 
and non-financial factors being examined in Equation (1). In addition to this, several firm-
specific variables that affect the likelihood of forced restatement are controlled for in this 
study.  
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The first control variable is board size (BDSIZE). An optimum number of board members 
determine that sufficient members are available to effectively discharge their 
responsibilities which affect the likelihood of forced restatement. This study measures 
BDSIZE as the number of board members (Carcello et al., 2011; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). 
The second control variable is board meeting (BDMEET). The number of board meeting is 
expected to give an impact on the likelihood of forced restatements due to the time 
allocated by the board to meet and discuss issues on firm’s financial reporting (Xie et al., 
2003). This study measures BDSIZE as the number of board meetings held for the year (Xie 
et al., 2003; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). 
The third control variable is the size of audit committee (ACSIZE). Specifically, the optimum 
number of directors in the audit committee may provide the necessary strength and 
synergy to support effective monitoring (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 
2009), thus affecting the risk of forced restatement. Relatively, ACSIZE is measured as the 
number of directors in the audit committee (Baber et al., 2012; Ho and Kang, 2013). 
The fourth control variable is audit committee meeting (ACMEET). A frequent audit 
committee meeting indicates an active and well-functioning audit committee. It would 
mean that directors spent more time to discuss outstanding accounting issues or perform 
their monitoring duties (Karamanou & Vafeas 2005) which eventually affect the likelihood 
of forced restatement. Consistent with Carcello et al. (2011) and Ho and Kang (2013), 
ACMEET is measured as the number of audit committee meeting held for the year. 
The fifth control variable is the presence of female directors (FEM).  Rogelberg and Rumery 
(1996) claim that the presence of a female member may improve team decision making by 
either promoting better integration and coordination of conflicting points of view or 
alleviating the aggressiveness of all-male group members. In such case, female directors 
facilitate a sound board decision-making and thereby help to reduce the likelihood of 
forced restatement. FEM is measured by the proportion of female directors on the board 
(Cao et al., 2013). 
The sixth control variable examined in Equation (1) is leverage (LEV). It is argued that firms 
with high leverage have the incentive to manage earnings in the attempt to enhance firm 
financial performance for the purpose of preventing violations of covenants in the existing 
debt contracts or raising new debt based on favourable terms (Defond and Jiambalvo, 
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1994; Minton and Schrand, 1999). Hence, forced restatement risk is associated with high 
debt level. LEV is measured as: 
LEVit = LTDit / TAit (26) 
Where LTDit is long-term debt (annual Datastream data item WC03251) for firm i in year t 
and TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
The seventh control variable examined is firm size (LNTA). The analyst and investment 
community placed close scrutiny on firms of large size  (Gleason, Jenkins & Johnson 2008). 
This, in turn leads to a great market pressure for such firms to engage in aggressive 
accounting in order to lessen unwanted political visibility (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
Hence, large firm size increases the likelihood of forced restatement. LNTA is measured by 
taking the natural logarithm of TAit where TAit is total assets (annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) for firm i in year t. 
The final control variable is firm age (AGE). Previous research found that young firms are 
tempted to have their share value increased by manipulating their earnings upwards prior 
to equity issuance (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Shivakumar, 2000). The young firms 
will discretionarily manage sales revenue or operating expenses, rather than non-recurring 
items to attain their earnings objective (Marquardt and Wiedman 2004). This creates the 
possibility that firm age might affect the likelihood of forced restatement. AGE is measured 
by taking the log of the number of years the firm has been listed. 
Overall, it should be noted that regression variables are likely to be affected by the 
different size or cross-sectional scale among sample firms, hence the scale effect problem 
(Barth & Kallapur, 1996). This would mean that small (large) firms have small (large) values 
for most of the variables, of which the magnitude differences are not related to the 
research question. In relation to this, Barth and Kallapur (1996) suggested two remedies to 
address the problems caused by scale effect, i.e. by using a scale proxy to deflate the 
original model and incorporating the scale proxy as an independent variable in the deflated 
model. In line with this suggestion, the financial variables examined in this study are 
generally measured based on ratios (as explained earlier) which are adjusted by size to 
allow for comparisons to be made. Not only does firm size is taken as a deflater for the 
ratios, but firm size (as proxied by LNTA) is also included in the logit model as a control 
variable.  
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Incorporating firm size as the additional independent variable does not alter the variance 
structure of the error terms, however it helps to eliminate coefficient bias. Wu and Xu 
(2008) highlight that if Xi is included as an independent variable in the working model, the 
same variable, Xi, should be incorporated in the deflated model, i.e., Xi should not be used 
to deflate Xi, otherwise the variable Xi will be eliminated from the model. By having to 
include all independent variables (including the scale proxy) in the deflated model, then 
deflation helps remedy coefficient bias and heterocedasticity simultaneously (Wu and Xu, 
2008).  
From the above analysis, it can be seen that multiple proxies for the same underlying 
prediction were simultaneously included in the logit regression model. The reason why 
multiple proxies are included is based on the fact that no single proxy is sufficient to 
measure the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structure (Beekes and Brown 2006; 
Larcker et al. 2007), nor it is sufficient to measure corporate reporting quality and firm 
performance. This study however recognises the limitation that the inclusion of multiple 
proxies simultaneously in the logit regression model is part of a model misspecification as it 
gives rise to attenuation bias such that many insignificant individual coefficients are likely 
to result (Lubotsky and Wittenberg 2007). This can be seen from the multivariate logit 
result in Table 6-2 of which none of the variables for audit committee quality, family 
ownership and control, and firm performance shows any significance with the occurrence 
of forced restatement. The low number of statistically significant covariates is prima facie 
evidence of some collinearity problems. 
In view of the attenuation bias from regressing multiple proxies, a sensitivity analysis is 
later conducted in Section 6.3.2.1 of Chapter 6 to separately check for result differences 
when one of the variables that are highly correlated with each other are excluded from the 
regression model. Further to this, a stepwise regression model is also performed in Section 
6.3.2.3 to identify a useful subset of determinants out of the numerous numbers of 
variables for determining the likelihood of forced restatement.  
5.2.4 Dealing with outliers 
The presence of outliers in a data set may cause inflation of error rates as well as 
considerable distortion of parameter and statistic measures when either the parametric or 
non-parametric test is measured (Zimmerman, 1994, 1995, 1998). However, removing 
outliers from a data set may have an unfavourable impact on the interpretation of a 
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regression analysis (Wooldridge, 2000). Deletion of outliers could also generate new 
extreme outliers (Coakes and Steed, 1999). Hair et al. (2010) further highlight that the 
econometric analysis might improve when outliers are removed, however, the 
generalizability of the finding analysis may be limited. This is due to the fact that some 
outliers of a variable might represent a portion of the population. Hence, retaining these 
outliers may help determine generalizability to the whole population.  
In my study, outliers might indicate abnormal routine of accounting. For example, 
abnormal amounts of transactions might indicate the possibility of financial misstatement. 
Rather than removing the extreme values, the continuous variables with extreme outliers 
are winsorised at the 1 percent and 99 percent level by replacing outlying values based on 
the 1st and 99th percentiles, accordingly. By winsorising, extreme values are pulled in 
closer within the normal distribution and ensure that the effect of extreme outliers is 
reduced in our statistical test.  Winsorised continuous variables (with extreme outliers) 
includes audit fees (AF), working capital accruals (WCAC), change in non-cash net operating 
assets (RSST), abnormal production cost (ABPROD), change in earnings (CHROA), financial 
distress (DISTRESS), change in free cash flow (CHFCF), incentive of raising finance (FINR), 
and share price volatility (SDW).  
Hamilton (1992) further suggests employing data transformation in order to reduce the 
effect of extreme outliers. Positively skewed variables such as price-earnings ratio (PE), 
total assets (TA) and firms’ age (AGE) are transformed using the natural logarithm. The 
variable transformation enables extreme outliers to be pulled in which reduces non-
normality. Further details on data descriptive are presented in the next Section 5.2.5. 
5.2.5 Descriptive Statistic 
Table 5-4 presents the descriptive statistic of tested variables which include mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis of 4,759 firm-year 
observations for the period 2002 until 2012. 
Panel A of Table 5-4 starts with the board quality variables, where board independence (BI) 
and financial expert directors (FL) show a mean of 0.423 and 0.306 respectively (median: 
0.400 and 0.286). This is consistent with prior Malaysian studies that recorded a higher 
mean of 0.385 for board independence (Rahman and Ali, 2006) compared to the mean of 
0.273 for financial expert directors (Abdul Wahab et al. 2014). While multiple directorships 
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(MULTI) shows a mean of 0.620 (median: 0.667) which is consistent with that reported by 
Hasnan et al. (2013) with a mean of 0.530. 
The next group of variables relates to audit committee quality where the mean for audit 
committee independence (ACIND) is at 0.792 (median: 0.750). Relatively, the audit 
committee independence shows a higher mean compared to board independence and this 
is consistent with Rahman and Ali (2006) in their study of Malaysian firms between 2002 
and 2003 that recorded a mean of 0.684 for ACIND (with lower mean for board 
independence at 0.385). As for audit committee experts (ACEXP), the mean is 0.445 
(median: 0.333), and is consistently higher than the mean for financial expert directors (FL). 
The mean for audit fee for the typical firm is reported at 0.001 and median at 0.000. 
The variable for family control, i.e. founders on the board (FB), presents a mean of 0.083 
(median: 0) which is slightly similar to that reported by Hasnan et al. (2013) at 0.06 
accordingly. In terms of government-related institutional ownership (INST), the mean is 
11.458 percent (median: 6.01) which is in line with the mean of 12.069 documented in 
Abdul Wahab et al. (2009). The government-related institutional ownership reaches up to 
the maximum of 94.38 percent which confirmed the findings by Tam and Tan (2007) that 
ownership is highly concentrated and entrenched in Malaysia. 
In relation to corporate reporting quality, the discretionary accruals measure of the 
Modified Jones model (DAMJ) reports a mean of 0.008. Comparatively, the mean for DAMJ 
is much lower relative to other accruals measure with a mean ranging from the lowest 
0.016 (for change in inventories – CHINV) to the highest of 0.494 (for soft assets – SFAST). 
Based on the reported mean, firms are seen to be reporting high amount of soft assets in 
their balance sheet (assets that are not cash or PPE) compared to other accrual items. This 
is consistent with Dechow et al. (2011) that shows a relatively low mean for DAMJ (0.000) 
in comparison to other accruals measures that range from 0.011 for change in inventories 
to the highest 0.509 for soft assets. 
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Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A – Continuous Variables 
 
Variables N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
BI 4539 .423 .400 .110 0 .857 .878 3.793 
FL 4518 .306 .286 .157 0 1 .863 3.653 
MULTI 4539 .620 .667 .270 0 1 -.393 2.261 
ACIND 4518 .792 .750 .157 0 1 .308 1.900 
ACEXP 4518 .445 .333 .211 0 1 .845 3.387 
AF 4759 .001 .000 .001 0 .005 2.695 9.530 
FB 4539 .083 0 .128 0 .75 1.707 .128 
INST 4539 11.458 6.01 15.997 0 94.38 2.479 9.971 
DAMJ 3117 .008 .007 .157 -1.156 1.363 -.277 13.246 
DT 4532 .023 .014 .030 0 .276 3.143 20.205 
WCAC 4519 .045 .016 .068 0 .353 2.309 9.002 
RSST  4510 .083 .040 .152 -.211 .574 2.107 7.470 
CHAR 4524 .017 .009 .085 -1.024 1.201 1.243 31.191 
CHINV 4524 .016 .005 .073 -1.323 .843 -.022 50.332 
SFAST 4753 .494 .492 .186 .000 1 .055 2.603 
ABCFO 3117 .009 .009 .109 -.744 1.182 .220 9.910 
ABPROD 3117 .039 0 .055 0 .145 1.066 2.499 
ABDISX 3117 -.005 -.001 .084 -.591 .473 -.539 10.726 
CHROA 4265 .035 .005 .096 -.143 4.604 1.561 4.604 
BM 4474 1.463 1.245 1.025 .027 13.498 2.172 13.904 
PE 4473 2.516 2.385 .949 -1.352 8.737 1.240 6.833 
DISTRESS 4759 5.742 4.746 4.681 -2.430 23.635 1.466 5.916 
CHFCF 4258 .073 .002 .100 0 .276 1.082 2.629 
FINR  4527 .152 .061 .241 0 .953 2.319 7.793 
SDW 4264 10.109 8.653 6.264 1.934 40.996 1.876 8.131 
BDSIZE 4539 7.564 7 1.851 3 17 .744 4.356 
ACSIZE 4518 3.351 3 .629 1 9 1.757 7.573 
BDMEET 4518 5.126 5 1.939 0 27 2.358 15.971 
ACMEET 4517 4.723 5 1.339 0 21 1.866 20.065 
FEM 4518 .089 0 .110 0 .5 1.137 3.718 
LEV 4757 .082 .037 .109 0 .691 1.961 7.388 
LNTA 4759 12.751 12.520 1.386 7.770 18.152 .948 4.292 
AGE 4759 2.595 2.639 .937 0 4.654 -.460 2.858 
 
Panel B – Dichotomous Variables 
 
Variables N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
AI 4759 .559 1 .497 0 1 -.239 1.057 
FM 4539 .582 1 .493 0 1 -.334 1.111 
CEOB 4539 .115 0 .319 0 1 2.417 6.812 
CEOF 4539 .355 0 .479 0 1 .606 1.368 
CEON 4539 .121 0 .326 0 1 2.331 6.435 
PC 4539 .111 0 .314 0 1 2.476 7.131 
Notes: Table 5-4 reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. The total number of observations 
differs for each variable due to missing observations. All variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. 
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The real earnings management variables show a mean of 0.009 (abnormal cash flow from 
operation – ABCFO), 0.039 (abnormal production cost – ABPROD) and -.005 (abnormal 
discretionary expenses – ABDISX). This is consistent with the contention by Roychowdhury 
(2006) that firms tend to manage their real activities such that they incur abnormally low 
level of cash flow from operations (resulting for e.g. from lenient credit terms), abnormally 
high level of production costs (to cut down cost of goods sold),  and abnormally low level of 
discretionary expenses (to boost reported earnings). 
The change in earnings (CHROA) has a mean of 0.035 (median: 0.05) showing that firms 
demonstrate a small growth in earnings. The book-to-market (BM) show a mean of 1.463 
(median: 1.245) indicating that the typical firm is undervalued. Price-earnings (PE) ratio 
show some consistency with a mean of 2.516 respectively (median: 2.385) indicating that 
the typical firm has a good growth prospect. The average firm is seen to have a healthy 
financial condition based on the high score of financial distress (DISTRESS) at a mean of 
5.742 (i.e. a Z-score between 1.10 and 2.60 indicates grey area, whereas below 1.10 
indicates financially distressed firm). 
The mean for the change in free cash flow (CHFCF) for a typical firm is 0.073 implying that 
there is a slight increase in free cash flow, hence firm’s ability to cover its capital 
expenditure. This is supported by the ex-ante measure of finance need, FINR, which shows 
a low mean of 0.152 (slightly above the minimum standard of -0.5) indicating that firms, on 
average, have enough free cash flow as internal funds. Share price volatility shows a mean 
of 10.109 (median: 8.653) and ranges from the minimum of 1.934 to 40.996 
From the perspective of control variables, board size (BDSIZE) has a mean of 7.564 
(median: 7), of which the number of board members ranges from 3 to 17. Abdul Rahman & 
Ali (2006) documented relatively similar board size with a mean of 8.89, ranging from 5 to 
15 members. As for audit committee size (ACSIZE), the mean is recorded at 3.351 (median: 
3) which ranges from 1 to 9 people in each audit committee. The average number of 
meeting held by the board (BDMEET) is 5.126 (median: 5) and ranges from 0 to 27 times 
per year. As for audit committee, the average number of meeting held (ACMEET) is 4.723 
(median: 5). The findings are relatively similar to Abdul Rahman & Ali (2006) that shows an 
average of audit committee meeting of 4.97 (median: 5). In addition, there is a mean of 
0.089 female directors (FEM) on the board (median: 0). 
Firms have relatively low leverage, based on the mean of 0.082 (median: 0.037) and ranges 
from 0 to 0.691. Comparatively, Abdul Rahman & Ali (2006) shows slightly higher mean for 
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leverage at 0.21 (median: 0.194) and ranges from 0.001 to 0.691. Whilst the mean for 
firm’s total assets (LNTA) stands at 12.751 (median: 12.520), the measure is lower 
compared to Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) in their study of Malaysian firms between 2007-
2009 that reported a mean of 19.651 (median: 19.434). As for firm’s natural log of age 
(LNAGE), the mean stands at 2.595 (approximately 13 years of age).  
 
Based on the descriptive statistics of the dichotomous variables, 56 percent of the listed 
firms in the sample have actual issuance of debt or equity. More than half of the sample, 
i.e. 58 percent are firms dominated by family ownership. 12 percent have CEO chairing the 
board, 36 percent have a founder as the CEO and 12 percent has a CEO sitting in the 
nominating committee. Finally, about 11 percent of firms in the sample have high political 
connection. 
5.2.6 Correlations 
Table 5-5 displays the correlation matrix among variables for both forced restatement and 
non-forced restatement firm-years observations. The purpose of examining the correlation 
between the variables is to ensure that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity may cause the variance of parameter estimates to be inflated, leading to 
inaccurate inferences about the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables (Midi et al., 2010). According to Gujarati and Porter (2003), any correlation 
between independent variables that is greater than 0.80 may indicate a problem of 
multicollinearity.   
In this section, the Pearson correlation is examined22. There are some variables that 
demonstrate significant correlations as shown in Table 5-5. The highest correlation is 
recorded between financial expert director (FL) and audit committee financial expert 
(ACEXP) with coefficient .631, p < 0.01. It is noted from the hand collection of corporate 
governance data, the financial literate directors who serve on the board of directors also 
tend to serve on the audit committee (see also Hashim and Devi, 2008). Although the 
correlation is significantly strong; nonetheless, the correlation coefficient is less than 0.80.  
The correlations between other independent variables are seen to be comparatively low 
and do not appear to suggest any multicollinearity problem. Additional test on VIF further 
                                                          
22
 In support of the Pearson correlation test, the variance inflation factors were also tested to test for 
multicollinearity (please refer Appendix 3). 
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shows that all independent variables are below 4 which indicate the absence of harmful 
collinearity problem (see Appendix 3). The results from the Pearson correlation are solely 
indicative and may not determine the potential conclusions on the drivers or determinants 
on incidences of forced financial restatement. Chapter 6 will present the results of 
multivariate logit and stepwise logit regression analysis for determining the drivers of 
forced financial restatement in Malaysia. 
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Table 5-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Combination of Forced Restatement and Non-Forced Restatement Firm-Years 
 RESTATE  BI  FL  MULTI  AF  ACIND  ACEXP  
RESTATE               
BI -.007              
FL .011  .148 ***           
MULTI .024  .048 *** .070 ***         
LNAF .064  .095 *** .133 *** .229 ***       
ACIND -.042  .408 *** .035 *** -.037 ** .004      
ACEXP -.014  .036 *** .631 *** -.006  .012  .069 ***   
FB -.024 * -.109 *** -.139 *** -.080 *** -.033  .046 *** .003  
INST .049 *** -.024  .036 ** .128 *** -.013  -.046 *** -.027 * 
DAMJ .013  -.009  .002  .002  .002  -.017  .027  
DT .003  -.062 *** -.062 *** -.040 *** -.022  -.090 *** -.050 *** 
WCAC -.021  -.010  .032 ** -.035 *** -.006  -.036 ** .034 ** 
RSST -.040 *** -.032 ** -.008  -.098 *** .002  -.042 *** .024  
CHAR -.023  .004  -.004  -.042 *** .025 * -.029 * .011  
CHINV -.013  -.044 *** -.026 * -.020  -.019  -.025 * .008  
SFAST .000  .067 *** .081 *** .016  .006  .069 *** .043 *** 
ABCFO -.014  -.002  .017  -.001  -.009  -.028  -.020  
ABPROD -.017  .002  .009  -.015  .012  .034 * .041 ** 
ABDISX .009  .011  -.085 *** .006  .014  .037 ** .003  
CHROA -.019  -.035 ** -.007  -.104 *** -.012  -.082 *** -.004  
BM .005  .056 *** .006  -.005  -.029 * .089 *** -.004  
PE .022  -.039 *** .023  .029 * .008  -.086 *** -.026 * 
DISTRESS -.038 *** -.054 *** -.040 *** -.006  .017  .006  -.003  
CHFCF -.024  .003  .007  -.009  -.012  -.014  -.006  
FINR -.016  .002  .031 ** -.035 ** -.003  -.029 ** -.007  
SDW .025  .080 *** .029 * -.015  .016  .040 *** -.008  
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Table 5-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Combination of Forced Restatement and Non-Forced Restatement Firm-Years 
 RESTATE  BI  FL  MULTI  LNAF  ACIND  ACEXP  
BDSIZE .014  -.270 *** -.207 *** .044 *** -.018  .063 *** -.093 *** 
ACSIZE .034 ** .076 *** -.065 *** .079 *** -.014  -.157 *** -.182 *** 
BDMEET .021  .097 *** .076 *** .093 *** .003  .040 *** .020  
ACMEET -.010  .104 *** .037 ** .110 *** .015  .084 *** .015  
FEM .069 *** -.13  -.066 ** -.054 *** -.012  .058 *** .011  
LEV -.004  .061 *** .119 *** .091 *** -.002  .012  .001  
LNTA -.034 ** .067 *** .089 *** .274 *** -.026 * .077 *** -.026 * 
AGE .014  .124 *** .061 *** .247 *** .009  .049 *** -.063 *** 
Notes: Table 5-5 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficient of all the variables tested in this study. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly (a two-tailed test of whether the correlation coefficient equals to zero). 
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Table 5-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Combination of Forced Restatement and Non-Forced Restatement Firm-Years 
 FB  INST  DAMJ  DT  WCAC  RSST  CHAR  CHINV  
FB                 
INST                 
DAMJ .073 *** .005              
DT .017  .031 ** .070 ***           
WCAC .035 ** -.058 *** .516 *** .057 ***         
RSST .061 *** -.039 *** .185 *** .110 *** .361 ***       
CHAR .026 * -.020  .253 *** .096 *** .453 *** .244 ***     
CHINV .036 ** -.031 ** .303 *** .114 *** .441 *** .189 *** .177 ***   
SFAST -.021  -.144 *** .187 *** -.230 *** .264 *** -.012  .138 *** .133 *** 
ABCFO .035 * .059 *** -.331 *** .092 *** -.337 *** .016  -.154 *** -.154 *** 
ABPROD -.047 *** .019  .217 *** -.013  .188 *** .040 ** .026  .334 *** 
ABDISX .070 *** -.019  .049 *** -.009  -.019  .022  .067 *** .039 ** 
CHROA .049 *** -.055 *** -.016  .030 ** .156 *** .541 *** .142 *** .041 *** 
BM .053 *** -.016 *** -.046 ** -.014  -.109 *** -.155 *** -.122 *** -.057 *** 
PE -.056 *** .028 * -.027  .008  -.078 *** -.125 *** -.018  -.051 *** 
DISTRESS .070 *** -.024  -.003  -.097 *** -.010  .075 *** -.054 *** -.061 *** 
CHFCF -.007  -.005  -.180 *** .025  -.153 *** .017  -.077 *** -.091 *** 
FINR -.008  .054 *** -.188 *** .111 *** -.161 *** .564 *** -.029 ** -.082 *** 
SDW -.008  -.126 *** -.040 ** -.015  .064 *** .099 *** .003  -.017  
BDSIZE -.037 ** .215 *** .038 ** .048 *** -.043 *** -.030 ** -.009  -.002  
ACSIZE -.130 *** .165 *** .007  .072 *** -.043 *** -.040 *** .003  -.038 ** 
BDMEET -.151 *** .328 *** .015  -.019  -.041 *** -.132 *** -.053 *** -.033 ** 
ACMEET -.108 *** .174 *** .012  .001  -.083 *** -.234 *** -.067 *** -.028 * 
FEM .074 *** -.034 ** .002  -.010  -.020  -.015  -.025 * .004  
LEV -.109 *** .121 *** .035 ** .043 *** -.020  -.008  -.016  -.006  
LNTA -.242 *** .403 *** .085 *** .075 *** -.071 *** -.113 *** -.011  .010  
AGE -.290 *** .104 *** .007  -.030 ** -.120 *** -.398 *** -.112 *** -.063 *** 
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Table 5-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Combination of Forced Restatement and Non-Forced Restatement Firm-Years 
 SFAST  ABCFO  ABPROD  ABDISX  CHROA  BM  PE  DISTRESS  
SFAST                 
ABCFO -.227 ***               
ABPROD .161 *** -.340 ***             
ABDISX -.035 * .040 ** -.175 ***           
CHROA -.010  .062 *** .008  .041 **         
BM .071 *** -.082 *** -.000  -.064 *** -.091 ***       
PE -.048 *** -.084 *** .038 ** .003  -.137 *** -.154 ***     
DISTRESS -.127 *** .152 *** -.105 *** .023  -.020  -.118 *** -.030 **   
CHFCF -.032 ** .348 *** -.053 *** .024  .148 *** -.010  -.023  -.049 *** 
FINR -.120 *** .571 *** -.095 *** .057 *** .467 *** -.181 *** -.069 *** .088 *** 
SDW .107 *** -.013  .019  -.014  .113 *** .133 *** .051 *** -.145 *** 
BDSIZE -.070 *** -.068 *** .007  .098 *** -.047 *** -.096 *** .012  -.014  
ACSIZE -.097 *** .022  -.024  .008  -.040 *** -.071 *** .027 * -.014  
BDMEET -.033 ** -.018  .055 *** .038 ** -.165 *** -.016  .040 *** -.085 *** 
ACMEET -.014  -.037 ** .036 ** .030 * -.261 *** .070 *** .040 *** -.061 *** 
FEM -.090 *** .006  -.025  .111 *** -.029 * .057 *** -.004  .024  
LEV -.102 *** -.036 ** -.004  .054 *** -.010  -.002  .027 * -.394 *** 
LNTA -.093 *** -.026  .031 * .042 ** -.180 *** -.064 *** -.056 *** -.142 *** 
SV .173 *** -.073 *** .159 *** -.131 *** .059 *** -.122 *** -.022  -.053 *** 
AGE .107 *** -.048 *** -.053 *** -.016  -.414 *** .122 *** .015  -.047 *** 
Notes: Table 5-5 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficient of all the variables tested in this study. The independent variables are defined Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly (a two-tailed test of whether the correlation coefficient equals to zero). 
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Table 5-5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Combination of Forced Restatement and Non-Forced Restatement Firm-Years 
 CHFCF  FINR  SDW  BDSIZE  ACSIZE  BDMEET  ACMEET  FEM  
CHFCF                 
FINR .436 ***               
SDW .049 *** -.040 ***             
BDSIZE -.012  -.015  -.111 ***           
ACSIZE -.019  .046 *** -.090 *** .380 ***         
BDMEET .016  -.121 *** .044 *** .121 *** .128 ***       
ACMEET .004  -.196 *** .042 *** .084 *** .087 *** .594 ***     
FEM .003  -.033 ** -.047 *** .159 *** .018  .040 *** .061 ***   
LEV .061 *** .009  .077 *** .072 *** .036 ** .162 *** .137 *** -.019  
LNTA -.015  -.012  -.140 *** .289 *** .236 *** .309 *** .266 *** .010  
AGE -.048 *** -.319 *** -.027 * .080 *** .125 *** .155 *** .194 *** -.023  
 
 
 
 LEV  LNTA  AGE  
LEV       
LNTA .399 ***     
AGE .068 *** .331 ***   
 
Notes: Table 5-5 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficient of all the variables tested in this study. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly (a two-tailed test of whether the correlation coefficient equals to zero). 
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5.2.7 Model specification 
5.2.7.1 The binary logit model  
To recap, it is the study’s main objective to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial 
determinants and corporate governance determinants of forced financial restatements among 
public listed firms in Malaysia. As shown in Equation (1) in Section 5.2.3., a binary logit model is 
applied for the study’s data analysis due to the nature of the dependent variable that is 
dichotomous. Specifically, the dependent variable takes the value of one for forced 
restatement and zero non-forced restatement.  
Technically, a binary response model can be estimated using either logistic or logit regression 
model. The only difference between both models lies in the presentation of the analysis report, 
whereby logistic model reports ‘odds ratios’ and logit model reports ‘coefficients’. Studies such 
as Zmijewski (1985), Wu et al. (2010) and Makeeva and Neretina (2013) indicate that both logit 
and probit models perform equally well. However, the logit model gains wider application in 
the extensive accounting literature compared to the probit model (see for example; Jones et 
al., 2008; Feng et al., 2011; Price et al., 2011; Abbott et al., 2012; Correia, 2014). Among the 
reasons is that logit models can be faster to use on larger datasets and multiple alternatives in 
comparison to probit models. Furthermore, the exponentiated coefficients from the logit 
model are reported as the log-odd ratios and have an intuitive interpretation. Unlike the 
coefficients from the probit model, it has no direct interpretation.  
The logit model is in the form of a cumulative logistic probability function. In logit models, the 
coefficients of the independent variables provide an estimation of the probability of an 
outcome as described by the dichotomous dependent variables. Under this logit analysis, the 
dichotomous dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of occurrence of an event (forced 
restatement / non-forced restatement). The analysis does not model the group membership 
but rather models the ‘log odds’ of belonging to any particular group of the dependent 
variable. Even though modeling the odds is possible, however, it is easier to model the natural 
log of the odds, i.e. [ln (odd) = ln (P / 1-P)].  The natural log transformation permits the 
dependent variable to vary between positive infinity and negative infinity, allowing it to be in 
continuous form. The logit model can be presented as follows: 
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Yi = α + β1X1 + β2X2 +μ  (27) 
where,  
Xi = the independent variable (s) 
Yi = 1 if the event occurs (for example, restatement)  
Yi = 0 if the event does not occur (for example, non-restatement) 
In a logistic regression functional form, equation (27) is written as follows: 
ln (P/1-P) = α + β1X1 + β2X2 +μ           (28) 
Following this, the probability of occurrence of an event, i.e. a company to have forced 
restatement, can be presented in the equation shown below:  
          𝑃 =
1
1+𝑒−(α + β1X1 + β2X2 +⋯+ βnXn )
   (29) 
The maximum likelihood method is used to estimate equation (29). The resulting decimal 
fraction of 0.5 implies an equal chance of a firm to have restatement or non-restatement. If a 
decimal fraction of 1 indicates firm with restatement, a decimal fraction higher than 0.5 
indicates a higher probability for a firm to restate (than not to restate). Positive coefficient (or 
log of odd ratio) values indicate a positive relationship between the probability of forced 
restatement and the independent variable; whereas negative values indicate a negative 
relationship. 
In comparison to the linear regression, the binary logit model has more relaxed assumptions. 
The logit model does not assume that independent variables to be multivariate normal. It does 
not make any assumption about the distribution of the independent or predictor variables as 
the variables can be in any form. This means that the independent variables do not have to be 
linearly related or have equal variance within each group (Menard, 1995; Hair et al. 1998, pp. 
239-325; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, pp. 6-7). This is beneficial for the modelling since 
accounting and financial data are rarely normally distributed (Smith, 2014). Finally, the 
independent variables of a logit regression need not only be ratio or interval scaled, as the logit 
model can also deal with nominal and ordinal data.    
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Even though logit regressions do not require the dependent variable to have a linear 
relationship with the independent variables, it is assumed that the relationship between the 
logit outcome of the dependent variable and the independent variables is linear (Mernard, 
1995). This means that in logit models, the log odds of the outcome variable are modelled as a 
linear combination of the explanatory variables. Based on Equation (1) as shown in Section 
5.2.3, I ran a specification error test to examine that this assumption holds true for the sample 
data. The specification error test is based on the idea that for a logit regression equation to be 
properly specified there should be no additional independent variables that are statistically 
significant. In other words, the dependent variable in the logit regression needs a “link” 
function to relate to the independent variables properly. A link error would indicate 
specification error. The link test for specification error would technically adds an additional 
independent variable to the logit model equation, which is likely to be statistically significant if 
there is a link error.  
Following UCLA (2016), the link test uses the linear predicted value (_hat) and linear predicted 
value squared (_hatsq) as predictors to be used in rebuilding the logit model. Let the model be 
y = f(Xβ) and parameter estimates be  ?̂?. The link test calculates _hat = X?̂? and _hatsq = _hat2. 
The model is refitted with the two variables, and result for link error (specification error) will 
be based on the significance of hatsq. 
Table 5-6: Results of the Error Specification Test 
Variables LOGIT REGRESSION 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
_hat 
1.678*** 
(.008) 
_hatsq 
.098 
(.268) 
Constant 
1.083 
(.323) 
Observations 2,896 
Model chi-square 59.89 
p-value .0000 
Degrees of freedom 2 
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Based on Table 5-6 above, the result from my specification error test shows that the linear 
predicted value (_hat) is significant at p < 0.05, whereas the linear predicted value squared 
(_hatsq) is insignificant.  The results indicate that the logit equation model as shown in 
Equation (1) above is properly specified based on the predictors (_hat) which show significance 
and the additional independent variable (_hatsq) that is insignificant. Hence, it is concluded 
that the logit model in this study fulfills the assumption that the relationship between the logit 
outcome of the dependent variable and the independent variables is linear. 
5.2.7.2 The stepwise logit model  
In addition to the binary logit model, a stepwise binary logit regression is also estimated to 
refine the selection of variables and determine exactly which explanatory variables can best 
predict forced restatement. The stepwise logit is performed to help address the attenuation 
bias problem that arises from the regression of multiple proxies simultaneously as shown in 
Equation (1).  
 In performing the stepwise logit, the study follows Yan et al., (2014) where both forward 
selection and backward elimination methods are combined at each step to determine which 
variables are to be included or excluded. The process starts with the forward selection method 
that rechecks at each single step the importance of all earlier-added variables. In any case 
where the partial sum of squares (indicating predictive power) for any of the earlier added 
variables is below the minimum criterion to remain in the model, the selection process would 
be changed to the backward elimination procedure where the variables are eliminated one at a 
time up to the extent where the minimum criterion are met by all the remaining variables. 
Variables are removed based on these approximations. Following  Dechow et al. (2011), the 
significance level for elimination at the 15 percent level is used. 
The advantage of the stepwise logit model is its ability to manage a huge amount of possible 
explanatory/predictor variables and fine-tune the model in choosing the best predictor 
(Thompson, 1989). Furthermore, the order in which variables are added or removed can give 
useful information as to the quality of the predictor variables. Nonetheless, there are some 
drawbacks from applying the stepwise regression (Cohen et al., 2003). Firstly, it is the 
procedure in the stepwise approach to fit many models. However, in selecting a fit model, the 
stepwise regression model tends to select a model that well fits the data only due to chance 
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alone. Moreover, when there are two independent variables that are highly correlated to each 
other, only one of the variables might be retained in the stepwise model regardless of both 
variables being important. Hence, the stepwise regression model might not produce the 
optimum fitted model. The stepwise approach is more of a model simplification, rather than as 
a model specification, as it tends to specify model based on the “apparent” significance of the 
covariates. 
In spite of the pitfalls, not all procedures for model selection are appealing; some of which 
might be effective in comparison to others. The application of the stepwise procedure might at 
least give us some awareness of the important determinants that may assist in signalling 
towards the likelihood of forced restatement, especially in the emerging market like Malaysia.  
5.2.7.3 The penalised likelihood logit model 
The penalised likelihood logit model is examined to test the robustness of the stepwise results. 
This is done in view of the stepwise logit’s drawback that tends to produce more of a model 
simplification, rather than a model specification which results in a non-optimum fitted model. 
The penalised likelihood model reduces biases, hence ensures a more reliable model that can 
perform well in signalling the likelihood of forced restatement.  
The small number of events (forced restatement firm-years) relative to the control group (non-
forced restatement firm-years) becomes the main issue that confronts the study. Based on the 
data collection, the Malaysian forced restatement firms make up only 2.5% of the total firm-
years observations. Cases of financial restatements due to earnings misstatement and financial 
irregularities are rare (Dechow et al., 2011; Files et al., 2014; Hennes et al., 2014) yet they are 
catastrophic events. It is catastrophic such that the low-likelihood financial misstatement may 
impose an extremely high cost to the investors, auditors, and regulators which could then 
finally lead to the illiquidity and failure of the capital market (Dechow et al., 2011).  
Other empirical literature outside the accounting field faces the common challenge of a rare 
event which is often catastrophic with severe consequences. For example, Van Den Eeckhaut 
et al. (2006) applied the rare events logistic regression to create a landslide susceptibility map 
in Flemish Ardennes (Belgium) covering a 200 km2 study area. The methodology adopted was 
based on the hypothesis that future landslide is expected to have similar causal factors as the 
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landslides that have occurred in the past. The study by Lu and Tolliver (2016) compare the 
various highway-rail grade crossing accident frequency models that can deal with under-
dispersion crash data issue (sample variance smaller than sample mean). They found that the 
Conway–Maxwell–Poisson model and the hurdle Poisson model are better at accommodating 
the over and under-dispersion data issue, whereas the Bernoulli model is only appropriate for 
the under-dispersion. As for Boubeta et al. (2015), they did a study to analyze factors affecting 
fires in the forest area of Galicia (Spain) during the summer season. The area-level Poisson 
mixed model was applied. The parametric bootstrap method was also employed to estimate 
the mean squared error of the fire predictors. Another study by Nelson et al. (2014) identifies 
potentially modifiable risk factors of delayed wound healings and develop a model to evaluate 
patient risk of such complication. The model was created based on the multivariate logistic 
regression, whereby the backward stepwise bootstrap regression model was applied to 
determine the best covariate to be retained in the logistic model.   
In the area of accounting, several studies were carried out to deal with a rare event, an event 
with a very small probability of occurrences. Dechow et al. (2011) for instance, did a stepwise 
logistic regression to determine any significant predictors of financial misstatement. The 
investigation by Dechow et al. was done based on 451 earnings misstatement firm-years, 
representing less than half of one percent of the total COMPUSTAT firm-years available. They 
use a backward elimination technique to develop the misstatement prediction model. 
Subsequent variables elimination was carried out based on the first-order approximation of the 
remaining slopes estimates computed using the Lawless and Singhal 1978 computational 
logarithm. The study by Dimmock and Gerken (2012) examines investment fraud predictability 
by applying probit regressions based on samples of Form ADV Disclosures. Their samples make 
up a total of 53,994 firm-year observations, of which only 517 (1%) are fraud firms. The 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve for the prediction model was tested to examine 
any possible tradeoffs between false positives and predicted fraud. Hribar et al. (2014), on the 
other hand, applied the conditional logistic regressions to predict fraud, restatements and 
comment letters. The fraud and restatement datasets make up around 2% of the total firm-
years observation. The study examined whether the unexplained audit fees measure is a better 
predictor of low quality accounting compared to other measures of accounting quality. The 
test was carried out on matched samples where the control firms are matched based on 
industry and size.  
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To address the concern about the small number of forced restatement event, the penalised 
likelihood of the logit model as proposed by Firth (1993) is applied by this study to test the 
robustness of the results produced by the conventional binary logit model. Applying the 
penalised likelihood of the logit model is essential as it overcomes the problem of maximum 
likelihood estimation of the traditional logit model which suffers from small sample bias. 
Specifically, the conventional logit model tends to overestimate the coefficient of explanatory 
variables while underestimating the probability of an event, P(Y=1), hence producing biased 
results in samples with rare events (King and Zeng, 2001, pp. 153-154). The application of the 
penalised likelihood of the logit model produces much less biased results, even in extreme 
condition with small sample size and very few events (dependent variable equals one)  (Heinze 
and Schemper, 2002; Leitgob, 2013; Flynn et al., 2013). Hence, the possibility of Type I error 
can be reduced, producing a much more robust logit regression analysis. The penalised 
likelihood function specifically includes a penalty function that penalises against the size of 
estimated coefficients and model complexity. The penalised likelihood method also has the 
advantage of generating finite, consistent parameter estimates when the estimates for 
maximum log likelihood do not exist due to quasi-complete or complete separation23 (Heinze 
and Schemper, 2002). It is nonetheless computationally feasible for large samples. The 
penalised likelihood method receives increasing use in a research area that commonly has 
small data properties, such as the medical research.  We are not aware so far of its application 
in any accounting literature. Applying the penalised likelihood approach in logit model is 
considered one of the contributions of this study towards the accounting body of knowledge. 
In technical terms, the parameters of the logit model are derived using the maximum 
likelihood estimates. However, the maximum likelihood estimates are prone towards small 
sample bias. As explained by Heinze and Schemper (2002, p. 2412), the maximum likelihood 
estimates for the regression parameters  βr  (r = 1,…, k) are derived as solution from the score 
equations 𝜕 log L/ 𝜕βr = U(βr) = 0, where L indicates the likelihood function. In ensuring that 
                                                          
23
 A situation may arise with logistic regression, particularly with small to medium data sets, that although the 
likelihood converges, there will be at least a parameter estimate that diverges to ±infinity. It normally occurs when 
the responses and non-responses can be separated perfectly by a risk factor or non-trivial combination of risk 
factors (Heinze & Schemper, 2002). The data in our study has a quasi-complete separation problem when the 
industry dummy is included in the traditional logit model. It is where a number of industries are found to perfectly 
predict the outcome (forced restatement). By using the traditional logit model, these ‘problematic’ industries will be 
eliminated which lead to a substantial reduction in the number of observation. 
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bias is reduced, (Firth, 1993) suggests to maximize the penalise log likelihood. This is done by 
basing estimation on the modified score equations as follows: 
 
U(βr)* = U(βr) + 1/2trace [ I(β)
-1 { 𝜕I(β)/ 𝜕 βr }] = 0                  (r = 1,…, k)       (5) 
 
Where I(β)-1 is the inverse of the information matrix being evaluated at β.  U(βr)*, being the 
modified score function, relates to the penalised log-likelihood, i.e.  log L(β)* = log L(β) + 1/2 
log |I(β)|, and likelihood functions, i.e.  L(β)* = L(β) |I(β)|1/2 . (Firth 1993) shows that by using 
this modification score, the O(n-1) bias of maximum likelihood estimates β will be removed.  
 
If the penalised likelihood estimates is applied to the logit model, the score equation U(βr) = 
∑ (𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 −  𝜋𝑖) 𝑥𝑖𝑟 = 0  will be replaced by the modified score equation as follows: 
 
U(βr)* = ∑ {𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 −  𝜋𝑖 + ℎ𝑖(
1
2
 − 𝜋𝑖) } 𝑥𝑖𝑟 = 0            (r = 1,…, k)  (6) 
 
Whereby the ℎ𝑖’s are the ith diagonal elements of the ‘hat’ matrix H = W 
½ X(XTWX)-1 XTW½  , 
with W = diag  {𝜋𝑖(1 − 𝜋𝑖)}. 
 
In general, the extant accounting and non-accounting literature that examines categorical 
dependent variable applied the logistic regression as well as the logit and probit model in 
making prediction of variables association (see for example Lindstrom and Tuomilehto, 2003; 
Van Den Eeckhaut et al., 2006; Dechow et al., 2011; Price et al., 2011; Hernandez et al., 2013; 
Hribar et al., 2014; Xu and Zhu, 2014; Nelson et al., 2014).  
For the purpose of our study, several models will be examined. To summarise, firstly, the 
binary logit model will be examined to test the study objective which is to identify the financial 
variables and corporate governance variables that can provide better insight in determining 
the likelihood of forced financial restatement among public listed firms in Malaysia. The binary 
logit model will also be used to examine and compare the attributes of income-decreasing 
restatement firms against those with income-increasing restatement and also zero effect 
restatement. Secondly, the binary logit models are tested in a stepwise manner. The stepwise 
logit regression is estimated to determine exactly which explanatory variables can best 
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determine the likelihood of forced restatement. Finally, the penalised likelihood logit model 
will be examined to test the robustness of the results produced by the stepwise logit model.  
 
5.3 Summary 
In contrast to the earnings misstatement prediction model that is extant in the developed 
countries such as the US, the forced restatement model developed in this study is specific to 
Malaysia. The model that may indicate the likelihood of forced restatement, nonetheless, may 
be applicable to other developing countries as the model development generally takes into 
account specific characteristics of the emerging economies. In addition to discussing the data 
collection procedure and sample selection, this chapter presents variable measurements which 
comprise of financial and non-financial factors of forced financial restatement. These variables 
are expected to be indicative of the probability of firm’s forced restatement. The final section 
of the chapter explains the specifications of three key models being applied for data analysis 
that includes the binary logit model, the stepwise logit model and the penalised likelihood logit 
model. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DATA ANALYSIS ON FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL ATTRIBUTES OF 
MALAYSIAN FORCED RESTATEMENT FIRMS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter generally discusses empirical results on identifying the determinants of the 
likelihood of forced restatement events, including the specific attributes of the different 
types of forced restatement firms in Malaysia. Specifically, this study demonstrates new 
evidence from a developing country with a unique institutional setting. The concept of 
forced restatement is enhanced based on the findings that provide a distinctive perspective 
different from those of the developed countries.   
Subsequent to Chapter 5 that explains the research approach, Chapter 6 presents data 
analyses and discusses test results. This chapter begins by presenting the univariate 
analysis followed by several multivariate logit analyses. The multivariate logit regression is 
firstly run on the pooled sample of forced restatement, in line with the main objective of 
this study which is to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial determinants and 
corporate governance determinants of forced financial restatements among public listed 
firms in Malaysia. This is followed by a multivariate logit regression on the different types 
of forced restatement, which is in line with the study’s second main objective, to 
distinguish between forced restatements that relate to opportunistic behaviour and those 
linked to accounting errors. In checking the robustness of the test results, several sensitivity 
analyses are examined. This includes the examination of the penalised likelihood logit 
model which is scarcely examined in the accounting research field. At the end of this 
chapter, Section 6.4 presents the summary of the study’s overall data analyses. The 
development of a forced restatement prediction model, including tests of its predictive 
ability on a holdout sample is presented in the following Chapter 7. 
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6.2 Univariate analysis 
Comparison between forced restatement firms and non-restatement firms  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of forced restatement firm-years and non-
forced restatement firm-years for the period 2002 to 2012. The continuous/discrete and 
dichotomous variables are displayed separately. Normality test such as the skewness-
kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilks and graphical methods including the box plots and histogram, were 
carried out to test the normality of data distribution. The result from the Shapiro-Wilks 
normality test, for example, indicates that p-value is less than 0.05. This means the null 
hypothesis that samples are normally distributed is rejected (Peers, 2006).  
With the nature of the continuous and discrete data being non-parametric, the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test was examined to test for median differences or mean rank differences24. 
Unusual characteristics of forced restatement firms relative to the whole sample are tested 
and results are shown in Panel A of Table 6-1. A comparison is done between the treatment 
group (forced restatement firm-years) and the control group (non-restatement firm-years 
and accounting restatement firm-years). For the dichotomous variables, the Chi-square test 
results are shown in Panel B of Table 6-1. A one-tailed test is used due to its 
appropriateness in testing of directional hypotheses (Jaggi and Lee, 2002). 
The rank-sum test in Panel A of Table 6-1, starts with board quality, where only the 
multiple directorships variable (MULTI) shows a mean rank significant difference. It is 
reported that the mean of MULTI is slightly higher at 0.661 for forced restatement firms 
compared to a mean of 0.619 for non-forced restatement firms. The slightly higher mean 
rank for forced restatement firms however contradicts the proposition in H1 that forced 
restatement tend to have a lower proportion of multiple directorships on board. 
                                                          
24
 The assumptions for Wilcoxon rank-sum test were tested. Unlike the rest of the variables, only board 
independence (BI), audit committee expertise (ACEXP), audit committee size (ACSIZE), board meeting (BDMEET) 
and female directors (FEM) show similar shape of distribution between the two groups (forced restatement 
versus non-forced restatement). In this case, median differences are tested for BI, ACEXP, ACSIZE, BDMEET and 
FEM while mean rank differences are tested for the rest of the variables.  
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Table 6-1: Differences between variable mean and median between forced restatement 
firm-years and non-forced restatement firm-years (2002-2012) 
  N Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Pred. 
sign 
z-stat 
(p-value) 
 
PANEL A      (Continuous Variables)  
Board quality variables:    
BI FFR 105 .437 .4 .105 - .722  
 NFFR 4434 .422 .4 .110  (.765)  
FL FFR 119 .317 .286 .161 - -.816  
 NFFR 4399 .306 .286 .157  (.793)  
MULTI FFR 105 .661 .667 .245 - -1.427 * 
 NFFR 4434 .619 .667 .270  (.077)  
Audit committee quality variables:   
 
ACIND FFR 119 .752 .667 .143 + 2.528 *** 
 NFFR 4399 .793 .750 .157  (.006)  
ACEXP FFR 119 .427 .333 .218 + .964  
 NFFR 4399 .445 .333 .210  (.167)  
AF FFR 121 .001 .001 .000 + -1.633  
 NFFR 4638 .001 .000 .000  (.949)  
Family control variable:   
 
FB FFR 119 .064 0 .121 + 2.016 ** 
 NFFR 4420 .083 0 .128  (.022)  
Government-related institutional ownership variable:   
 
INST FFR 119 16.229 7.19 21.791 + -1.547  
 NFFR 4420 11.329 5.985 15.795  (.939)  
Corporate reporting quality variables:    
 
DAMJ FFR 76 .021 .021 .094 + -1.079  
 NFFR 3041 .008 .008 .159  (.141)  
DT FFR 116 .024 .013 .029 + .018  
 NFFR 4416 .005 .013 .030  (.493)  
WCAC FFR 116 .036 .013 .046 + .449  
 NFFR 4403 .045 .016 .068  (.327)  
RSST FFR 119 .427 .025 .218 + 2.897 *** 
 NFFR 4399 .445 .040 .210  (.0019)  
CHAR FFR 115 .005 .003 .082 + .871  
 NFFR 4409 .017 .009 .085  (.192)  
CHINV FFR 115 .010 .001 .044 + 1.374 * 
 NFFR 4409 .016 .005 .074  (.085)  
SFAST FFR 121 .494 .463 .174 + .057  
 NFFR 4632 .494 .493 .186  (.477)  
ABCFO FFR 76 -.001 .001 .086 - 1.023  
 NFFR 3041 .009 .009 .110  (.847)  
ABPROD FFR 76 .033 0 .049 + .801  
 NFFR 3041 .039 0 .055  (.211)  
ABDISX FFR 76 -.000 -.000 .089 - -.221  
 NFFR 3041 -.005 -.001 .084  (.587)  
Firm performance and demand for external finance variables: 
 
  
CHROA FFR 121 .024 .006 .084 + .343  
 NFFR 4638 .036 .005 .096  (.366)  
BM FFR 118 1.495 1.294 .956 - -.642  
 NFFR 4356 1.462 1.244 1.027  (.261)  
PE FFR 118 2.642 2.470 .997 + -1.379  
 NFFR 4355 2.513 2.382 .947  (.916)  
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  N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Differences 
between two 
proportions (Chi
2 
statistic, df=1) 
 
PANEL B (Dichotomous Variables) 
AI FFR 121 .455 0 .500   
 NFFR 4638 .562 1 .496 5.534 ** 
FM FFR 119 .487 0 .502   
 NFFR 4420 .584 1 .493 4.524 ** 
CEOB FFR 119 .109 0 .313   
 NFFR 4420 .115 0 .319 .037  
CEOF FFR 119 .269 0 .445   
 NFFR 4420 .357 0 .479 .010  
CEON FFR 119 .118 0 .324   
 NFFR 4420 .121 0 .326 .010  
PC FFR 119 .244 0 .431   
 NFFR 4420 .107 0 .310 21.788 *** 
Notes: FFR is forced financial restatement and NFFR is non-forced financial restatement. Table 6-1 reports two 
sample test which compares FFR firm-years and non-FFR firm-years. The total number of observations differs 
for each independent variable due to missing observations. Panel A presents the continuous variables where 
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is examined to evaluate median differences and mean ranks. Panel B presents the 
dichotomous variables where the Chi-square test is examined to evaluate proportions differences. All variables 
are defined in 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly, one-
tailed test. 
  
 
DISTRESS FFR 121 4.656 3.569 3.894 - 2.858  
 NFFR 4638 5.771 4.772 4.697  (.998)  
CHFCF FFR 112 .058 0 .090 - 1.227  
 NFFR 4146 .073 .002 .100  (.890)  
FINR FFR 121 .129 .047 .227 - 1.412  
 NFFR 4638 .153 .061 .241  (.921)  
Share price volatility variable: 
 
SDW FFR 106 11.087 9.561 6.113 + -1.982  
 NFFR 4158 10.084 8.635 6.267  (.976)  
Control variables: 
 
BDSIZE FFR 119 7.420 7 1.893 +/- .977  
 NFFR 4420 7.568 7 1.850  (.328)  
ACSIZE FFR 119 3.403 3 .717 +/- -.975  
 NFFR 4399 3.349 3 .626  (.330)  
BDMEET FFR 119 5.529 5 2.314 +/- -1.213  
 NFFR 4399 5.115 5 1.927  (.225)  
ACMEET FFR 119 4.891 5 1.859 +/- .141  
 NFFR 4398 4.719 5 1.322  (.888)  
FEM  FFR 119 .613 0 .793 - .724  
 NFFR 4399 .665 0 .814  (.766)  
LEV FFR 121 .129 .094 .146 + -4.029  
 NFFR 4636 .081 .036 .107  (1.000)  
LNTA FFR 121 13.231 12.990 1.654 + -3.667  
 NFFR 4638 12.739 12.508 1.377  (1.000)  
AGE FFR 121 2.750 2.833 .908 + -2.074  
 NFFR 4638 2.591 2.639 .937  (.981)  
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Next is audit quality, where only audit committee independence (ACIND) shows a 
significant mean rank difference. The result shows that forced restatement firms have a 
slightly lower mean of 0.752 for ACIND compared to 0.793 for non-forced restatement 
firms. There is a slight difference in the mean rank, nonetheless the result again contradicts 
with the proposition (H2) that a higher proportion of audit committee independence 
intensifies closer monitoring which trigger and increases the likelihood of forced 
restatement. 
The measure for family control, i.e. founders on the board (FB), shows a significant mean 
rank difference with a lower mean of 0.064 for the forced restatement firms compared to 
0.083 for non-forced restatement firms.  It provides preliminary evidence that family 
control is negatively associated with forced restatement. This preliminary result, however, 
contradicts H3 which posits that family control tend to exert pressure on managers to 
report good firm performance which increases the likelihood of forced restatement. It also 
contradicts findings of prior studies that found firms with founders on the board are more 
likely to manipulate and distort earnings report (Dechow et al., 1996; Hasnan et al., 2013). 
In the corporate reporting quality category, only change in non-cash net operating assets 
(RSST) and change in inventory (CHINV) show significant mean rank differences. Forced 
restatement firms show a lower mean of 0.427 for RSST and 0.010 for CHINV (compared to 
the mean for non-forced restatement firms of 0.445 and 0.016). This result preliminarily 
rejects H5, indicating that although forced restatement firms report positive change in net 
operating asset accruals and inventory possibly due to income-increasing accrual choices, 
but the overstatement is done at a lower degree compared to the control group. 
None of the variables in the firm performance and demand for external finance category 
are significant. The same applies to the control variables where none of them are found to 
be significant. 
The chi-square test results for the dichotomous variables are shown in Panel B of Table 6-1. 
The chi-square test indicates that the relative frequencies are reliably different between 
the treatment and control firms. While political connection (PC) shows higher frequency for 
forced restatement firms (mean: 0.244 versus 0.107), results show that the expected 
frequencies for actual issuance of debt or equity (AI) and family ownership (FM) are 
significantly lower for the forced restatement firms with mean 0.455 and 0.487 respectively 
(compared the non-forced restatement firms’ mean of 0.562 for AI and 0.584 for FM). This 
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is consistent with the firms’ relative sample size which is smaller compared to the non-
forced restatement firms. Overall, the results indicate that forced restatement firms are 
relatively active in raising finance possibly due to maintaining firm growth or in support of 
their high leverage as discussed earlier. There is also family ownership as well as political 
connection among forced restatement firms which supports the contention that both 
factors may reduce monitoring effectiveness and drive the managers from working towards 
maximising shareholders’ return.  
In summary, findings from the descriptive statistic show lack of consistency with the study 
hypotheses. Firstly, in relation to the control firms, it can be seen that forced restatement 
firms generally have higher proportion of directors with multiple directorships, indicating a 
more skillful directors on the board who may monitor managers more diligently. There is 
however less audit committee independence among forced restatement firms which may 
possibly reduce the effectiveness of managerial monitoring. Forced restatement firms also 
have low proportion of founders on the board, hence lesser family control which limits 
their ability to exert pressure on the managers. Forced restatement firms were also found 
to report increasing accruals for change in net operating asset and inventory, although the 
magnitude is relatively lower compared to the non-forced restatement firms. This in line 
with the proposition that there is incentive among forced restatement firms to 
opportunistically report income-increasing accruals possibly to produce favourable 
earnings. Forced restatement firms are also politically connected and were also found to 
have actual issuance of equity or debt and family ownership, although the frequencies may 
be lower in relation to the non-restatement firms and this is consistent with their smaller 
sample size. 
It should be noted that results from the rank-sum test and chi-square test are not sufficient 
to support the hypothesis testing. In the next Section 6.3, the multivariate logit regression 
will be examined in determining whether the variables tested in the univariate tests 
provide joint significance in signaling the likelihood towards forced restatement in 
Malaysia.  
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6.3 Multivariate analysis 
6.3.1 Multivariate logit analysis on the pooled sample of the Malaysian forced 
restatement firms 
In this section, a multivariate logit regression is tested on the pooled forced restatement 
sample to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial determinants and corporate 
governance determinants of forced financial restatements among the Malaysian listed 
firms. Results shown in Table 6-2 are based on the logit model tested on 2,896 firm-year 
observations25. The odds ratio (OR) of the logit model suggests a positive association 
between the explanatory variable and the likelihood of forced restatement if OR is greater 
than 1.0, and a negative association between the explanatory variable and the likelihood of 
forced restatement if OR is less than 1.026. 
 
Based on Table 6-2, results show that board independence (BI) has a negative association 
with the likelihood of forced restatement and is statistically significant at the five percent 
level. In economic terms, a one standard deviation decrease in board independence (from 
its mean) increases the odds that a forced restatement will take place by 4.2 times27 
(holding all other variables constant). In the perspective of the marginal effect, a one unit 
decrease in board independence increases the probability of forced restatement by eight 
percentage points. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Peasnell et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 
2005; Marra et al., 2011), board independence is a significant determinant of the likelihood 
of forced restatement. The result indicates that low board independence impedes an  
 
                                                          
25
 From the initially screened data with a net total of 4,759 firm-year observations (refer Table 5-1 in Chapter 
5), a further 1,641 observations with incomputable discretionary accruals were dropped. The inability to 
calculate discretionary accruals arises as the estimation model pools across firms over time within each two-
digit SIC coded industry. The pooling process caused substantial reduction in the number of observation as it 
only includes two-digit SIC code industries that have at least 10 firms in any specific year (Hazarika et al., 2012). 
Any two-digit SIC code industries that have less than 10 firms were excluded from the computation hence the 
unquantifiable discretionary accruals observations. Another 222 firm-years of industry dummies were 
eliminated due to perfect collinearity with the event of non-forced restatement. 
26 The odds ratios for continuous variables are based on the calculation of (exp (βx Sx) − 1); where βx is 
estimated regression coefficient and Sx is sample standard deviation for variable x. As presented in Table 6-2, 
the odds ratios for continuous variables represent the change in odds of belonging to the forced restatement 
group, given a one standard deviation change in the variable of interest. As for indicator variables, the odds 
ratios are based on the calculation of (exp(βx) − 1). Accordingly, the odds-ratios for indicator variables represent 
the change in odds of belonging to the forced restatement group, given a change in the variable of interest 
from 0 to 1 (Ettredge et al., 2010). The significance levels reported in Table 6-2 are based on a one-tailed test.  
27 The 4.20 figure is derived from the odds ratio of the estimated logit model. Initially, the odds ratio shown in 
Table 6-2 for board independence (BI) is 0.238. The result suggests that the odds of firms with high board 
independence versus firms with low board independence issuing a forced restatement are 0.238. That is, a firm 
with lesser board independence has 4.20 (=1/0.238) greater odds of issuing forced restatement, all else equal 
(Srinivasan et al., 2015). 
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Table 6-2: Multivariate Logit Regression Model Examining Determinants of Forced 
Restatement in Malaysia during 2002-2012 
Variables Hypo-
thesis 
Predicted 
sign 
Logit Model   
   Delta  
(marginal effect) 
Odds Ratio 
 
Z-statistic P – value 
BI H1 - -.082 .238 -2.09** .018 
FL H1 - .014 1.868 .51 .696 
MULTI H1 - -.005 .800 -.39 .653 
ACIND H2 + -.026 .310 -1.02 .154 
ACEXP H2 + .002 1.105 .12 .454 
AF H2 + -3.432 .000 -1.03 .153 
FM H3 + .001 1.037 .11 .458 
FB H3 + .016 2.053 .49 .312 
CEOF H3 + .003 1.166 .32 .375 
CEON H3 + -.009 .649 -.88 .189 
CEOB H3 + .002 1.108 .21 .418 
INST H4 + -.000 .992 -.77 .220 
PC H4 + .020 2.504 2.09** .019 
DAMJ H5 + .041 6.468 1.26* .100 
DT H5 + .102 103.21 1.12 .132 
WCAC H5 + -.133 .002 -1.72 .958 
RSST H5 + -.025 .320 -.65 .258 
CHAR H5 + -.025 .314 -.53 .299 
CHINV H5 + -.011 .613 -.17 .432 
SFAST H5 + .017 2.162 .89 .186 
ABCFO H5 - -.044 .135 -1.07 .141 
ABPROD H5 + -.132 .002 -1.79 .963 
ABDISX H5 - -.012 .585 -.29 .614 
CHROA H6 + .043 7.020 .65 .258 
BM H6 - -.000 .985 -.10 .538 
PE H6 + .004 1.180 1.11 .133 
DISTRESS H6 + -.000 .990 -.24 .594 
CHFCF H6 - .008 1.427 .22 .586 
FINR H6 - -.070 .041 -1.86** .032 
AI H6 + -.002 .893 -.27 .395 
SDW H7 + .001 1.033 1.49* .069 
BDSIZE  +/- -.006 .758 -2.55** .011 
BDMEET  +/- -.003 .859 -1.36 .175 
ACSIZE  +/- .010 1.574 1.74* .082 
ACMEET  +/- .002 1.103 .72 .470 
FEM  - -.004 .822 -.99 .984 
LEV  + .063 17.916 2.00** .023 
LNTA  + .008 1.414 2.28** .011 
LNAGE  - -.002 .900 -.49 .312 
Industry dummies   Included    
Year dummies   Included    
Observations   2,896    
LR Chi
2
   115.73    
p-value   .041    
Degrees of freedom   91    
Notes: Table 6-2 presents results from the logit regression model examining the determinants of forced 
restatement in the Malaysian firm sample. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the forced 
restatement event. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 in Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly (based on one-tailed tests where directional predictions are 
provided). 
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effective managerial monitoring; hence supporting H1 that low board quality increases the 
likelihood of forced restatement.  
Political connection (PC) is positively and significantly associated to the likelihood of forced 
restatement (p-value < 0.05). Economically, the presence of a political connection increases 
the odds that a firm is issued with forced restatement by 2.50 times. In terms of marginal 
effect, this would mean that a change in political connection from zero to one increases 
forced restatement probability by only two percentage points. The result supports the 
contention of prior studies in Malaysia which claim that politically connected firms are 
deemed to be operationally inefficient as a result of cronyism (Gul, 2006; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003) and have higher risk of financial misstatement (Hasnan et al., 2013; Abdul 
Wahab et al., 2014). Overall, H4 is supported that there is a positive relationship between 
firm’s political connection and the occurrence of forced restatement.  
The logit regression further shows significance for the discretionary accruals variable 
(DAMJ). DAMJ is positively associated to the likelihood of forced restatement, significant at 
the ten percent level. A one standard deviation increase in DAMJ increases the odds that a 
forced restatement will take place by 6.47 times. Consistent with the low statistical 
significance, DAMJ shows a relatively low marginal effect where a one unit increase in 
DAMJ increases the probability of forced restatement only by 0.4 percentage points. The 
overall result indicates that firms engage in opportunistic behaviour by adopting aggressive 
accounting in their financial report which increases the risk of forced restatement. H5 is 
therefore supported where a distortion in corporate reporting quality is positively 
associated to the occurrence of forced restatement. 
Firm’s level of internal fund (FINR) shows a negative and significant relationship with the 
likelihood of forced restatement at the five percent significance level. In economic terms, 
as the firms gets nearer to exhausting its internal funds, a one standard deviation decrease 
in FINR increases the odds for forced restatement to be issued by 24.39 (=1/0.041) times. 
The marginal effect is where a one unit decrease in FINR increases the probability of forced 
restatement by seven percentage points. There is an indication that forced restatement 
firms suffer from a declining internal fund (FINR). This creates the intention for firms to 
raise new capital at low cost which increases the risk of forced restatement. Overall, the 
result supports H6 whereby the demand for external financing increases the likelihood of 
forced restatement.  
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Share price volatility (SDW) further shows a positive and significant relationship with the 
likelihood of forced restatement at the ten percent significance level. In economic terms, a 
one standard deviation increase in share price volatility increases the odds of forced 
restatement by 1.03 times. With a low statistical significance, the marginal effect for SDW 
is also very small where a one unit increase in SDW increases the probability of forced 
restatement by only 0.1 percentage point. Essentially, the result indicates that share price 
volatility triggers the need for forced restatement; however, the economic effect is close to 
being insignificant. The overall result shows support for H7 which posits a positive 
relationship between share price volatility and the occurrence of forced restatement. 
Essentially, share price volatility indicates firms’ perceived risk and the uncertainty in their 
future earnings performance. This may prompt closer monitoring among external 
authorities, thus triggering the need for forced restatement.  
A few control variables show some significant results. This includes board size (BDSIZE) 
which shows a negative and significant relationship with the likelihood of forced 
restatement (p-value < 0.05). In economic term, a decrease in one standard deviation of 
BDSIZE increases the odds of forced restatement by 1.32 (=1/0.758) times. The marginal 
effect is however quite weak where a one unit increase in board size decreases the 
probability of forced restatement by only 0.6 percentage points. The result indicates that a 
small board size may lead to ineffective monitoring possibly due to insufficient members 
available to carry out various corporate functions and the discharge of responsibilities, 
which increases the likelihood of forced restatement.  
Audit committee size (ACSIZE) also shows a significant result. ACSIZE is positively and 
significantly associated to the occurrence of forced restatement at the five percent 
significance level. A one standard deviation increase in audit committee size increases the 
odds of forced restatement by 1.57 times (while holding other variables constant). 
Marginally, the impact is not strong whereby a one unit increase in audit committee size 
increases the likelihood of forced restatement by only a one percentage point. Overall, a 
larger audit committee increases the effectiveness of detecting misstatement, which 
increases the occurrence of forced restatement.  
Finally, leverage (LEV) and firm size (LNTA) both show a significant positive association with 
the likelihood of forced restatement (p-value < 0.05). A one standard deviation increase in 
leverage increases the odds of forced restatement by 17.92 folds. The impact is that a one 
unit increase in leverage increases the probability of forced restatement by six percentage 
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point. As for firm size, an increase in LNTA increases the odds of forced restatement by 1.41 
folds. The marginal effect is again quite small such that the increase in one unit of firm size 
increases the likelihood of forced restatement by only 0.8 percentage point. 
The goodness of fit statistic in Table 6-2 shows a likelihood ratio Chi2 of 115.73 with 𝜌 < 
0.05. This means that the model as a whole is significant by which the independent 
variables allow the model to provide prediction on the likelihood of forced restatement. 
The overall logit regression results indicate that H1, H4, H5, H6 and H7 are supported. It 
implies that firms have a low board independence which limits the effectiveness of 
managerial monitoring thus increasing the probability of forced restatement. Not only 
forced restatement firms are politically connected, but they are also found to be involved 
in producing a defective reporting through practices of opportunistic earnings 
management. It should be noted however that the economic impact of the earnings 
management on the occurrence of forced restatement is very small. Furthermore, forced 
restatement firms generally have a decreasing level of internal fund which creates the 
incentive for raising external finance, hence the increased risk of forced restatement. 
Forced restatement firms’ share price are also volatile, being an indicator of the firm’s 
perceived risk, which increases the intensity of monitoring by the authorities, thus 
triggering the likelihood of forced restatement. Note that the result however shows the 
economic impact of share price volatility on forced restatement event may not be so 
significant.  
6.3.2 Sensitivity analysis  
6.3.2.1 Sensitivity analysis based on alternative specification of exploratory 
variables 
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the logit regression 
results to some alternate specifications of the explanatory variables. The first sensitivity 
test relates to the proxies used to measure firm’s accruals quality. Results are tabulated 
and shown in Appendix 4. The proxies for accruals quality include the Modified Jones 
discretionary accrual model (DAMJ), deferred tax expenses (DT), change in working capital 
(WCAC), change in non-cash net operating assets (RSST), change in accounts receivable 
(CHAR), change in inventories (CHINV) and soft assets (SFAST). Although these proxies are 
related accruals measure, the correlation among each of the proxy is relatively small 
(correlation coefficient less than 0.60). This may imply that each proxy is a unique 
measurement that measures different construct. Nonetheless, the highest correlation is 
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recorded between WCAC and DAMJ with correlation coefficient 0.52 with p < 0.01 implying 
a possibility of overlapping measure due to imperfect multicollinearity. 
Hence, I re-run a multivariate logit test separately to check for differences in results when 
either WCAC or DAMJ is dropped out.  Firstly, the result shows no significant changes when 
excluding DAMJ (and retaining WCAC) from the logit model. There is a very slight decrease 
in the log-likelihood Chi2 of 114.16 at p < 0.05 (original log likelihood Chi2 is 115.73 at p < 
0.05). All other parameter estimates are not sensitive to the exclusion of DAMJ from the 
logit model, except for deferred tax expenses (DT). The previously insignificant DT is 
currently found to be positively related to the likelihood of forced restatement, significant 
at the ten percent level. The relationship seems strong where a one standard deviation 
increase in DT increases the odds of forced restatement by 231.61 times. Nonetheless, the 
economic impact is so small such that a one unit increase in DT increases the probability of 
forced restatement by approximately zero percentage point. By having to remove DAMJ, 
there is still an indication that forced restatement firms engage in opportunistic accounting 
practices as implied by the temporary-book-tax differences in deferred tax expenses that 
arises due to an upward earnings management. 
 Alternatively, I re-examine the logit model by retaining DAMJ and excluding WCAC. The 
result shows hardly any change with a slight decrease in log-likelihood chi2 of 112.32 at p < 
0.05. The rest of the parameter estimates are not sensitive and remain relatively the same. 
The main difference lies in price-earnings ratio (PE) where the variable shows a significantly 
positive relationship with the likelihood of forced restatement (p < 0.10). Results show that 
a one standard deviation increase in PE increases the odds of forced restatement by 1.218 
times. The economic impact seems relatively insignificant due to the delta measure that 
approximates to zero. Overall, forced restatement firms are seen to demonstrate a positive 
growth prospect. This increases the risk of forced restatement as firms tend to have strong 
incentives to show a persistent growth in order to maintain high stock valuations. 
Another issue arises that relates to two closely related proxies; each measuring director 
financial expertise (FL) and audit committee financial expertise (ACEXP). Results are 
tabulated in Appendix 5. The correlation coefficient between FL and ACEXP is 0.63 with p < 
0.01 implying that both proxies have a strong correlation, giving rise to the possibility that 
both proxies might measure the same construct. In this case, another sensitivity test was 
re-examined to measure the multivariate logit model when either one of the proxies was 
excluded. In line with our expectation, results generated from the logit model that exclude 
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ACEXP (while retaining FL) remain similar to the original logit model. The log likelihood Chi2 
remain similar at 115.72 with p < 0.05 (originally log likelihood Chi2 = 115.73, p < 0.05). 
Except for DAMJ that shows insignificance, the rest of the parameter estimates are not 
sensitive and remain relatively the same. Similarly, when re-examining the logit model that 
excludes FL (and retaining ACEXP), results, in general, remain unchanged except for DAMJ 
which again shows insignificance. There is hardly any change in the log likelihood chi2 with 
a figure of 115.47 with p < 0.05. 
Previously, in the multivariate logit model, a dummy variable was used to signify family 
ownership (FM). However, it may be argued that the use of actual ownership level may 
provide more information compared to the use of a dichotomous dummy variable. An 
additional sensitivity test was examined on the use of actual ownership level for FM. 
Results are shown in Appendix 6. A multivariate logit model that includes absolute 
ownership level for FM was re-estimated. The log likelihood Chi2 however increases to 
132.01 with p < 0.01 (originally, log likelihood chi2 = 115.73, p < 0.05). The signs and 
significance of the explanatory variables remain unchanged. However, when incorporating 
the actual ownership levels for FM into the logit model, FM tend to become significant and 
positively related to the likelihood of forced restatement. A one standard deviation 
increase in FM increases the odds of forced restatement by 1.011 times. Again, the delta 
method produces nearly zero measure which signifies an insignificant economic impact. 
Results imply that the concentrated family ownership structure often lead to a 
misalignment of interest between large and minority shareholders. The conflict of interest 
gives rise to wealth expropriation from the small investors’ wealth for private gain which 
eventually increases the risk of forced restatement. 
In addition, board meeting (BDMEET) shows a negative association with the likelihood of 
forced restatement, significant at the ten percent level. An increase of a one standard 
deviation in board meeting frequency reduces the odds of forced restatement by 1.247 
times. However, the impact is relatively insignificant since the delta measure shows a figure 
close to zero. The result implies that the number of board meeting act as an effective tool 
for monitoring managerial behaviour in their accounting practices. This would mean that 
more time is spent by the board members to discuss issues related to the quality of 
financial reporting, hence reduces the likelihood of forced restatement. Overall, the rest of 
the parameter estimates are not sensitive to the changes in the estimation of family 
ownership. 
180 
 
6.3.2.2 Sensitivity analysis to test interaction effect  
This section expands on the previous sensitivity analysis in Section 6.3.2.1. Specifically, an 
additional analysis is performed using the structural regression model to examine whether 
accruals quality variable mediates the impact of the explanatory variables on the likelihood 
of forced restatement. It further examines whether there is any interaction effect among 
the explanatory variables. The structural regression model was performed using the 
structural equation modeling software, Mplus version 7.2 (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-
2014) of which the maximum likelihood estimator was used. The structural equation 
modeling has received extensive application mainly in the area of business research that 
includes strategic management, managerial accounting, and marketing, but its usage is still 
lacking in the accounting literature (Glaum et al., 2013). 
In contrast to the previous studies that applied the indexing method28 to measure the 
quality of financial information among firms, this study applied a more robust method of 
the structural equation model to test the predictive ability of the forced restatement 
model. The structural equation method provides a simultaneous assessment of the direct 
and indirect relationships of variables based on the maximum likelihood estimation, 
producing a coherent and systematic analysis (Glaum et al., 2013). 
Prior to examining the structural regression model, this study tested a confirmatory factor 
analytic (CFA) model on all latent constructs to prepare the variables for the structural 
equation modeling test. Nonetheless, untabulated results from the test show that the 
initial assessment on the CFA analysis did not work very well. Results on factor loadings are 
inconsistent with the study’s grouping of variables except for accruals quality (which shows 
a low value of correlations among the indicator variable). Furthermore, due to poor factor 
loadings, the forced restatement prediction model generated by the structural equation 
modeling method is inappropriate, and the specification cannot be possibly right. 
Essentially, the factoring analysis and the structural regression method did not work and 
seem not to be the suitable approach for estimating the forced restatement prediction 
model.  
                                                          
28 Several studies such as Jalila and Devi (2012), Baber et al. (2012) and Abdullah et al. (2015) have used 
alternative methods such as “indexing” especially in measuring corporate governance variables. It is argued that 
the index method can be used as a proxy, for example, on the overall quality level of financial disclosure made 
by firms. However, indexing is very poor and not particularly useful because it is equally weighted without any 
justification for the equal weighting. The dichotomous procedure used to score the instrument in the index 
treats each item as being equal, thus no indication on the level of emphasis is given to any particular category 
of items (Li et al., 2008). 
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Due to the inappropriateness of the structural equation modeling, this study alternatively 
examines the interaction effects between certain variables using the multivariate logit 
model. This is to ensure the durability of the original multivariate logit results previously 
derived from the pooled forced restatement test sample. The first interaction effect tested 
is those between earnings management measured by the Modified Jones Model (DAMJ) 
and real earnings management (REM). Consistent with the findings by Badertscher (2011) 
and Zang (2012), there is a possibility that managers might substitute to real earnings 
management when all choices of accruals management are exhausted. While other 
research (e.g. Doukakis, 2014) has found that firms engage in accruals as well as real 
earnings management activities simultaneously to improve firm’s profitability or avoid 
reporting losses.  
The interaction effect between the incentive on raising finance (FINR) and change in 
earnings (CHROA) is also examined. Managers are inclined to report profitability with the 
anticipation of getting access into the capital market (Erickson et al., 2006; Lennox and 
Pittman, 2010). By reporting good earnings performance, the firm’s share price may 
increase, thus reducing the cost of issuing new equity.  Studies such as Dechow et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that firms tend to report earnings growth for the purpose of allowing 
managers in raising finance necessary for investment. Consistent with these findings, this 
study examines possible interaction effect that might exist between FINR and CHROA.  
The possible interaction effect between founder CEO (CEOF) and board independence (BI) 
is also tested. There is a possibility that board independence might be undermined when 
the founder is also the firm’s CEO. Founders have a huge influence over business decisions 
and are less likely to be accountable to the board of directors (Dechow et al., 1996). Within 
the Malaysian scenario where the culture discourages from criticism or opinion differences, 
the quality of board independence may be threatened when dealing with manipulation acts 
especially when there exist a dominant-styled founder CEO on the board (Satkunasingam et 
al., 2012). 
Finally, the interaction effect between change in free cash flows (CHFCF) and political 
connection (PC) is also examined. There is a likelihood for politically connected firms to be 
involved in over-investment or investing in unprofitable projects by using the surplus free 
cash flow that the firms have (Jensen, 1986). The involvement in non-value maximising 
activities is done opportunistically for private or political gain at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
182 
 
Results of the interaction effect test are shown in Table 6-3.  The logit model with 
interaction effect shows relatively consistent results with the original logit model. However, 
the overall marginal effect based on the delta method shows close to zero impact for each 
of the explanatory variables tested. On the one hand, variables including board 
independence (BI) and firm’s internal fund level (FINR) consistently show a significant and 
negative relationship with the likelihood of forced restatement. Based on the interaction 
effect logit test, the odds of forced restatement increase by 58.82 times with every one 
standard deviation decrease in BI (original logit: 4.2 times).  As for firm’s internal fund, a 
one standard deviation decrease in FINR increases the odds of forced restatement by 18.52 
times (original logit: 24.39 times). The results consistently show support for H1 and H6. 
On the other hand, variables such as political connection (PC) and share price volatility 
(SDW) consistently show a significant and positive relationship with the likelihood of forced 
restatement. Results for the new logit remain relatively the same whereby for political 
connection, the result indicates that the presence of PC increases the odds of forced 
restatement by 2.17 times (original logit: 2.50 times), whereas for share price volatility, a 
one standard deviation increase in SDW increases the odds of forced restatement by 1.03 
times (similar to original logit: 1.03 times). H4 and H7 are consistently supported. 
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Table 6-3: Comparison of the Multivariate Logit Models in Examining Interaction Effects to 
Determine the Likelihood of Forced Restatement in Malaysia  
Variables MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(Interaction Effect Excluded) 
MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(Interaction Effect Included) 
 
Delta  
(marg. effect) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(p-value) 
Delta  
(marg. effect) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(p-value) 
BI -.082 .238** .018 -.000 .017** .019 
FL .014 1.868 .696 .000 1.944 .707 
MULTI -.005 .800 .653 -.000 .771 .675 
ACIND -.026 .310 .154 -.000 .295 .142 
ACEXP .002 1.105 .454 .000 1.051 .477 
AF -3.432 .000 .153 -.005 .000 .151 
FM .001 1.037 .458 -.000 .972 .467 
FB .016 2.053 .312 .000 2.000 .321 
CEOF .003 1.166 .375 -.000 .660 .382 
CEON -.009 .649 .189 -.000 .635 .180 
CEOB .002 1.108 .418 .000 1.054 .458 
INST -.000 .992 .220 -.000 .992 .212 
PC .020 2.504** .019 .000 2.168* .064 
DAMJ .041 6.468* .100 .000 3.430 .267 
DT .102 103.21 .132 .000 117.78 .132 
WCAC -.133 .002 .958 -.000 .002 .953 
RSST -.025 .320 .258 -.000 .281 .233 
CHAR -.025 .314 .299 -.000 .327 .313 
CHINV -.011 .613 .432 -.000 .479 .401 
SFAST .017 2.162 .186 .000 2.308 .167 
ABCFO -.044 .135 .141 -.000 .032** .043 
ABPROD -.132 .002 .963 -.000 .000 .986 
ABDISX -.012 .585 .614 -.000 .405 .680 
CHROA .043 7.020 .258 .000 8.154 .263 
BM -.000 .985 .538 -.000 .985 .539 
PE .004 1.180 .133 .000 1.172 .143 
DISTRESS -.000 .990 .594 -.000 .992 .425 
CHFCF .008 1.427 .586 -.000 .811 .545 
FINR -.070 .041** .032 -.000 .054* .056 
AI -.002 .893 .395 -.000 .895 .398 
SDW .001 1.033* .069 .000 1.033* .073 
BDSIZE -.006 .758** .011 -.000 .759** .011 
BDMEET -.003 .859 .175 -.000 .855 .165 
ACSIZE .010 1.574* .082 .000 1.524 .108 
ACMEET .002 1.103 .470 .000 1.119 .415 
FEM -.004 .822 .984 -.000 .834 .819 
LEV .063 17.916** .023 .000 18.933** .022 
LNTA .008 1.414** .011 .000 1.423** .011 
LNAGE -.002 .900 .312 -.000 .902 .314 
DAMJ*ABCFO    .000 34636.8** .041 
DAMJ*ABPROD    .001 1.87e+09 .133 
DAMJ*ABDISX    .000 22.836 .415 
FINR*CHROA    -.000 .000 .351 
CEOF*BI    .000 4.977 .311 
CHFCF*PC    .000 7.778 .287 
Industry dummies   Included   Included 
Year dummies   Included   Included 
Observations   2,896   2,896 
LR Chi
2
   115.73   120.09 
p-value   .041   .056 
Deg. of freedom   91   97 
Notes: Table 6-3 presents comparative results between the original logit model and a new logit model that include interaction 
effects, measured on the pooled sample of the Malaysian forced restatement firms. The dependent variable is a dichotomous 
variable of the forced restatement event. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly. 
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Overall, consistent with the original logit model, the new logit model with interaction effect 
demonstrates that forced restatement firms have low board independence and lower level 
of internal funds. Besides having high political connection, forced restatement firms also 
experience from a share price volatility. The interaction effect logit model however shows 
contradicting results related to the earnings management variables. On the one hand, the 
discretionary accruals measured by the Modified Jones Model (DAMJ) are no more 
significant. On the other hand, the previously insignificant abnormal cash flow from 
operations (ABCFO) currently shows a significant negative relationship with the likelihood 
of forced restatement. The result shows that a one standard deviation decrease in ABCFO 
increases the odds of forced restatement by 31.25 times. The interaction effect between 
DAMJ and ABCFO further shows significance and is positively related to the occurrence of 
forced restatement which supports H5. In economic terms, the increase of one standard 
deviation in the interaction effect between DAMJ and ABCFO increases the odds of forced 
restatement by 34,637 times. While the relationship is very strong, the impact is however 
very weak, with marginal effect approaching zero.  
The result implies that forced restatement firms engage in both accruals-based and real 
earnings management in preparing their financial reports. Forced restatement firms seem 
to put more emphasis on managing real activities to improve short term earnings 
performance. The direct impact of managing real activities such as discounting prices and 
granting lenient credit terms may effectively reduce cash flow (as can be seen from the 
decreasing firm’s internal fund - FINR), but it helps accelerate firm’s sales and profit in the 
short term.  
Control variables such as board size, leverage, and firm size maintain the same sign and 
significance under the new logit model except for audit committee size which is no more 
significant. In comparing model fitness, the new logit model that include interaction effects 
demonstrates slightly higher goodness of fit but at a lower significance; i.e. X2 = 120.09 (p < 
0.10) relative to the original model; X2 = 115.73 (p < 0.05). Not much improvement can be 
seen in the overall performance of the new logit model. Results show that both logit 
models are significant and are seen to demonstrate a relatively good performance in 
predicting the likelihood of forced restatement.  
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6.3.2.3 Sensitivity analysis using the stepwise and penalised likelihood logit model  
Following the analysis of the full multivariate logit model in section 6.3.1, this section 
examines the stepwise logit regression to determine which explanatory variables best 
predict forced restatement. The procedure for the stepwise binary logit regression was 
explained earlier in Section 5.2.7.2 of Chapter 5. The stepwise logit model was chosen as it 
might be very useful in identifying a useful subset of determinants out of the numerous 
numbers of variables for determining the likelihood of forced restatement. The stepwise 
procedure brings in and removes variables that meet the entry and removal criteria, and 
stops to the extent where a stable subset of variables is achieved.  
The result of the stepwise test is shown in Table 6-4. Note that, the number of observation 
in the original logit model was n=2,896. Comparatively, the number of observations in the 
stepwise logit model reduces to 2,434. The decline was due to the elimination of 462 firm-
years of industry dummies due to perfect collinearity between the dummies and the event 
of non-forced restatement (represented by the dichotomous dependent variable in the 
logit model). The overall result of the stepwise logit is fairly consistent with the result from 
the multivariate logit regression. Explanatory variables which include board independence 
(BI), political connection (PC), discretionary accruals (DAMJ), the level of internal fund 
(FINR) and share price volatility (SDW) retain the same sign and remain significant. The 
marginal effects for each significant variable in the stepwise model are fairly consistent 
with those of the original logit model.  
In terms of control variables, those variables that are significant in the multivariate logit 
model remain significant in the stepwise model. Variables including board size (BDSIZE), 
leverage (LEV) and firm size (LNTA) are significant and retain the same sign. It should be 
noted, however, that audit committee independence (ACSIZE) which was previously 
significant in the logit model, is no more significant in the stepwise model. Overall, the 
goodness of fit statistic of the stepwise model improved much higher with a likelihood ratio 
Chi2 of 1036.35 with 𝜌 < 0.01 (compared to the original logit likelihood ratio Chi2 of 115.73 
with 𝜌 < 0.05). This means that the model as a whole is significant  
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Table 6-4: Stepwise Logit Model versus Penalised Likelihood Logit Model in Examining the 
Determinants of Forced Restatement in Malaysia  
Variables 
Hypo-
thesis 
Pred 
sign 
Stepwise Logit 
Penalised Likelihood Logit 
   
Delta  
(marginal 
effect) 
Odds Ratio  (p-value) Odds Ratio  (p-value) 
BI H1 - -.064 .028***  (.008) .049**  (.013) 
PC H4 + .015 2.351**  (.014) 2.233**  (.013) 
DAMJ H5 + .040 9.277**  (.019) 7.833*  (.071) 
WCACW H5 + -.115 .002  (.996) .002  (.972) 
ABPROD H5 + -.079 .013  (.956) .018  (.934) 
FINRW H6 - -.061 .035***  (.006) .057**  (.016) 
SDW H7 + .000 1.027**  (.037) 1.030*  (.064) 
BDSIZE  +/- -.004 .795***  (.003) .802***  (.005) 
LEV  + .030 5.389*  (.071) 5.193*  (.085) 
LNTA  + .004 1.267**  (.020) 1.295**  (.020) 
Industry 
dummies 
  
 
Included  Included  
Year dummies    Included  Included  
Observations    2,434  2,915  
McFadden’s 
pseudo R
2
 
  
 
.089    
Model chi-
square 
  
 
1036.35***  61.03**  
p-value    .000  .023  
Degrees of 
freedom 
  
 
29  41  
Notes: Table 6-4 presents robustness test results from the stepwise logit and penalised likelihood logit regression 
model. The penalised likelihood model is compared to the stepwise logit model to test for robustness of the 
determinants of forced restatement in the Malaysian firm sample. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable 
of the forced restatement event. The independent variables are defined in 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 15% accordingly. 
by which the independent variables allow the model to provide prediction on the likelihood of 
forced restatement. 
The maximum likelihood estimates for logit regression models often suffer from biases or non-
existence problems due to multicollinearity or separation problems that stem from a huge 
number of highly correlated items (Shen and Gao, 2008). The same problems apply to our data 
since the industry dummies project high collinearity with the non-forced restatement event. 
The sample data produces a quasi-complete separation problem when some of the industry 
dummies are found to highly predict the outcome of non-forced restatement (note that some 
industries have more, some less or indeed no restatements). The conventional logit model 
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tends to eliminate these ‘problematic’ industries through the stepwise procedure, leading to a 
substantial reduction in the number of observation and degrees of freedom. 
Firth (1993) proposed the penalised likelihood estimator and it was discovered to reduce 
biases and the non-existence problems. The penalised likelihood method provides the benefit 
of producing finite, consistent parameter estimate especially when the maximum log likelihood 
estimates do not exist caused by quasi-complete or complete separation. Heinze and Schemper 
(2002) suggest that when the datasets used in logistic models give rise to separation, the 
maximum likelihood estimation is often asymmetric (tend to infinity and inestimable), thus 
producing a model Chi2 and confidence intervals that are liable to inaccuracy. In cases of 
separation, the penalised method allows convergence to finite estimates.  Rather than omitting 
variables and refitting the reduced model, the variable coefficient is instead constrained to 
zero. The variable is retained in the model to ensure that it contributes to the penalisation. 
Firth’s penalised likelihood approach assures the existence of estimates by removing the first 
order bias at each step of iteration. The penalised likelihood method is not only feasible in 
extreme condition with small sample size and very few events (dependent variable equals one)  
(Heinze and Schemper, 2002; Leitgob, 2013; Flynn et al., 2013), it is nonetheless 
computationally feasible for large samples. 
In addition to the stepwise model, this section examines the penalised likelihood logit for 
robustness test. Findings from the penalised likelihood logit show support for H1, H4, H5, H6, 
and H7, thus confirming the robustness of the stepwise results. Overall, the results obtained 
from the penalised likelihood logit demonstrate that forced restatement firms typically have 
low board independence which hinders from an effective monitoring, hence the likelihood of 
forced restatement. Forced restatement firms are found to have high political connection and 
at the same time are closer to exhausting its internal fund, both of which factors increases the 
tendency for them to be issued with forced restatement. Managers of forced restatement 
firms are also found to be adopting aggressive accounting practices to manage earnings 
opportunistically. Forced restatement firms also face from volatility in their share price which 
prompts market awareness of the firm’s high risk, which triggers the likelihood of forced 
restatement. 
The overall goodness of fit statistic of the penalised likelihood logit model however reduces 
where X2 (2915) = 61.03, df = 41, p < 0.05 (compared to the stepwise logit model’s; X2 (2434) = 
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1036.35, df = 29, p < 0.000). Although the model fitness reduces, the penalised likelihood logit 
still shows that the prediction model as a whole is significant. The robustness test reveals that 
there is evidence that the model can perform well in predicting the likelihood of forced 
restatement. In summary, the significant variables in the logit models may be used to provide 
some hint and provide considerable input for better planning in the future in order to cope 
with the catastrophic nature of the forced restatement rare event. 
6.3.3 Multivariate logit analysis on income-decreasing, income-increasing and zero-effect 
forced restatement  
In this section, another round of multivariate logit analysis is undertaken in examining the 
study’s second main objective which is to identify in particular whether the relationship 
between key accounting, financial and corporate governance variables and the likelihood of 
forced financial restatements differs. I run three different multivariate binary logit models in 
this section to examine specific attributes that relate significantly to the three types of forced 
restatement: (i) income-decreasing forced restatement; (ii) income-increasing forced 
restatement; and (iii) zero-effect forced restatement.  
The results for the logit regression are presented in Table 6-5, of which the findings for income 
decreasing forced restatements are firstly discussed. The logit results derived from the income-
decreasing forced restatement sample is fairly consistent with the logit results of the pooled 
sample. Firstly, board independence (BI) shows a negative association with the likelihood of 
income-decreasing forced restatement, significant at the ten percent level. In economic terms, 
a one standard deviation decrease in BI increases the odds of income-decreasing forced 
restatement by 71.43 (=1/0.014) times. While there is evidence of a strong relationship, 
however, the impact based on the marginal effect is very small. This can be seen where a one 
unit decrease in BI increases the probability of income decreasing forced restatement by three 
percentage point. The result implies that income decreasing forced restatement firms have a 
relatively small proportion of independent directors on the board which restrict their ability to 
discharge an effective monitoring on the managers, thus the increased likelihood for income 
decreasing forced restatement to take place. 
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Table 6-5: Multivariate Logit Regression Model Examining Determinants of Income Decreasing 
Restatement, Income Increasing Restatement and Zero Effect Restatement in Malaysia during 
2002-2012 
Variables Income Decreasing 
Restatement 
Income Increasing  
Restatement 
Zero Effect  
 Restatement 
 Delta 
probability 
Odds Ratio 
(p-value) 
Delta 
probability 
Odds Ratio 
(p-value) 
Delta 
probability 
Odds Ratio 
(p-value) 
BI 
-.029 
.014* 
(.056) 
-.001 
.386 
(.598) 
-.009 .006** 
(.046) 
FL 
-.004 
.590 
(.628) 
.002 
14.569 
(.875) 
-.004 
.102 
(.829) 
MULTI 
-.000 
.969 
(.519) 
-.001 
.444 
(.707) 
.001 
2.127 
(.733) 
ACIND -.005 
.484 
(.336) 
-.000 
.649 
(.441) 
-.003 
.147 
(.290) 
ACEXP .005 
2.019 
(.242) 
-.001 
.432 
(.311) 
-.001 
.439 
(.268) 
AF -.438 
.000 
(.303) 
-.186 
.000 
(.239) 
-.222 
.000 
(.276) 
FM .001 
1.223 
(.307) 
-.000 
.946 
(.466) 
.001 
1.725 
(.189) 
FB -.013 
.158 
(.119) 
.002 
.998 
(.333) 
.002 
3.086 
(.281) 
CEOF .004 
1.73 
(.167) 
-.001 
.148 
(.213) 
-.002 
.344 
(.121) 
CEON -.009 
.292 
(.116) 
-.000 
.751 
(.311) 
-.002 
.250 
(.981) 
CEOB -.001 
.907 
(.441) 
-.000 
.588 
(.275) 
.002 
2.893 
(.158) 
INST -.000 
.987 
(.186) 
-.000 
.981 
(.929) 
.000 
1.007 
(.314) 
PC .010 
4.459*** 
(.007) 
-.001 
.294 
(.929) 
.003 
6.639*** 
(.010) 
DAMJ .014 
8.062 
(.229) 
.004 
135.652*** 
(.001) 
.014 
2241.836** 
(.033) 
DT -.005 
.4989 
(.455) 
.013 
.000*** 
(.009) 
.015 
6188.748 
(.213) 
WCAC -.036 
.005 
(.121) 
-.013 
.000*** 
(.010) 
-.021 
.000 
(.123) 
RSST .009 
3.700 
(.224) 
-.004 
.005 
(.131) 
-.023 
.000 
(.987) 
CHAR -.016 
.104 
(.154) 
-.002 
.091 
(.193) 
.011 
460.682* 
(.071) 
CHINV -.030 
.013 
(.939) 
-.000 
.515 
(.456) 
-.012 
.001 
(.306) 
SFAST .006 
2.477 
(.164) 
-.001 
.492 
(.347) 
.001 
1.569 
(.744) 
ABCFO .001 
1.179 
(.528) 
.001 
2.995 
(.644) 
.009 
129.865 
(.970) 
ABPROD -.004 
.560 
(.442) 
-.007 
.000 
(.135) 
-.034 
.000 
(.985) 
ABDISX .013 
6.830 
(.763) 
-.007 
.000** 
(.039) 
.001 
2.071 
(.905) 
CHROA .001 
1.217 
(.477) 
.004 
319.846* 
(.088) 
-.006 
.038 
(.254) 
BM .000 
1.053 
(.620) 
.000 
1.042 
(.555) 
-.000 
.957 
(.593) 
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PE .000 
1.029 
(.436) 
.000 
1.023 
(.468) 
.000 
1.020 
(.478) 
DISTRESS -.000 
.999 
(.511) 
-.000 
.882 
(.407) 
-.000 
.864 
(.129) 
CHFCF -.006 
.410 
(.621) 
-.005 
.001** 
(.022) 
.008 
102.536 
(.989) 
FINR -.050 
.001** 
(.049) 
-.002 
.083 
(.848) 
-.007 
.016* 
(.058) 
AI -.006 
.443 
(.930) 
.000 
1.500 
(.298) 
-.000 
.849 
(.416) 
SDW .000 
1.037** 
(.037) 
-.000 
.952 
(.108) 
-.000 
.978 
(.319) 
BDSIZE -.001 
.876 
(.284) 
-.000 
.634 
(.185) 
-.001 
.702 
(.202) 
BDMEET -.001 
.925 
(.556) 
-.000 
.949 
(.854) 
-.000 
.875 
(.735) 
ACSIZE .001 
1.136 
(.757) 
.000 
1.036 
(.963) 
-.000 
.817 
(.706) 
ACMEET .001 
1.102 
(.589) 
-.000 
.944 
(.855) 
-.001 
.506 
(.317) 
FEM -.001 
.919 
(.655) 
-.000 
.736 
(.816) 
-.000 
.768 
(.728) 
LEV .002 
1.303 
(.457) 
 
.004 
137.034* 
(.056) 
.004 
8.472 
(.246) 
LNTA .002 
1.268 
(.131) 
.001 
3.872*** 
(.000) 
.000 
1.298 
(.241) 
LNAGE .001 
1.082 
(.385) 
-.000 
.539 
(.933) 
-.001 
.571 
(.104) 
Industry 
dummies 
 Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Year dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Observations  2,149
29
  1,330
30
  828
31
 
Model chi-square  435.22  524.77  196.71 
p-value  .0000  .0000  .0000 
Degrees of 
freedom 
 62 
 
56 
 
52 
Notes: Table 6-5 presents results from the logit regression model examining the determinants of income decreasing 
restatement, income increasing restatement and zero effect restatement among the Malaysian firm sample. The 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the forced restatement event. The independent variables are 
defined in Seection 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly. 
                                                          
29 The initial number of firm-year observations for the income-decreasing forced restatement sample is n=4,698. 
1,830 observations with incomputable discretionary accruals were dropped. The inability to calculate discretionary 
accruals arises as each estimation model pools across firms over time within each two-digit SIC coded industry. The 
logit regression further dropped 719 firm-years of industry dummies which have perfect collinearity with the event 
of non-forced restatement. The income-decreasing forced restatement logit model is left with a net total of 2,149 
firm-years observations.  
30
 The initial number of firm-year observations for the income-increasing forced restatement sample is n=4,680. 
1,834 observations with incomputable discretionary accruals were dropped. The logit regression further dropped 
1,516 firm-years of industry dummies which have perfect collinearity with the event of non-forced restatement. The 
income-increasing forced restatement logit model is left with a net total of 1,330 firm-years observations. 
31
 The initial number of firm-year observations for the zero-effect forced restatement sample is n=4,658. 1,813 
observations with incomputable discretionary accruals were dropped. The logit regression further dropped 2,017 
firm-years of industry dummies which have perfect collinearity with the event of non-forced restatement. The zero-
effect forced restatement logit model is left with a net total of 828 firm-years observations. 
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Firms’ political connection further shows a positive association with the likelihood of income 
decreasing forced restatement, statistically significant at the one percent level. The odds of 
income decreasing forced restatement increases by 4.46 times with a change of political 
connection from zero to one. The marginal effect shows that the presence of political 
connection increases the probability of income decreasing forced restatement by only one 
percentage point. The result is in line with prior studies in Malaysia that show politically 
connected firms are operationally inefficient and have higher risk of financial misstatement 
(Hasnan et al., 2013; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). 
Firms that are near to exhausting their internal funds are also susceptible to income decreasing 
forced restatement. Specifically, firm’s level of internal fund (FINR) is negatively and 
significantly associated to the likelihood of income decreasing forced restatement. The 
relationship is high whereby a one standard deviation decrease in FINR increases the odds of 
income decreasing forced restatement by approximately 1,000 times. However, the impact is 
relatively low where a one unit decrease in FINR increases the probability of income decreasing 
forced restatement by five percentage points. The result is in line with Dechow et al. (2011) 
where a decrease in firm’s internal funds (thereby increasing firm’s financing need) increases 
the risk of forced restatement. 
Share price volatility (SDW) further shows a significant result. It is shown that SDW is positively 
related to the likelihood of income decreasing forced restatement, significant at the five 
percent level. Economically, a one standard deviation increase in SDW increases the odds of 
income decreasing forced restatement by 1.04 times. However, the marginal effect hardly 
shows any impact such that a one unit increase in SDW causes nearly zero impact on the 
likelihood of income decreasing forced restatement. The result however indicates that share 
price volatility creates alert among regulators and related authorities of firms’ ongoing 
problems, prompting them for more intense monitoring which triggers the likelihood of an 
income decreasing forced restatement.  
In summary, the goodness of fit statistic in Table 6-5 shows log likelihood Chi2 (X2 (2149) = 
435.22, df = 62, p < 0.000) indicating that the model as a whole is significant. It indicates that 
the independent variables allow the model to provide a prediction on income decreasing 
forced restatement.  
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Overall, results show that board independence, political connection, firm’s internal funds level 
and share price volatility demonstrate a significant association with the occurrence of income 
decreasing forced restatement event. None of the variables for audit committee quality, family 
ownership and control, and firm performance show any significance. The discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management variables also show no significant association, implying that 
income decreasing forced restatement firms do not engage in opportunistic income-inflating 
recognition prior to forced restatement. However, there is the possibility that forced 
restatement firms are susceptible to reporting material accounting error due to low monitoring 
by the board and low operational inefficiency from having political connection. The possibility 
of implementing new changes in firm’s own accounting policy might also have led to the 
occurrence of income-decreasing forced restatement.  
The result for the income increasing restatement firms follows. Table 6-5 shows insignificant 
results for board quality, audit committee quality and even family ownership and control. 
However, there is evidence to indicate that income increasing forced restatement firms are 
involved in practices of earnings management. It was found that the discretionary accruals 
(DAMJ) are significantly and positively related to income increasing forced restatement at the 
one percent significance level. A one standard deviation increase in DAMJ increases the odds of 
income increasing forced restatement by 135.65 times. Based on the marginal effect, the 
impact is seen to be quite low where a one unit increase in DAMJ increases the probability of 
income increasing forced restatement by 0.4 percentage point. It indicates that income 
increasing restatement firms have been managing earnings possibly to report income 
decreases in prior periods.  
The income-decreasing earnings management practices are further supported by the 
significant deferred tax expense (DT) variable, whereby a negative association is recorded, 
significant at the one percent level. In economic terms, a decrease of one standard deviation in 
DT increases the odds of income increasing forced restatement by a large amount as indicated 
by the odds ratio that is approaching to zero. The marginal effect indicates that a one unit 
decrease in deferred tax expenses increases the probability of income increasing forced 
restatement by 1.3 percentage point.  The negative association implies a low deferred tax 
expenses among income increasing forced restatement firms which arises due to the 
decreasing earnings being reported during the misstatement period.  
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The variable change in working capital (WCAC) also shows significance in support of the 
significant discretionary accruals (DAMJ). WCAC demonstrates a significant negative 
relationship with the event of income increasing forced restatement. This is based on the fact 
that in line with the aim to report income decreases during the misstatement period, income 
increasing forced restatement firms tend to report less working capital in such a way that it will 
depress earnings downwards. Based on economic significance, the odds ratio is reported to be 
approaching to zero signifying the strong relationship with the odds of income increasing 
forced restatement with every change in the standard deviation of WCAC. The impact however 
is quite low where a one unit decrease in WCAC increases the likelihood of income increasing 
forced restatement by 1.3 percentage point. 
Income-increasing forced restatement firms were also found to have low abnormal 
discretionary expenses (ABDISX). This can be seen from the negative sign that ABDISX has, 
significant at the five percent significance level. The low abnormal discretionary expenses 
would mean that firms are cutting down discretionary expenses, e.g. in research and 
development and advertising, which reduce earnings in the long-term. In economic terms, a 
one standard deviation decrease in ABDISX affect the odds of income increasing forced 
restatement by a large increase due to the odds ratio that approaches to zero. The marginal 
effect is however quite low implying that a one unit decrease in ABDISX increases income 
increasing forced restatement by 0.7 percentage point.  
The variable change in earnings (CHROA) is also reported as being significant.  CHROA reported 
a positive and significant association with the likelihood of income increasing forced 
restatement (p < 0.10). There is a relatively strong relationship such that a one standard 
deviation increase in CHROA increases the odds of forced restatement by 319.85 times. 
However, a low impact is demonstrated such that a one unit increase in WCAC increases the 
likelihood of income increasing forced restatement by only 0.4 percentage points. The result 
indicates that income-increasing forced restatement firms are typically growth firms. The fact 
that the firm have good growth in earnings might be the reason why firms tend to manage a 
decrease in earnings, possibly to reduce tax payable (as shown by the significant deferred tax 
expense variable – DT) or to reduce political cost.  
In the perspective of the demand for external financing, forced restatement firms tend to have 
a decreasing change in free cash flow (CHFCF). Result shows that a one standard deviation 
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decrease in CHFCF increases the odds of income increasing forced restatement by 
approximately 1,000 times. In terms of marginal effect, a one unit decrease in CHFCF increases 
the probability of income increasing forced restatement by 0.5 percentage point. It can be seen 
that income-increasing forced restatement firms suffer from a decreased change in free cash 
flow which reduces their internal capital base, hence the low abnormal discretionary expenses 
(ABDISX) incurred by the firms, as explained earlier. With a reducing level of free cash flow, 
firm’s internal capital base becomes more restricted, which limit their ability to invest hence 
increasing the likelihood of income increasing forced restatement. 
Two control variables, leverage (LEV) and firm size (LNTA) are found to be significant. 
Specifically, LEV is positively and significantly associated with the event of income increasing 
forced restatement (p < 0.10). A one standard deviation increase in LEV increases the odds of 
income increasing forced restatement by 137.03 times. The impact is where a one unit increase 
in LEV increases the likelihood of income increasing forced restatement by 0.4 percentage 
point. As for firm size, LNTA has a positive association with the event of income increasing 
forced restatement, significant at the one percent level. The increase in one standard deviation 
of LNTA increases the odds of income increasing forced restatement by 3.87 times. In terms of 
its impact, the marginal effect shows that a one unit increase in LNTA increases the probability 
of income increasing forced restatement by 0.1 percentage point.  
The logit model of the income increasing forced restatement shows a goodness of fit statistic 
with a likelihood ratio Chi2; X2 (1,330) = 524.77, df = 56, 𝜌 < 0.000. The overall goodness of fit 
improves in comparison to the income-decreasing forced restatement logit model’s (X2 (2149) 
= 435.22, df = 62, p < 0.000). The logit model as a whole is significant by which the independent 
variables allow the model to provide prediction on the likelihood of income increasing forced 
restatement. In summary, the income increasing forced restatement logit model shows 
significance for variables comprising discretionary accruals (DAMJ), deferred tax expenses (DT), 
change in working capital (WCAC), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISX), change in 
earnings (CHROA) and change in free cash flow (CHFCF). Results indicate that income-
increasing forced restatement firms engaged in opportunistic earnings management in their 
financial reporting.  With a negative change in working capital accruals and low abnormal 
discretionary expenses, there is evidence that firms manage earnings to report income 
decreases during the misstatement period. There is also evidence that the income-decreasing 
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accruals management was made possibly to reduce tax payable. Although income-increasing 
forced restatement firms are mainly growth firms, they however suffer from a decline in free 
cash flows which restrict their internal capital base, leaving the firms susceptible to the risk of 
income-increasing forced restatement.    
Finally, results of the zero-effect forced restatement firms are discussed. It is noted that zero-
effect forced restatement firms have low board independence (BI). BI has a negative 
association with the likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement, significant at the five percent 
level. A one standard deviation decrease in board independence increases the odds of zero-
effect forced restatement by 167 (=1/0.006) times. The delta method however shows a low 
impact, whereby a one unit decrease in board independence increases the likelihood of zero-
effect forced restatement by 0.9 percentage point. Overall, an effective monitoring is restricted 
due to the low proportion of independent directors on firm’s board which gives rise to the 
likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement. 
Zero-effect forced restatement firms were also found to be firms that have political 
connection. This can be seen from the positive and significant association that political 
connection (PC) has with the likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement (p < 0.01). The 
change of PC from zero to one increases the odds of zero-effect forced restatement by 6.64 
times. The marginal effect however shows that the change in PC increases the likelihood of 
zero-effect forced restatement by 0.3 percentage point. There is evidence to show that 
politically-connected firms are operationally inefficient such that they are prone to be issued 
with zero-effect forced restatement. 
Similar to the income increasing forced restatement firms, the zero-effect forced restatement 
firms are also found to be adopting opportunistic earnings management in their financial 
reporting. This is shown from the discretionary accruals variable (DAMJ) which has a positive 
association with the likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement, significant at the five percent 
level. A one standard deviation increase in DAMJ increases the odds of zero-effect forced 
restatement by 2241.84 times, whereby the impact is relatively low as a one unit increase in 
DAMJ increases the probability of zero-effect forced restatement by 1.4 percentage point. The 
current accruals, CHAR, that measures the change in accounts receivables further support 
firms’ adoption of opportunistic accounting practices. CHAR is positively related to the 
likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement, significant at the ten percent level. A one 
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standard deviation increase in CHAR increases the odds of zero-effect forced restatement by 
460.68 times. The impact is where a one unit increase in CHAR increases the likelihood of zero-
effect forced restatement by 1.1 percentage point. There is an indication that zero-effect 
forced restatement firms report an increase in CHAR possibly to opportunistically manage 
earnings during the misstatement period. 
In terms of financing needs, the variable for firm’s internal fund (FINR) shows significance. 
Based on the result in Table 6-5, a one standard deviation decrease in FINR increases the odds 
of zero-effect forced restatement by 62.5 (=1/0.016) times. The marginal effect of the delta 
method shows that a one unit decrease in FINR increases the probability of zero-effect forced 
restatement by 0.7 percentage point. Based on the result, there is an indication that zero-
effect forced restatement firms are near to exhausting their internal funds, which increases the 
likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement.  
The logit model on the zero-effect forced restatement sample shows a goodness of fit statistic 
with a likelihood ratio Chi2 of (X2 (828) = 196.71, df = 52, p < 0.000). The model displays a 
relatively weak goodness of fit in comparison to the income-decreasing forced restatement 
logit model (X2 (2149) = 435.22, df = 62, p < 0.000) and the income-increasing forced 
restatement logit model (X2 (1330) = 524.77, df = 56, p < 0.000). The zero-effect forced 
restatement logit model is, however, significant by which the independent variables allow the 
model to provide prediction on zero effect forced restatement. 
Overall, there is evidence that zero-effect forced restatement firms have a low board 
independence which impedes from an effective monitoring to be carried out. With poor 
monitoring, the firms are found to be involved in opportunistic accounting practices, such that 
there is evidence of earnings management, as supported by the significant discretionary 
accruals and increasing change of accounts receivables variables. The fact that firms have 
political connection further supports the contention that managers are inclined to mask 
information that relates to assets expropriation made on the basis of political interest. The 
zero-effect forced restatement firms further suffer from a decreased in their free cash flow, 
which reduce their internal funds, thus increases the risk of financial misstatement, hence 
forced restatement.  
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6.3.4 Stepwise and penalized likelihood logit model on income-decreasing forced 
restatement    sample  
Results of the logit model presented in the previous Table 6-5 show the different key 
determinants of the three types of forced restatement. In contrast to the findings that show 
income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatement firms were engaged in aggressive 
accounting practices during the misstatement period, the income-decreasing forced 
restatement firms, however, show no evidence of opportunistic accounts manipulation. 
Despite the fact that income-decreasing forced restatement firms are free from manipulation 
acts; the possibility remains that the firms might have reported material income-increasing 
accounting errors during the periods prior to forced restatement. Unintentional earnings 
misstatement due to error is an accounting irregularity (please refer section 3.5 in Chapter 3 
for definition on forced restatement) which lead to forced restatement due to GAAP violation 
in the preparation of financial report.   
In relation to this matter, this section presents further data analysis specifically on the income-
decreasing forced restatement sample due to its catastrophic nature. The income-increasing 
and zero-effect forced restatement sample is not examined as they are unlikely to be as 
disastrous. The results of the income-decreasing forced restatement multivariate logit model 
are compared to the stepwise logit and penalised likelihood logit model for robustness test. 
Results comparison is shown in Table 6-6.  
Figures presented in Table 6-6 show that the results of the income-decreasing forced 
restatement sample using the stepwise logit model are fairly consistent with those of the 
multivariate logit model. Explanatory variables including board independence (BI), political 
connection (PC), firm’s level of internal fund (FINR) and share price volatility (SDW) retain the 
same sign and remain significant. The marginal effects of the stepwise model further show 
consistency with the original logit model. The model’s goodness of fit for the stepwise model 
shows further improvement at a log-likelihood Chi2 of 700.38 (p < 0.000) compared to the 
original logit model with a log-likelihood Chi2 of 435.22 (p < 0.000). The betterment of the 
model’s goodness of fit implies the model’s improved predictive ability and that information 
about BI, PC, FINR and SDW allow the model to provide a prediction on income-decreasing 
forced restatement. 
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Table 6-6: Stepwise Logit Model versus Penalised Likelihood Logit Model in Examining the 
Determinants of Forced Restatement in Malaysia  
Variables  Income-decreasing 
 forced restatement 
 Delta  
(marginal 
effect) 
Stepwise Logit Penalised Likelihood Logit 
  Odds ratio p-value Odds ratio p-value 
BI -.030 .027* .061 .136* .075 
PC .009 2.788** .011 2.280*** .008 
CHINV -.030 .027 .940 .177 .862 
AI -.008 .390 .986 .524 .989 
FINR -.064 .001*** .006 .083*** .032 
SDW .000 1.030** .034 1.030* .056 
Industry dummies  Included  Included  
Year dummies  Included  Included  
Observations  2,181
32
  4,137  
Model chi-square  700.38***  20.06  
p-value  .000  .003  
Degrees of freedom  21  69  
Notes: Table 6-6 presents robustness test results from the stepwise logit and penalised likelihood logit regression 
model. Each penalised likelihood model is compared to the stepwise logit model to test for robustness of the 
determinants of income-decreasing forced restatement firms. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of 
the forced restatement event. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 15% accordingly. 
The results of stepwise logit model are compared to the penalised likelihood logit model for 
robustness test. The overall result remains consistent, however, the goodness of fit statistic of 
the penalised likelihood logit model reduces; i.e. X2 = 20.06 (p < 0.001). Although the model 
fitness reduces, the penalised likelihood logit still shows that the prediction model as a whole is 
significant. The robustness test reveals that there is evidence that the model can provide a 
prediction on the likelihood of forced restatement. Note that the number of observations 
under the penalised likelihood logit model is higher; where n=4,137 compared to  n=2,181 
under the stepwise model. As discussed earlier, the penalised likelihood logit model overcomes 
the separation problem by allowing convergence to finite estimates. Rather than omitting 
variables and refitting the model, the variable coefficient is instead constrained to zero. The 
variable is essentially retained in the model to ensure that it contributes to the penalisation. 
In summary, results of the robustness test using the stepwise and penalised likelihood logit 
model indicate that factors including board independence, politcial connection, firm’s level of 
internal fund and share price volatility are all key determinants of the likelihood of income-
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decreasing forced restatement. There may be no evidence of opportunistic accounting 
practices, however, there is the possibility that income-decreasing forced restatement firms 
are susceptible to reporting material income-increasing accounting error. The impact of an 
income-decreasing forced restatement can be catastrophic because it may impose extremely 
high cost to auditors (potential lawsuits), regulators (loss of reputation) and investors (suffer 
from negative stock returns). 
6.4 Summary 
The current chapter mainly presents data analysis on the determinants of the likelihood of 
forced restatement in Malaysia. A multivariate logit regression was firstly tested on the pooled 
sample. Results show evidence of opportunistic earnings management among forced 
restatement firms, possibly to portray good earnings performance. Other factors such as low 
board independence, firm’s political connection, low level of firm’s internal fund and share 
price volatility were found to increase the likelihood of forced restatement. The stepwise logit 
and penalized likelihood logit models provide robustness and confirms the predictive ability of 
the logit model.    
Sensitivity analyses were also carried out to examine the robustness of the logit regression 
results to some alternate specifications of the explanatory variables. Except for some minor 
changes in the results, the parameter estimates are generally not sensitive to the changes in 
the estimation of the predictor variables. 
The chapter proceeds with examining specific attributes that relate significantly to income-
decreasing, income-increasing, and zero-effect forced restatement. Comparatively, results 
show that only income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatement firms appear to be 
aggressive and opportunistic in producing their financial report. There is no evidence to show 
that income-decreasing forced restatement firms engaged in earnings management during the 
misstatement period. The possibility remains that these firms might have reported material 
income-increasing accounting errors that have led to the occurrence of income decreasing 
forced restatement. Factors including low board independence, having political connection, 
low internal fund and share price volatility are also the key determinants that can signal 
towards the likelihood of income decreasing forced restatement. 
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Additional tests were conducted specifically on the income-decreasing forced restatement 
sample due to its catastrophic nature. The income-increasing or zero-effect forced 
restatements were not examined as they are unlikely to be as disastrous. Findings from the 
robustness tests of the stepwise and penalized likelihood model further validate the claim that 
the logit model provides relatively good predictive ability and that the explanatory variables 
allow the model to provide prediction on the likelihood of income decreasing forced 
restatement. 
The data analysis presented in this chapter is useful as it provides warning signals or red flags 
of forced restatement. The attributes of the different types of forced restatement firms are 
also discovered. In support of a more reliable forced restatement prediction, the next chapter 
will develop and test an exploratory prediction model that can signal potential for income 
decreasing forced financial restatement among public listed firms in Malaysia. 
201 
 
CHAPTER 7  
PREDICTION OF FORCED RESTATEMENT  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the two secondary objectives of the study which are; (i) to develop an 
exploratory prediction model based on the key accounting financial determinants and 
corporate governance determinants that drive income-decreasing forced financial restatement 
among the public listed firms in Malaysia; and (ii) to test whether the exploratory prediction 
model can signal potential for income decreasing forced financial restatement among public 
listed firms in Malaysia. This chapter specifically focuses on examining the quality of the model 
in predicting the likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement due to its catastrophic 
nature.  
The following Section 7.2 defines rare event and explores the various reasons that give rise to 
the low degree of rare event predictability. Section 7.3 presents data analyses on the predictive 
ability of the income decreasing forced restatement model. The model’s prediction 
performance based on a holdout sample is further discussed in Section 7.4. Finally, Section 7.5 
concludes the chapter. 
7.2  Rare events and its predictability 
Consistent with González-Rivera (2014), this study defines rare events as occurrences which 
happen rarely and which have catastrophic consequences. Cases of financial restatements due 
to earnings misstatement and financial irregularities are such rare events (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Files et al., 2014; Hennes et al., 2014) as they occur infrequently (Dechow et al., 2011; 
Dimmock and Gerken, 2012; Hribar et al., 2014). Their impact can be catastrophic because they 
may impose extremely high cost to investors, auditors and regulators and in extreme cases, 
they lead not only to the bankruptcy of individual firms but affect the performance and 
liquidity of the whole capital market (Dechow et al., 2011), as evidenced in cases such as Enron 
or Lehman Brothers.  
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The degree of predictability of rare event may be very low. According to Makridakis et al. 
(2009), prediction in the business and economic world is almost impossible due to great 
uncertainty of events associated with all business and economic activities. Makridakis et al. 
(2009) further argue that the possible inaccuracy of prediction imposes huge dilemma for both 
decision and policy makers. On one hand, admitting to the limits of prediction accuracy may 
imply towards the inability to assess decision accuracy and surrounding uncertainty. On the 
other hand, accepting the possibility of accurate prediction would mean being surrender to 
experiencing surprises and illusion of control, which often ends with destructive consequences.  
Goodwin and Wright (2010) highlight several reasons why rare events are very hard to predict. 
Firstly, when the data has a large set of similar events (large reference class), there will be 
greater predictability as the relative frequency information can be extracted. Large reference 
class is associated with large sample sizes, thus allowing a highly reliable evaluation of the 
underlying probability distribution. Judgmental biases can also be prevented as large reference 
class is examinable with statistical analysis in the process of its estimation task. In contrast to a 
rare event, such as the occurrence of financial fraud or financial crisis, it would be harder to 
establish its relative-frequency-based probabilities, hence its high unpredictability.  
Secondly, a forecasting model can be a simplification of the real system and may not capture 
the multiple interactions between the different unique elements within the systems. This is 
likely to be applicable in models of economy, human body or weather systems (Orrell and 
McSharry, 2009). Minor changes in any part of the system may produce amplifying effect via 
the complex interaction. This could cause the forecast model to underestimate the true range 
of uncertainty leading to estimation of probabilities that are poorly calibrated.  
Thirdly, causal relationship between variables forms the basic assumption of most forecasting 
models. Nonetheless, the coherent theory of causality, although concurred by many experts in 
the respective field, does not establish the existence of causality. Correlations may result from 
unknown third factor (spurious) or may be illusory (Hamilton and Rose, 1980) especially when 
it involves human judgment, or they may only be applicable in certain conditions relevant to 
the particular reference data. Still, the fallacy that high correlation indicates causation can be a 
strong influence towards one’s reasoning. 
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Finally, human judgment is frequently employed to assess the probabilities of a rare event 
occurring especially when there are inadequate event cases within the reference class for 
statistical estimation. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) contend that people use heuristics or 
simple mental strategies to deal with the complexity of probabilities estimation. Heuristic can 
at times produce good estimations, however it can also results in systematically biased 
judgements. 
In the context of our study, although the rare event of financial misstatements might have low 
predictability, the attempt to develop a detection tool that can signal symptoms of forced 
restatement remain crucial so that at least red flags or warning signs of misstatement firms are 
brought to the knowledge of interested parties at an earlier stage. Misstating firms that 
warrant investigation can then be more easily identified. The degree of predictability may be 
relatively low; however, the ongoing attempt to develop a restatement prediction model may 
allow gradual improvement to be made upon the weaknesses of prior prediction models. In 
this way, the accuracy of future prediction of misstating firms can then be enhanced.  
7.3  Predictive ability analysis 
This section analyses the overall classification accuracy to determine how well the model 
performs in predicting the likelihood of a firm issuing an income-decreasing forced 
restatement. Essentially, the predictive ability of the penalised likelihood logit of the income-
decreasing forced restatement model (as presented in Section 6.3.4 of Chapter 6) will be 
tested.  
The penalised likelihood logit model is used over the traditional logit model due to its 
robustness. As highlighted earlier in Section 5.2.7.3 of Chapter 5, the penalised likelihood 
model overcomes the limitation of the maximum likelihood estimation of the traditional logit 
model which overestimates the coefficient of explanatory variables while underestimating the 
probability of an event, especially in samples with rare event, thus producing biased results. 
The penalised likelihood model specifically includes a penalty function that penalises against 
the size of estimated coefficients and model complexity. Hence, the penalised likelihood logit is 
considered more reliable as it produces less biased results, especially in samples with small 
data properties.  
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The variables included in the income-decreasing forced restatement predictive model are 
based on those chosen in the stepwise logit model. The stepwise procedure brings in and 
removes variables that meet the entry and removal criteria and stops to the extent where a 
stable subset of predictor variables is achieved. In effect, the selection of a useful subset of 
determinants by the stepwise logit model helps to overcome the limitation of attenuation 
biases that arises from having multiple proxies in the logit model (this was previously discussed 
in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5).  
Based on the stepwise selection and elimination process, several variables were included in the 
model comprising board quality (proxied by board independence - BI), firm’s political 
connection (PC), the demand for external finance (as proxied by firm’s level of internal fund – 
FINR) and share price volatility (SDW). The variables maintained in the stepwise model are 
relatively consistent with the significant variables in the traditional multivariate logit model 
(please refer to Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 6) used to signal the likelihood of income-decreasing 
forced restatement. In producing an optimum model that well fits the data, change in 
inventories (CHINV) and actual issuance (AI) are also selected and included in the stepwise 
model.  
Consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 6 and of previous studies (e.g. Peasnel et al., 
2005, Zhang, 2010, Dechow et al., 2011), all variables included in the model are standard 
variables that have an impact on earnings misstatement and forced restatement. An exception 
applies to the political connection (PC) variable as it is specific to the Malaysian context. As 
explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 
1970 has given rise to the existence of informal ties between a leading politician or political 
party and the Malaysian corporations (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). Due to the close relationship 
with the government, firms tend to conceal any gains benefited from the political connection 
and expropriation activities, especially when it involves large benefits and of dubious legality 
(Fisman 2001). In such situation, managers might become engaged in earnings misstatement to 
mislead shareholders, thus increasing the tendency for forced restatement to occur. 
 Following Dechow et al. (2011), the predictive ability test is done by examining the predicted 
probabilities of each observation that were assigned by the penalised likelihood logit model. 
The predicted values are firstly calculated based on the estimated coefficient generated when 
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each firm’s individual attributes are plugged into the penalised likelihood logit model. The 
formula for the predicted probability is as follows: 
Probability = 
𝑒(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
1+ 𝑒(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
 
The predicted probability is then scaled by the unconditional probability of income-decreasing 
forced restatement to arrive at the F-score. The unconditional probability is equivalent to the 
number of income-decreasing forced restatement firms divided by the total number of firms. 
The following example shows how F-Score is calculated for KNM Group Berhad that issued 
income decreasing forced restatement in 2008: 
Predicted value = -3.360 + (-1.993) x (BI) + 0.824 x (PC) + (-1.732) x CHINV + (-0.646) x AI + (-
2.486) x (FINR) + 0.30 (SDW) 
Predicted value = -3.360 + (-1.993) x (0.3) + 0.824 x (1) + (-1.732) x (0.117) + (-0.646) x (1) + (-
2.486) x (0) + 0.30 (16.451) 
Predicted value = -3.489 
Probability = 
𝑒(−3.489)
1+ 𝑒(−3.489)
 
𝑒 = 2.71828183 
Probability = 0.0296 
Unconditional probability = 52 / (52 + 4085) = 0.01257 
F-score = 0.0296 ⁄ 0.01257 
F-Score for KNM Group Berhad = 2.358 
An F-score equivalent to one indicates that the predicted probability of income-decreasing 
forced restatement and the unconditional probability is equivalent. An F-score exceeding one 
indicates that the probability of income-decreasing forced restatement is higher than the 
unconditional probability. This would mean that with an F-Score of 2.358, KNM Group Berhad 
has a higher probability of issuing an income- decreasing forced restatement compared to a 
randomly selected firm. 
Panel A of Table 7.1 shows the ranking of firm-years into quintiles based on each F-Score 
magnitude. In addition to the frequency of income decreasing forced restatement firms and 
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non-forced restatement firms, the minimum F-score are also reported for each quintile. If the 
model performs very well in identifying income decreasing forced restatement firms, then the 
income decreasing forced restatement firms are expected to be grouped in the fifth quintile. 
The results shown in Table 7.1 indicate that 40.38 percent of incomes decreasing forced 
restatement firms are in the fifth quintile, in comparison to the 20 percent expected level. The 
minimum score for quintile 5 is 1.478, which easily places KNM Group in the fifth quintile 
based on its F-Score of 2.358. 
The sensitivity of the model is tested in order to determine the rates for Type I and Type II 
error based on an F-Score cut-off of 1.00. A Type I error suggests a false positive, where non-
forced restatement firms are incorrectly classified as income decreasing forced restatement 
firms, whereas a Type II error suggests a false negative, where income decreasing forced 
restatement firms are incorrectly classified as non-forced restatement firms. 
Results as presented in Panel B of Table 7-1 show that the model correctly classifies 39 from 
the total of 52 income decreasing forced restatement firms (sensitivity is equal to 75%). Based 
on an F-Score cut-off of 1.00, the model incorrectly classifies 2,412 firms out of the 4,085 non-
forced restatement firms as income-decreasing forced restatement firms (Type I error is 59 
percent),  whereas 13 firms out of the 52 income-decreasing forced restatement firms are 
incorrectly classified as non-forced restatement firms (Type II error is 25 percent). 
Taking an example from the perspective of an auditor, the cost for both Type I and Type II error 
is relatively high. A Type I error (a non-forced restatement firm is forced to issue an income 
decreasing forced restatement) may be costly, as it may results in auditors to try to get their 
clients to change their accounting practices or issue them with a negative report. When it is 
realised that the auditors have wrongfully accuse their clients of misrepresentation, this may 
tarnish auditors’ credibility and reputation, hence giving their company a bad name. 
Alternatively, the cost attached to the Type II error is also high. For example, when auditors fail 
to detect a firm with income decreasing forced restatement (but which is later revealed), there 
is a possibility for the auditors to be sued by shareholders, get sanctioned by the regulators, 
such as the Securities Commission, and suffer from a reputation loss. 
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Table 7-1: Detection rates of income-decreasing forced restatement and non-forced 
restatement firms 
Panel A  
  N Minimum F-Score Percentage (of total) 
Quintile 1       
IDFR 3 0.141 5.77 
NFR 824 0.037 20.17 
Quintile 2 
   
IDFR 3 0.591 5.77 
NFR 824 0.572 20.17 
Quintile 3 
   
IDFR 8 0.802 15.38 
NFR 819 0.777 20.05 
Quintile 4 
   
IDFR 17 1.044 32.69 
NFR 811 1.02 19.85 
Quintile 5 
   
IDFR 21 1.478 40.38 
NFR 807 1.445 19.76 
 
Panel B – Overall classification accuracy 
  IDFR NFR Total 
IDFR 39 13 52 
NFR 2412 1673 4085 
Total 2451 1686 4137 
    IDFR 75.0% 25.0% 
 NFR 59.0% 41.0% 
 
    Correct classification = 41.38% (1) 
Sensitivity =  75.00% (2) 
Type I errors = 59.05% (3) 
Type II errors = 25.00% (4) 
Notes: IDFR is income decreasing forced financial restatement firm and NFR is non-forced restatement firm. 
(1) Correct classification is calculated as [(39+1,673) ⁄ 4,137]. 
(2) Sensitivity is calculated as (39 ⁄ 52).  
(3) Type I errors are calculated as (2,412 ⁄ 4,085). 
(4) Type II errors are calculated as (13 / 52). 
The potential costs of Type I and Type II error are however not limited only to the auditors. 
Both of these errors may give impact on firm’s share price and the confidence in the market. 
Hence, investors and regulators will be concerned about both types of errors as these errors 
are seen to be very costly. When a firm that investors have shares in is wrongfully accused of 
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misrepresentations, it gets under pressure to restate its earnings and therefore suffer a fall in 
share prices which impact in a huge loss to the investors. The same applies when misstated 
firms are unidentified, enabling them to get away with their wrongdoings. Once it is discovered 
that misstated firms are classified as healthy firms by mistake, the market may lose their 
confidence on the quality of financial reporting, thus affecting the stability of firm’s share price 
in the market. It also damages the reputation of regulators reflecting their inability to provide 
an effective monitoring and good investor protection and poor quality of enforcement of 
accounting rules.  
In this situation, the income-decreasing forced restatement model developed by this study 
seems to produce an average performance in its predictive ability. Although the model’s 
sensitivity rate is high at 75 percent and that the F-Score cut-off produces a low Type II error at 
25 percent, but the Type I error is nevertheless high at 59 percent. The Type I error exceeds 50 
percent which might possibly impose severe costs mainly to the investors and the regulators.  
7.4  Additional predictive analysis on holdout sample 
This section presents additional analysis on the predictive ability of the income decreasing 
forced restatement model using a holdout sample. This study follows Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
and Wu et al. (2010) to estimate a rolling out-of-sample. The first estimation started with firm-
year observations from 2002 to 2004 and income-decreasing forced restatement in 2005. The 
coefficients being estimated are then used for predicting income-decreasing forced 
restatement in 2006 with data up to 2005. The second step expands with the second 
estimation which uses firm-year observations from 2002 to 2005 and income-decreasing 
forced restatement in 2006. The set of coefficients generated from the second estimation is 
then used for predicting income-decreasing forced restatement in 2007 based on data up to 
2006. The windows continue to expand, by which the set of estimated coefficients that is used 
for predicting income-decreasing forced restatement in 2014 is based on 2002 to 2012 firm-
year observations and 2005 to 2013 income-decreasing forced restatements.  
There are 33 income-decreasing forced restatements in the out-of-sample period (2006 – 
2014). Similar to the test conducted earlier in Section 7.3, this study follows Dechow et al. 
(2011) in examining the overall classification accuracy of the out-of-sample prediction model 
based on an F-Score cut-off of 1.00.  Consistently, firm-years are ranked in quintiles based on 
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each F-Score magnitude. The ranking of all the income-decreasing forced restatement firms in 
the fifth quintile would indicate a perfect model.   
Panel A of Table 7-2 presents the frequency as well as the proportion of the income decreasing 
forced restatement being grouped into each quintile. Results indicate that most of the income 
decreasing forced restatement firms, comprising 30.30 percent, is in the fifth quintile, in 
comparison to the 20 percent expected level. The minimum score for quintile 5 is 1.478. 
However, the model does not seem to predict very well since a high proportion of the income 
decreasing forced restatement firms are grouped in the first decile (21.21 percent) in 
comparison to the second and third quintile (12.12 percent and 15.15 percent respectively). 
A sensitivity test is examined in order to determine the Type I and Type II error rate and results 
are presented in Panel B of Table 7-2. Results show that the model correctly classifies 17 from 
33 income decreasing forced restatement firms (sensitivity is equal to 51.52%). The model 
produces 34 percent Type I error rate when it incorrectly classifies a 1,107 (out of 3,221) non-
forced restatement firms as an income decreasing forced restatement firm. The model further 
produces 48 percent Type II error when it incorrectly classifies 16 (out of 33) income-
decreasing forced restatement firms as a non-forced restatement firm.  
The holdout sample model performs well by generating a high rate of correct classification at 
65 percent and the sensitivity rate is recorded at 52 percent. The out-of-sample prediction 
model nonetheless produces a Type I error rate at 34 percent and a higher Type II error rate at 
49 percent. Although the Type I error is relatively low, there is almost 50 percent of Type II 
error to happen which gives rise to very severe cost. It is likely that this model may not be 
preferable among relevant parties especially to the investors and regulators due to the highly 
significant cost possibly incurred in detecting the likelihood of income decreasing forced 
restatement.  
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Table 7-2: Detection rates of income-decreasing forced restatement and non-forced 
restatement firms based on a holdout sample 
Panel A  
  N Minimum F-Score Percentage (of total) 
Quintile 1       
IDFR 7 0.037 21.21 
NFR 644 0.005 19.99 
Quintile 2    
IDFR 4 0.429 12.12 
NFR 646 0.411 20.06 
Quintile 3    
IDFR 5 0.674 15.15 
NFR 646 0.654 20.06 
Quintile 4    
IDFR 7 1.005 21.21 
NFR 644 0.91 19.99 
Quintile 5    
IDFR 10 1.487 30.30 
NFR 641 1.322 19.90 
 
Panel B – Overall classification accuracy 
  IDFR NFR Total 
IDFR 17 16 33 
NFR 1107 2114 3221 
Total 1124 2130 3254 
    IDFR 51.5% 48.5% 
 NFR 34.4% 65.6% 
 
    Correct classification = 65.49% (1) 
Sensitivity =  51.52% (2) 
Type I errors = 34.37% (3) 
Type II errors = 48.48% (4) 
Notes: IDFR is income decreasing forced financial restatement firm and NFR is non-forced restatement firm. 
(1) Correct classification is calculated as [(17+2,114) ⁄ 3,254]. 
(2) Sensitivity is calculated as (17 ⁄ 33).  
(3) Type I errors are calculated as (1,107 ⁄ 3,221). 
(4) Type II errors are calculated as (16 / 33). 
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7.5  Summary 
This chapter provides analysis on the overall classification accuracy of the income decreasing 
forced restatement prediction model using the scaled prediction probability (F-Score) by 
Dechow et al. (2011). The test was conducted to determine how well the model performs in 
predicting the likelihood of a firm issuing an income-decreasing forced restatement. 
The first predictive ability analysis shows that the income decreasing forced restatement model 
performs at an average level. Although the model generates a high sensitivity rate and a low 
Type II error rate,  the Type I error rate is nevertheless high at above 50 percent. The model’s 
prediction performance further reduces when it comes to predicting the likelihood of income 
decreasing forced restatement using a holdout sample. This can be seen from the second 
predictive analysis. The sensitivity rate reduces to 52 percent and Type I error rate increases to 
34 percent. Notwithstanding the model’s Type II error rate increases much higher than Type I 
error to nearly 50 percent. In such situation, the prediction model  may not be desirable to 
potential parties, especially the investors and regulators, due to the possibility of incurring 
highly significant costs in the detection of income-decreasing forced restatement firms.  
The attempt to developing a forced restatement prediction model however remains crucial as 
it helps to indicate red flags of firms engaged in financial misstatement. Although the forced 
restatement prediction model may not produce high prediction accuracy, findings from the 
prediction model may still offer valuable input to related parties such as the investors, 
auditors, and regulators for future planning and strategy on how to cope with the catastrophic 
rare event. 
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CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter summarises key research findings of this thesis and discusses the implications and 
contributions to the accounting literature. As discussed in Chapter 1, the main objectives of the 
study were to test hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial determinants and corporate 
governance determinants of forced restatements, including the specific attributes of the 
different types of forced restatement firms in Malaysia. This study further expands by 
examining the secondary objectives to develop an exploratory prediction model and to test 
whether the model can signal potential for income-decreasing forced restatement in Malaysia.  
Based on the high-profile cases of forced restatement such as Xerox and WorldCom, it can be 
seen that forced restatement does not only cause bankruptcies of the firms directly affected 
but it can also affect the performance and liquidity of capital markets. Forced financial 
restatements are of significant concern as they might undermine investors’ confidence in the 
quality of financial reporting of the firms directly affected and also of firms which are perceived 
to be similar. In extremis, this can lead to increased costs of capital for listed as well of non-
listed companies, as equity and debt investors demand higher risk premia due to their lack of 
confidence in financial reporting. Moreover, investors are at risk of losing money, as the value 
of their assets falls, either because of managerial opportunism as managers use accounting 
manipulation to hide poor performance or malpractice or because the increase in risk premia 
leads to deterioration in the value of their equity and debt securities. The ability to identify 
symptoms or indicators of forced restatement would, therefore, be useful to investors, 
analysts, auditors and regulators to identify firms which might be at risk of requiring a forced 
restatement in the future unless interventions are made early.  
Markets with comparatively poor corporate governance are likely to be at higher risk of ripple 
effects from individual cases of forced financial restatements. This raises the importance of 
research into the key drivers of forced financial restatements and into the possibility to predict 
the occurrence of forced financial restatements in emerging economies, such as Malaysia. 
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Although Malaysia has a range of specific institutional structures, some of the key 
characteristics of its listed companies’ corporate governance and ownership structures are 
characteristics for many emerging economies in South East Asia. Instances such as poor 
investor protection, ownership concentration, a high degree of political connection and weak 
enforcement of rules and regulations have a noticeable impact on the quality of financial 
reporting (Hasnan et al., 2013; Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail 2015). However, Malaysia’s 
institutional background also differs from other East Asian emerging economies, partly due to 
the impact of policies directed at increasing the economic participation of the native 
Bumiputera population. In this context, the influence of institutional investors which 
predominately serve to support Bumiputera’s savings and pension provisions is of particular 
interest.  
Based on the research objectives developed earlier, several research questions arise which 
include: (1) What is the relationship between key financial variables and the likelihood of 
forced restatements? ; (2) What is the relationship between key corporate governance 
variables and the likelihood of forced restatements? ; (3) Does the key accounting, financial 
and corporate governance variables, and the likelihood of forced financial restatements differs, 
depending on whether they are income-decreasing, income-increasing or zero-effect forced 
financial restatements?; and (4) Is it possible to develop a prediction model to signal the 
likelihood of income-dereasing forced financial restatements for public listed firms in 
Malaysia?.  
Numerous research specifically examine financial factors (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010; 
Ettredge et al., 2010; Dechow et al., 2011)  or corporate governance factors (Abdullah et al., 
2010; Mohamad, Rashid and Shawtari, 2012; Bao and Lewellyn, 2017) alone in predicting 
earnings misstatement. While there is research that examines the combination of financial 
factors and corporate governance factors, the extent of corporate governance factors that 
were examined is too restricted, for example, limited to assessing CEO attributes (e.g. Kim et 
al., 2016). This study, however, includes both financial factors and corporate governance 
factors as predictors of forced restatement. While this thesis is mainly a replication of prior 
research on Malaysian data, it differs from prior research in that more comprehensive 
determinants were examined ranging from firm characteristics, firm’s financial performance, 
accruals-based, and real earnings management, capital market incentives, governance, to firm 
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ownership. This research exploited various financial and non-financial factors to produce more 
compelling evidence that can identify the predictors or determinants of forced restatement. 
There are also studies that conducted research into examining income-increasing restatements 
and income-decreasing restatements (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Abbott et al., 2006; Callen et al., 
2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no research yet being done on zero-
effect financial restatement. This study differs from prior research as it examines the 
determinants of income-decreasing forced restatements, income-increasing forced 
restatements and zero-effect forced restatements to analyse how firms’ attributes might differ 
between the different types of forced restatement.  
In the context of Malaysia, numerous research was conducted to analyse the motivations and 
causes of financial restatement (Hasnan et al., 2013; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014; Hussain et al., 
2016). Empirically, the research in Malaysia that examines the determinants of financial 
restatement mainly focuses on corporate governance factors (e.g.  Abdullah et al., 2010; Abdul 
Wahab et al., 2014). Other Malaysian studies that examine both financial and corporate 
governance factors, however, looked into how these determinants impact fraudulent financial 
reporting (e.g. Hasnan et al., 2013).  
This study differs from prior research by investigating a broader range of financial and non-
financial factors and how these factors can help predict the likelihood of the different direction 
of forced restatement in Malaysia, i.e. income-decreasing, income-increasing and zero-effect 
forced restatement. The various factors examined include board quality, audit committee 
quality, firm ownership and control, accruals-based earnings management, real earnings 
management, firm’s financial performance, capital market-based incentives, and share price 
volatility. Other than to provide more compelling evidence on predictors of forced 
restatement, this study fully utilised the information to effectively discriminate those factors 
that determine aggressive earnings misstatement from those of mere accounting errors.  
Sample data for this study covers the period from 2002-2012. Period of the data started from 
2002 to allow ample time for the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance which was 
introduced in 2000 to take effect on companies’ corporate governance and their quality of 
financial reporting. Moreover, it is argued that any confounding effect from the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997/1998 will not be present in the study’s sample (Abdullah et al., 2010). As the data 
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collection for this study only commences in 2014, the data period then ends in 2012 (except for 
the collection of lagged data, i.e. forced restatement, which ends in the most recent period for 
the study in 2013). The data comprises of 121 forced restatement firm observations, 1,505 
accounting restatement firm observations and 3,133 non-forced restatement firm observations 
in Bursa Malaysia. Although forced restatements are rare events; i.e. the Malaysian forced 
restatement firms made up only 2.5% of the total observations; nonetheless, the ability to 
predict the possibility of forced restatement is important due to the potentially catastrophic 
nature of the event that may impose high costs on the investors, auditors, and regulators.  
8.2  The importance to study Malaysia 
Malaysia was chosen as the background for this study. Malaysia is of interest as it is a 
developing country with an emerging capital market. Highly concentrated ownership which 
mainly characterised the Malaysian listed firms distinguishes it from the dispersed ownership 
of the Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the UK. A unique attribute that differentiates 
Malaysia from the other developing countries is the presence of strong influence of the 
Malaysian economic policies that are aimed to minimize economic imbalance between the 
various ethnic population in Malaysia and to enhance economic participation among the 
indigenous Bumiputera ethnic group (Gul, 2006). Firms’ close relationship with the government 
has also made Malaysia to be well-known with its relationship-based economy (opposing the 
arm’s length system). While the economic system helps to stimulate business interest among 
the Bumiputera population, it has also contributed to the presence of politically favored 
corporations (Gul, 2006). With the strong political connection, businesses enjoyed the luxury of 
gaining concessions, monopoly rights, government subsidies and licenses, but at the same 
time, they are highly exposed to possibilities of cronyism and corruption. In particular, findings 
from this study show there is high tendency for politically-connected firms to misstate financial 
report due to obscuring financial information which results from expropriation activities 
engaged by the government and their cronies. Within these economic, market, cultural and 
political perspectives, it is important to study Malaysia as it provides distinctive findings which 
in many respects are different from the developed countries, but at the same time, the findings 
might represent other Asian countries with a similar background.  
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At the earlier stage of conducting this study, I expected to find that the various attributes of 
good corporate governance such as board and audit committee quality may help reduce or 
trigger the detection of forced restatement. This is in light of theoretical considerations and 
prior empirical research which supports the contention that good corporate governance 
practices reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour (e.g. Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Ma et 
al., 2016; Bao and Lewellyn, 2017). Nonetheless, data analysis from this study showed some 
puzzling findings which do not support my expectation, especially where none of the audit 
committee quality variables show any significant impact on the event of forced restatement. 
While board independence may be the only proxy from the board quality group of variables 
that has a significant association with forced restatement event, nonetheless its economic 
effect is relatively small. The findings in this study generally show that the implementation of 
corporate governance through good monitoring practices have relatively minor impact in 
reducing managerial opportunism and seems not to be working effectively as intended in 
practice. 
Findings of this study have implications towards government policy in strengthening the quality 
of financial reporting and thus might be of interest to the regulators. In fact, various attempts 
were undertaken by the regulators to strengthen corporate governance, but still the change 
seems less effective in improving the quality of financial reporting. One of the reasons may be 
due to the high political connection among firms which impede the effort towards producing 
high quality financial information. For example, results show that political connected firms are 
more likely to engage in aggressive financial reporting. Managers tend to conceal financial 
information that relates to the benefit gained from the government, especially when the 
benefit increases managers’ wealth at the expense of the shareholders. This is done via 
opportunistic reporting of discretionary accruals probably to show that firms are performing 
well when actually they are not. Despite the deviant reporting behaviour from having political 
connection, this study however found that firms’ volatility in share price may be used as a 
signal for regulators of firms’ potential problems, which warrant them further investigations. 
Overall, while this study may not provide precise and accurate forecast of forced restatement, 
this study nonetheless provides some meaningful inputs for the Malaysian regulators to 
formulate planning and strategy in dealing with firms having symptoms or indicators of forced 
restatement. With regard to the findings that show poor corporate governance practices in 
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Malaysia, the regulators hence need to emphasise on having higher quality board of directors; 
i.e. by defining strictly the term “independent”, rather than stressing the quantity of directors.  
Notwithstanding, the findings further provide insights on how regulators can formulate policies 
to reinforce more efficient audit committees and also limit the extent of firms’ political 
relationship. Findings from my study also benefits the regulators being valuable input for them 
to develop reporting strategies or standards that can be used to minimise discretionary 
accruals manipulation and monitor the report of discretionary accruals much more effectively. 
Regulators may contribute further by strengthening investor protection policy to promote a 
more credible financial reporting and support the development of a more resilient capital 
market. 
8.3 Contribution of the study 
The study on earnings management differs from the research that investigates forced 
restatement. Research on earnings management considers the use of managers’ discretion 
over accounting choices (within the GAAP) to mask firm’s underlying performance but which 
does not amount to fraudulent reporting (Walker, 2013). When engaged in earnings 
management, there is the effect of mean reversion, i.e. where managers reverse income-
decreasing (or increasing) accruals recognised in the past periods (Jones, 1991). Alternatively, 
there is also the cumulative effect of reporting a one-directional earnings management, up to 
the extent that managers might no longer able to hide earnings manipulation sufficiently 
(Ettredge et al., 2010), that it eventually end in forced restatement. Moreover, the 
discretionary accruals models that were developed to detect possible earnings management 
were criticised for producing biased and noisy discretion estimation (Dechow et al., 1995; Kang 
et al., 1995; Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Guay et al., 1997; Thomas and Zhang, 2000). Hence, 
the results of prior studies that used the discretionary accruals models as a basis of 
measurement were called into questions.  
The research that examine forced restatement differs from the earnings management studies 
by its ability to identify firms that engage in intentional misstatements and unintentional errors 
(Dechow et al., 2010). While earnings management is “the practice of distorting the true 
financial performance of the company” (Klein, 2002, p. 376), forced restatement firms are 
distinguished as those who have admitted or been identified by making a mistake in financial 
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reporting (Dechow et al., 2011). In contrast to earnings management studies, the advantage of 
examining forced restatement is the ability to identify firms that violate the GAAP and are 
fraudulent without the need to specify a model for detecting misstating firms. 
In examining the determinants of forced restatement and predicting the likelihood of forced 
restatements, this study differs from prior studies in several perspectives. Previous literature 
has explored the factors which drive earnings management (Mohamad et al., 2012; Bao and 
Lewellyn, 2017) – a major cause for subsequent forced restatements – and forced 
restatements (Ettredge et al., 2010; Files et al., 2014). It is either that the literature tend to 
focus on variables covering either financial factors (Dechow et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 2010; 
Dechow et al., 2011)  or corporate governance factors alone (Abdullah et al., 2010; Mohamad 
et al., 2012; Bao and Lewellyn 2017). 
For example, Mohamad et al. (2012) studied 43 government-linked company observations in 
2003 (pre-transformation) and 2005 (post-transformation) and discover that corporate 
governance mechanisms have not much impact in curbing earnings management activities, 
except for board meetings and the separation of CEO and chairman.  While Bao and Lewellyn 
(2017) examined 1200 firms from 24 emerging markets and discover that controlling 
ownership has a positive impact on earnings management. In the context of forced 
restatement, Ettredge et al., (2010) examine balance sheet bloat (high level of working capital 
balances) for evidence of income-increasing earnings management. As for Files et al., (2014), 
they examine whether auditor characteristics, such as audit changes and  quality, restatement 
severity, and company circumstances, such as discontinued operations and internal control 
weaknesses may affect the likelihood of repeat restatements. In general, so far research has 
failed to consider how the combination of various financial and non-financial features can be 
used for developing a forced restatement predictive model.  
This study contributes to the literature by responding to the call of Dechow et al. (2011) and 
Kim et al. (2016) to extend their study by incorporating various financial measures and 
corporate governance factors in developing a model to predict forced restatement. Not only 
does this study consider both factors jointly but it also considers share price volatility as 
possible determinants of forced restatement. The examination of the various types of financial 
and non-financial factors is important as it provides a better understanding of specific financial 
symptoms and firm characteristics of forced restatement. It eventually allows users of financial 
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statements to be in a better position for identifying and curtailing future manipulative 
accounting activities.  
In addition, the research responds to considerations which suggest that there might be 
complementary and substitutive relationships between accruals-based earnings management 
and real earnings management, as well as between financial variables and corporate 
governance variables (Ding et al., 2015). This study, therefore, models the interaction effects 
between the different types of non-financial and financial variables. To our knowledge, this is 
the first time the interaction effects of accruals-based earnings management and real earnings 
management, the incentive of raising fund and change in earnings, founder CEO and board 
independence, as well as change in free cash flows and political connection are examined. Of 
all these, only one of the interaction effects, i.e. accruals-based earnings management and real 
earnings management (abnormal cash flow from operations) is statistically significant. The 
result indicates that firms engage in both accruals-based and real earnings management, 
specifically by managing real activities that could accelerate sales performance in the short 
term.  Findings from the interaction effect analysis provide a better understanding of specific 
financial indicator and firm characteristics, hence providing a more robust result particularly on 
the determinants of forced restatement. 
Furthermore, the penalised likelihood logit method was applied in this study for data analysis. 
This research analysis method has received extensive applications in research areas that 
commonly have small data properties, such as the medical research field. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no accounting literature so far that has applied the penalised likelihood 
logit model for data analysis.  In comparison to the conventional logit model, the penalised 
likelihood logit method produces less biased results, particularly in data with small sample size 
and very few events (Heinze and Schemper, 2002; Leitgob, 2013; Flynn et al., 2013). The 
penalised likelihood function specifically includes a penalty function that penalises against the 
size of estimated coefficients and model complexity, hence producing a more robust logit 
regression analysis. 
The structural equation modeling (SEM) which is rarely applied in the accounting research field 
(Glaum et al. 2013) was also attempted in order to examine whether accruals quality mediates 
the relationship between the various financial and non-financial factors and the likelihood of 
forced restatement. SEM was shown to produce smaller standard error hence better 
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parameter estimates compared to regression, specifically when testing mediation analysis 
(Iacobucci et al., 2007). The superiority of SEM lies in its ability in disentangling the various 
effects and examining their respective impacts on the outcome variable (Galum et al., 2013). 
Results from this study however show that factor loadings and the forced restatement 
prediction model generated by SEM are inconsistent with all of this study’s previous results. 
The findings nonetheless provide a useful insight that the SEM might not be a suitable 
approach in the research of developing a forced restatement prediction model.  
In addition, prior studies, e.g. Lobo and Zhao (2013) and Sue et al. (2013), fail to distinguish 
forced restatements that are due to earnings misstatements from those that are due to 
accounting error (apart from studies such as Kim et al., 2016). Unlike income-decreasing forced 
restatements that are likely due to intentional misstatements, Ettredge et al. (2010) suggest 
that income income-increasing forced restatements are most likely due to accounting errors – 
though attempts at tax evasion might also be an incentive (Lim, 2011). The need to 
differentiate between the different type of restatements becomes critical especially when the 
accounting regulations are becoming more and more strict (Kim et al., 2016) leading to the 
likely increase in the frequency of unintentional misstatements (i.e. due to accounting errors). 
Failure to distinguish the different types of forced restatements may give rise to the risk of 
making inaccurate inferences with regard to the developed hypotheses that involve managerial 
misconduct. This study differs by examining the difference between income-decreasing forced 
restatement, income-increasing forced restatement and zero-effect forced restatement. This is 
important as the incentives of managers, directors, and blockholders, as well as the 
perceptions of and implications for investors and regulators, are likely to differ between the 
different events.  
Finally, this research is set in an emerging economy with a comparatively weak institutional 
setting, which exacerbates the threat of managerial opportunistic behaviour, the hazard that 
blockholders or politicians might influence firm decisions for their own benefit, as well as the 
risk that investors might evaluate not only their investment in the affected firm but also similar 
firms or the stock market as a whole. The specific feature in Malaysia, which is also common in 
other emerging countries, is the less distinct separation between firm ownership and 
management, which creates incentives for the blockholders to expropriate wealth from the 
minority shareholders (Hasnan, Rahman & Mahenthiran 2013). The presence of firms with 
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family ownership concentration and pyramidal ownership structure is abundant, along with 
poor investor protection and weak law enforcement that hinders from effective detection. A 
specific characteristic of Malaysia which is different from other emerging countries (such as 
Hong Kong and Thailand) is the high political connection among firms. The government plays a 
high interventionist role in business activities which in turn resulted in substantial implications 
on the quality of financial reporting (Gomez & Jomo 1999). The above features in Malaysia that 
are also found in a range of South East Asian emerging economies creates a suitable condition 
for aggressive earnings management to take place, hence the motivation for this study. 
In order to identify the relevant variables and their interrelationships, I first conducted the 
multivariate logit regression analysis in order to identify the variables which affect the 
likelihood that firms will be forced to restate earnings. Further to examining the pooled 
sample, the logit regression was also conducted on the different type of forced restatement 
samples in determining whether firms’ attributes might differ between income-decreasing, 
income-increasing and zero-effect forced restatement.  
Results of the income-decreasing forced restatement firms are then used as a basis for 
developing a prediction model. This is done in view of the catastrophic nature of the income-
decreasing forced restatement event compared to the income-increasing and zero-effect 
forced restatement which is not so disastrous. The predictive model is developed based on the 
robustness tests of the stepwise logit and penalised likelihood logit regression model. A rolling 
out-of-sample estimation is further carried out to test the predictive ability of the income-
decreasing forced restatement model.  
Although unfortunately, extensive testing found that the predictive model is not sufficiently 
robust to predict income-decreasing forced restatements with a sufficiently high degree of 
accuracy, the research has nevertheless, yielded some highly interesting results which might 
still provide useful insights to investors, investment analysts, auditors, and regulators.  
Examining the different types of forced restatements provides some insights into 
understanding the ex-ante factors that cause firms to eventually report non-GAAP financial 
results and those that lead to accounting error. This study further provides a better 
understanding of the symptoms and incentives of opportunistic accounting practices which 
would be of great interest to the investors, auditors, analysts and regulators. Findings from this 
study also provide input for the development of forced restatement prediction models and the 
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refinement of prediction models that could indicate the likelihood of firms that are involved in 
GAAP violation.   
8.4 Discussion on the findings of the study 
8.4.1 Factors affecting the likelihood of firms to be forced to restate earnings 
A logit regression analysis was conducted to examine the study’s main objective to test 
hypotheses regarding key accounting, financial determinants and corporate governance 
determinants of forced financial restatements among public listed firms in Malaysia. Findings 
from the pooled sample analysis indicate that a number of variables, including audit committee 
quality, family ownership and control, and firm performance, do not show any significant 
relationships with the likelihood of forced restatement. Nonetheless, there is evidence to 
support H1 where a negative relationship between board quality and the occurrence of forced 
financial restatement is recorded. More specifically, board independence was found to be 
significantly and negatively related to the likelihood of forced restatement. The result implies 
that having an independent board determines a more effective monitoring such that the 
directors are less susceptible to the management influences and that a more independent 
judgment is given within the decision-making process. While this study finds that a highly 
independent board can effectively mitigate defective reporting, the results seem to contradict 
the general findings of prior Malaysian studies that independent directors have no significant 
impact on financial reporting quality (Wan-Hussin, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2010) or that board 
independence is positively associated with earnings management practices (Hashim and Devi, 
2008). 
Findings show partial support for H4 that posits a positive relationship between government-
related institutional ownership and firm’s political connection and the occurrence of forced 
financial restatement. This is evidenced from the significant positive relationship that firms’ 
political connection has with the likelihood of forced restatement. There is an indication that 
politicians might have given managers undue pressure to report a better performance to 
improve their own reputation as having not only political but also business acumen. 
Alternatively, it might be that politicians exploit firms to pursue political ambitions, e.g. by 
creating more jobs than efficient or by donating to political or social causes, which might 
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explain a tendency to manipulate earnings upwards in order to hide this activity from 
investors. 
The engagement in opportunistic accounting practices is evidenced when the discretionary 
accruals of the Modified Jones model demonstrate a significantly positive association with the 
likelihood of forced restatement. The result supports H5 that posits a positive relationship 
between the distortion of corporate reporting quality and the occurrence of forced financial 
restatement. Whilst the current accruals show no significant impact, the possibility lies at the 
fact that forced restatement firms might have manipulated discretionary accruals for the sake 
of concealing firm’s real earnings performance for rent-seeking purposes.   
Additional result from the interaction effect analysis further shows that the interaction 
between discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flow from operations (real earnings 
management) was significantly and positively related to the likelihood of forced restatement. 
The inclusion of the interaction effect caused the non-interacted variable of discretionary 
accruals to become insignificant, while the previously insignificant variable of abnormal cash 
flow from operation became statistically significant and negatively related to the likelihood of 
forced restatement. Overall, the result shows that while firms are engaged in the management 
of discretionary accruals, they are also involved in managing real activities. The reduction in 
firms’ level of abnormal cash flows implies managers’ attempt to accelerate sales and improve 
short-term earnings performance (e.g. by discounting selling price and granting lenient credit 
terms) (Braswell and Daniels, 2017). 
Forced restatement firms further demonstrate a negative change in their internal funds which 
effectively initiate firms’ needs to raise external finance. The result which shows a significantly 
negative association between the change in firm’s internal fund and the likelihood of forced 
restatement indicates that H6 is partially supported. Firms suffering from a decline in their 
internal fund would mean that their capital base is becoming more constrained. Firms might 
have difficulty to raise funds due to the inability of securing favourable terms (Dechow et al., 
2011). Thus, as the internal funds are near to getting exhausted, it is more likely that firms use 
earnings management to try to improve investors’ perceptions of the firm’s performance and 
therefore being able to raise additional capital more cheaply (Lennox & Pittman 2010). 
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Finally, result further shows support for H7 where a significant positive relationship between 
share price volatility and the occurrence of forced financial restatement is documented. Share 
price volatility acts as a useful indicator to the regulators of firms’ potential problem that lead 
to the propensity of earnings misstatement. While high risky firms exhibit high stock price 
volatility, this may alert auditors and regulators such that it increases their intensity of firm 
monitoring which in turn triggers the need for forced restatement. 
Consistent with the study’s second main objective, the financial and non-financial factors that 
affect the likelihood of the different type of forced restatement were also examined. Results of 
the income-decreasing forced restatement firms are firstly discussed. In general, the findings of 
the income-decreasing forced restatement sample are relatively consistent with those of the 
pooled forced restatement sample. The only difference lies at the fact that while earnings 
management was found to have a statistically positive relationship with the likelihood of 
forced restatement, there is however no evidence to show that the opportunistic earnings 
management have any effect on the likelihood of income decreasing forced restatement.  This 
lack of evidence might be due to the possibility that income-decreasing forced restatement 
firms have been reporting material accounting mistakes or errors. This is likely to happen 
especially when the accounting regulations are becoming more and more strict (Kim, Baik & 
Cho 2016) leading to the likely increase in the frequency of unintentional misstatements (i.e. 
due to accounting errors). There is also the possibility that the income-decreasing forced 
restatement might be the result of firms changing their own accounting policies from having to 
previously misapply accounting policies for private gain.  
Similar to the pooled sample test, it was found that board independence, political connection, 
change in firm’s internal fund and share price volatility are all significantly related to the 
likelihood of income-decreasing forced restatement. Although there are no signs of 
opportunistic income-inflating earnings management, it is crucial to understand the symptoms 
or indicators of income-decreasing forced restatement, which act as red flags of firms that 
warrant investigation, allowing auditors and regulators for early intervention to minimise 
possible catastrophic impact from earnings misstatements. 
Quite contradicting findings were obtained from the analysis of the income-increasing forced 
restatement. A noticeable difference compared to the income-decreasing forced restatement 
test result is that the likelihood of income-increasing forced restatement was affected by 
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opportunistic earnings management practices. This is evidenced based on the significant 
positive relationship that the discretionary accruals of the Modified Jones model have with the 
likelihood of income-increasing forced restatement. 
One possible way of how these firms manage earnings is via the opportunistic management of 
working capital accruals. This is possible as the working capital accruals demonstrated a 
statistically significant negative association with income-increasing forced restatement. It 
implies that firms tend to depress earnings downward by reporting less working capital. 
Further to this, firms are seen to incur less abnormal discretionary expenses as can be seen 
from the negative relationship that the variable has with income-increasing forced 
restatement. The fact that firms engage in real activities management by cutting down 
discretionary expenses, e.g. research development and advertisement costs, would impact in 
earnings reduction in the long term. There is an indication that among the reason why firms 
are eager to report decreasing earnings is to ensure that their tax payable is minimised. As 
shown from the test results, firms were found to report low deferred tax accruals during the 
misstatement period. This is evidenced when the deferred tax expenses variable document a 
significantly negative relationship with the likelihood of income-increasing forced restatement.  
The fact that income-increasing forced restatement firms are mainly growth firms further 
support their incentive for reporting reducing earnings. Result shows that change in earnings is 
positively related to the likelihood of income-increasing forced restatement. Since income-
increasing forced restatement firms are growth firms, they are prone to be imposed with 
higher tax due to high earnings, or alternatively they are more exposed to high political cost. 
These form the reason why firms are keen to manage earnings downward such that they can 
pay lesser tax or are subject to lower political cost.  
Another attribute of income-increasing forced restatement firms is the deterioration in their 
level of free cash flow. The reduction in free cash flow might be the result from the firms being 
too strict in the extent of their spending in discretionary expense. As highlighted earlier, the 
cutting down of discretionary expenses such as research and development expenses, might 
have possibly impact sales performance such that firms’ free cash flow tend to decrease.  
The discussion of test results based on the zero-effect forced restatement sample follows. 
Similar to the income-increasing forced restatement firms, the zero-effect forced restatement 
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firms are found to be involved in practices of opportunistic discretionary accruals 
management. This can be seen from the significant positive relationship demonstrated by the 
discretionary accruals variable. Change in receivables further shows a significant and positive 
relationship with the likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement. In one perspective, it 
indicates a genuine growth among firms. In another perspective, the positive change in 
accounts receivable can be an indication of an aggressive earnings management. In particular, 
zero-effect forced restatement firms might have opportunistically managed their accounts 
receivables and perform a year-on-year mean reversion to hide problems. This would mean 
that earnings are effectively adjusted in the next period to sufficiently reverse the earnings that 
were over/understated in prior period, leading to the possibility for zero-effect forced 
restatement to occur. 
Zero-effect restatement firms further portray a few attributes of a weak corporate governance. 
They were seen to have a low proportion of independent directors on the board which explains 
why these firms are having financial reporting problems that lead to zero-effect forced 
restatement.  
Furthermore, the fact that these firms have political connection make them susceptible to 
reporting poor quality earnings. Being politically connected, resources tend to be channeled 
away from the listed firms towards the politicians and their cronies in fulfilling their own 
private gain (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). As such, politically-connected 
firms are prone to misstate earnings to masks any potential expropriations  (Lim et al., 2014) 
which increases the likelihood of zero-effect forced restatement. 
Engaging in opportunistic reporting behaviour appears more intriguing especially when test 
results show that the zero-effect restatement firms demonstrate a low level of internal funds. 
This would mean that when firms’ internal capital base is getting exhausted due to the 
decreasing internal funds, managers are induced to manipulate earnings in such a way that 
these firms could get easy and cheap accessibility to external funds.  
Overall, findings from this study seem useful in terms of providing insights on possible 
symptoms and incentives of forced restatement in Malaysia as well as in other developing 
countries that have similar institutional settings. Institutional background such as high political 
connection, poor investor protection and weak law enforcement mainly features the emerging 
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markets, particularly those in the South-East Asia region including Malaysia. Specifically, 
concentrated ownership which is a common attribute in the emerging economies was 
proposed to be the main determinant of poor corporate governance practices among firms in 
the developing markets. Once ownership exceeds a certain threshold, it becomes easier for the 
controlling shareholders to obtain control over managers for the sake of gaining private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  
Regardless of attempts of the Malaysian government to introduce corporate governance 
reforms, there is however no evidence to show that factors such as firm ownership structure or 
audit committee quality contributes in detecting irregularities and enforcing restatements. The 
only contributing corporate governance factor that help mitigate the likelihood of forced 
restatement is board independence. The findings from this study suggest that the practice of 
having an independent board helps to promote an effective monitoring and ensure that quality 
earnings are reported. Regardless of its significance, the economic impact of board 
independence is however very small. This gives implication to Malaysia and other emerging 
countries where regulators and policy makers need to emphasise more on having quality 
directors (independent) rather than on quantity of directors on firm board. The term 
‘independent’ should be accurately defined and established. Notwithstanding, the findings give 
insights as to the need not only for regulators to consider a more careful implementation and 
enforcement of the corporate governance system, but they could also consider improving ways 
to increase directors and managers awareness of moral practices and ethics, besides enhancing 
communication between firm’s directors, managers and market participants as a whole. 
My findings further benefit interested parties such as the investors, regulators, and analysts as 
firms that warrant investigation can be easily identified. Accounting items such as working 
capital, accounts receivables, inventories and any unusual pattern that is recorded in the 
respective account balance should trigger further investigation by the auditors.  These 
accounting items are susceptible to manipulation as its value is generally material and is 
related to the business daily operations. An interesting avenue for future research is to gain a 
better understanding of the role of working capital management in Malaysia. Within the 
Malaysian institutional setting of high concentrated firm’s ownership structure and high 
political connection, the study gives enlightenment to the regulators the imperative need to 
implement more efficient monitoring activities and enhance the legal and judicial enforcement. 
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8.4.2 Trying to build a forced restatement prediction model 
One major reason for developing a forced restatement model is to predict and detect income-
decreasing forced restatements that are catastrophic in nature. Following the development of 
an income-decreasing forced restatement model, the model was further tested to assess its 
predictive performance. Results, however, show that the predictive ability of the income-
decreasing forced restatement logit model is not quite compelling and scores average 
performance in producing an accurate forecast. Regardless of the model’s high sensitivity rate 
(high classification accuracy for forced restatement firms), the prediction model is seen to 
produce a relatively higher Type I error compared to the Type II error. The poor predictive 
ability of the income-decreasing forced restatement model is further supported by the 
assessment of the rolling out-of-sample estimations that shows the prediction model is weak 
and not powerful enough to accurately forecast income-decreasing forced restatement events. 
The outcome from the holdout sample test shows that the Type II error rate is higher than the 
Type I error rate.  
In general, the low rating for prediction accuracy as shown by the high Type I and Type II error 
implies that the income-decreasing forced restatement model is unlikely to produce an 
accurate prediction. Hence, the prediction model may not be favoured by the market 
participant, especially the investors and the regulators. The susceptibility of the model to 
producing inaccurate prediction may lead to costly impacts such as a fall in firms’ share price 
which results in a huge loss of equity investment and market confidence. At the same time, the 
reputation of regulators that promotes investor protection may be tarnished.  
Predicting a rare event in the business world is almost impossible due to the huge uncertainty 
of events in relation to business and economic activities (Makridakis  et al., 2009). The same 
applies to predicting forced restatements which are very difficult due to the complex 
interaction of various factors that cause the rare event. Despite the limitations of forecasting, 
and the low possibility of producing accurate and precise prediction, the research activity of 
developing a prediction model may still provide valuable input for future planning and strategy. 
This is possible as the attributes of misstatement firms on various dimensions indicated by the 
forced restatement logit model (such as accruals quality, firm performance, and corporate 
governance) can be used as warning signs or red flags of firms that warrant investigations, 
creating awareness among interested parties at an earlier stage. This gives an opportunity for 
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auditors, for example, to manage their audit processes accordingly, hence minimizing possible 
legal risks. Moreover, investors and financial institutions may be able to adjust the level of 
exposure to these risky forced restatement firms in advance.  Whereas the regulators may be 
more prepared in formulating more effective laws and regulations in the effort to control or 
minimise deviant managerial behaviour. 
8.5  Limitations and avenues for future research 
Substantial effort was placed in conducting this research to ensure that the study objectives 
are achieved and all research questions are met. However, similar to any other research, this 
research suffers from several limitations. This section discusses the limitations of the research 
and suggests several recommendations for future research.  
Firstly, the research conducted in this study was based on a sample of Malaysian firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, the generalization of findings in this study to the markets in other 
countries may not be straightforward, although, in some respects, Malaysia is considered a 
typical emerging market with typical corporate governance systems and challenges. 
Secondly, this study uses originally reported numbers (not restated) for analysis purposes. This 
is to identify the extent to which the financial measure representing aggressive accounting 
behaviour is associated with the likelihood of forced restatement. The approach of examining 
originally reported data however gives rise to the possibility of a mechanical positive 
association between test variables such as earnings quality and firm performance, and the 
likelihood of forced restatement. This is most likely to happen as forced restatement is itself an 
evidence of aggressive accounting practices that are present in financial reports. It would be 
useful for future research to examine restated financial data in examining key accounting 
determinants of forced restatement in order to prevent any mechanical relationship and 
determine a more reliable test result. 
Thirdly, certain corporate governance variables used in this study, such as multiple 
directorships and director expertise, are reported based on a voluntary disclosure. The high 
ownership concentration that is prevalent in Malaysia means that firm’s voluntary disclosure is 
poor because insiders are better informed about firm’s business activities and financial position 
(Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Hence, the reliance made on voluntary disclosure may induce 
230 
 
potential endogeneity problems in test analysis due to spurious correlation as both accounting 
misstatements (leading to forced restatement) and poor disclosure quality may be driven by 
the same omitted variable. In addressing this problem, future research may perform 
simultaneous regression analysis by regressing endogenous variables on relevant exogenous 
variables (instruments) in line with prior literature such as Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Abernathy 
et al. (2013) to address the endogeneity problem. 
Fourthly, this study included multiple proxies for the same underlying prediction in the forced 
restatement logit regression model. The inclusion of multiple proxies is due to the fact that no 
single proxy is sufficient to measure the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structure 
(Beekes & Brown 2006; Larcker et al. 2007), nor it is sufficient to measure corporate reporting 
quality and firm performance. Nonetheless, the inclusion of multiple proxies simultaneously in 
the logit model is considered part of a model misspecification as it gives rise to attenuation 
bias such that many insignificant individual coefficients are likely to result (Lubotsky & 
Wittenberg 2007). Consistent with Lubotsky and Wittenberg (006) such attenuation biases can 
be minimised in future research by incorporating a single proxy for the tested variable or 
alternatively, examining a single summary measure representing the set of proxy variables in a 
regression model.  
Fifthly, the discretionary accruals measure was applied in this study as a proxy for earnings 
management. Other types of opportunistic earnings manipulation can be considered in future 
research which includes insider trading, tunneling activities or related-party transactions 
among the publicly listed firms in Malaysia. Furthermore, it might be helpful for future 
research to take into account the direction of earnings management over time, so that 
research analysis can be made in the direction of earnings manipulation rather than solely on 
its scale when examining the absolute figures of earnings management. 
Sixthly, the measure used for forced restatement is dichotomous, hence its inability to 
measure the magnitude of forced restatement. Future study may consider measuring the 
absolute amount of forced restatement so that the severity of forced restatement is known. 
For example, the higher the magnitude of forced restatement many indicate that the 
presentation of accounting information in prior periods is of poorer quality. 
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Seventhly, this study can only identify earnings misstatements and manipulations that have 
been actually identified via forced restatement in company’s financial statement. There is a 
possibility that many misstatement cases have gone undetected where they are left uncaught 
for forced restatement. This creates an interesting avenue for future studies to investigate 
whether firms with key attributes of misstatement (e.g. high political connection) manage 
earnings within the boundaries of GAAP?  Do these firms suffer from a subsequent decline in 
financial performance? Is there a possibility for these firms to engage in future assets write-
downs or write-offs? Future research may also consider including culture (e.g. race and 
education) as a factor that could signal towards the likelihood of restatement. Cultural factors 
seem to be important due to the traditions that are instilled among citizens of a nation which 
thus might be used to help justify why things are the way they are (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Eightly, this study excluded repeat restatements from the studied sample to prevent statistical 
results being driven by firm-level effect across observations. However, the increased in 
frequency of repeat restatement  (Files, Sharp & Thompson 2014) present an important 
avenue for future research to consider analysing repeat restatement and examine how findings 
from the single forced restatements may generalize to repeat forced restatements. Future 
studies may also consider whether repeat restatements arise due to firm’s initial forced 
restatement or due to another latent propensity to forcedly restate. 
Ninthly, future research may consider examining how the market would react when there is 
forced restatement. Forced restatements provide information that may not only lower outside 
shareholders’ expectation of companies’ financial reporting quality but also intensify their 
concerns about managerial opportunistic financial reporting behaviour (Ma, Ma & Tian 2016). 
Little is known on how firms with concentrated ownership may influence the way investors 
may react towards changes in the quality of accounting information.  Hence, it might be useful 
for future research to investigate how forced restatement announcement by family control 
firms and firms with high institutional ownership may affect investors reaction differently. 
Finally, the costs associated with forced restatements are severe up to the extent that results 
in a significant drop in company’s share price (Scholz 2008), an increase in firm’s cost of capital 
(Hribar & Jenkins 2004) and an increase in firm litigation (Palmrose & Scholz 2004). In view of 
this severe implications, it might also be interesting to know whether forced restatement firms 
have the incentive and subsequently improve their financial information quality. It might be 
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useful for future research to examine firms’ earnings quality for the period after the 
restatement.  Findings from the research may be applied by regulators and auditors as to know 
whether firms with past forced restatement firms need continuous scrutiny. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Description of GAO’s Restatement Category 
Category Description 
Mergers  and 
acquisitions 
Restatements of acquisitions or mergers that were improperly 
accounted for or not accounted for at all. These include instances in 
which the wrong accounting method was used or losses or gains 
related to the acquisition were understated or overstated. This does 
not include in-process research and development or restatements 
for mergers, acquisitions, and discontinued operations when 
appropriate accounting methods were employed 
Cost or expense Restatements due to improper cost accounting. This category 
includes instances of improperly recognizing costs or expenses, 
improperly capitalizing expenditures, or any other number of 
mistakes or improprieties that led to misreported costs. It also 
includes restatements due to improper treatment of tax liabilities, 
income tax reserves, and other tax-related items process 
In-process research 
and development 
Restatements resulting from instances in which improper accounting 
methodologies were used to value in-process research and 
development at the time of the acquisition. 
Other Any restatement not covered by the listed categories. Cases included 
in this category include restatements due to inadequate loan-loss 
reserves, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, or improper accounting 
for bad loans and restatements due to fraud, or accounting 
irregularities that were left unspecified 
Reclassification Restatements due to improperly classified accounting items. These 
include restatements due to improprieties such as debt payments 
being classified as investments 
Related-party 
transactions 
Restatements due to inadequate disclosure or improper accounting 
of revenues, expenses, debts, or assets involving transactions or 
relationships with related parties. This category includes those 
involving special purpose entities 
Restructuring, 
assets, or inventory 
Restatements due to asset impairment, errors relating to accounting 
treatment of investments, timing of asset write-downs, goodwill, 
restructuring activity, and inventory valuation, and inventory 
quantity issues 
Revenue 
recognition 
Restatements due to improper revenue accounting. This category 
includes instances in which revenue was improperly recognized, 
questionable revenues were recognized, or any other number of 
mistakes or improprieties that led to misreported revenue 
Securities related Restatements due to improper accounting for derivatives, warrants, 
stock options and other convertible securities 
Note: We excluded announcements involving stock splits, changes in accounting principles, 
and other financial statement restatements that were not made to correct mistakes in the 
application of accounting standards. 
Source: GAO, 2006, pg.19 
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APPENDIX 2 
Variable Definition and Operationalisation  
  ACRONYM VARIABLES  
DEFINITION / 
OPERATIONALISATION 
PRED 
SIGN 
SOURCE 
1 BI 
Board 
independence 
 
The proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the 
board. 
 
- 
 
Annual 
report 
2 FL 
Financial 
expert 
directors 
 
The proportion of directors with 
financial expertise, e.g. a CPA, 
CFA, or experience in corporate 
financial management (for 
example, as chief financial 
officer, treasurer, controller, or 
vice president of finance).  
 
- 
 
 
 
Annual 
report 
3 MULTI 
Multiple 
directorships 
 
The proportion of directors on 
the board having multiple 
directorships in other 
companies. 
- 
 
Annual 
report 
4 ACIND 
 
Audit 
committee 
independence 
 
 
The proportion of independent 
non-executive directors in the 
audit committee. 
 
+ 
 
 
Annual 
report 
5 ACEXP 
Audit 
committee 
expertise 
 
The proportion of financially 
expert directors on the audit 
committee  
+ 
 
 
Annual 
report 
6 AF 
 
Audit fees 
 
 
 
AFit = AFit / TAit 
 
AFit is audit fees (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC01801), TAit is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999). 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
7 FM 
Family 
ownership 
 
 
FM is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if at least 
20% of the firm’s equity was 
owned by the family members, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
 
+ 
 
Annual 
report 
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8 FB 
Founders on 
the board 
 
The proportion of the firm’s 
founders on the board of 
directors. 
 
+ 
 
Annual 
report 
 
9 
1)CEOB 
2)CEOF 
3)CEON 
CEO’s 
influence on 
the board  
 
The dummy variables are coded 
1 if:  
 
(1) CEO chairs the board  
(2) CEO belongs to the founding 
family  
(3) CEO serves on the board’s 
nominating committee or if the 
board has no such committee;  
and zero otherwise 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
report 
10 INST 
Government-
related 
institutional 
ownership 
 
The percentage of equity 
shareholdings held by 
government-related 
institutional investors from the 
top ten largest equity 
shareholders. 
 
+ 
Annual 
report 
11 PC 
Political 
connection 
 
PC is a dummy variable coded 1 
if the company is identified as 
being connected with a  
politician if at least one of its 
large shareholders (anyone 
controlling at least 10% of 
voting shares) or one of its top 
officers (CEO, president, vice-
president, chairman or 
secretary) is a member of a 
parliament, a minister, or is 
closely related to a top 
politician or party; and zero 
otherwise 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual 
report 
12 DAMJ 
 
Modified 
Jones model 
discretionary 
accruals 
 
 
 
Total accruals are calculated 
based on the difference 
between net income before 
extraordinary items and net 
operating cash flows: 
 
TACCit = NIit - CFOit 
 
 
+ 
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TACCit is total accruals, NIit is net 
income before extraordinary 
items (annual Datastream data 
item WC01551), CFOit is net 
cash flow from operating 
activities (annual Datastream 
data item WC04860) 
 
The model parameters are 
estimated based on the 
following equation: 
 
TACCit / TAit-1 =α + β1(1 ⁄ TAit-1) + 
β2 (ΔREVit - ΔARit) ⁄ TAit-1 + 
β3PPEit⁄ TAit-1 + ԑ. 
 
TAit-1 is total assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02999) for year t-1, ΔREVit is 
change in revenue (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC01001) from the preceding 
year, ΔARit is change in accounts 
receivable (annual Datastream 
data item WC02051) from the 
preceding year, PPEit is 
property, plant and equipment 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02501) 
 
The discretionary accruals are 
calculated by using the 
estimated parameters:  
 
Uit =(TACCit / TAit-1) – [α + β1(1 ⁄ 
TAit-1) + β2 ((ΔREVit - ΔARit) ⁄ TAit-
1) + β3(PPEit⁄ TAit-1)  
 
Where Uit represents the 
discretionary accruals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
13 DT 
 
Deferred tax 
expense. 
 
 
 
DTit = DTit ⁄ TAit-1 
 
DTit is deferred tax expense 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC03263),  TAit-1 is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) for year t-1 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
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14 WCAC 
 
 
 
Working 
capital accrual  
 
 
 
 
WCACit = [[ΔCAit–ΔCSTIit] – [ΔCLit 
– ΔDCLit– ΔTPit]] ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-
1)/2] 
 
Where ΔCAit is change in 
current assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02201) from the preceding 
year, ΔCSTIit  is change in cash 
and short-term investments 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02001) from the preceding 
year,  ΔCLit  represents change 
in current liabilities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03101) from the preceding 
year, ΔDCLit is change in debt in 
current liabilities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03051) from the preceding 
year, ΔTPit is change in taxes 
payable (annual Datastream 
data item WC03063) from the 
preceding year, and TA is total 
assets (annual Datastream data 
item WC02999) 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
15 RSST 
 
 
 
Change in 
non-cash net 
operating 
assets  
 
 
 
 
RSSTit = (ΔWCit + ΔNCOit + 
ΔFINit)⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] 
 
Where; 
WCit = [CAit– CSTIit] – [CLit– 
DCLit];  
 
NCOit = [TAit– CAit - IAit] – [TLit– 
CLit – LTDit] 
 
FINit= [STIit + LTIit] – [LTDit+ DCLit 
+ PSit] 
 
CAit is current assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02201), CSTIit is cash and 
short-term investments (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02001), CLit  represents 
current liabilities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03101), DCLit is debt in 
+ 
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current liabilities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03051),  
 
IAit is investments and advances 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02250 & WC02256), TLit is 
total liabilities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03351), CLit is current 
liabilities (annual Datastream 
data item WC03101), LTDit is 
long-term debt (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03251). 
 
STIit is short-term investments 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02008), LTIit is long-term 
investments (annual 
Datastream data item WC02250 
and WC02256), LTDit is long-
term debt (annual Datastream 
data item WC03251), DCLit is 
debt in current liabilities 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC03051), PSit is preferred 
stock (annual Datastream data 
item WC03451), TAit is total 
assets (annual Datastream data 
item WC02999). 
 
 
Datastream 
16 CHAR 
 
 
 
Change in 
receivables 
 
 
 
 
CHARit = ΔARit / [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] 
 
ΔARit is the change in accounts 
receivables (annual Datastream 
data item WC02051) from the 
preceding year, TAit is total 
assets (annual Datastream data 
item WC02999). 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
17 CHINV 
 
 
Change in 
inventories 
 
 
 
CHINVit = ΔINVit ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] 
 
ΔINVit is the change in 
inventories (annual Datastream 
data item WC02101) from the 
preceding year, TAit is total 
assets (annual Datastream data 
item WC02999). 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
239 
 
18 SFAST 
 
 
Soft assets  
 
 
 
SFASTit  = (TAit – PPEit – CCEit) ⁄ 
TAit 
 
TAit is total assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02999), PPEit is property, 
plant and equipment (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02501), CCE is cash and cash 
equivalent (annual Datastream 
data item WC02001). 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
19 ABCFO 
 
 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations  
 
 
Abnormal cash flow from 
operations is the residual from 
the following equation:   
 
CFOit / TAit-1 = β1 [1/ TAit-1] + β2 
[REVit / TAit-1] + β3 [∆REVit / TAit-
1] + εit 
 
CFOit is net cash flow from 
operating activities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC04860), TA it-1 is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) in year t-1, REVit is 
revenue (annual Datastream 
data item WC01001), ΔREVit is 
change in revenue (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC01001) from the preceding 
year, εit is a residual term that 
captures the level of abnormal 
cash flow of firm i in year t. 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
20 ABPROD 
 
 
 
Abnormal 
level of 
production 
costs   
 
 
 
 
Abnormal level of production 
cost is the residual from the 
following equation:   
 
PRODit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) 
+ α2 (REVit / TAit-1) + α3 (Δ REVit / 
TAit-1) + α4 (Δ REVit-1 / TAit-1) + ԑit; 
 
PRODit represents the 
production cost and is defined 
as the sum of the cost of goods 
sold; COGSit (annual Datastream 
data item WC01051) and 
change in inventory; ΔINVit 
+ 
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(annual Datastream data item 
WC02101) from the preceding 
year. 
 
TAit-1 is total assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02999) in year t-1, REVit is 
revenue (annual Datastream 
data item WC01001); 
and ΔREVit is the change in 
revenue from the preceding 
year, ΔREVit-1 is the change in 
revenue from year t-2 to year t-
1, εit is a residual term that 
captures the level of abnormal 
cash flow of firm i in year t. 
 
21 ABDISX 
 
Abnormal 
level of 
discretionary 
expenditures   
 
Abnormal level of discretionary 
expenditures is the residual 
from the following equation:   
 
DISXit /TAit-1 = α0 + α1(1 / TAit-1) + 
α2 (REVit-1 / TAit-1) + ԑit 
 
DISXit is discretionary 
expenditures defined as  the 
sum of research and 
development expenditures 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC01201) and selling, general 
and administrative expenses 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC01101), TAit-1 is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) in year t-1, REVit-1 is 
revenue (annual Datastream 
data item WC01001) in year t-1, 
εit is a residual term that 
captures the level of abnormal 
cash flow of firm i in year t. 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
22 CHROA 
 
 
Change in 
earnings 
 
 
 
CHROAit = [EARNit  ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-
1)/2]]- [EARNit-1  ⁄ [(TAit-1 - TAit-
2)/2]] 
 
EARN it is net income before 
extraordinary items (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC01551), TAit is total assets 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
241 
 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999) 
 
23 BM 
 
 
Book-to-
market ratio 
 
 
 
BM = BVE ⁄ (EQ x MP) 
 
BVE is book value of equity 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC03501), 
EQ is common shares 
outstanding (annual Datastream 
data item WC05301), MP is 
year-end market price 
(Datastream data item 
WC05001) 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
24 PE 
 
 
Price earnings 
ratio 
 
 
 
PE = (EQ x MP) / EARN 
 
EQ is common shares 
outstanding (annual Datastream 
data item WC05301), MP is 
year-end market price 
(Datastream data item 
WC05001), EARN is net income 
before extraordinary items 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC01551) 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
25 DISTRESS 
Financial 
distress 
 
Financial distress is measured 
by using the Altman’s (1993) Z”-
score model: 
 
Z” = 6.56(X1) + 3.26(X2) + 
6.72(X3) + 1.05(X4); 
 
Where; 
X1 = WCit / TAit; 
X2 = REit / TAit;  
X3 = EBITit / TAit; 
X4 = BVEit / TLit 
 
where:  
WC is working capital (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03151), TAit is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999), RE is retained 
earnings (annual Datastream 
data item WC03495, EBIT is 
+ 
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earnings before interest and tax 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC18191), BVE is book value of 
equity (annual Datastream data 
item WC03501). 
 
26 CHFCF 
 
 
 
 
Change in free 
cash  
flow 
 
 
 
 
 
CHFCF = Δ[EARNit - RSST 
Accrualsit] ⁄ [(TAit - TAit-1)/2] 
 
EARN it is net income before 
extraordinary items (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC01551), RSST Accrualsit (refer 
variable no. 15 for definition 
and operationalisation), TAit is 
total assets (annual Datastream 
data item WC02999). 
 
- 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Datastream 
27 FINR  
 
 
Firm’s level of 
internal fund 
 
 
 
FINRit = (CFOit – CAPEXit-1 ) ⁄ CAit-1  
 
CFOit is net cash flow from 
operating activities (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC04860), CAPEXit-1 is capital 
expenditures (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC04601) in year t-1, CAit-1is 
current assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02201) in year t-1. 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
28 AI 
 
 
 Actual 
issuance 
 
 
 
AI is a dummy variable coded 1 
if annual Datastream data item 
WC04251 > 0 (net proceeds 
from sale/issue of common and 
preferred equity) or annual 
Datastream data item WC04401 
> 0 (long term borrowing) 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Datastream 
29 SDW 
 
 
Share price 
volatility 
 
 
 
SDW = Annual standard 
deviation of monthly SRTN 
 
SRTN is stock return (monthly 
Datastream data item 
WC05001) 
+ Datastream 
30 BDSIZE Board size 
Number of board members 
 
+/- 
Annual 
report 
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31 BDMEET Board meeting 
 
Number of board meetings held 
for the year 
 
+/- 
 
Annual 
report 
32 ACSIZE 
Size of audit 
committee  
 
Number of audit committee 
members 
 
+/- 
 
Annual 
report 
33 ACMEET 
Audit 
committee 
meeting 
 
Number of audit committee 
meeting held for the year 
 
+/- 
 
Annual 
report 
34 FEM 
Female 
director 
 
The proportion of female 
directors sitting on the board 
 
- 
 
Annual 
report 
 
35 LEV 
 
Leverage 
 
 
 
LEVit = LTDit / TAit 
 
LTDit is long-term debt (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC03251), TAit is total assets 
(annual Datastream data item 
WC02999). 
 
+ Datastream 
36 LNTA 
 
 
Firm size 
 
 
 
LNTA = Natural logarithm of TAit 
 
TAit is total assets (annual 
Datastream data item 
WC02999). 
 
+ Datastream 
37 AGE Firm age 
 
The log of the number of years 
the firm has been listed. 
 
- 
 
38 YEAR Year 
 
An array of eleven fiscal year 
dummies of 2002 to 2012, 
however the year 2002 is 
arbitrarily omitted in order to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity. 
 
  
39 IND Industry 
An array of fifty six industry 
dummies, where firm belongs 
to one of the fifty six primary 
two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) industry 
codes.  
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APPENDIX 3  
VIF and Tolerance Level for the Explanatory Variables 
Variable VIF SQRT VIF Tolerance 
(1/VIF) 
R-squared 
RESTATE 1.02 1.01 .980 .020 
BI 1.64 1.28 .609 .391 
FL 2.04 1.43 .489 .511 
MULTI 1.13 1.06 .888 .112 
ACIND 1.50 1.23 .665 .335 
ACEXP 1.90 1.38 .527 .473 
AF 1.02 1.01 .981 .019 
FM 1.47 1.21 .680 .320 
FB 2.17 1.47 .461 .539 
CEOF 2.50 1.58 .399 .601 
CEON 1.11 1.05 .902 .098 
CEOB 1.10 1.05 .910 .090 
INST 1.45 1.20 .691 .309 
PC 1.34 1.16 .746 .255 
DAMJ 1.63 1.28 .613 .387 
DT 1.18 1.09 .846 .154 
WCAC 2.35 1.53 .426 .574 
RSST 1.35 1.16 .739 .261 
CHAR 1.37 1.17 .732 .268 
CHINV 1.67 1.29 .600 .400 
SFAST 1.35 1.16 .741 .259 
ABCFO 2.10 1.45 .475 .525 
ABPROD 1.47 1.21 .682 .318 
ABDISX 1.16 1.08 .860 .140 
CHROA 1.30 1.14 .770 .230 
BM 1.60 1.26 .627 .374 
PE 1.53 1.24 .652 .348 
DISTRESS 1.49 1.22 .672 .328 
CHFCF 1.44 1.20 .695 .305 
FINR 2.08 1.44 .480 .520 
AI 1.18 1.09 .848 .152 
SDW 1.22 1.10 .819 .181 
BDSIZE 1.77 1.33 .564 .436 
BDMEET 1.53 1.24 .652 .348 
ACSIZE 1.50 1.22 .667 .333 
ACMEET 1.44 1.20 .697 .303 
FEM 1.15 1.07 .872 .128 
LEV 1.48 1.22 .677 .323 
LNTA 1.86 1.36 .734 .463 
LNAGE 1.42 1.19 .401 .296 
Mean VIF 1.54    
 
 
Based on the rule of thumb, having tolerance equal to 0.1 or less, which is equivalent to 
VIF of 10 or higher, may create a cause of concern (Chen et al., 2003). The table above 
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show that the tolerance for the variables ranges from 0.399 (CEOF) to 0.981 (AF) and 
that the VIFs are all less than 3. Overall, results indicate that there is no concern for 
multicollinearity in this study. 
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APPENDIX 4  
Sensitivity Analysis on the Likelihood of Forced Restatement in Malaysia (DAMJ vs WCAC) 
Variables MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(DAMJ Excluded) 
MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(WCAC Excluded) 
 
Delta  
(marginal 
effect) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(p-value) 
Delta  
(marginal 
effect) 
Odds 
Ratio 
(p-value) 
BI -         0.000  .025** 0.019 -      0.000  0.028** 0.022 
FL           0.000  1.907 0.702         0.000  1.564 0.643 
MULTI -         0.000  .796 0.657 -      0.000  0.814 0.642 
ACIND -         0.000  .306 0.149 -      0.000  0.338 0.171 
ACEXP           0.000  1.090 0.461         0.000  1.103 0.455 
AF -         0.002  .000 0.157 -      0.000  0.000 0.169 
FM           0.000  1.057 0.435 -      0.000  0.988 0.486 
FB           0.000  2.211 0.296         0.000  2.018 0.317 
CEOF           0.000  1.175 0.370         0.000  1.147 0.389 
CEON -         0.000  .658 0.196 -      0.000  0.671 0.208 
CEOB           0.000  1.061 0.453         0.000  1.119 0.411 
INST -         0.000  .993 0.247 -      0.000  0.992 0.215 
PC           0.000  2.443** 0.021         0.000  2.368** 0.025 
DAMJ            0.000  2.450 0.259 
DT           0.000  231.611* 0.096         0.000  105.918 0.133 
WCAC -         0.000  0.010 0.922    
RSST -         0.000  0.355 0.275 -      0.000  0.142 0.128 
CHAR -         0.000  0.417 0.340 -      0.000  0.184 0.174 
CHINV           0.000  0.771 0.462 -      0.000  0.149 0.233 
SFAST -         0.000  2.493 0.142         0.000  1.844 0.238 
ABCFO -         0.000  0.065 0.936 -      0.000  0.219 0.206 
ABPROD -         0.000  0.003 0.958 -      0.000  0.004 0.950 
ABDISX           0.000  0.675 0.585 -      0.000  0.688 0.582 
CHROA -         0.000  6.785 0.263         0.000  5.206 0.290 
BM           0.000  0.981 0.551         0.000  1.005 0.514 
PE -         0.000  1.169 0.145         0.000  1.218* 0.088 
DISTRESS           0.000  0.995 0.554 -      0.000  0.985 0.352 
CHFCF -         0.000  1.470 0.407         0.000  1.659 0.622 
FINR -         0.000  0.043** 0.033 -      0.000  0.052** 0.041 
AI           0.000  0.897 0.399 -      0.000  0.841 0.342 
SDW -         0.000  1.032* 0.074         0.000  1.031* 0.080 
BDSIZE -         0.000  0.761** 0.011 -      0.000  0.767** 0.014 
BDMEET           0.000  0.856 0.168 -      0.000  0.850 0.148 
ACSIZE           0.000  1.582* 0.077         0.000  1.549* 0.092 
ACMEET -         0.000  1.105 0.466         0.000  1.131 0.357 
FEM           0.000  0.824 0.165 -      0.000  0.832 0.177 
LEV           0.000  18.248** 0.022         0.000  13.679** 0.034 
LNTA -         0.000  1.423*** 0.010         0.000  1.420*** 0.010 
LNAGE -         0.000  0.889 0.291 -      0.000  0.904 0.319 
Industry dummies   Included   Included 
Year dummies   Included   Included 
Observations   2,896   2,896 
LR Chi
2
   114.16   112.32 
p-value   .044   .056 
Degrees of freedom   90   90 
Notes: The table presents comparative results between a logit model that exclude DAMJ (while retaining WCAC) and another 
logit model that excludes WCAC (while retaining DAMJ), measured on the pooled sample of the Malaysian forced restatement 
firms. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the forced restatement event. The independent variables are 
defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly. 
 
247 
 
APPENDIX 5  
Sensitivity Analysis on the Likelihood of Forced Restatement in Malaysia (ACEXP vs FL) 
Variables MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(ACEXP Excluded) 
MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(FL Excluded) 
 
Delta  
(marg. effect) 
Odds Ratio (p-value) 
Delta  
(marg. effect) 
Odds Ratio (p-value) 
BI -0.000 0.024** 0.018 -0.000       0.025**  0.019 
FL 0.000 2.043 0.777    
MULTI -0.000 0.799 0.654 -0.000 0.818 0.639 
ACIND -0.000 0.310 0.154 -0.000 0.315 0.158 
ACEXP    0.000 1.464 0.285 
AF -0.002 0.000 0.153 -0.002 0.000 0.154 
FM 0.000 1.038 0.457 0.000 1.029 0.467 
FB 0.000 2.080 0.309 0.000 1.857 0.336 
CEOF 0.000 1.161 0.378 0.000 1.171 0.372 
CEON -0.000 0.650 0.190 -0.000 0.655 0.194 
CEOB 0.000 1.111 0.416 0.000 1.096 0.426 
INST -0.000 0.992 0.222 -0.000 0.992 0.211 
PC 0.000 2.490** 0.019 0.000 2.535** 0.017 
DAMJ 0.000 6.449 0.104 0.000 6.552 0.102 
DT 0.000 100.37 0.134 0.000 109.571 0.128 
WCAC -0.000 0.002 0.957 -0.000 0.003 0.955 
RSST -0.000 0.320 0.258 -0.000 0.301 0.247 
CHAR -0.000 0.311 0.297 -0.000 0.322 0.304 
CHINV -0.000 0.618 0.433 -0.000 0.595 0.428 
SFAST 0.000 2.155 0.187 0.000 2.209 0.179 
ABCFO -0.000 0.135 0.141 -0.000 0.135 0.141 
ABPROD -0.000 0.002 0.963 -0.000 0.002 0.967 
ABDISX -0.000 0.603 0.609 -0.000 0.534 0.633 
CHROA 0.000 6.990 0.259 0.000 7.335 0.253 
BM -0.000 0.985 0.461 -0.000 0.983 0.546 
PE 0.000 1.178 0.134 0.000 1.185 0.126 
DISTRESS -0.000 0.990 0.595 -0.000 0.991 0.591 
CHFCF 0.000 1.422 0.585 0.000 1.467 0.593 
FINR -0.000 0.041** 0.032 -0.000 0.040** 0.031 
AI -0.000 0.889 0.391 -0.000 0.895 0.398 
SDW 0.000 1.033* 0.069 0.000 1.032* 0.073 
BDSIZE -0.000 0.759** 0.011 -0.000 0.754*** 0.009 
BDMEET -0.000 0.858 0.172 -0.000 0.863 0.186 
ACSIZE 0.000 1.568* 0.082 0.000 1.586* 0.077 
ACMEET 0.000 1.105 0.462 0.000 1.099 0.488 
FEM -0.000 0.822 0.162 -0.000 0.817 0.153 
LEV 0.000 17.695** 0.023 0.000 18.794** 0.021 
LNTA 0.000 1.413** 0.012 0.000 1.408** 0.012 
LNAGE -0.000 0.900 0.311 -0.000 0.906 0.323 
Industry dummies   Included   Included 
Year dummies   Included   Included 
Observations   2,896   2,896 
LR Chi
2
   115.72   115.47 
p-value   .035   .037 
Deg. of freedom   90   90 
Notes: The table presents comparative results between a logit model that excludes ACEXP (while retaining FL) and another logit 
model that excludes FL (while retaining ACEXP), measured on the pooled sample of the Malaysian forced restatement firms. The 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the forced restatement event. The independent variables are defined in Section 
5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% accordingly. 
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APPENDIX 6  
Sensitivity Analysis on the Likelihood of Forced Restatement in Malaysia (FM – ownership level) 
Variables MULTIVARIATE LOGIT 
(FM based on actual level of ownership) 
 
Delta 
(marginal effect) 
Odds Ratio (p-value) 
BI -0.000 0.035 0.033 
FL -0.000 0.958 0.529 
MULTI 0.000 2.026 0.711 
ACIND -0.000 0.230 0.106 
ACEXP 0.000 1.072 0.470 
AF -0.000 0.000 0.108 
FM 0.000 1.011 0.040 
FB 0.000 2.533 0.273 
CEOF 0.000 1.302 0.294 
CEON -0.000 0.583 0.153 
CEOB -0.000 0.957 0.467 
INST -0.000 0.985 0.911 
PC 0.000 2.285 0.037 
DAMJ 0.000 12.341 0.051 
DT 0.000 78.051 0.153 
WCAC -0.000 0.002 0.955 
RSST -0.000 0.147 0.161 
CHAR -0.000 0.139 0.176 
CHINV -0.000 0.419 0.384 
SFAST 0.000 2.060 0.209 
ABCFO -0.000 0.165 0.192 
ABPROD -0.000 0.002 0.963 
ABDISX -0.000 0.830 0.461 
CHROA 0.000 9.950 0.229 
BM -0.000 0.999 0.497 
PE 0.000 1.180 0.150 
DISTRESS -0.000 0.993 0.435 
CHFCF 0.000 1.352 0.570 
FINR -0.000 0.028 0.029 
AI -0.000 0.967 0.471 
SDW 0.000 1.040 0.039 
BDSIZE -0.000 0.747 0.010 
BDMEET -0.000 0.802 0.073 
ACSIZE 0.000 1.719 0.050 
ACMEET 0.000 1.152 0.307 
FEM -0.000 0.807 0.150 
LEV 0.000 31.001 0.009 
LNTA 0.000 1.510 0.005 
LNAGE -0.000 0.945 0.401 
Industry dummies   Included 
Year dummies   Included 
Observations   2,754 
LR Chi
2
   132.01 
p-value   .003 
Degrees of freedom   91 
Notes: The table presents logit results when family ownership is measured by its actual ownership level, measured on the pooled 
sample of the Malaysian forced restatement firms. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of the forced restatement 
event. The independent variables are defined in Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% accordingly. 
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